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Houthi encampments continue to grow in the capital. Guarded by Houthi members these camps have become home to followers of Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, who are calling to topple the government. Read more on page 2
Photos by Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

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Cabinet approves annual bonuses for public employees

■ Bassam Al-Khameri

SANA'A, Aug. 27—The cabinet approved the annual bonuses for civil servants, military and security personnel due since 2012, on Tuesday. The payments are set to become effective on Thursday.

The state-run Al-Thawra newspaper reported that Prime Minister Mohammad Basindwa met with the cabinet on Tuesday and sanctioned the bonus payments.

In addition, the cabinet added 250,000 public employees, military and security personnel to the Social Welfare Fund's lists, who will be provided with annual bonuses.

The cabinet's decision was made in an attempt to ease the economic burden on public employees that resulted from recently slashed fuel subsidies.

Recipients are to receive a lump-sum payment covering the past two years and annual bonuses in the years to come.

Abdulfatah Al-Jahrani, who works at the police department, said, "I will receive YR1,100 (\$5.12) per month, for the past two years. This means that I will get YR26,400 (\$123) in total. This isn't enough because the price of everything has increased after the government lifted the fuel subsidies." Yet,

Al-Jahrani admits that "it's better than nothing."

Redhwan Aqlan, a translator for a private company, said the government provided bonuses to public employees to ease the economic impact on them after it removed the fuel subsidies but has completely forgotten about the private sector employees and the self-employed.

"The government should have taken all people into consideration because hundreds of thousands of people aren't public employees," Aqlan added.

Analysts said that this step by the government will not completely ease the economic impact of lifting

the fuel subsidies on people.

Mustafa Nasser, an economist at the local think-tank Studies and Economic Media Centre, said the bonuses cannot balance the increasing prices of basic goods and services.

"These scant bonuses don't resolve the problem and only aim to calm people down. They are only about \$5 per month," he added.

The government on July 30 lifted the fuel subsidies on gas and diesel. Accordingly, prices of gas and diesel increased by more than half, from YR2,500 (\$11.6) and YR2,000 (\$9.3) per 20 liters, respectively, to YR4,000 (\$18.6).

Houthi leader pushes forward with demands, exchanges heated rhetoric with Hadi

■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A, Aug. 27—Tensions rise in the capital as Houthi leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi and President Hadi exchange letters and condemn each other in speeches. Al-Houthi says he will not back down and announced that protests will escalate on Friday, while Hadi says he will not bow to pressure from the rebel group.

Al-Houthi threatened to go to the "third escalation" of his self-described revolutionary movement when he appeared on the Houthi-run Al-Masirah TV Channel on Tuesday night for his third weekly broadcast. Al-Houthi repeated his calls for the Houthis to continue demonstrating against the government, saying that the protesters' demands are legitimate, fair, and achievable.

Al-Houthi did not reveal the specifics of the planned escalation, only saying that it will happen this Friday and will be "more painful and disturbing."

"We will not change our position... We do not want your ministries; we

want to bring down the government and replace it with a competent, honest government," he declared.

In his speech Al-Houthi also addressed the recent anti-Houthi demonstrations in the capital, labeling their opposition to his movement as being "calls for sedition protecting corruption and harming the people." Al-Houthi gave no indication he would retreat on his demands.

On Monday he sent a letter to the president which included several demands to resolve the tension. The demands are essentially the same as his August 17 speech: "Abolishing the decree to lift the fuel subsidies, implementing the National Dialogue Conference's outcomes, and establishing a committee to study the economic situation to combat corruption."

Hadi's response

President Hadi met on Wednesday morning the head of the Popular Solidarity Committee, a pro-government civil alliance, and its secretariat to discuss escalations by the Houthis.

Nadia Abdullah, a local photo-journalist who attended the meeting, said that Hadi renewed his accusations that "Iran is interfering with Yemen's affairs in a major way." According to Abdullah, Hadi also accused Iran of funding four TV channels tasked with opposing his regime and claimed that there are Iranian advisers to the Houthis.

"Houthis are reckless youth. They want to drag Yemen into a civil war. They are thinking of ruling Yemen but they don't care about the price increase, the people, or the national standards," Hadi was reported as saying.

He continued, "we will perform a C-section to extract the Houthis from the entrances of Sana'a. We will not allow for the country to be dragged into a window-to-window war as [former president] Ali Saleh wants along with some of his supporters, who also support Al-Houthi in Amran with weapons."

On Monday Hadi sent a letter to Abdulmalik Al-Houthi demanding him to evacuate the entrances of Sana'a and to hand over Amran governorate.

Diplomatic condemnation

UN Special Advisor on Yemen Jamal Benomar released a statement Tuesday night in which he said, "the situation is very worrying. It is the most concerning since the beginning of the transitional period."

Benomar confirmed, "all sides are partners in Yemen in what has happened and in what will happen. Everybody should realize that there is no way out of this crisis except through a peaceful solution based on the NDC outcomes, which the Yemeni people have agreed on."

The UNSC will convene in New York on August 29 to discuss the situation in Yemen.

The general secretary of the Arab League, Dr. Nabeel Al-Arabi, condemned on Monday evening the unfortunate events happening in Sana'a.

Al-Arabi confirmed in a statement his complete refusal "for any attempts aiming to undermine the political process in Yemen or causing it to fail, calling all Yemeni political forces to abide by the NDC's outcomes."

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Houthi camps in the capital continue to grow

“We are not leaving the square until our demands are met”

■ **Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki**

SANAA, Aug. 26— Protest camps in downtown Sana'a are witnessing a daily influx of Houthi supporters from both within Sana'a governorate and from governorates around the country.

There are over 50 camps inside the capital, with the area they are clustered around being referred to by locals as a protest square.

The Houthi camps are located on the Airport Road near the Yemeni Postal Service Office, Al-Thawra Park in Al-Thawra district, and the ministries of electricity, interior, and communication.

There are daily marches in the

streets around the camps, in addition to night festivals crowded with protesters inside the square.

While most of the protesters appear follow Houthi leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, the Yemen Times talked to a few protesters in the camps who are members of the General People's Congress (GPC) and support the Houthis' cause.

At one of the camps Akram Al-Shoabi, a sheikh in Amran governorate, told the Yemen Times, “we are GPC members and we have joined Al-Houthi's marches because we share the same demands, mainly to topple the government.”

He added, “we are not leaving the square until our demands are met, even if Al-Houthi makes a deal with the president and asks us to leave, we will not do so.”

Mohammad Ali Ghalib, a Houthi protestor in the square, explained the daily routine of protesters

camping there. He said they spend their entire day in the camps, beginning it with what the Houthis call “the scream,” their chant which goes: Death to America, death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory for Islam.

“After breakfast, we receive the crowds joining us from other governorates, and before Dohar (noon) prayers we go for marches to the nearby streets. Then we come back and do “the scream.” After that we sit until Maghreb (evening) prayers. We talk and discuss how to achieve our demands and discuss the country's conditions. Sometimes we go for marches before Maghreb, and at night there are festivals lasting until late at night.”

The Yemen Times did not see any weapons being carried openly in the camps within Sana'a. However, in the camps on the outskirts

of the capital—which have been growing steadily since being established on August 18—it appeared that every person carried at least one weapon.

In a speech on August 17, Al-Houthi called on Yemenis nationwide to support a revolution to topple the government; for the fuel subsidies cuts to be reversed; and for the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcomes to be implemented.

The next day what Al-Houthi terms the “first escalation” began, with supporters setting up camps outside Sana'a. On August 22, the “second escalation” commenced with protesters setting up camps inside the capital.

Al-Houthi threatened that if authorities do not meet the Houthis' demands they will escalate their actions and use methods that “will not sit well with the government.”

Officer assassinated in Dhamar following recent killings

■ **Abdulkarim Al-Nahari**

DHAMAR, Aug. 27—Unknown armed men riding on a motorbike assassinated Major Fazea Al-Buaiti, the manager of the Relations and Guidance Office for Dhamar governorate's police, near a qat market in Dhamar city, on Tuesday afternoon.

Lieutenant Colonel Saleh Al-Buaiti, the manager of the Criminal Investigation Department in Jahran district, and a relative of the deceased, said, “the armed men were planning on kidnapping Fazea Al-Buaiti and taking him to an unknown destination by motorbike. However, he resisted them despite not having his firearm, which led the kidnappers to kill him with three bullets to the head.”

He continued, “the security apparatus is now tracking the perpetrators, especially after getting leads confirming that the operation is a criminal one and not related to terrorism.”

According to Al-Buaiti a number of suspects were apprehended and are being investigated, while other suspects are being tracked.

The murder comes after a failed assassination attempt on the life of Dhamar's governor, Yahya Al-Amry, last Sunday. Al-Amry survived a shower of bullets while visiting a committee of Dhamar General Hospital. The assassination attempt left 12 of Al-Amry's bodyguards injured.

According to the governorate's security chief, Brigadier Abdulkareem Al-Odaini, 16 of the armed men who attempted to assassinate

Al-Amry were arrested, while the rest are still being tracked. He confirmed that one suspect was injured during an exchange of fire with the hospital's security personnel.

Also on Sunday, at noon, armed men fired on the house of the Brigadier Al-Odaini. The gunfire damaged the exterior of the house but no injuries were reported.

A security source with the police in Dhamar, who asked to remain anonymous, said that security guards posted at the house engaged the assailants, who fled and clashed with another security patrol near the house. However, the source would not reveal any information regarding casualties.

Armed tribesmen from Yaar tribe, in Dhamar's Antis district, took over the Western Area Police Station in Dhamar city on Friday night after Dr. Abdullah Ahmed Al-Yaary, 34, was killed.

Mukbil Al-Yaary, a relative of the deceased doctor, said he was shot during his sister's wedding convoy by the police patrol on Thursday night.

Abdulazez Al-Yaary, one of the sheikhs in Yaar tribe, said that the tribesmen handed over the police department after two days of controlling it to local security.

Another tribal source claimed that Governor Al-Amry and the commander of the 7th Military Command, Brigadier Ali Mohsen Moothana, had given tribal leaders of Yaar tribe 20 Kalashnikov rifles as a means of tribal arbitration until the investigation is completed and the suspects are sent to court.

Tribe occupies Rada'a city after two of its members killed

■ **Ali Saeed**

SANAA, Aug. 27—Dozens of armed tribesmen from Gaifah, north Rada'a district, momentarily occupied Rada'a city in Al-Baida governorate on Monday after two of their relatives were killed earlier that morning by unknown gunmen, local sources told the Yemen Times.

Salah Salim Al-Hutam and Ghazi Jumjum Al-Hutam from Gaifah tribe were killed early Monday morning in a Houthi neighborhood in Rada'a city, Fahd Al-Taweel, a local journalist in

Al-Baida said. Both the deceased worked as qat sellers in the city.

Gaifah area is a major supply source of qat to the governorate, which is located in central Yemen. Residents from Gaifah work in farming and selling the leafy narcotic, which is chewed by a large portion of the Yemeni population.

A security official who requested anonymity for security concerns confirmed the names of the two deceased individuals, adding that the criminals were riding a motorbike.

A few hours after the murders, dozens of armed tribesmen from

Gaifah entered the city.

“They besieged houses of Houthi supporters, blocked main streets in the city, shut down all commercial shops, and looted an arms retail shop owned by a Houthi in the city,” said Al-Taweel.

At noon on Monday the armed tribesmen left Rada'a city without any confrontations with the security or military forces in the city.

Ali Qarmooosh, the security chief of Rada'a, said in a phone conversation with the Yemen Times that tensions are rising in the city, adding that armed men had killed another man, on Wednesday morning.

day morning.

Al-Bayda has been experiencing growing insecurity since former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted from office by the 2011 uprising. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) occupied Rada'a city for two weeks in January 2012 and only left after a deal with the government to release 15 imprisoned AQAP militants.

Since early 2012, the government has carried out several military campaigns against tribesmen in Gaifah, accusing them of providing shelter for AQAP militants.

Arab League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization: Illiteracy exceeds 8 million mark in Yemen

■ **Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki**

SANAA, Aug. 27 - There are

8.5 million male and female illiterates in Yemen, which accounts for almost a third of the country's

population of 26 million, according to Dr. Yahya Al-Saidi, manager of the Education Administration at the Arab League Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (ALECSO).

Al-Saidi said of the 40 million illiterate Arabs, more than 8 million are from Yemen.

Mustafa Al-Saberi, the press secretary for the education minister said that the ministry can neither deny nor confirm the statistics by ALECSO.

“The last statistics by the Literacy and Adult Education Organization in 2004 showed that there are 6,245,464 illiterates in Yemen above 10 years old,” he said.

“The ministry faces several problems in terms of illiteracy eradication, such as a lack of awareness about the importance of education among fathers; traditions and customs that hold back females from education; and a shortage in the budget to accelerate the illiteracy eradication process,” added Al-Saberi.

The Education Ministry has since carried out several programs to eradicate illiteracy, such as encouraging female students to enroll in schools by providing food items and cash payments to the students' families.

“We are currently carrying field visits to rural areas to spread awareness among people about

the importance of education,” said Al-Saberi.

ALECSO presented its statistics on illiteracy at a national workshop addressing the Yemeni committee for Education, Culture, and Science, and international organizations like the Islamic Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (ISESCO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The workshop started on Sunday and will end on Thursday.

Illiteracy is a key concern for Yemen's economy.

Some parents are compelled to stop their kids from studying in order to work to support their families. As a result, many of the children deprived of an education work for themselves, or join the army.

