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Clashes in capital after Houthis seize nearby village

■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A Sept. 17—The Houthis took control of Al-Qabel village in Bani Al-Harith district, north of the capital Sana'a, on Tuesday after several hours of fighting. Clashes also broke out on Tuesday evening in Shamlan area in the capital, leaving seven dead, according to Houthi sources.

On Tuesday, fighting in Al-Qabel village, which is about 15 kilometers away from Sana'a, left 16 soldiers dead and an undetermined number of civilians killed and injured, according to a high ranking official in the Security Administration of Sana'a governorate who asked not to be named.

It remains unclear what sparked the fighting. The Houthis claimed the clashes started when Islah Party members tried to drive their armed men out of the village.

The Houthis gained control of Al-Qabel village after prolonged fighting, during which seven armed Islah men and two Houthis were killed in addition to another three who were injured, according to Mohammad Al-Jarmouzi, a resident in the village.

"Sheikh Saleh Amer [the secretary of the president's military affairs adviser, Brigadier Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar] and armed Islah men threatened Houthi residents and tried to force them out of the village four days ago," Ali Al-Emad, a member in the Houthis' Political Office, told the Yemen Times on Wednesday.



Clashes erupted in Shamlan area in the capital on Wednesday, one day after the Houthis took control of Al-Qabel village, 15 km outside Sana'a.

Al-Emad said that "due to those threats, armed Houthis took precautionary measures and armed themselves just in case of confrontations. Then on Tuesday, at dawn, armed Islah men attacked the Houthis' houses. Subsequently, our fighters engaged them for several hours, during which seven armed Islah men were killed and two Houthis were killed, in addition to another two who were injured."

"After hours of fighting our armed men controlled Al-Qabel village and armed Islah men surrendered while others fled out of the area," according to Al-Emad.

After the Houthis gained control of the village they bombed Amer's house and a building in the village

belonging to the Islah Party on Tuesday evening, according to Al-Jarmouzi.

Clashes inside Sana'a

Following events in Al-Qabel village, a military convoy was ambushed by the Houthis in Shamlan area inside the capital on Tuesday evening and clashes broke out. Seven soldiers were killed in the attack, according to Houthi sources.

Al-Emad accused Ali Mohsen of dispatching the military convoy to Al-Qabel. "We were surprised by over ten army vehicles and another seven armored ones sent from Brigadier Ali Mohsen in Sana'a. But our people did not allow them to enter and killed seven and injured a lot

more, in addition to destroying five military vehicles," he said.

Neither Amer nor the Islah Party could be reached for comment.

The director of Bani Al-Harith district, Abdullaah Muharram, said the clashes in Al-Qabel village were between the Houthis and residents in the village, without mentioning Islah.

"There are around seven bodies on the street, while all the checkpoints from Shamlan area to Al-Qabel village are manned by the Houthis; there are no military personnel," he said, adding that the clashes ended at 5 PM.

Adnan Al-Asbahi, a resident in Shamlan area, said the clashes between the Houthis and Islah supporters began at 4 PM and ended late Tuesday night. According to him, stretching from Madhbaah market all the way to Shamlan bottled water factory, citizens had closed their shops and secured their homes in Shamlan until Wednesday morning, fearing the renewal of clashes.

The village of Al-Qabel, located north of Sana'a, is of special historical significance for the Houthis. It is a touristic area which contains Dar Al-Hajar, the old summer house for the Imams of the old Imamate.

The Security Administration of Sana'a refused to comment on these events.

The Houthis have besieged Sana'a since August 18, demanding the toppling of the government, the reversal of the July 30 fuel subsidy removal, and the implementation of the NDC outcomes.

Government victory claims in Al-Ghail contradicted

■ Bassam Al-Khameri

SANA'A, Sept. 16—Brigadier Adel Al-Qumeri, the commander of the Al-Jawf Command, announced on Tuesday that the military has achieved victory over the Houthis in Al-Ghail district of Al-Jawf governorate through air and land attacks.

In an interview with the independent Al-Saada Channel, Al-Qumeri said that the military is currently battling the Houthis in other parts of the governorate to prevent them

from controlling any areas in Al-Jawf, but that victory has been achieved in Al-Ghail.

However, the Yemen Times was told that "the clashes are escalating in Al-Ghail district" by Talal Al-Azani, the communications officer for the governor of Al-Jawf's Media Office.

Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthis' Political Office, also disagreed with the brigadier's statement. Al-Bukhaiti told the Yemen Times that no victory was achieved over the Houthis in Al-

Ghail district.

"Ansar Allah [the Houthis] have battled Islah members in Al-Ghail district and other areas of Al-Jawf and was able to gain control of some location in these areas," he said.

The involvement of Islah members in the fighting was refuted by Brigadier Al-Qumeri, who said, "the military, backed by the popular committees, is currently fighting against the Houthis in Al-Jawf."

Investigation into alleged shelling of residential areas

The commander's announcement came after the Defense Ministry on Monday sent a fact-finding committee to Al-Jawf to investigate the alleged shelling of residential areas in Al-Jawf by Yemen's air force.

Locals told the Yemen Times that on Sunday the air force shelled civilians twice in Al-Khalaf area of Al-Jawf's Al-Rawd district, leaving one civilian dead and six others wounded, including two women.

The Al-Jawf governor's communications officer Al-Azani told the Yemen Times that the committee, headed by Mahiob Rashad Al-Masri, head of the Military Intelligence Department, visited the shelled areas and met with victims' relatives.

Faisal Al-Aswad, a journalist based in Al-Jawf, confirmed to the Yemen Times that the committee visited the houses and residential areas shelled by the air forces to gather information.

According to Al-Azani, "the committee returned to Sana'a and will report to the air force to investigate with the pilot who shelled these areas and the information he used [which led him to target that location]. The air force will then report to President Hadi."

Abdulsalam Al-Aji, a relative of three of the victims, said that all the injured people are still in the Science and Technology Hospital in Sana'a.

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Newly appointed US ambassador holds first press conference

■ Ali Abulohoom

SANA'A, Sept. 17—Matthew H. Tueller, newly appointed US ambassador to Yemen, held his first press conference on Wednesday morning following his arrival to Sana'a at the end of May.

He was nominated as the US ambassador to Yemen by President Barack Obama in January this year. His nomination was confirmed by the US Senate and he was sworn in by Secretary of State John Kerry on May 8.

At the press conference on Wednesday Tueller expressed US views concerning the Yemen's political transition and events following the conclusion of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC), including the violence that erupted

in the capital last week.

A large part of the press conference revolved around the Houthis.

Houthi supporters set up their encampments in and around the capital almost a month ago, after the government denied its demands which included: Revocation of the fuel subsidy cuts, reshuffling of the government, and implementation of NDC outcomes.

Tueller's response in light of recent events was, "we view with grave concern the activities of Ansar Allah [the Houthis] that have led to the deterioration of the security situation in the capital. We called on all parties and all political actors to engage in serious good faith negotiation in order to resolve this matter peacefully."

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Yemen Today employees threaten protest escalation

■ **Bassam Al-Khameri**

SANA’A, Sept. 17—Employees of Yemen Today, a satellite TV channel owned by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, threatened on Wednesday to continue their protests unless their demands are met.

The employees on Monday staged a protest in front of the headquarters of the General People’s Congress (GPC) in Sana’a to demand their salaries and the resumption of the channel’s broadcast.

Yahya Al-Hadi, a broadcaster at Yemen Today, said that employees will stage protests in front of the embassies of the G10 ambassador’s countries in Sana’a on Thursday to demand their salaries and the resumption of the channel’s operations.

“The employees haven’t received salaries for two months and freelance employees haven’t received any money for five months,” he added.

Yemen Today was shut down by presidential guards on orders from President Hadi on June 11 for “inciting violence.” The shut-down followed the channel’s coverage of protests that same day, which demanded the ousting of the government.

Many local and foreign media institutions condemned the closure of the channel, saying it violates media freedom.

Al-Hadi said that the government had no reason for closing the channel, as Yemen Today did not go against the state and its national interests.

“We were neutral and covered peoples’ protests against the lack of fuel and this isn’t a reason to close the channel. We covered and supported the military in its war against Al-Qaeda in Abyan and Shabwa too,” said Al-Hadi.

Mohammed Al-Omais, the director of the channel, said that the employees have a right to protest and to demand their rights.

“Those employees are demanding salaries and the resumption of broadcast,” he added.

Al-Omais said that the owner of the channel, which he claimed to be the GPC party, agreed to provide salaries for the employees until the channel resumes broadcasting.

There are more than 250 employees working for Yemen Today.