Mujahid Ali Al-Haisi, is one such parent who discontinued his son's education. “My son was a second grade student but he quit two years ago and started to help me sell qat. He makes about YR1,500 (approx. \$7) per day. This gives us a chance to meet our basic needs because I'm not a public employee,” Al-Haisi told the Yemen Times.

“I'm not happy that he quit school but I'm obliged to do so because of my difficult economic circumstances,” he added.

Violence continues in Al-Jawf, prominent tribal leader killed

■ **Bassam Al-Khameri**

SANAA, Aug. 27—Violent clashes ongoing between the Houthis and opposing tribesmen in Al-Jawf governorate, have left a prominent tribal leader dead.

Ahmed Mohsen Najda, the 39-year-old tribal leader and head of the Islah Party's Political Department in Al-Jawf, was killed late Monday in an attack in Halwan area, Al-Ghail district of Al-Jawf.

Mubarak Al-Abadi, director of the Islah Party's Media Department in

Al-Jawf said that Najda was shot dead while he was trying to rescue an injured tribesman affiliated with the Popular Committees.

“Najda is a tribal leader and was trying to rescue an injured tribesman in Al-Ghail district but was shot dead by the Houthis,” he added.

Al-Abadi claims that people involved in the fighting in Al-Jawf are tribesmen defending their governorate, regardless of their political affiliation.

Al-Abadi denied news reports by local media suggesting nine of Na-

One soldier killed, three injured in Al-Dhale city

■ **Nasser Al-Sakkaf**

SANAA, Aug. 27—One soldier was killed and three people were wounded in an attack on an army vehicle in Al-Dhale city by unknown armed men on Tuesday.

An armored vehicle of the 33rd Armored Brigade was attacked on its way to a military site in Al-Dhale governorate on Tuesday, according to Waleed Al-Khateeb, media officer in the Coordination Office in Al-Dhale city.

The Coordination Office is a civilian committee tasked with securing Al-Dhale city.

One soldier was killed, and two soldiers as well as one civilian were injured in the attack, said Al-Khateeb. He suspected the unknown armed men to be members of the Southern Movement, which was formed in 2007 and advocates an independent South Yemen.

Al-Khateeb said the attack led to fighting between the two sides that lasted less than thirty minutes, after which the armed men fled.

When the Yemen Times contacted Southern Movement activist Essam Al-Shaeri from Al-Dhale, he said that the conflict took place between citizens in Al-Dhale and did not involve the Southern Movement.

“Some Hirak [Southern Movement] members have controlled some locations in the governorate and have been restricting the

army's access into it,” said Al-Khateeb, adding that the armored vehicle was on its way to enter one of the locations controlled by the Southern Movement.

A member of the Al-Dhale Tribal Council, Mohammad Al-Aqla, said the attack came after security forces of the 33rd Armored Brigade were deployed in the city on Monday evening, which caused members of the Southern Movement there to be alert.

In another incident reported in the same area on Monday, Mohammed Al-Haneq, general manager of the Ministry of Education's office in Al-Dhale, survived an attack on his car by unknown armed men, yet the driver was killed.

Al-Dhale has been witnessing a series of sporadic clashes between the army and armed members of the Southern Movement since late 2013. On December 27, 2013, the 33rd Armored Brigade shelled a funeral tent filled with Southern Movement members, killing 15. The brigade explained the shelling happened by mistake whereupon the Southern Movement demanded the brigade's relocation.

Dozens of people from both sides, including civilians, have been killed in clashes between both parties since late 2013.

The Yemen Times attempted to contact local security forces in Al-Dhale area for comments but they refused to respond.



Last Yemeni detainees released from Afghanistan

SANAA, Aug. 27—The National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD) said that Yemeni Authorities have received the last two Yemeni detainees from Bagram Detention Center in Afghanistan.

HOOD's in-house lawyer Abdulrahman Barman said the two prisoners, Ameen Mohammad Al-Bakri and Fadi Ahmed Al-Maqalili, are victims of America's so called “War on Terror.” Both soldiers were released as part of the United State's arrangement to withdraw from Afghanistan.

According to Barman, Al-Bakri and Al-Maqalili were detained since 2002 without being convicted in court. Their cases were filed with the American legal system and were delivered to Yemeni Authorities, however, there was no court ruling.

Barman said “the Political Security Office arrested the two men as soon as they arrived in Yemen. Their families are calling for their release.”

Armed groups and security forces clash in Hadramout

SANAA, Aug. 27—Army forces stormed houses in Al-Qatan district of Hadramout governorate which were suspected of harboring members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Hadramout-based journalist Mohammad Al-Sharafi said the raid came as part of a security campaign to pursue individuals suspected of being AQAP members.

Al-Sharafi explained that two helicopters assisted the raid and flew in low altitude over Al-Qatan city. The number of civilian deaths is unknown.

Many local residents in the area where the clashes broke out have been displaced to nearby areas, although the violence ceased after a few hours.

Military aircraft destroyed in Taiz

SANAA, Aug. 27—A military aircraft carrying Lieutenant Mohammed Al-Dobae crashed on Wednesday morning as it was about to land in Taiz International Airport, the state-run security Media Centre of Taiz governorate reported.

The pilot was killed instantly in the crash and the Czech-made L-39 aircraft was destroyed.

Sami Noaman, a Yemeni researcher on military aircrafts, said that including today's plane crash there have been a total of ten military airplane crashes since 2012.

“The investigation into this incident must not be shrugged off like the previous ones,” he added.

Two Houthi members killed, five soldiers kidnapped and released

SANAA, Aug. 26—On Monday Houthis kidnapped five soldiers and released them the same day in Hamdan district, Sana'a governorate. The kidnapping was said to be in retaliation for the killing of two Houthi militants earlier on Monday, who were killed by a soldier at a military checkpoint, north of the capital.

The two Houthi members were driving on a motorbike through a military checkpoint without stopping. According to the Ministry of Interior, they were carrying a stack of qat wrapped in clothe, which a soldier mistook for weapons and shot them. In retaliation Houthi members kidnapped five soldiers in Bait Naem market in Hamdan.

The soldiers were released when General Mohammad Yahya Al-Hawri, the commander of the 6th Military Command, intervened to resolve the issue. The soldier who shot the two Houthis was sent to the 6th Military Command prison.

Eight months in review:

Taking Yemen from bad to worse

■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

Yemen has witnessed eight dreadful months, during which it has undergone significant changes. Many citizens consider these changes to have led the country into further decline. Earlier, citizens were feeling hopeful for this year, thinking it would be different from the years following the 2011 uprising. As demands for a better life have gone unrealized, hopes for a better future disappeared.

The hope and optimism that culminated with the overthrow of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh diminished as time passed, but was nevertheless carried through to this year. However, a number of successive events in recent months have altogether destroyed previous hope that the situation in Yemen would improve. Indeed, many citizens are too preoccupied with fear from current issues—from the Houthis in the north and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in the south, to rampant hunger and poor health nationwide—to even worry about the future.

In this report the Yemen Times examines the course of the major political, economic, and military developments Yemen has witnessed during the past eight months of 2014.

Major political events

In January, Yemenis were anticipating the outcomes of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), which was established to resolve the political crisis in Yemen that resulted from the 2011 uprising. Preparations remain underway to follow through with a number of as-of-yet unimplemented NDC outcomes, though a number of decisions came out of the conference.

After ten months of talks, the NDC came to an end on January 25. The NDC document, which contains the outcomes of the conference and serves as a roadmap for the next stage in the transition process, was approved. The document calls for a new constitution to be drafted and establishes that a new six-region federation is created. President Hadi was granted a one-year extension from February 21. Hadi was also given the constitutional authority to change the government to achieve "quality, integrity, and national partnership, and expand the Shura Council by adding numerous members representing many groups."

On February 10, it was officially announced that after the constitution is adopted Yemen will become a federal state comprised of six regions: Hadramout Region, which includes the governorates of Al-Mahra, Hadramout, Shabwa, and Socotra; Saba Region, which includes Al-Jawf, Marib, and Al-Bayda; Aden Region, which includes

Abyan, Lahj, Al-Dhale, and Aden; Al-Janad Region, which includes Taiz and Ibb; Azzal Region, which includes Sana'a, Amran, Sa'ada and Dhamar; and Tehama Region, which includes the governorates of Hodeida, Rayma, Al-Mahweet, and Hajja.

With grave violations of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights reported in Yemen in recent years, the UN Security Council (UNSC) on February 26 passed UNSC Resolution 2140. The resolution calls on UN member states to place sanctions on individuals found to be "obstructing or undermining the successful completion of the political transition" and "impeding the implementation of the outcomes of the final report of the comprehensive NDC through violence, or attacks on essential infrastructure."

June 11 witnessed major chaos in Sana'a as protesters took to the



In May a French security escort was assassinated and another was injured in Sana'a by unknown armed men. (Photo: Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki)



The NDC came to an end on January 25 and the NDC document, which contains the outcomes of the conference and serves as a roadmap for the next stage in the transition process, was approved. (Photo: almasdaronline.com)

streets over fuel shortages, burning tires in major intersections and bringing traffic to a halt. President Hadi claimed this was an attempted coup, but stopped short of blaming anyone in particular.

Due to the continuing deterioration of economic conditions and



AQAP has launched several attacks against post offices and financial institutions, including the looting of the International Bank on August 7, in Al-Qatan district of Hadramout. (Photo: Ansar Al-Sharia Twitter account)



Frustrations over fuel shortages culminated in the June 11 protest in Sana'a. (Photo: Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki)

ties published in May by the state-run Saba News Agency.

Due to acts of sabotage against oil and electricity lines, as well as roadblocks by tribesmen, population growth, and general government mismanagement, Yemenis endured long hours of darkness for more than five months, often going without power for most of the day. Frustrations over fuel shortages culminated in the June 11 protest in Sana'a.

The crisis lasted until July 30, when the government slashed fuel subsidies. The price of 20 liters of gas rose from 2,500 (\$12) to YR4,000 (\$19), and the price of diesel went up from YR2,000 (\$9) to 3,900 (\$18) per 20 liters. The fuel subsidy cuts were agreed upon by all parties.

This decision prompted people to demonstrate against the price hikes. The demonstrations against the fuel subsidy cuts are ongoing, although this grievance is being adopted by both sides in the ongoing protests both for and against the Houthis.

In Hadramout governorate, AQAP has launched several attacks against post offices and financial institutions, including the looting on August 7 of the International Bank in Al-Qatan district of Hadramout.

Major security events

Wars, bombings, sporadic clashes, assassinations, and kidnappings characterize the security situation in Yemen during the past eight months.

The month of January was filled with targeted attacks against army and security personnel, resulting in the assassinations of 15 soldiers and officers.

Two major incidents occurred in January. First, 18 soldiers were killed and six others wounded in an attack on a checkpoint in Shibam, Hadramout on January 7. AQAP claimed responsibility for the operation. On January 16, ten soldiers were killed in joint attacks carried out by suspected AQAP members against three army locations in Al-Bayda governorate.

In February, two officers and six soldiers were killed in various attacks against the army in Shabwa and Abyan. On February 13, seven soldiers were killed when 29 prisoners escaped from the Central Prison in Sana'a, 19 of whom were known AQAP members.

In March, 12 soldiers and officers were assassinated. In a major attack waged by armed men on an



Since mid-August tens of thousands of Houthi supporters have protested in Sana'a and encampments have been set up both inside the capital and on its outskirts. (Photo: Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki)

army checkpoint in Hadramout 22 soldiers were killed.

In April, 16 army and security forces members were killed in Aden and Hadramout in attacks by suspected AQAP militants on army locations and checkpoints. Also in April, a total of 63 armed men allegedly affiliated with AQAP were killed in drone attacks on Saturday and Sunday in the governorates of Al-Bayda (10), Shabwa (3), and Abyan (50).

On April 29, a military offensive began against AQAP in Shabwa and Abyan. The conflict lasted a month, leaving hundreds of military personnel and alleged AQAP militants dead.

The Ministry of Interior held a press conference at the end of April in which they announced 52 assassinations of soldiers and officers had occurred in March and April alone. The ministry also announced that 148 soldiers and officers were killed during the same period due to bombings and clashes with AQAP militants in all of Yemen.

In May, 30 soldiers were killed in attacks on army locations in Hadramout and Lahj, and in June 35 soldiers were killed in attacks on army's locations and checkpoints in Hadramout and Lahj.

Important events in July were, as mentioned previously, the capture of Amran by the Houthis on July 8 and the killing of the commander of the Amran-based 310th Armored Brigade, Brigadier General Hameed Al-Qushaibi, on an unknown date by Houthis.

In August, six military personnel were assassinated, two in Aden, four in Hadramout; thirteen were killed by an explosive device in Lahj, ten of them civilians; and 14 soldiers were executed by AQAP in Hadramout on August 8. The latter incident came two days after AQAP gained temporary control over the districts of Al-Qatan and Seyoun,

leading to large-scale battles between the army and AQAP.

Targeting media and foreigners

Recent months have witnessed worrying developments in the realm of news media in Yemen. On June 11, the Yemen Today TV Channel was shut down by Presidential Guards on President Hadi's order following the channel's coverage of the demonstrations and riots in Sana'a that same day.

On August 15, Abdulrahman Hameed Al-Deen, the radio director at the state-run Sana'a Radio, was assassinated by unknown gunmen. That same week, there was a reported increase in threats against journalists.

Foreign nationals have also been the subjects of numerous attacks. In May, a French citizen was assassinated and another was injured in Sana'a by unknown armed men. The two men were working as security escorts for the EU mission to Yemen.

The last eight months saw a number of kidnappings, with a surge early on in the year. Although the number of kidnappings is unknown due to a media blackout and lack of information, a number of kidnapped foreigners have been released.

On April 19, the Uzbekistan doctor Saleem Momen was released in Al-Jawf governorate. He was kidnapped two months prior in Sana'a.

On May 13, a German national who was studying Arabic in Sana'a was released via tribal mediation after being held since late January.

On July 26, English teacher Mike Harvey, a British national, was released after being held for six months.

All these events made the past eight months bloody, tragic, and downright awful.



In months of sporadic clashes between the army and Houthis, hundreds were killed from both sides, including Commander Al-Qushaibi of the 310th Armored Brigade (funeral pictured). (Photo: Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki)

Major economic events

Since the beginning of this year, oil pipelines have been subject to dozens of bombings and other acts of sabotage. It is estimated that over the last three years this has cost the Yemeni government about \$4.75 billion, according to official statis-



Illegal neighborhoods in Sana'a lack public services

Around 35,000 households in Sana'a obtain electricity illegally

Story by **Nasser Al-Sakkaf**
Photo by **Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki**

Given the high rent and costly land in Sana'a, many residents build illegal houses on the outskirts of the capital.

Five years ago, Daroos Saeed went to Bani Al-Harith district on the borders of the capital to build a house there illegally. He hoped that the construction office would register his building, "but that never happened," says Saeed.

Residents in illegal neighborhoods, who live in unregistered houses, lack public services such as water, electricity, sewage systems, and public institutions like hospitals and schools. Roads are sandy and unpaved, phone lines are non-existent and cellphone connections are often poor.

"I stock all essential commodities and basic medicine in my house for cases of illness or emergency, as it is hard to reach hospitals, especially late at night," says Saeed.

While residents in illegal neighborhoods are largely neglected by the government, strong social networks and support systems in the quarter aim to balance this lack of public services. "Neighbors are living as one family, sharing the same concerns," says Saeed.

"All the residents in illegal neighborhoods are mostly from the same economic class; there are no wealthy or poor, everyone is middle class," he explains.

According to Abdurraqeb Ata, the manager of the Public Works Office in Sana'a, residents in illegal neighborhoods have no right to claim the provision of public services.

"Those buildings are supposed to be removed," he explains. However, "the office is making concessions

by letting them live their lives, in spite of the fact that they went to build in those areas knowing that it is illegal," added Ata.

Ata said that the government is registering areas in Sana'a, which are considered in its urban planning and provided with public services. Registered land, especially in urban areas, is more expensive than unregistered land, which is not allowed to be built on.

Illegal neighborhoods consist of unlicensed houses illegally built on land that is either owned by the government or unregistered.

They are located in Qaa Al-Qaidhi, an area on the southern outskirts of Sana'a, near the southern entrance of Sana'a and in parts of Al-Khafji, Al-Hezam Al-Akhdar, Al-Sunaynah, and Al-Layl areas. Illegal neighborhoods are also found in Wadi Ahmad, Bani Al-Hawat, and Al-Khamees areas.

Abdullah describes illegal neighborhoods as a paradise for people with limited income. Even though water and sewage is not available, residents get water from tankers, and "electricity is available for free."

While Abdullah speaks highly of his neighborhood, others disagree, complaining about high transportation costs when travelling to the far-away city center and the lack of governmental services. Both constitute a financial burden to citizens, explains Motahar Al-Shadhi, a resident in Qaa Al-Qaidhi area.

Illegal electricity

With no public services in place, many residents in illegal neighborhoods obtain electricity illegally, according to Saeed.

"I myself get electricity illegally," he admits, blaming the Public Electricity Corporation for refusing to provide him with electricity on the grounds that he does not hold a permit for his house.

According to Saeed, residents in illegal neighborhoods are not generally opposed to getting electricity legally. In fact, many wish to use an official electricity grid instead of the illegal one that is plagued by many outages.

Ali Al-Harazi, who has been living in the illegal neighborhood of Hizyaz for over seven years, explains "I always wanted to obtain electricity legally but I could not because I built my house illegally." He was attracted by the low costs of land in Hizyaz, but he could never obtain a permit as the land he built on was not registered with the government.

In Sana'a alone there are tens of thousands of homes relying on illegal electricity. This trend makes breaking the law the status quo in many neighborhoods.

As soon as you set foot into illegal neighborhoods in Sana'a you will stand amazed at the chaotically connecting power lines and loose cables hanging over streets and running along house walls.

According to Ali Mahmoud, the general secretary of the Public Electricity Corporation's office in Sana'a, "illegal power lines are found on the outskirts of Sana'a as those areas are not connected to the official electricity grid. They are illegal and not registered, and homeowners in those areas do not have permits to build their houses."



Illegal tapping into electricity lines comes at a great risk: Every day cases of injuries or deaths caused by electrical shocks are registered at Sana'ani hospitals.

Abudlkader Abdulwase, who replaces electricity meters for the Public Electricity Corporation, says "there are those who connect their houses with electricity that they illegally obtain from official power grids as far as hundreds of meters away from their homes."

The Public Electricity Corporation only connects houses with building permits to the grid, according to Mahmoud.

Sana'a accounts for 40 percent of the country's overall energy consumption, using about 400 megawatts of a total of 1,200 megawatts produced by different power plants in Yemen, according to Mahmoud. Approximately 200 megawatts are consumed illegally in Sana'a, according to Mahmoud.

"In Sana'a there are 35,000 households running on illegal electricity, and the city cannot connect

them to the official power grid as they live in unlicensed buildings," he explains.

In Sana'a there are about 350,000 electricity subscribers, including the illegal ones.

Illegal energy consumption goes unpunished

Despite knowing that many residents tap into the power grid illegally, the Public Electricity Corporation stands idle because it does not have the authority to arrest anyone.

"The strongest measure the corporation can take is to disconnect illegal power lines. But that is pointless because citizens will reconnect them as soon as possible."

The government's Public Works Office seems equally clueless about what to do with illegal energy subscribers—the arrest of entire neigh-

borhoods seems unfeasible.

Mahmoud said that there will be campaigns to connect illegal houses to the official power grid. Yet he expresses his concerns over the daily increase of illegal houses and a consequent rise of illegal energy consumption. After all, the corporation makes serious financial losses, with each megawatt costing YR70,000 (\$326) per hour.

The 2011 uprising, which brought about a noticeable decline in the government's presence, caused a sudden surge in illegal neighborhoods, with thousands of citizens using the socio-political disturbances to build illegal houses.

Majid Al-Bashiri, an engineer in Hizyaz electricity station, argues that illegally tapping into electricity lines poses a greater risk to the individual than to the corporation, as power grids are tapped into without any safety measures in place.

"When the corporation's employees connect power lines they examine a house's internal grid and install a fuse box as a precautionary measure. But when power lines are tapped into illegally, no thoughts are paid to safety measures," Al-Bashiri says.

Every day cases of injuries or deaths caused by electrical shocks are registered at the emergency room of Al-Thawra Hospital in Sana'a, according to Mohammad Alwan, the emergency room's general supervisor.

Abdulwase explains that the main concern of the citizens is getting electricity to light up their houses and they do not care about legal or illegal power.

He adds, "most citizens do not hesitate to install electricity meters. On the contrary, they welcome the electricity teams because they know the danger they are in if they continue to use power without meters and without safety measures."

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University of Science & Technology

أسمى التهناني لطلبة الثانوية العامة للعام الدراسي ٢٠١٣/٢٠١٤م

بمناسبة النجاح ويسرها أن تعلن عن تقديم

منح دراسية وتخفيضات

المنحة	المستفيدون	بدء الدراسة	موعد التقديم
منح دراسية مجانية	أوائل الجمهورية العلمي - الأدبي	العالم الجامعي ٢٠١٤/٢٠١٥م	الآن وحتى ٢٠١٤/١٠/٣٠م
منح دراسية مجانية تنافسية	الطلبة المتفوقين الحاصلين على معدل ٩٠% فأكثر العلمي - الأدبي	العالم الجامعي ٢٠١٥/٢٠١٦م	٢٠١٥/٠٢/٢٨-١م
تخفيض ٢٥% من الرسوم الدراسية	الطلبة المتفوقين الحاصلين على معدل ٩٠% فأكثر العلمي - الأدبي	العالم الجامعي ٢٠١٤/٢٠١٥م	الآن وحتى ٢٠١٤/١٠/٣٠م



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Former Dutch Ambassador to the Yemen Times:

“Political stability” key concern for Yemen

Nadia Al-Sakkaf, the editor-in-chief of the Yemen Times, interviewed Jeroen Verheul, the former Netherlands ambassador to Yemen, at the Netherlands embassy in Sana'a.

Verheul, who has been in the country since 2012, arriving in the midst of Yemen's political transition, shared his experience and fondness for Yemen before embarking on a new journey as Roving Ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hague.

“I feel very sad to leave Yemen, because both Yemen as a country and its population have touched my heart,” he says.

Talking about his time in Sana'a, Verheul explained his fascination with the rugged terrain and his unending love for hiking in Yemen's beautiful mountains. Verheul visited Yemen once before, in 2001, where he had the opportunity to sample qat. Like many first-time visitors to the country, he had his share, and the experience was far bitter than he had imagined. He admits that since then, “I've not had it again.”

Apart from beautiful landscapes, Verheul has been struck by the friendliness, hospitality, and open attitude of the Yemeni people. He regrets that he was not able to see more of the country and its people, but says he felt restricted due to the security situation. What hurts Verheul most is the plight of the people, due to lack of basic needs such as consistent power, fuel, and water supply.

In an interview with Nadia Al-Sakkaf, Verheul talks about his remorse after seeing the current political uncertainties stall the country's progress, and emphasizes the imminent need for political and economic stability. He also discusses the Netherlands' contribution towards a safe water project and his vision for a brighter Yemen.



Jeroen Verheul, former Dutch ambassador to Yemen has been in the country since 2012. He has recently been appointed Roving Ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Hague.

Were you expecting the political situation to improve?

Yes, absolutely. I had this expectation especially in 2011, after the transition, that a new political phase would start and that improvements would reach the population. Very few people have seen improvement in their lives, and that's what really makes me sad. Yes we have not been able to achieve much.

Last year, almost a year ago, it was a very difficult time for the embassy. Embassies announced they were targeted by terrorists.

Since then what have you done in terms of more security precautions? You said the mobility is limited today, so how is the embassy operating today?

Of course, we cannot say much about that. Security information is always privileged information. In terms

of general information, we can say this is a non-family post. We cannot bring our spouses or our children with us. Because if we were to, we would have to protect them.

Since last year?

No, this is already long ago. In 2011, just before the revolution, it was already decided. I had hoped [the situation] would be better and my spouse could also come to see Yemen. But unfortunately that has not been possible.

Are the different programs running—the staff, visa, still operational?

We do not implement a lot of programs ourselves. We use partners like the United Nations and institutions, international NGO's, local NGO's. We also implement programs through the government

so we don't have to bring in staff. There is staff from those organizations. WFP (World Food Program) has good staff; they are recruited by those organizations.

Netherlands' \$5 million investment in Sana'a Basin Water Management project

The Netherlands is on a mission to save Sana'a from drought. Tell me about that.

Of course when you develop the development program, you look at what the constraints are in the country. What are the challenges the country needs to overcome to grow economically and prosper in terms of development. In our analysis, Yemen faced three key constraints. The first: The lack of rule of law and

security; second: The threat of dwindling water resources, third: Huge population growth. So we decided to focus our program on trying to help Yemen tackle those constraints. We have activities in the field of law and security, and in the field of population, sexual, and reproductive health.

But why water in particular? Are you feeling optimistic about the projects and saving Sana'a?

But that focus has mainly been on providing access to safe drinking water. We have helped the urban water supply and the rural water supply. One of the things I learnt after having worked on that, is that if you improved the access to water there is a huge increase in demand for water and that water is used for irrigation. That water is also used to provide qat. If you provide more access to water, it is not necessarily going to the people, it is going to farmers.

When did the decision come about?

I think a year ago an evaluation was done and we thought we need to expand our focus on the water sector and create access to safe water. We need to look at how Yemen is managing its water resources. At that time we supported Yemen in creating institutions, for example the national authority for water resources, the Ministry of Water and Environment. We've helped Yemen create institutions, helped Yemen in creating legislation and implementation.

Yemen's priorities moving forward

If we are to refocus the priorities, what do you think Yemen should focus on for the next one-and-a-half years?

I think the first priority is political stabilization. What you have seen in the National Dialogue Conference, you came up with a lot of recommendations, but still there are political differences between those parties who participated in the National Dialogue. It looks like the National Dialogue was not the end of the political debate and that debate needs to be managed.

I think the parties need to be told, if you agree to something, then you need to stick to it and there is a kind of need to enforce that. Because, otherwise, you can just sign here on the dotted line and then you do something completely different. I think there needs to be consistency: if you agree to something, you also take on a commitment to stand by it.

In other words, are you asking the president to toughen up?

First of all, I think the duty lies with citizens and civil society. Citizens need to hold their political parties to account. If you are a partisan of a certain political party and you see your political party is saying one thing and doing another, then you have a duty to stand up and ask “what are you doing?”

That works in a democratic country, where people are educated enough. But the institutions in Yemen, I don't think it's realistic. What you mean in terms of political stability now is that you are asking people to figure out their differences around the table.

Yes exactly. It's of course ridiculous that you end up fighting different groupings that are seated at the negotiation table. In the National Dialogue they have agreed to a way forward on Yemen and now they are fighting in Amran and Al-Jawf. That's something that's absolutely unacceptable.

Politics, similarities between Yemen and Netherlands

But this is something the international community cannot really do much about—they can threaten or advise, but eventually it's up to the Yemenis.