“We are currently contacting the

owners of the channel to solve this matter because the well-trained employees of the channel may leave for other jobs if they don’t receive salaries,” added Al-Omais.

A source at the Ministry of Information spoke to the Yemen Times on condition of anonymity as he is not allowed to share information with the press. The source explained that the channel was closed due to disagreements inside the GPC.

“The Information Ministry has nothing to do with the closure of the Yemen Today channel and isn’t in charge of resuming the broadcast,” he added.

Former President Saleh met with Yemen Today’s staff on June 24, emphasizing that the channel will start operating again with its entire staff, but nothing has happened so far.

111th Brigade soldiers on strike in Abyan

■ **Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki**

SANA’A, Sept. 16—The 111th Infantry Mountain Brigade in Ahwar district of Abyan governorate has witnessed a division in the past two weeks, as two units in the brigade refuse to obey their commander’s orders to fight off Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Shaker Al-Ghadeir, an officer in the 111th Infantry Mountain Brigade, confirmed that the two regiments who are fighting armed men in the area, alleged to be AQAP members, are still refusing to obey their commander’s orders.

“The soldiers’ excuse is that the commander sends them to be easy prey for Al-Qaeda. When a patrol leaves the camp, armed men attack it and kill soldiers and no action is undertaken by the brigade’s command to protect them,” he said. “If a patrol team asked the brigade’s command for help, they send it late, thereby giving the armed men a chance to escape, and we consider this a betrayal,” added Al-Ghadeir, who supports the soldiers’ position.

Sadiq Abuallah Aamer, a soldier who opposes the commander of the brigade, echoed similar thoughts to Al-Ghadeir. “The command does not care about us and they send us on patrols in the districts where we become targets for armed AQAP members,” he said. “They kill us over and over and the command fails to do its job which is supporting us during clashes with AQAP.”

The division of the 111th Brigade follows clashes between the 3rd Battalion, which is part of the 111th Brigade, and alleged AQAP members on September 6. The fighting led to the killing of four AQAP suspects, two of whom are Saudi nationals, Ibrahim Mohammad Saleh Al-Asaery and Suliman Al-Mansaki, according to Al-Ghadeir.

“Those killed in the fighting

were identified through their ID cards, and their dead bodies were taken to the 4th Military Command in Aden governorate. Two soldiers were killed and another two were injured in the same clashes, and the brigade’s command did nothing to help,” according to Al-Ghadeir. “A large group of armed Al-Qaeda members moved from Al-Mahfad district [in Abyan governorate] to Ahwar district when the military started a military campaign against AQAP in Al-Mahfad,” added Al-Ghadeir, who is expecting clashes between the brigade and AQAP suspects soon.

The Yemen Times attempted to contact the brigade’s commander but was unable to reach him as his cellphone was switched off.

Jamal Al-Qeiz, head of the Security Department at the Defense Ministry, confirmed to the Yemen Times that it has not been reported to the ministry yet that soldiers from the 111th Infantry Mountain Brigade have refused orders for more than two weeks.

Al-Qeiz added, “the rebellion poses a serious problem because Ahwar district is one of the main areas in which AQAP has a strong presence. A month ago the brigade was backed up with a military unit from Sana’a, to support them in the fighting against AQAP.”

“When any brigade witnesses such a rebellion, the ministry sends forces from other military camps to restore security,” said Al-Qeiz.

Since 2011 Al-Mahfad and Ahwar districts are considered two of the most important strongholds of AQAP.

The 111th Brigade has been stationed in Ahwar district since 2011 and has been engaged in ongoing fighting with alleged AQAP members from May 2011 until June 2012. The brigade remained in the district after AQAP was forced out of Ahwar by a large-scale military offensive.

Negotiations ongoing between the Houthis, government

■ **Khalid Al-Karimi**

SANA’A, Sept. 16—Negotiations between the Houthis and the government will go ahead, despite obstacles, Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti told the Yemen Times.

Negotiations between both sides kicked off on Saturday, and are underway in both Sa’ada governorate and the capital.

Al-Bukhaiti, a member of Houthis’ Political Office, told the Yemen Times they initially reached an agreement to lower the price of gas to YR3,000 (\$14) per 20 liters and reform the government. “However, there have been disagreements,” he said.

“The growing escalations will exert pressure on the government to come up with solutions quickly,” Al-Bukhaiti added.