That's why I am emphasizing the responsibility of the citizens and the responsibility of civil society because you are right—citizens are not very well educated in Yemen; it's not a full blown democracy. But, all citizens have responsibilities, especially the educated citizens. If they are organized in civil society, even they have responsibilities. That said,

political parties also have responsibilities.

Yemen joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), will it make a lot of difference?

I think the benefits of getting on to WTO are huge. But in order to benefit from that, you need a huge infrastructure. That means you need to have a private sector that is able to benefit from the opportunities they are providing in market access, so you need to be able to produce, and unfortunately the export production of Yemen is not very strong. You have oil and gas and a bit of agriculture which is being exported. The huge gain from WTO is from services. Education—can you get people from abroad and educate them? Can you export educated labor? Service delivery in the telecom sector—the telecom sector is not liberalized, and there is a huge scope for growth here. If you look at what Kenya is doing for example or what India has done in the telecom sector, it's huge. You need to have the right environment in place to benefit from WTO membership.

Unfortunately, in Yemen WTO membership is not going to help in the short term. I often compare Yemen with the Netherlands. You are strategically located. Similarly, we are strategically located vis-a-vis Germany, in the river delta. So we have built our wealth mainly through trading and transporting, from Rotterdam to Germany. You are strategically located in Aden and Hodeida. There are all kinds of ports, you don't have a hugely populated hinterland. But there are other ways you can use your ports to provide services for the trade that is passing through and of course, Yemen itself is a huge country.

Does that mean we will see you again?

I hope so. Certainly one of the things that Yemen needs is trade and investment. For that to happen you need a predictable political and security environment which is stable, which is definitely not the case at the moment. So once that is the case, trade and investment will happen and then certainly I hope to come

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**YT vision statement****"To make Yemen a good world citizen."****Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf,**
(1951 - 1999)
Founder of Yemen Times**OUR OPINION****Scenarios for the near future**

No one can predict the future, but by using past experience and current indicators, analysts can assess what is going on and forecast where we are heading.

Past experience has taught us that if you raise a beast in your backyard, hoping to use it to rid a greater threat, this beast is likely to get out of control and become the problem itself.

Past experience has taught us that curing symptoms with Band-Aid solutions instead of dealing with their underlying causes will only make matters worse.

Past experience has taught us that words, if not followed by action, are empty and that consistently lying makes you unable to gain or keep people's trust.

And finally, past experience has taught us that people want food, shelter, security, jobs, and other basic needs more than anything else—even if they disagree with their benefactors' political positions, they support any group which satisfies these needs.

Assessing the situation today, we know that we have no functional government, no unified army, no money, and no concrete plans. Instead, we face armed groups who are hungry for power and who are not hesitant to challenge the state. Most concerning of all, however, is the people's nationwide and nearly unanimous discontentment.

Where does this leave us? We are currently standing at a crossroads between falling into armed conflict—if no one backs off and a compromise isn't reached—and sailing Yemen to safe shores by reaching an agreement that saves everyone's face.

I think the first thing President Hadi should do is to reclaim Amran from the Houthis and take back the army's stolen weapons. He should do this while maintaining strong security measures in the capital—as he is currently doing.

While this step will endorse the state's power, it should be followed by another step that proves compromise: Removing the prime minister and announcing a new government of competent individuals with some ministries going to the Houthis and to others who are not represented in the current government—with the exception of ministries essential to the functioning of the state which should be given to competent independents appointed by the president.

The new inclusive government should make the decision to reduce fuel prices. What many people do not know is that the price of fuel could be decreased by YR500 (\$2.30) to YR800 (\$3.70) per 20 liters while still maintaining the international price as this new reduction could be achieved by removing additional government taxes and fees.

At the same time, welfare money should be dispersed and the poor should start receiving their allowances, the money for which has already arrived from Saudi Arabia.

This step should be immediately followed by removing camps from the capital. If needed, by force. Thousands of people should not be allowed to camp near the airport or ministries. If they want to have a peaceful sit-in they could go to less vital locations. Finally 20,000 Houthis should be recruited into the army and placed in different camps all over the country, especially in the east.

This way Hadi will save face, the Houthis will save face, and Yemenis—especially the poor—will have a better economic situation. Most importantly, we will be saved from an impending war.

It is a tricky balance, but one that can be achieved if there is a strong will and a true desire to make things better. Otherwise, the drums of war will start beating and we could suddenly turn from the region's success story to another failed Arab Spring country.

Nadia Al-Sakkaf

Summary executions in Somalia

Recent executions in Somalia put the quality of justice delivered of military courts into question

Laetitia Bader
aljazeera.com
First published Aug. 24

Somalia's military court sentenced three men to death on July 30 for alleged membership in the armed Islamist group Al-Shabaab and involvement in attacks in Mogadishu, the capital. Four days later, the Somali media posted to Twitter photographs of their limp, hooded bodies tied to poles.

Such rapid executions once again call into question the quality of justice in Somalia's military courts. The government should try civilians before civilian courts, respect the presumption of innocence, ensure that confessions are not extracted under duress, and allow defendants adequate time for appeals. Sadly, Somalia's new military court chairman, Colonel Abdirahman Mohamed Turyare, has boasted of flagrant violations of these requirements under international law. He recently told the media that his court was waging a "new war against terrorists." Under international law, the death penalty is permitted only after a rigorous judicial process—a fair trial in which the defendant has adequate time to prepare a defense and appeal the sentence, among other requirements.

In March, Human Rights Watch (HRW) released a report detailing how Somalia's military court proceedings "fall short of international fair trial standards." Relatives of defendants and

independent observers have very limited access to the hearings, allowing the court to operate without oversight. A central concern was the speed at which death sentences have been carried out. HRW opposes the death penalty in all circumstances as an inherently cruel and irreversible punishment. That concern is even greater given the due process concerns we identified with the military court.

Unfortunately, these practices appear to have been getting worse in recent months.

Thirteen executions have taken place in Mogadishu in 2014, nine been carried out just since July. Eleven of those executed were not members of the Somali armed forces; the majority accused of being Al-Shabaab members or fighters. A man accused of carrying out an attack on Maka al-Mukarama hotel in Mogadishu in November 2013 was sentenced and executed within just over two weeks in July.

Carrying out death sentences so rapidly prevents defendants from filing an appeal. It also makes it less likely that the president will be able to review the case for a possible pardon or commutation.

The military court has tried defendants for a broad range of crimes not within its jurisdiction, notably common crimes against civilians.

Turyare told the media that parents of Al-Shabaab suspects will be arrested and he claimed some were already in detention. "It is failure to exercise respon-

sibility as father or mother to report to the police that your children are missing or went to terrorist group," he said. Arresting families of suspects is a form of collective punishment that is contrary to fundamental principles of justice.

In its recent decisions, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights has called on countries to prohibit trials of civilians before military courts and to restrict the cases appearing before these courts to military offences committed by military personnel. Somalia should comply with these decisions by transferring civilian cases to civilian courts, rather than cementing an abusive practice.

Even the outdated Somali military law doesn't grant the court such powers. Turyare claimed that trying Al-Shabaab suspects under the military penal code is justified, but HRW's assessment of the code found the legal basis for the trial of civilians in the military court, including Al-Shabaab members not taking part in hostilities, to be doubtful.

Defendants are also often held in facilities run by Somalia's national intelligence agency, notorious for mistreatment during interrogations. Turyare told the media that those recently executed had "confessed." International human rights law and Somalia's provisional constitution state that no one can be compelled to testify against themselves or to confess guilt. This basic standard helps to protect defendants from being

coerced or tortured into confessing.

The state-run Somali National Television has contributed to undermining the defendants' chances of a fair trial by broadcasting interviews with them during their detention and trial, describing their alleged involvement in attacks. This shows governmental disregard for the presumption of innocence.

Amid these swift executions, Somalia has called on Kenya to extradite to Mogadishu an alleged Al-Shabaab journalist who is reportedly under arrest in Kenya. While Kenya still has the death penalty on its books, it has not executed anyone in decades, and should not return anyone to Somalia who surely will not receive a fair trial.

The Somali government should reform its courts before making requests for extradition. The president should impose a moratorium on the death penalty, and his government should work to ensure that all national courts, civilian and military, respect fair trial standards. Without serious improvements in the quality of trials, the injustices of the past will continue.

As one Somali defense lawyer told me: "I believe that all human beings, including Al-Shabaab suspects, have the right to fair trial." Wise words that the head of the military court and the Somali authorities should hear if they hope to rebuild people's trust in their justice system.

Laetitia Bader is an Africa researcher at Human Rights Watch.

The Fear of Political Islam:

Why Arabs Betrayed Gaza

Ramzy Baroud
middleeasteye.net
First published Aug. 25

Ask any Arab ruler, and they will tell you of the great sacrifices their countries have made for Palestine and the Palestinians. However, both history and present reality are testaments, not only to Arab failure to live up to the role expected of them and stand in solidarity with their own oppressed brethren, but also to the official Arab betrayal of the Palestinian cause. The current war on Gaza, and the dubious role played by Egypt in the ceasefire talks between Hamas and Israel are cases in point.

Read these comments by Aaron David Miller, a scholar at the Wilson Centre in Washington to appreciate the depth of the unmistakable Arab betrayal. "I have never seen a situation like it, where you have so many Arab states acquiescing in the death and destruction in Gaza and the pummeling of Hamas," Miller told the New York Times. "The silence is deafening."

Miller explains Arab silence in relations to their loathing of political Islam which rose to prominence following the so-called Arab Spring. Such rise saw the advent of movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda in Tunisia to the centers of power. The "Arab Spring" challenged and, at least temporarily, disabled the hegemony over power by corruption-ridden, pro-Western Arab elites, unleashing the energies of civil societies that have been historically marginalized.

Political Islam, especially that which is affiliated with moderate Islamic ideology known as Al-Wasatiyyah (roughly translated as "moderation") swept-up the votes in several democratic elections. Like Hamas's victory in the Palestinian elections in 2006, other such Islamic movements followed suit the moment the "Arab Spring" pushed open a small margin for democracy and freedom of expression.

The danger of political Islamic move-

ments that don't adhere to an extremist ideology like that of the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda, for example, is that they are not easy to dismiss as "extremists," "terrorists," and such. At times, in fact, often, they seem much more inclined to play the democratic game than self-proclaimed Arab "secularist," "liberal," and "socialist" movements.

Israel's most recent war on Gaza, starting on July 7, came at a time that political Islam was being routed out in Egypt and criminalized in other Arab countries. It was the first major Israeli military attack on Gaza since the ousting of democratically-elected Muslim Brotherhood President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013. Although the Israeli war morphed in the course of a few days to that of a genocide (thousands killed, thousands wounded, and nearly a fourth of the Gazan population made homeless), most Arab countries remained mostly silent. They mouthed-off some random condemnations that meant so very little. Egypt, however, went even further.

Soon after the Israeli war "Operation Protective Edge" began, Egypt proposed a most suspicious ceasefire, one that even the Times found peculiar. "The government in Cairo... surprised Hamas by publicly proposing a ceasefire agreement that met most of Israel's demands and none from the Palestinian group (Hamas)," wrote David Kirkpatrick on July 30. Hamas, the main Palestinian party in the conflict, which is also declared by Egypt's government as "terrorist," was not consulted and only learned about the proposal through the media. But, of course, Israel's Benjamin Netanyahu welcomed the Egyptian proposal; Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, a main rival of Hamas, and a strong opponent of armed resistance (and arguably, any form of Palestinian resistance, really) welcomed the "brotherly" Egyptian gesture; other Arab rulers rushed to commend Egypt's Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi for his astute regional leadership.

Of course, the whole exercise was a farce, meant to eventually blame Hamas

and the resistance in Gaza for refusing an end to the conflict (which they didn't start and were its ultimate victim), and to prop up Al-Sisi as the new icon of peace and moderation in the region; the kind of "strong man" with whom the United States government liked to do business.

It all failed, of course, for one single reason: The Gaza resistance held its ground, costing Israel serious military losses, and igniting worldwide sympathy and respect.

But no respect came from traditional Arab governments, of course, including those who praise the legendary "sumoud"—steadfastness—of the Palestinian people at every opportunity, speech and sermon. The renewed success of Hamas, which arguably had been fading away into oblivion after the overthrow of Egypt's brotherhood, and the severing of ties with Damascus and Tehran, was puzzling, and immensely frustrating to these governments.

If Hamas survives the Gaza battle, the resistance will promote its endurance before the Middle East's supposedly strongest army as a victory. Netanyahu will suffer dire consequences at home. Ties between Hamas and Iran could be renewed. The "resistance camp" could once more rekindle. The moral victory for the Brotherhood and the moral defeat of Al-Sisi (and his prospected regional role) would be astounding.

An alliance of sorts was founded between several Arab countries and Israel to ensure the demise of the resistance in Gaza—not just the resistance as an idea, and its practical expressions, but also its political manifestations as well, which are felt far and beyond the confines of Gaza's besieged borders.

Former Israel lobbyist and current vice president of the Brookings Institution in Washington, Martin Indyk, has an explanation. "There's an 'alignment of interests' between nations that aren't allies, yet have 'common adversaries,'" Indyk told Bloomberg. "As they see that the US is less engaged than it was before, it's natural that they look to each other—quietly, under the table in most

respects—to find a way to help each other."

Naturally, the latest round of ceasefire talks in Cairo failed because the party that is hosting the talks deems the leading Palestinian resistance group Hamas "terrorist" and would hate to see a scenario in which Gaza prevails over Israel. If the resistance demand of ending the siege is met, especially the demand of reactivating the Gaza seaport and airport, Egypt would be denied a major leverage against Hamas, the resistance, and the Palestinian people altogether.

And if the resistance wins—as in holding the Israeli military at bay, and achieving some of its demands—the political discourse of the Middle East is likely to change altogether, where the weak will, once again, dare challenge the strong by demanding reforms, democracy, and threatening resistance as a realistic way to achieve such objectives.

Interestingly, the Hamas victory in the Palestinian Legislative Elections in 2006 had revived the possibility of political Islam in achieving its goals via the ballot box, which was a harbinger of the rise of political Islam throughout the region following the "Arab Spring." Any victory for Palestinian resistance can also be considered equally as dangerous for those who want to maintain the status quo throughout the region.

Some Arab rulers continue to declare their strong support of Palestine and its cause. "Operation Protective Edge," however, has exposed beyond a doubt that such solidarity is just a mere show of words; and that, although discretely, some Arabs wish to see Israel crush any semblance of Palestinian resistance, in Gaza and anywhere else.

Ramzy Baroud is a PhD scholar in People's History at the University of Exeter. He is the managing editor of Middle East Eye. Baroud is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author, and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com. His latest book is My Father Was a Freedom Fighter: Gaza's Untold Story (Pluto Press, London).

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The fall of Amran and the future of the Islah Party in Yemen

Charles Schmitz
Middle East Institute
First published Aug. 25

As the world's attention was riveted on the lightning conquests of the Islamic State in Iraq, Yemen's Houthi movement made an equally stunning but largely unnoticed military advance on Amran governorate and captured the provincial capital, Amran, in July. The fall of Amran has extraordinary political significance: The Houthi advance dislodged the Al-Ahmar family's grip on the leadership of the Hashid tribal confederation, a central political pillar of the Yemeni Republic since 1962, and threatens the survival of the Islah Party itself.

During the capture of Amran, the Houthis destroyed the 310th Armored Brigade, which was allied with General Ali Mohsen, who, along with the Al-Ahmar family and a group of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, are the heart of the Islah Party.

The fall of Amran is even more stunning in light of what appears to be complicity by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi. Since January, Houthi fighters have been making steady progress on the ground, alternatively buying and coercing new tribal alliances, defeating military units, and strategically using the politics of the transitional period in Yemen. The Houthi movement was party to Yemen's famous National Dialogue Conference and it is included in formal political discussions about the future of Yemen. Over the last six months, a pattern emerged: Houthi fighters would make incursions into new territory, President Hadi would send a delegation to

negotiate a settlement, and the Houthi leadership would exploit the settlement to advance further its control of northern Yemen. President Hadi appears to be allowing the Houthi advances to hurt the Islah Party as part of a major reshuffling of the political landscape in Yemen.

Abdul Wahab Al-Anisi, secretary general of the Islah Party, argued that the Houthi advance was due either to incompetence in the military under President Hadi or to treason. Most observers acknowledge that the Yemeni military is so riddled with internal divisions that a coherent command structure is impossible to maintain. However, the events in the final hours of the fall of Amran suggest not simply chaotic military incompetence but rather a quite intentional and planned shift in power within the Yemeni military and politics.

For weeks the Houthis had been battling Yemeni military and Islah-supporting tribal fighters around Amran in order to control the main entrances to the city. Hadi repeatedly brokered one ceasefire after another, all of which were violated by Houthi fighters without repercussions and all of which gave them further military advantage. On July 8, 2014, the military planned a major operation to clean the city of Houthi fighters at the same time as President Hadi's security officials were in negotiation with the Houthi leadership to broker yet another ceasefire. An agreement was reached to stop the fighting and turn Amran's main military base over to a police force until a new unit of the Yemeni military could replace the current unit. The Houthi fighters had achieved their objective—removal of Yemeni military units allied with Islah.

The reinforcements from Sana'a

were ordered to return to barracks, and inside Amran itself, General Al-Qushaibi gave orders for his men to withdraw. However, the Houthi fighters took advantage of the ceasefire and poured into the city. Apparently, after assistance from Hashid tribes allied with former President Saleh, Houthi fighters burst into the headquarters of the 310th Armored Brigade and executed General Al-Qushaibi, a close associate of Ali Mohsen. The killing of Al-Qushaibi was in part a revenge killing for the death several years earlier of Hussein Al-Houthi, brother of the current Al-Houthi leader, Abdulmalik, and a stark message to Ali Mohsen that the Houthi militants were in easy striking range.

The Houthi leadership claims its offensive is not against the Yemeni military and state, but against elements that are acting on partisan rather than national interests. This is a thinly veiled reference to supporters of Islah, which the Houthi leadership sees as its main enemy in the north.

President Hadi has consistently maintained that no legitimate group need resort to arms because the new Yemeni state allows all Yemenis to achieve their goals through a peaceful political process. Hadi's words are directed toward the Houthi movement and Al-Qaeda, the two organizations in Yemen challenging the state with force of arms, although Al-Qaeda does not have anywhere near the capabilities of Ansar Allah, the Houthi organization.

Nevertheless, President Hadi did not appear too upset with the collapse of the Al-Ahmar leadership of Hashid and the reversals of Ali Mohsen's military units, and incomprehensibly, the Houthi fighters were able to leave Amran with

the weapons of an entire armored brigade without resistance. President Hadi toured the city shortly with a large contingent of the government cabinet, promising to rebuild physical infrastructure and restore state institutions, as if to say that all is well now.

Meanwhile in Sana'a, Ali Mohsen very publically presided over the return to Sana'a and burial of the body of Al-Qushaibi. President Hadi was absent from the ceremonies, even though Al-Qushaibi was a long serving, high-ranking military commander. What is clear is that the Islah Party, which had been poised to take a commanding electoral victory in Yemen's post-transition elections, is now struggling to survive.

What is even more extraordinary about these events is that Islah was, in many ways, the heart of Saudi influence in Yemen. The foundations of Islah lie in the Saudi spread of Wahhabism in Yemen and the Saudi fight against communism on the Arabian Peninsula in the 1970s and 1980s. In the 2000s, Islah was Saudi's front line against the Houthi movement because the Saudis saw the Houthis as a new Hezbollah, Iranian military and political power located on Saudi Arabia's vulnerable back door. Suddenly, Saudi Arabia put Islah on the list of terrorist organizations: Islah contains an element of the Muslim Brotherhood that the Saudis see as an enemy in the region, and the US-backed President Hadi allows Iranian-backed Houthis to make military and political gains in Amran.

The Gulf Initiative that allowed Yemen's elites to back away from civil war in 2011 was in many ways an elite pact that allowed Islah a much larger role in ruling the country. In 2012, when the Gulf

Initiative took effect, the transitional government was effectively half Islah and half General People's Congress, the party of former President Saleh. The military events in Amran indicate that the balance of power on the ground in Yemen is shifting, and the regional politics—Saudi and American fears of Al-Qaeda and Iranian hands in

Yemen—seem also to have shifted. Islah appears to be the loser in the current reshuffling of the political deck, but the new winners have yet to show their faces.

Charles Schmitz is a scholar at the Middle East Institute and an associate professor of geography at Towson University.

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PALM YEMEN Sana'a, Republic of Yemen Job Vacancies Announcement

PALM YEMEN-Sana'a a leading company for General Services and Consultancy is looking for qualified Candidates who are able to ensure hotel services standards are achieved in all departments. PALM YEMEN provides a good salary and benefits package. Professional experience in Administration, facility operations and maintenance is the most critical selection factors for all of the positions. Inter personal skills, time management and Fluency in English are also a positive selection factors.

POSITION	DESCRIPTION	MONTHLY SALARY
Assistant Controller	The Assistant Controller shall work with Controller to ensure that all financial transactions that occur by the vendors and subcontractors are completed and properly accounted for in the financial system. They will assist in coordinating the flow of all costs obligated. They will assist in ensuring that all staff members are properly paid and that subcontractor vendors are paid in a timely manner including any taxes or fees associated with those wages. Assistant Controller will work with Controller in managing and reconciling petty cash and ensuring purchasing agents have sufficient cash to carry out their duties. Above all tasks assigned, they must ensure that all financials activities transacted in Yemen are completed within the guidelines of the country and with the highest quality and business ethics. Ensure that all company bank accounts and balance sheet accounts have been reconciled monthly. Check Income statement on a monthly basis for reasonableness and accuracy. Review all income statement GL detail accounts/job cost detail reports for compliance to ensure costs have been recorded accurately to the correct accounts. Review the financial statements monthly with Controller. Assist in yearend audits and can speak English fluently. Five years' work experience and Bachelor degree in Accounting. All other duties as assigned by manager or supervisor.	\$2,500 US Dollar (Gross)
Physical Security and Safety Manager	Senior-level security professional who understands Yemini culture, can speak the language, has existing contacts / can create new contacts within Yemen's various governmental organizations in order to conduct liaison and obtain timely and useful information in matters pertaining to the security of Palm Yemen Staff. Can communicate effectively with local and foreign staff, colleagues and counterparts. All other duties as assigned by a manager or supervisor.	\$600 US Dollar (Gross)
Lady Receptionist	Perform in a pleasant, professional, and efficient manner, a combination of duties mainly related, but not limited to, check-in and checkout of guests which contributes to an overall positive experience. Greets, registers, and assigns rooms to guests. Issues room key and escort instructions to Bell person or directly to guest as appropriate. Transmits and receives messages using equipment such as telephone, fax, and switchboard. Answers inquiries pertaining to hotel services, registration of guests and shopping, dining, entertainment and travel directions. Keeps records of room availability and guests' accounts. All other duties as assigned by a manager or supervisor.	\$400 US Dollar (Gross)
Hospitality Support Specialist (Waitress)	Presents menu, answers questions and makes suggestions regarding food and service. Writes order on check or memorizes it. Relays and/or enters order into POS system for the kitchen and serves courses from kitchen and service bars. Observes guest to fulfill any additional request and to perceive when meal has been completed. Totals bill and accepts payment or refers patron to cashier. May ladle soup, toss salads, portion pies, and desserts, brew coffee, and perform other services as determined by establishment size and practice. May clear and reset counters or table at conclusion of each course. All other duties as assigned by a manager or supervisor.	\$410 US Dollar (Gross)
Inventory Specialist	Compiles and maintains records of quantity, type, and value of assets, material, equipment, merchandise, or supplies stocked in an establishment: Counts assets, material, equipment, merchandise, or supplies in house and posts totals to inventory records, manually or using a computer database. Proper control of the physical inventory will add to a positive guest and staff experience. All other duties as assigned by a manager or supervisor.	\$410 US Dollar (Gross)
Human Resource Coordinator	A human resource coordinator is an executive responsible for carrying out several tasks related to administration. He/ She is a coordinator for all important functions such as hiring and recruiting, and development, maintaining employee records, etc. Generally, the coordinator works under the supervision of the human resource director. The coordinator is also responsible for consulting with managers and supervisors about company policies and procedures. The coordinator helps employees and their managers in performance and disciplinary matters. He/ She may even propose and develop a set of rules that would monitor the discipline and work of workers. The job also includes consulting with practice managers regarding employee turnover, absenteeism, changes in work settings, employee motivation and recognition, and other employee-related aspects. His/her responsibility also includes assessing, sieving, and interviewing candidates for available positions; and making referrals of well-qualified and skillful applicants to the respective department managers. Other tasks assigned to him/her include carrying out field interview campaigns and advertising, arranging for all essentials needed for the recruitment drive, coordinating work with other staff members, determining employee performance appraisals and developing plans and strategies for recruitment. All other duties as assigned by a manager or supervisor.	\$650 US Dollar (Gross)

Interested Qualified applicants can send CV to hr.recruiter@palmymen.com
Deadline: 15 days after the date of published.



Vacancy Announcement

Vacancy Notice No.: UNFPA/FTA/2014/01

Post Title: Programme Associate

Contract Type: Fixed Term Appointment

Post Level: GS-6

Duty Station: UNFPA Country Office, Sana'a

Duration: One year initially with possibility for renewal subject to satisfactory performance

Job Purpose

Under the direct supervision of the Assistant Representative, the Programme Associate supports the design, planning and management of UNFPA's country programme by providing and managing data inputs, providing logistical support, monitoring project implementation and following up on recommendations. The Programme Associate applies established systems and procedures and assists in the creation of substantive knowledge by compiling, synthesizing and analyzing information relevant to population and development, reproductive health and gender issues. S/he is instrumental in facilitating programme/ project implementation using and developing appropriate mechanisms and systems and ensuring compliance with established procedures.

Duties and Responsibilities:

- In coordination with national counterparts and project personnel, guides routine implementation of assigned projects, coordinating delivery of project inputs, ensuring participation of national counterparts in training activities and study tours.
- Provides logistical support to projects by coordinating review meetings and other project related workshops and events. Trains and guides project personnel and staff on national execution and programme policies and procedures.
- Contributes to creation and sharing of knowledge by synthesizing and documenting findings and lessons learned, success stories and best practices, strategies and approaches of the CO, and drafting relevant materials for dissemination.
- Supports monitoring of project and programme activities, conducting field visits, and preparing regular inputs to status and progress reports. Analyzes basic factors affecting the achievement of results, recommends corrective actions and follows up on recommendations.
- Supports advocacy and resource mobilization efforts of the CO by compiling and synthesizing relevant background material for use in discussions and public events. Provides assistance in organizing and conducting donor meetings and public information events.
- Drafts correspondences and translation of relevant documents. Liaises constantly with the Operations Unit for the inputs and appropriate programme/project implementation.
- Processes mandatory and budgetary revisions, analyzes data from project delivery reports; compares with the official data; maintains documents and work plans for the monitoring of project implementation, files data and information for easy follow-up.
- Prepares together with NPOs financial estimates and reflects them in budgets; monitors expenditures;
- Processes the closure of financially and operationally completed programmes/projects.
- Takes proactive role in planning and contributes to programme and office portfolio-related advocacy events (workshops), including preparation of inputs for the CO website, brochure and periodic newsletters.
- Any other tasks assigned by the management relevant to the job portfolio.