Sultan Al-Atwani, a member of parliament, said, “so far, we have been optimistic the debates between the government and the Houthi representatives will yield fruit. The only way to overcome this situation is through dialogue, not violence or weapons.”

Al-Atwani called on the Houthis to put their weapons aside and evacuate their camps in and around the capital city.

“Negotiations between the government and the Houthi representatives are ongoing and will take a long time to arrive at a consensus,” said Adenine Al-Rajehi, a Sana’a-based analyst who works with the Taiz Centre for Human Rights.

“The two sides should offer concessions so that debates would pay off. Now the situation is alarming and political bickering should be put aside,”

added Al-Rajehi.

The Yemen Times contacted Ahmed Awdh Bin Mubarak, manager of the President’s Office, several times but received no response.

Al-Rajehi clarified the delay for the negotiation process, saying, “the Houthi representatives are not happy about dividing the country into federal states. They want their region to have a sea port,” he said.

Mohammad Abdulsalam, the official spokesperson for the Houthis, said in a phone interview with the Azal satellite TV channel on September 14 that the Houthis wish to include oil-rich Al-Jawf governorate and Hajja governorate, which includes a port, in the federal Azal region.

The Azal region currently includes Sa’ada, Sana’a, Amran, and Dhamar governorates.

Ibrahim Al-Moyad, a Houthi protestor, said that in case of failed negotiations, “we will peacefully escalate. We will close all the capital city entrances. And we will use civil disobedience.”

Al-Moyad added, “if the government uses lethal force against us, senior officials will defect from the government as it happened in the 2011 uprising. This will serve our purpose.”

Negotiations between the two groups began on Saturday, following the killing of Houthi protesters in front of the cabinet in Sana’a on September 9. Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on Yemen, Jamal Benomar, released a statement on Monday, saying that he will continue mediating negotiations with the Houthis and government.

2011 uprising victims still await compensation

■ **Ali Abulohoom**

SANA’A, Sept. 16—Victims of the 2011 uprising and Southern Movement clashes have still not been compensated despite President Hadi ordering the monthly payments to begin at the end of July.

The 2011 Revolutionary Victims Fund is tasked to disperse monthly stipends to those left severely disabled and to the families of those killed in both the 2011 uprising and Southern Movement clashes.

Sarah Abdullah Hassan, the head of the fund, told the Yemen Times in mid-July that by the end of the month the fund would begin handing out compensation to those left severely disabled and to the families of those killed in both the 2011 uprising and Southern Movement clashes with the government.

The monthly compensation was determined in July to be YR35,000 (\$163), about the same as a soldier’s salary. It was to be paid to 800 injured members of the 2011 uprising and to 50 members of the Southern Movement. This does not include all the victims, only those who have submitted the required documentation to the 2011 Revolutionary Vic-

tims Fund.

In early July President Hadi demanded the Ministry of Finance to pay compensations at the end of the month. However, not a single victim has received any payments yet.

On Tuesday, Hassan told the Yemen Times that the 2011 Revolutionary Victims Fund is not responsible for the postponement of the monthly funds being disbursed.

“There has been a misconception about the task of the fund. The fund is not tasked with handing money out to the people but instead with providing the Ministry of Finance with a database of those killed and wounded to endorse monthly payments that would be disbursed afterwards by post offices throughout Yemen,” she explained.

According to Hassan, the Ministry of Finance has already been provided with the necessary data by the fund but the budget for the monthly compensation is outstanding.

Hamid Al-Othaib, the general manager of the Department of Governmental Funds Budget at the Ministry of Finance, told the Yemen Times that “the problem doesn’t lie in the Ministry of Finance as it has endorsed the budget of the fund.” In

his opinion, the entire treasury deficit is to blame and explains why the money has not been disbursed yet.

Hassan confirmed that she has requested for the Minister of Finance Mohammed Zimam to disburse the monthly stipends, adding that the current political and economic troubles may prevent them from following through with the president’s order.

In addition to providing the Ministry of Finance with a database of the victims, the fund is also tasked with facilitating medical support of the injured, sending those seriously wounded abroad to receive treatment and sending those with mild injuries to local hospitals.

Hashim Al-Abarah, a 25-year-old victim of the government’s violent response to the peaceful protests in 2011, said despite the fact that his file has been submitted to the fund, he has received no treatment thus far.