Minimum Qualifications

- University degree in development, social science; management or any other relevant fields.
- Extended experience (3 Years) in programme/project management and development issues at the national or international level.
- Excellent knowledge of computer and Internet use including mastery of word processing.
- Excellent drafting and communication skills.
- Good knowledge of English Language.
- Knowledge of Arabic language is required

Required Competencies

- Values:** Integrity, commitment, embracing diversity, embracing change.
- Core Competencies:** Achieving results, accountability, developing and applying professional expertise, analytical and strategic thinking, working in teams, communicating for impact.
- Required skills set:** Providing a technical support system; facilitating quality programmatic results; providing logistical support; managing documents correspondence and reports; managing information and work flow; planning, organizing and multitasking; supporting financial data analysis.

UNFPA offers an attractive compensation package commensurate with qualifications and work experience. UNFPA offers equal opportunities however qualified females are strongly encouraged to apply. This post is open to applicants of Yemen nationality only.

Please send your application quoting the vacancy number with covering letter including P11 FORM which can be downloaded from the below link: <http://yemen.unfpa.org/P11.doc> to Vacancies.yemen@unfpa.org or to UNFPA Address below:

UNFPA Faj Attan behind Alwi al-Salami residence
P.O. Box 7272, Sana'a

Deadline for applications: **11 September 2014**.
Please note that only short listed candidates will be considered and notified.



(ولا تحسبن الذين قتلوا في سبيل الله أمواتا بل أحياء عند ربهم يرزقون)

الفاتحة

بقلوب مؤمنة بقضاء الله

نتقدم بأحر التعازي وأصدق المواساة القلبية
إلى الأخ/

الشيخ/ بكيل صالح غلاب وأخوانه

وذلك في إستشهاد والدهم

اللواء الشيخ/ صالح محمد غلاب

على يد عناصر الغدر والخيانة في مدينة يريم

سائلين المولى عز وجل أن يتغمد الفقيد بواسع رحمته وأن يسكنه فسيح جناته
ويلهم أهله وذويه الصبر والسلوان

المعزون

صالح محمد الخلاقي

توفيق عبدالله السعيد

مصطفى محمد فرحان غلاب



بفضله تميتكم

Republic of Yemen
Public Finance Modernization Project (PFMP)
General Procurement Notice for
Expression of Interest for the consultancy of
Public Procurement System Assessment # 11/C.3.3/CS/IC/ /PFMP-AF/15
(Individual Consultant)
Grant No. (H8470).

1. Introduction

The Government of Yemen under the Public Finance Modernization Project (PFMP) has received a grant from the International Development Association (IDA) and intends to use part of the grant's proceeds to pay, for the consultancy work required to assess the existing public procurement system in Yemen and train HATC staff on monitoring and evaluation process in order to assess the impact of reforms initiative and detect problems of reform and take the remedial action.

2. Background

The Government of the Republic of Yemen has adopted the National Reform Agenda (NRA). Procurement reform process started in 2006 with the help of many donor organisations in the legislative reform context, a new National Procurement Law (NPL) No (23) for the year 2007 was adopted in August 2007. Efforts were made during the preparation of the new law by the Government Officials, World Bank, and other funding institutions to bring up the NPL provisions to a level compatible to the international procurement practices. Moreover, the Executive By-Law (EBL) was also issued in 2009 to supplement the NPL and establish the detailed procurement process. Further development were also achieved in the legal, organisational, and transparency and integrity of the system, including preparation of procurement manuals, standard bidding documents, re-establishment of the High Tender Board (HTB) and Tender Committees (TCs) in more autonomous and transparent criterion, and capacity building and training. Some new organizations were also established to monitor and supervise the procurement process, and fighting corruption i.e. the High Authority for Tender Control (HATC), and Supreme National Authority to Combat Corruption (SNACC). Although the completed reforms are seen to have contributed to the development of the public procurement systems in Yemen, yet institutional strengthening, capacity building, legislative improvement, technological development, public sector development, and integrity enhancement should take place in the years to come to ensure soundness and sustainability of the system. Considering these challenges, a lot of efforts and funding will be required to bring up the system to the desired level. Mainly for any future development i the assessment of the current status of the system elements, benchmarking the system against well-established indicators, and establishing a tool for future assessments against these indicators to identify the progress made and identify the gaps which need to be bridged.

The current consultancy services aim at addressing this requirement through recruitment of an independent consultant who will establish the benchmarking of the system and develop the appropriate tool for future monitoring and evaluation.

The consulting service is also part of HATC capacity building to ensure the enforcement of the law; it aims at improving the existing public procurement system in Yemen,

3. Objectives

The main objective of the consultancy services under consideration is to assess the existing public procurement system in Yemen and train HATC staff on the process to enable HATC conduct future monitoring and evaluation to assess the impact of any reform initiatives and detect problems of reform so that remedial action could be taken.

4. Deliverables:

- The consultant shall submit the following reports in English and Arabic:
1. An inception report that includes a well-timed work plan for subsequent deliverables.
2. Preliminary Assessment Report on the findings of the overall assessment of the PPS.
3. Final Assessment Report incorporating Client's comments on the preliminary Assessment Report.

5. Qualifications of the Consultant and Personnel.

The consultant should be a professional qualified procurement specialist with the following minimum qualifications and experiences:

- Have an advanced degree in Business, Law, engineering or any other relevant major;
- At least 15 years of experience in procurement
- Excellent knowledge of public procurement system assessments according to internationally recognized standards;
- In-depth knowledge and hands-on experience in public procurement systems.
- Previous consulting services experience
- Fluency in Arabic for verbal and written communication, English language proficiency will be a plus.

The Consultant will be selected in accordance with the procedures set out in the World Bank's Guidelines: "Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank Borrowers, May 2004 (revised October 2006, & May 2010)."

Interested consultant may obtain further information at the address below or send an email to the e-mail address: procurement@pfmpyemen.org. Expressions of interest accompanied with the supporting documents must be delivered to the below address by 11/09/2014.

Mr. Othman Alsefyani
Executive Director
Public Finance Modernization Project(PFMP)
Abu Dhabi St, Sana'a.
P.O. Box: 5823/4
Tel: [+967-1 504168] Fax: [+967-1 243038]

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وهنا تسعى "إذاعة يمن تايمز" لتعزز من دور مؤسساتها الإعلامية المستقلة لتصل إلى كل من لا تصل إليه عبر صحيفتها لتكون من الإذاعات الرائدة في اليمن التي جعلت من الحياد والاستقلال سياسة خاصة لها مواصلة بذلك سمعتها الحسنة التي استطاعت أن تفرضها من خلال سياسة الصحيفة على الرغم من عدم وجود قوانين منظمة لعمل الإذاعات الخاصة في اليمن.

أهدافنا

يعمل "راديو يمن تايمز" على طرح وجهات نظر جديدة وموضوعات هامة للجمهور اليمني ويعايش قضايا المواطنين الذين يجيدون اللغة الانجليزية والعربية والألمين بشكل مباشر. ويسعى أيضا لإيجاد فضاءات جديدة لحرية الرأي والتعبير في اليمن عامة وفي العاصمة صنعاء خاصة ليكون راديو يمن تايمز «صوت من لا صوت لهم» وليعزز مفاهيم الديمقراطية وحرية الرأي والتعبير من خلال دوراته البرمجية المتنوعة التي تعالج قضايا المرأة والطفل وحقوق الإنسان وتدافع عن الحريات بواسطة إعلامها الهادف وبرامجها المتعددة والتي تخاطب بشفافية وموضوعية كل مستمعيها وتتسم بروح شبابية وإيجابية واضحة لكل من يتابعها سواء سكان صنعاء أو اليمن.

التأسيس

"راديو يمن تايمز" هو أول إذاعة مجتمعية في صنعاء، حيث بدأ العمل في هذا المشروع في بداية 2012، والذي كان تأسيسه من أهم رؤى مؤسس يمن تايمز الراحل، البروفسور عبد العزيز السقاف. ولذلك سعت الأستاذة / نادية السقاف رئيس تحرير صحيفة يمن تايمز إلى تحقيق فكرة المؤسس الراحل، من خلال تأسيس راديو يمن تايمز بمشاركة الكثير من المتطوعين والداعمين ومن آمن بأهمية الإعلام المستقل ودور الإذاعات المجتمعية. وتعد إذاعة يمن تايمز جزء من مشروع أصواتنا، و هو برنامج دولي يدعم تأسيس الإذاعات المجتمعية في دول الربيع العربي. حيث يتمحور هذا البرنامج حول العرب الذين سعوا لأن تكون أصواتهم المستقلة مسموعة، بعيداً عن الاحتكارات الحكومية، أو التجارية، بحيث تكون نقطة انطلاق جديدة لكل من يريد الخوض في تجربة الإذاعات المجتمعية المستقلة.

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Politics of Qat: The Role of a Drug in Ruling Yemen

By Peer Gatter

Book review and extracts
Nadia Al-Sakkaf

The cover page shows an old man with an apprehensive look in his eyes, half-smiling as he hands you a bunch of qat leaves. In the background there is a wild-eyed teenage boy, cheeks swollen from the qat that fills them, peering into the camera.

This 862 page hard-cover book published by Reichert Publications is a weap-

on in all senses of the word. Besides documenting the ever growing role qat plays in Yemen and in the life of Yemenis, the book also analyses Yemen's qat policy, the tribal qat economy, and the qat connections of our decision makers.

I had this huge publication lying by my bedside for months before I summoned the courage to pick it up and start reading. This was not only due to its intimidating size, but probably even more so due to its

topic. Qat, and the political and economic schemes around it, were to me as a Yemeni always a well-known problem. I just was too afraid to read for myself and acknowledge how I as a citizen am part of a society that enables this culture of qat.

I don't chew Qat and personally I am ardently opposed to it. But I live in a society where Qat prevails. After years of research, Peer Gatter, the author of this book, published it in 2012, offering to the

world an insight into this drug and what it has done to my country. Gatter was working for many years for the World Bank and UNDP in Yemen and is now heading the Integrated Expert Program for Afghanistan of the German Development Cooperation (GIZ-CIM).

To read more about the book go to www.qat-yemen.com



PART 12

The long awaited conference on qat-2002

In order to gain control over the qat debate, the government decided to hold a "First National Conference on Qat" on rather short notice. In its Order No. 43 of July 1999, the cabinet decreed that the event should take place in October or November of the same year with technical and financial assistance of international donor agencies. The decree designated the Ministry of Planning and Development and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation as executors of the order.

Upon a subsequent decision by President Saleh the tribally dominated Shura Council was to oversee the preparation of the conference. Thus, in October 1999 the three-member steering committee for the conference held its first session. It was comprised of Ahmad Muhammad Sufan, minister of planning and development, and Ahmad Salim Al-Jabali, minister of agriculture and irrigation, and was headed by Abd Al-Aziz Abd Al-Ghani, president of the Shura Council. Following this meeting a secretariat was instated to prepare for the conference with technical support of the World Bank and under the guidance of Abd Al-Rahman Tarmum, the vice minister of planning and development. As a realistic date for holding the conference, April of the following year was targeted.

Growing political resistance to a conference on qat

Due to the delicate nature of the subject, the organizers of the conference had initially gone about with great caution. The aim of the conference was not publicized, progress reports only circulated internally, and even among donors supporting the event the subject was discussed behind closed doors. At the Ministry of Planning and Development, a conference secretariat was set up on the minister's floor as a unit of the vice minister's office.

Despite these precautions, the preparations for the qat conference did not go unnoticed. The organizers soon began to face severe opposition from farmer associations, tribal groupings, and even from within the government. Threats were received and anti-foreign sentiment grew strong.

Before long, members of the steering committee came under pressure in their political constituencies and suffered verbal attacks for their support of the conference. The issue surfaced in parliamentary debates and created heated discussions, particularly in the tribally dominated Shura Council. Just too many parliamentarians and council members were involved in qat farming and thus concerned that the outcome of the conference could give the national and international opponents of qat arguments for a prohibition or regulation of the trade and cultivation of the drug. In the Shura Council—many of whose delegates are sheikhs—the question was raised on why the Ministry of Planning and Development was pushing so hard for this conference and why Abd Al-Aziz Abd Al-Ghani, the council's president, was serving as its chairman.

Saleh withdraws his support for the conference

Initially supportive of a conference on qat, President Saleh withdrew his backing once the economic cri-

sis of the late 1990s had been overcome. This change of mind occurred sometime during late 2000. When in January 2001 the head of a United Nations agency paid a visit to Yemen and eagerly asked the president about progress in preparing for the conference, Saleh declared rather undiplomatically and in sharp words that qat was solely a Yemeni concern and "not a problem." He praised the positive impact of the crop on Yemen's rural economy and on the livelihood of farmers.

Having come under immense pressure and having reportedly received instructions from President Saleh and some influential sheikhs to end the qat debates in the Shura Council, Abd Al-Ghani changed camps in late 2000 and took sides with the opponents of the symposium. He did this without resigning from his post of chairman of the qat conference and remained thus in a prime position to counteract and delay the efforts of the conference's secretariat.

Yet, when the conference eventually happened, led by the minister of planning and development, the minister surprisingly won President Saleh's patronage for the event despite his earlier opposition. Possibly due to the angry opposition of the tribes, Saleh was sharp enough not to make a personal appearance and contented himself with addressing an open letter to the conference participants in a very reserved and cautious wording.

In his letter addressed to the participants Saleh gave witness of a distanced position and implied that this affair was neither his, nor a domestic problem, but rather one with roots in Israel. "As you hold your conference on qat," his introductory statement read, "we would like to stress the importance that the resolutions and recommendations reached... should incorporate scientific and practical approaches to this social phenomenon that has a great impact on the economic, social, and health domains."

The conference takes place against all odds

Two years elapsed and the morale of donors concerning the qat conference was at its lowest when the minister of planning and development surprised the international community with a public announcement. On a state visit to Japan in January 2002, Sufan was confronted by his Asian counterpart with the qat question and spontaneously declared that Yemen was more than ever determined to hold this symposium—"it will take place within two months time!" When the news broke in Yemen, there was bewilderment in large parts of government and relief in Yemen's donor community that all the efforts had not been in vain.

Upon his return to Yemen, Sufan summoned a meeting of the steering committee that was hosted at the house of the Shura Council's president. The three-day debating session was held in Abd Al-Ghani's spacious mafraj amid many qat chews. Apart from Sufan and Abd Al-Ghani, a number of influential sheikhs of the Shura Council were present, as well as the minister of agriculture and irrigation, Ahmad Salim Al-Jabali, the vice minister of planning and development, Abd Al-Rahman Tarmum, and members of the conference secretariat. Abd Al-Ghani declared that he had received high orders to end the qat debate with all its foreign in-



Free qat handouts secure a high voter turnout in Yemen's elections.

volvement.

"Qat is an issue touching nothing but the Yemeni people and Yemeni culture. We have to discuss what is benefitting the Yemeni nation and the national economy. We do not care what the World Bank wants or what Al-Azhar in Cairo says, this is a Yemeni issue. There is no way we can enter a discussion that may lead to a religious ruling against qat. This is very dangerous for all of us."

As Abd Al-Ghani refused to hold his or the Shura Council's protective hand over the event, the debate ended rather frigidly. When standing in the courtyard and waiting for their drivers, Sufan turned to Tarmum and Al-Jabali and said "Abd Al-Ghani and his people in the Shura Council are cowards. If they do not dare to raise the qat issue we will go our own way." On the following day, Sufan reduced the inflated steering committee to two members only—the minister of water and environment and himself and won the blessing of Prime Minister Abd Al-Qadir Bajamal who agreed to hold the opening address.

On Sufan's initiative a second cabinet decree on qat was passed (No. 66 for 2002, dated March 5, 2002) instructing the Ministry of Planning and Development to carry out the conference in the first week of April of that year. He even secured the patronage of Saleh who sent someone to read his keynote address instead of showing up personally.

Under heavy security measures the conference finally took place on April 6-7, 2002 in the Sana'a Police Officer's Club with an unexpected level of participation. Invitations had gone out to more than 400 government agencies, NGOs, political parties, universities and research centers, private sector enterprises, farming communities, diplomatic missions, and international organizations. Nearly 800 people attended the opening ceremony—including many members of cabinet.

Only few high-ranking Yemeni politicians were absent, among them the ousted chairman of the conference secretariat, Abd Al-Ghani, and Sheikh Al-Ahmar, speaker of parliament and leader of Yemen's mighty Hashid tribal confederation. The

organizers put a great emphasis on holding an unbiased conference and its official aim was thus carefully defined as "creating awareness on the positive and negative impacts of the qat phenomenon among representatives of public opinion in rural and urban areas and to design a strategic national vision to gradually alleviate the negative impact of qat for a promising future."

In his opening speech, Prime Minister Bajamal called qat a problem that has entered the fabric of community relations and dates back more than 700 years. He labeled the holding of the conference a clear priority for his administration and called upon the political class to stop criticizing the government for its idleness regarding qat, when in fact the administration was carefully and quietly studying the problem. Bajamal admitted that this problem could not be solved by administrative orders, owing in part to the material interests that dominate the continuous expansion of qat cultivation as a result of the immense financial returns.

Ahmad Muhammad Sufan, the minister of planning and development, declared in his address that "at no time in the past have there been official government dealings [on qat] elevated to the current public level." According to his assessment this was "due to the lack of desire on the part of political and societal leaders in our country over the past decades and centuries to confront people's reactions, whether they support or oppose the use and cultivation of qat."

The conference was divided into three consecutive working sessions: The first addressed the relationship between qat, public health, environment and society; the second session focused on the role of qat in agriculture and its effect on water resources; and the third session dealt with the linkages between qat and Yemen's many members of cabinet.

The panel of discussants was quite diverse and was comprised of scientists, politicians, technocrats, members of NGOs such as the Yemeni Women Union, representatives of the Agricultural Credit Bank, and delegates of farmer unions. The au-

dience was also well selected in an attempt to mirror Yemen's society. Representatives from all governorates including civil society organizations, academics, labor union representatives, medical doctors, members of parliament with different political affiliations, journalists, religious dignitaries, military and police leaders, and women activists were present. Even a number of qat farmers and qat merchants had been invited. The discussions were lively. They were based on the studies prepared two years earlier that were distributed as books to all participants.

Qat chewing was prohibited during the conference and a number of chewers who had brought along their qat in anticipation of a long day, had to grumpily abstain from the habit. On the second conference day some staunch chewers came better prepared bringing along pre-chewed qat leaves in little plastic bags, and slipped small quantities into their cheeks in moments they believed to be unobserved.

Views of qat advocates and opponents

The opponents of qat stressed that the drug has a considerable impact on health and results in an overuse of pesticides. Qat, they claimed, was wasting people's incomes and has a negative impact on family welfare. Most chewers deprive their families of vegetables and fruits for the sake of buying qat. Qat also leads to a waste of time and a neglect of family duties. It is at the root of corruption and causes laziness among civil servants. The crop is further competing in many highland areas with the population for precious water resources and has replaced traditional cash crops such as grapes, almonds, and coffee for which Yemen is famous. As qat has expanded at the cost of food crops, it affects the nation's food security.

Views in favor of qat recalled that it supports the rural economy and is thus improving the standard of living of many farmers and merchants. It has alleviating effects on rural-urban migration and is improving the infrastructure by financing roads and electricity networks. Qat advocates stressed that 20 percent of Yemen's

workforce depend on qat and that the crop generates 16 percent of the country's GDP. Qat cultivation does also not have a negative impact on the economy, since the value added by qat is much higher than that of any other crop it has replaced. Qat lobbyists also pointed out that there was no scientific evidence for any negative impact of qat chewing on Yemen's economy and none on its impact on health. Experiments with rats cannot prove its danger for humans. Qat can thus not be held responsible for health problems, unless overused. If overused, they reasoned, any other food item could be a threat to health. Proponents of the drug said that there were no social alternatives to qat consumption and in order to prevent people from using addictive and dangerous drugs, qat must remain legal. Overall, chewing creates social harmony among Yemenis.

It would be wrong to assume that all discussants highlighting positive aspects of qat were necessarily propagating its cultivation and spread.

A highlight in the debate was the mention of qat-based soft drinks produced in England. A cheerful murmur came from among the audience and excited interjections were heard.

A Dhamar tribesman jumped up in one of the discussion rounds and shouted, "if you make a law against qat, I will come with my people and kill you in your beds while you are asleep, together with your children and wives." In the uneasy silence that followed, the chairman of the session asked him whether he was aware of what he was saying and that he could be arrested for this. The farmer mumbled an excuse into his beard and sat down. During lunch break, the tribal participants withdrew to discuss on how to react if the recommendations of the conference would call for a control of qat cultivation. It never came to this, since Prime Minister Bajamal ended the conference abruptly with a brief closing address without any recommendations having been presented.

Whether this was deliberate or simply an error in protocol coordination between the prime minister and the conference secretariat was left to speculation. The recommendations were hastily distributed to the crowd that was quickly flocking out of the building to hasten to the qat markets.

Recommendations of the conference

The discussants, seconded by the vivid participation of the audience, produced a listing of very concrete policy recommendations for the government. These included among others the need to (a) create public awareness of the effects of qat, (b) promote alternative leisure activities, (c) rationalize water and pesticide use in qat agriculture, (d) promote and develop high value crops as alternatives to qat, (e) improve marketing facilities for other crops, (f) confine qat sales to special markets, (g) revise the current agricultural credit policy in order to award credits to small holders and help farmers to adopt modern irrigation techniques, (h) reform the taxation of qat and strengthen tax collection mechanisms, (i) provide stronger support to the Qat Research Unit, and (j) establish a committee within the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation that is to develop and put into place a national strategy on qat.



Yemen's Brain Drain

Dr. Murad Alazzany and
Professor Robert Sharp

Intelligent, well-educated and experienced individuals constitute a precious resource to any society, but are particularly crucial to Yemen as it seeks to implement the outcomes of its National Dialogue Conference. The country's fight to retain human capital and avoid "brain drain" is vital, as a loss of talent and minds will pose a serious threat to its political transition and development. Talented and intelligent people provide valuable role models to Yemen's youth who must be in-

spired to stay and work in their home country.

Many countries, especially industrialized and richer ones, go to great lengths to attract qualified people from abroad to support their development and economic performance. Meanwhile, economically less advantaged countries, which see their already precarious economic and social conditions deteriorating, try to stop the brain drain by stepping up incentives offered to their skilled and talented labor force.

Brain drain commonly describes the movement of high-skilled individuals from poor to rich countries.

The most famous example, more ideological than economic, is Albert Einstein, who left his native Germany to work in and for America, becoming a US citizen in 1940. Further historic examples include the brain drain from Europe between 1933 and 1943 and more recently the brain drain from the Eastern Bloc—mainly from the former Soviet Union—which occurred in response to the region's communism between 1922 and 1961.

Most recently brain drain is becoming a problem in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and India.

Continued on the backpage



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Yemen fuel subsidy cuts hit poor hardest



Although the government promised it would redirect savings made from cutting subsidies to welfare payments for the poor, cash hand-outs have been delayed and many continue to go without social welfare support.

IRIN
First published Aug. 25

A sharp increase in fuel prices threatens to plunge hundreds of thousands of Yemenis into poverty and food insecurity in the Arab world's poorest country—particularly if regular welfare payments to Yemen's poorest people continue to be dispersed erratically, aid organizations have warned.

The government's decision to slash fuel subsidies has set off a wave of discontent, with major protests in the capital Sana'a over the past week calling for the cuts to be reversed and the government to be dissolved.

While the cuts were widely seen as a necessary step in order to avoid economic meltdown, a government commitment to use the savings to boost welfare spending has so far not materialized, with the welfare payments over six months late.

Fuel subsidies are among the few widely available social goods in Yemen, and are said to keep down the cost of transport, water, and food, while supporting local industry. But they have also proven extremely expensive in recent years, costing \$3-3.5 billion in 2013, more than a fifth of all state spending, during a period when the government has moved heavily into the red, running successive record deficits and leaning heavily on financing from the increasingly saturated local banking sector.

In July, the government in-

creased the price of gasoline by 60 percent and diesel by 95 percent as part of a package of reforms aimed at unlocking foreign funding and easing pressure on the budget, which has seen growing deficits since the country's 2011 youth-led uprising. The decision sparked major protests in Sana'a while the price of transport and bread have risen at least 20 percent in recent weeks.

In an internal document seen by IRIN, Yemen's Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation estimates that the decision to cut fuel subsidies could lead to an additional 500,000 Yemenis falling under the headline. More than half Yemen's population—in excess of 12.5 million people—currently lives in poverty.

Payments delayed

To prevent such a disastrous situation the government had promised to redirect any savings made from cutting subsidies—which historically benefited the country's wealthiest people—towards welfare payments for the poorest. Sana'a announced in early August that it would add 250,000 people to the list of those receiving unconditional cash transfers from the Social Welfare Fund (SWF)—the state-run body that organizes the payments—bringing the total number of people covered by the fund to 1.75 million. Individuals would receive quarterly handouts up to YR12,000 (\$56).

But SWF, which is supported by a number of foreign governments and international institutions including the World Bank, has not

made regular payments to its beneficiaries since the beginning of the year, SWF officials confirmed to IRIN. In early August the fund finally made its first payment in 2014, providing people with money that was due in January.

Who is responsible for the delay is a matter of dispute, with Abdulkarim Salah, director of policy at SWF, telling IRIN that budgetary shortfalls were to blame. "The Finance Ministry does not have enough money to pay [SWF] so our payments have been delayed," he said, adding that they had received assurances from the Finance Ministry that the cash required to make the next two quarterly payments should be made available within the next month. "We are not sure if it will come," he added, however.

This is despite increased support from Yemen's oil-rich neighbor Saudi Arabia, which is believed to have provided the country with several hundred million dollars specifically to cover the costs of the payments in June. Although government sources have informally confirmed that Riyadh provided \$2 billion in assistance, the Sana'a government has not publicly confirmed the influx of cash, in part so as not to raise expectations in the civil service or among ordinary Yemenis.

"The agreement was that the increase in fuel prices would be compensated by an increase in grants to the poorest Yemenis through the Social Welfare Fund" says Julien Harneis, the UN children's rights and emergency relief organization (UNICEF) represen-

tative in Yemen. "But the SWF payments haven't been regular. That is obviously a big issue."

"We don't have enough to eat"

On a recent afternoon in the up-market Hadda district of Sana'a, the impact of the late payments was laid bare. At 2 PM Houria Hamoud, a 55-year-old mother of eight, was sitting outside the home of a Yemeni businessman known for giving handouts of cash and food to the poor. She had been there since 7 AM, and the businessman was yet to appear.