Al-Abarah lost a kidney and his spleen when he was shot during a march on April 28, 2011. “I am still in urgent need of two surgeries, but the fund always brushes off my frequent requests,” Al-Abarah exclaimed.

“How could they hand money out

monthly to injured people whilst they are uncommitted to providing injured people with health care and medicines?” he questioned.

Responding to this, Hassan said that once the fund was established in September 2013 it directly took care of those injured by sending them to hospitals, including to some outside of Yemen if they could not be treated locally, based only on the seriousness of the cases and nothing else.

“We at once received YR200,000,000 (\$930,000) from the government and we are about to finish spending all the money on almost 800 injured protesters and we are still receiving more documents of the rest of the injured. The only budget we have right now is the donation of Nobel Laureate Tawakkol Karman, estimated to be \$500,000. Soon we will start spending it on the injured.”

The 2011 uprising left 1,444 killed and around 29,000 wounded, many of whom are permanently handicapped. In addition, around 2,000 people from the Southern Movement have been killed and around 7,000 have been wounded in protests since 2007.

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

Government victory claims in Al-Ghail contradicted

Al-Aji added that the committee visited them on Tuesday and discussed the incident with them.

“They promised to compensate us but we only want the committee to uncover those who gave wrong information to the air force,” added Al-Aji. He refused to comment on what form of compensation was offered, only saying that it was declined by the victims and their families.

So far, the government has not released any statement responding to the accusations by locals that residential areas were shelled by the air force.

The Yemen Times tried for days to contact the Defense Ministry but did not receive a response.

Fighting prevents electricity line repairs

In a related development, the Electricity Ministry said on Tuesday that it was unable to fix damaged power lines in Al-Jawf due

to the ongoing clashes in the governorate.

The power lines, which run from Marib governorate to Sana’a, were damaged in Al-Jawf on Monday due to clashes between the Houthis and the military, backed by the popular committees.

“The engineering teams, accompanied by security personnel, were unable to fix the power lines in Al-Jawf due to the ongoing clashes. Even if the power lines are fixed, they may be attacked any moment,” the state-run Saba News Agency quoted a source in the ministry as saying.

The Electricity Ministry on Monday announced that the Marib gas power station stopped working due to the new damage to the power lines in Al-Jawf.

Residents in the capital Sana’a are reporting daily power outages lasting for at least eight hours, often running much longer.

Newly appointed US ambassador holds first press conference

He emphasized that talks between President Hadi and the Houthis should be based on the GCC Initiative and NDC outcomes. “We strongly support President Hadi in his effort to resolve this issue through negotiations. We along with G10 colleagues have indicated that we are preparing to take actions to identify and take measures against any parties and individuals that are threatening the peaceful transition of Yemen,” he added.

Tueller declared that the US differentiates between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis. “We do make a distinction between a group that participates and continues participation in the political process. The Houthi movement participated in the NDC and made many positive contri-

butions to the outcomes of it. They have a legitimate political position and aspiration to take part in the political process. When they resort to the use of arms and intimidation, that’s when we begin to question the activities of Ansar Allah [the Houthis].”

Tueller called on Abdulmalik Al-Houthi and the movement he represents to participate in the political process to achieve their aspirations.

Tueller admitted that there is no direct contact with Al-Houthi as he refuses to meet with American representatives.

“I have no objection to meet with the Houthis as they represent a significant portion of the Yemeni population. I will tell them if they have any grievances from

the past, they can be peacefully addressed.”

Tueller implicitly supported the demands of the Houthis who are, amongst others, pressing for a change in government and the elimination of corruption.

Seeing their demands as legitimate, he highlighted parallels between the Houthis’ demands and NDC decisions. The NDC has called for a change of government, he explained, “and it should be based on ministers free of political influences, eliminating corruption and implementing the outcomes of the NDC.”

“I certainly believe that if the negotiation turns successful, it will represent a step in the right direction... and it will stabilize the situation in Sana’a and surrounding areas.”

UN Sanctions Committee prepared to punish political spoilers

■ **Khalid Al-Karimi**

SANA’A, Sept. 17—The UN Security Council Sanctions Committee issued a statement on Tuesday saying it is ready to consider determining individuals and entities to be sanctioned for obstructing Yemen’s political transition.

The Sanctions Committee was established by Security Council Resolution 2140 (2014) on February 26.

The statement was released amidst ongoing tensions between the government and the Houthis, a Shia rebel group that has set up camps in and around the capital since August 18.