"We don't have enough to eat," she said, pointing out that her husband's heart condition made it impossible for him to find regular work. "We try to collect food from restaurants or on the street [but] the situation has become worse and worse. We used to get some money from the government, but these last few months there has been nothing."

The increase in the fuel price, she said, meant that what little money she was able to earn from begging was stretched even thinner, leading her to make tough choices. "[My children] just started school again," she said. "They need bags, shoes, and I have no money. I told my daughters to stop school because we cannot afford even stationery for them."

The increase is also impacting farmers, who account for the bulk of jobs in rural Yemen—still home to more than 60 percent of the population. Before the subsidy was cut, Yemen faced severe fuel shortages, and diesel was largely

absent from the official fuel market, with many farmers—who use the fuel for tractors and water pumps—turning to the black market for fuel. By liberalizing the fuel price, the government effectively brought the cost of diesel to parity with black market prices.

"During Ramadan, many farmers didn't plough their fields because they couldn't afford the cost of the diesel and even if they could they couldn't afford the cost of water for irrigation," said Colette Fearon, Yemen country director for Oxfam. "Farmers are planting less, and that is really translating to less employment, to the shops taking a hit because people have less money."

Higher prices for basic commodities during a period of diminished economic activity will cause many of Yemen's poorest people to begin selling off what few assets they have including livestock that could be a future source of income, UNICEF's Harneis says. Many of the country's poor already sold off what little they had in 2011 and 2012, with organizations like UNICEF and Oxfam only just beginning to help people rebuild. "That's why it's so important that the SWF money comes in," Harneis says. "If it does, people will be able to feed their families, pay for medical services, and keep their children school. If it doesn't it is the children who will suffer."

Safety net preparations lacking

SWF and local and international NGOs have generally been sup-

portive of the subsidy cuts but have questioned the speed with which the cut was made and the lack of preparations made to ensure the necessary safety nets were in place. During discussions with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in May for a \$560 million loan, the government agreed to cut the subsidy by between 20 and 40 percent as part of a phased programme of cuts, starting in October. IMF had pushed the government to start easing the subsidy earlier so as to ease its financing requirements for the year, but had not requested a deeper initial cut.

"We knew that this had to happen, and I am not surprised by the increase," Salah says. "But we had talked to the Finance Ministry, the Planning Ministry, and the World Bank about it and we didn't expect this big of an increase."

Due to the rising cost of living, even if regular payments are made by SWF, they will not be enough to cover basic living costs, added Salah, who for some time has advocated an increase in the welfare payment. "The principle of this fund, when it was set up in 1996, was to help people buy basic items," he said. "But year on year, prices have gone up. We negotiated with the government to increase the money we dispersed [by 50 percent] but there has been no response from the government side, and now they want to increase the number of people covered by 250,000 even when we have no money."

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The Two Types of Reading and Their Benefits (Part 1)

By JAMES M. SUTTON

In this series of articles, we shall focus on two primary types of reading that the majority of the population in the world partakes in. In general, when we read, we either read for academic stimulation or we read for pleasure. Anything that we pick up to read has one of those two main purposes. You might see two people pick up the exact same newspaper and they will both leave with a completely different understanding of everything that they just read based on their intentions of reading that newspaper. You will see one person just picked up the newspaper to read because he was bored and felt like having something a bit entertaining to waste his time with. The other person picked up the newspaper because he is truly trying to find out what the problems in the world today are. Moreover, he might even be reading the newspaper to practice new language that he learned in the classroom. However, the focus here is on how we can actually benefit from these two types of reading.

The most ignored form of reading in the world today is the reading for academic stimulation. By the term 'reading for academic stimulation,' I mean reading to learn and increase one's intelligence. This type of reading is done by a person reading books on subjects he has no prior knowledge of. It is a kind of journey out into the unknown depths of darkness to uncover some hidden knowledge that is buried deep in the realms of ignorance. It is the metaphorical meaning put forth by Robert Frost in his most famous poem "A Road Not Taken," in which he came to the conclusion in the end that the journey into the deep abyss of the unknown was in fact the reason for the change in his life. People, in general, are creatures of habit; and this is what normally gets us into the most trouble. We look for habit in an ever-changing environment. We look for comfort in a world full of trials and tribulations. For this group of people, the comfort they seek is the comfort of ignorance.

"Ignorance is bliss," or so they say. For some it is the highest form of bliss. How can one enjoy oneself knowing that he has to work

hard to procure knowledge that has been hidden from the majority of the masses? How can one enjoy oneself knowing that the only way for him to increase his level of knowledge about the problems of the world is to delve deep into a sea of understanding that, from clear observation, has no bottom to its deep chasm full of darkness that seems to go on for eternity? Why give up my prudent life of gallivanting around the world in search of entertaining ways of wasting my time only to bring on the unneeded stress of trying to solve the world's problems? This is clearly what is meant through Plato's 'Allegory of the Cave.'

In 'the Allegory of the Cave,' which is found in Plato's 'the Republic,' Plato clearly lays out an exact description of a people steeped in ignorance. He tells a story of a people living in the earth in a dark cave. They have light provided from a fire behind them and above them. Between them and the fire they have a wall built that casts shadows which are then used to entertain them. As people cast shadow puppets on the wall they also add their own voice. This in turn causes the people

in the cave to actually think that these shadows are real living beings (kind of like TV in our days, wouldn't you think?). Because of their lack of understanding of the real world, they take this unreal environment they live in as the real thing; they do not know any better. Plato then goes on to explain what would happen to these beings if they were released from this cave and let go into the sunlight to gaze on reality. These are people that were so fixated on that wall of shadows that they never even took the time to turn their head in another direction to see what else is to be found in their existence. When they get let out of their cave into reality, they will suffer from severe pain throughout their body. Their heads will ache from constant movement and their eyes will suffer dramatically from coming out of extreme darkness into the brightest of light. He even gave advice as to how to deal with these people. They should be brought out of the cave in the evening so as to feast their eyes on the moon and become accustomed to a little bit of light. As the night grows in darkness they will be accustomed to being in more light

than they were in before.

Then as the darkness of twilight begins its exit and the dim light of dawn takes center stage, the objects around them start to become clearer and clearer. The reality of their existence starts to take on a whole new meaning as the sun breaks forth over the eastern horizon. As a person from the cave is introduced to this light, he will also start to comprehend so much other information that passed him by in his cave, such as the changing of the seasons, the growing of different crops, the existence of different animals roaming the land, etc. Then the question was posed: Would he rather live in this new life toiling the land and living a life of serfdom, or return to his existence in the cave living a life of shadow puppets and an absence of reality. Of course, he would rather live his newfound existence in light even if it meant suffering than to go back to his life of darkness. There is much more in the 'Allegory of the Cave' than can be explained here due to lack of space. Readers are advised to read this and ponder deeply on the meanings of what Plato is trying to imply through his speech.

We can just now imagine a whole generation of people stuck in front of their TVs and laptops in a world of shadow puppets. They are afraid of academic stimulation because they have become so complacent while being held prisoner in their meager existence. They are afraid to break the chains that have bound them to the walls of ignorance. They fear the light of understanding and knowledge to enter their hearts and remove them from the darkness that encompasses them night and day. Even as they wander off in the bright daylight hours, you will find the darkness still encompasses them as they live in a boxed in world of ignorance. Why shall they fear light? Are they not afraid of that encompassing darkness they dwell in? This, unfortunately, is the state of many of the people we have to deal with on a daily basis. In fact, you will be hard pressed to find the people who have been released from the cave in this day and time. In the next article, we will observe some of the benefits of academic reading and how we can actually transition ourselves from a cave man's mentality to a learned man's mentality.

How to Be a successful language Learner

By RABAB AYASH

In every aspect of human life, from the professional world to family interactions, good thinkers and successful people help solve problems. So many studies have been conducted to study and analyze how successful people think and act. Many of these researches concluded that the way successful people approach the thought process is a key differentiator. Being successful is a task that needs so many work and effort to be achieved. All learners can achieve success if they have the strong willing and desire to do so. In this article, I tried to gather as many tips as I could. These tips may do nothing for you but if you truly wish to change your life for the better, and are willing to pay a price in time and thinking and effort to reach your goals — and if you're not kidding yourself — then you hold in your hands a diamond plucked from a beach of pebbles, a road map to a better future, a valuable blueprint that will enable you to completely restructure your future. Therefore, being successful is a succession of different and various strategies that are determined by each language learner to achieve the goals of every language learning task.

Now ask yourself these questions, Do I really want to be successful language learners? Then what make up a successful learner?

Good Language Learners need to own certain characteristics here are some of these characteristics:



Good language learners find their own way and take charge of their own learning. They determine the methods that are best for them as individual learners. They learn from others and experiment with different methods. They organize their study of the language, and they organize information about the language they study. They are creative. They experiment with the language and they play with grammar, words, and sounds.

Furthermore, good language learners make their own opportunities for practicing the language inside and outside of the classroom. They learn to live with uncertainty by focusing on the meaning of what they can understand, by not getting flustered, and by continuing

to talk or listen without necessarily understanding every word. They use mnemonics and other memory strategies to recall what they are learning. Good language learners make errors work for them and not against them. They use every single linguistic knowledge they have, including knowledge of their first language, in learning a second language. They use contextual clues to aid their comprehension of the language. They maximize use of all potential contexts around the language attended to for enhancing comprehension. They learn to make intelligent guesses.

Good language learners also try to learn chunks of language as wholes and formalized routines to help them perform beyond their

competence. For example, they may learn idioms, proverbs, or other phrases knowing what the whole phrase means without necessarily understanding each individual part. They learn certain tricks and make up various strategies that keep conversations going. Good language learners learn certain production techniques that also fill in the gaps in their own competence. They give no chance to pauses in their speech. They know that every conversation needs further devices beside verbal device to progress and continue going. They learn different styles of speech or writing to learn to vary their language according to the formality of the situation.

To mark an end for this long topic, I advise every language learner to start planning for his/her learning. Choose the tips that suit your needs, abilities and desires. Have your own style of learning. Develop your own learning strategies. Have confidence in yourself and your abilities. Be organized. Avoid random work. Do not leave anything stop you. Put your goals always in front of your eyes. Remind yourself of your goals constantly. Try to select your friends carefully. Do not befriend people who are always frustrated and disappointed. Finally, try to learn from successful people but avoid imitating them for they are successful because they did not imitate others and they mapped their lives by their own hands. Successful people do not try to be copies of their role models and that what made them distinguished. Dream > Plan > Do > Succeed!

A BIT OF GRAMMAR

Future Actions

By MUNEERA AL-MAHDALI

Will: We use 'will' when we decide to do something at the time of speaking. The speaker has not decided before. The party is a new idea.

Going to: we use 'going to' when we have already decided to do something. Manal has already decided to invite lots of people before she spoke.

Study the differences between will and going to:

Amal is talking to Manal

A: Let's have a party.

M: That's a great idea. We'll invite lots of people.

Later that day, Manal meets Sara:

M: Amal and I have decided to have a party.

We're going to invite lots of people.

Compare:

- 'Amal phoned while you were out.' 'Ok. I'll phone her back.'
- but**
- 'Amal phoned while you were out.' 'Yes, I know. I am going to phone her back.'
- 'Zaine is in hospital.' 'Oh really? I didn't know. I'll visit her.'
- But**
- 'Zaine is in hospital.' 'Yes, I know. I am going to visit her tomorrow.'

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Yemen's Brain Drain

While Yemen suffers from brain drain, evidence and research into the problem is spotty. According to official statistics revealed by the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the number of Yemenis holding undergraduate

and post-graduate certificates yet working in neighboring countries is almost 30,000.

Most are doctors or university professors, which is particularly disturbing considering Yemeni hospitals and universities are cur-

rently suffering from a severe lack of qualified employees. Dr. Adnan, who works at the Al-Sabaen Hospital in Sana'a, stated that most of the medical students who graduate from Sana'a University and are certified in medicine have sought jobs abroad. Rumor has it that up to 130 of Sana'a University's professors have applied for sabbatical leave abroad. Many extended their time away due to the better pay they receive outside Yemen. Some have been out of the country for ten years. The University Council was forced this year to extend their leave as there were no funds to pay those who came back last year. Dhamar University is worse: Among the three hundred university professors representing the teaching body, up to eighty are abroad with only thirty being on official sabbatical leave.

Yemen's brain drain is a real concern and directly impacts the country's deteriorating health and education services. Hisham Sharaf of the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research stated that there are many young Yemenis who were funded by the government to study abroad but never came back, preferring to settle in the countries they studied in or to seek work in the richer Gulf countries. In his

opinion, "it constitutes a waste for the country's resources and a huge loss for the government."

Brain drain will get worse in Yemen if unchecked. The following is suggested:

- **Strategy:** Draft a Yemeni human capital retention strategy and link it to foreign donations to assure funding.
- **Jobs, jobs, jobs:** Create jobs in Yemen—linked to the resource strategy—and focus the effort during the initial stages on those jobs that prevent the brain drain, then build and expand to other sectors.
- **Incentivize the brains:** Through appropriate compensation, status and recognition, make working in Yemen attractive for those highly qualified and desired doctors and professors. If you can appeal to their sense of nationalism too, you can inspire the youth to follow them and aspire to their types of employments.
- **Link education to jobs:** Link the number of positions and scholarships in higher education to achievable and funded jobs linked to the national strategy for human capital retention.

- **Engage neighboring countries:** Effective diplomacy will help reduce an unreasonable flow of brains out of Yemen and secure necessary funding.
- **Achieve a minimum wage:**

Do not forget the workers because they leave too. Government should develop a reasonable minimum wage that will provide hope for a stronger future.

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