“Committee members expressed their readiness, with a sense of urgency, to consider proposals for the designation of individuals or entities as subject to the targeted sanctions measures,” the statement read.

The Committee’s panel of experts would focus on “specific lines of inquiry and case-studies in relation to individuals or entities engaging in or providing support for acts that threaten the peace, security, or stability in Yemen,” the statement added.

The Committee said it already investigated four issues related to Yemen’s security and stability. These issues include the violence and armed conflict in the north

of the country, the activities and influence of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and the General People’s Congress, the activities of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and the Southern Move-

ment, as well as ongoing attacks on oil and gas distribution pipelines.

In the north of the country, it is the “activities of the Houthis, the Islah Party, tribesmen, and other groups involved in the conflict” that are being investigated.

Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthis’ Political Office, called the Sanctions Committee’s statement “unimportant.”

“The formation of the sanctions committee is a humiliation to Yemenis. If the Security Council is serious in making Yemen a better place, they would accommodate all political powers in the decision-making process and oppose the corrupt officials,” Al-Bukhaiti told the Yemen Times.

In case sanctions were imposed on individuals and groups they would only harm Yemen’s interests, he said.

The Yemen Times tried to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Human Rights several times but did not receive any response.

Asad Omar, a legal expert who is working with the Yemen Observatory for Human Rights, told the Yemen Times he accuses the Sanctions Committee’s statement and its investigations of being late.

Omar added that the immunity that was granted to former President Saleh as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative is not effective internationally, pointing out that international sanctions could be imposed on him.

International diplomacy steers Yemeni Politics

■ **Khalid Al-Karimi**

“The nation is undergoing a very complicated situation. It is in front of a crossroad. It is either the choice of life, development, and a new Yemen, or havoc and insecurity,” President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi said in a speech on September 2 in the presence of senior state officials.

While the status quo is of course alarming in Yemen, Hadi appears to remain confident. Unlike his predecessor Ali Abdullah Saleh in 2011, he has so far enjoyed unquestioning and unwavering support from the international community.

The Yemeni example illustrates the crucial role that international diplomacy can have on deciding the president's fate and a country's political future.

International condemnation of Saleh

In 2011, Ali Abdullah Saleh managed to resist months of popular and nationwide protests demanding the ousting of his government.

The considerable internal pressure placed on Saleh by ongoing demonstration was reinforced by wide-spread international condemnation of his cling to power and violent response to protests.

Strong statements condemning the violent protests in Yemen came from the US, the UN, Gulf countries, and the European Union.

International actors, particularly representatives of the UN and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), visited Yemen long before Saleh's resignation, criticizing the government's violence against protesters and calling for a peaceful political transition inside the country.

While Saleh long rejected the transition-of-power plan offered by the opposition, or Joint Party Meeting (JMP), he gave in to rising internal and external pressure in April 2011, accepting the GCC's invitation to negotiate Yemen's political

future with international actors and the JMP.

International pressure did not end there. In July 2011 a UN fact-finding mission visited Yemen, documenting serious and widespread abuses of human rights and calling for an independent international investigation to hold those responsible accountable.

In early October, a leading political activist calling for political change in Yemen, Tawakkol Karman, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

All the while, international actors continued to call for a peaceful political transition which, in the eyes of many, increasingly equaled a demand to end Saleh's regime.

On October 21, 2011, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 2014. It called on the ruling party represented by President Saleh and the opposition parties (JMP) to sign the GCC Initiative, which was first announced in April in 2011.

After many maneuvers, Saleh inked the agreement on November 23, 2011 in return for immunity from prosecution.

While it is clear that Saleh's resignation was not solely caused by international interference, diplomatic pressure and involvement certainly constituted an important factor in the former president's downfall, and indeed, the current political developments in the country.

International support for Hadi

Three years after Saleh's departure, international interference in Yemeni politics is yet again making headlines—this time acting largely in favor of the incumbent President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi.

It is especially now, in light of an increasing spread of the Houthis in the north of the country and in the capital, that the international support of President Hadi gains in importance.

In the middle of August, Houthi supporters started erecting their camps at the entrances of Sana'a, and later inside the capital itself,

calling for the toppling of the government, the revocation of the fuel subsidy removal, and the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) outcomes. The Houthis' have maintained tents in Change Square near Sana'a University since 2011.

In late August, the UN Security Council called on Houthi militants to withdraw from Amran and remove camps pitched in the heart of the capital city and on its outskirts.

“The Security Council expresses grave concern about the deterioration of the security situation in Yemen in light of the action taken by the Houthis, led by Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, and those who support them, to undermine the political transition and the security of Yemen,” the council said in a statement.

The statement explicitly condemned the Houthi campaign to bring down the government, the establishment of camps, and the ongoing fighting in Al-Jawf governorate.

At the same time, the Security Council reaffirmed its support for the president, calling on all government bodies to step up efforts to develop much needed reforms, including reforms of the security and military fields.

In the same vein, in mid-August in Sana'a, Jamal Benomar, the United Nations Special Envoy to Yemen, called on all parties in Yemen to commit to the GCC Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism as well as the NDC outcomes and the Security Council resolutions on Yemen so that these parties go ahead towards building a new Yemen.

With recent events in Sana'a it appears that international support goes as far as granting impunity to Hadi.

On September 9, when Houthi protesters were killed by security forces in front of the cabinet in Sana'a, not only did the government stay silent on the deaths, but so did the international community.

On September 11, Jamal Benomar, speaking of the September 9 kill-



President Obama met with Yemeni President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi earlier this month at the White House.

ing of Houthis by government forces, merely “expressed his deepest regret over the loss of lives due to the unfolding events in the past few days.” On September 13, he released another statement, equally vague, placing no responsibility on the Yemeni government or demanding it to investigate the deaths.

A statement by the Group of Ten Ambassadors on September 13 also makes no specific mention of the killings, only placing blame on the Houthis and expressing “grave concern in particular regarding [the Houthis'] public actions which have led to instability.”

The Human Rights Watch (HRW) report released September 14 constitutes an exception to this international silence. It clearly states that “unnecessary lethal force” was used by security forces in dispersing unarmed protesters. “Human Rights Watch has documented two other incidents in Yemen since President Hadi took office in February 2012 in which military and other security forces used unnecessary lethal force,” the report reads.

According to HRW, “the government has announced official investigations into allegations of unlawful force by the security forces, but no

results have been made public. No officials have been held account for excessive force or unlawful killings, as far as Human Rights Watch has been able to determine.”

Reasons behind Hadi's international support

Political analysts in Sana'a suggest two reasons as to why the international community is supporting President Hadi, one of them being the president's legitimacy and the other being the presence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen.

“If the international community sees a president fit, they try to maintain him in office. Hadi, at the moment, is deemed appropriate in the eyes of the international community,” says political analyst Adnan Al-Rajehi.

In addition, “the world witnessed that the president [Hadi] waged a war against Al-Qaeda in 2012. Hadi expelled Al-Qaeda operatives from many areas in Abyan and Shabwa governorates [southern Yemen].” Though Saleh was also fighting Al-Qaeda, Al-Rajehi said Saleh was only trying to please the international community and was not sincere in his fight of AQAP in Yemen.

When aid becomes a business

Story by **Mohammad Al-Khayat**
Photo by **Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki**

Visiting the food distribution center of the Islamic Relief Organization (IRO) on Marib Street on the outskirts of Sana'a makes one fully realize the suffering that internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Yemen endure.

A woman in her seventies stands in a long line under the burning sun, waiting for 50 kilos of flour, two and a half liters of oil, and four kilos of beans.

This is the monthly amount of staple foods each person receives from the IRO in Sana'a.

Opposite the line of internally displaced persons, traders are awaiting their daily commodities. In Sana'a, as elsewhere, a few business-minded men discovered aid goods to be a potential source of income.

Ahmed Al-Qadhi, who used to be a wholesaler, found a new product to trade in aid commodities. It was in 2014, with an increasing number of internally displaced people streaming into Sana'a, that he began to spend more time around IRO's distribution center.

Along with four or five others, Al-Qadhi is now buying aid commodities from IDPs. He sells those goods in his wholesale store elsewhere in Sana'a. Al-Qadhi's business idea capitalizes on the difficulties that IDPs face in transporting their aid back home.

It is not easy to move around 50 kilos of flour and four kilos of beans.

“We buy these food items to help refugees who cannot take them

to the places they live in,” said Al-Qadhi, adding that “we buy those goods at prices that are suitable—for us and for them too.”

In a seeming attempt to further justify his work, Al-Qadhi emphasizes that “we do not buy food items except with the owners' permission. Actually, in many cases they come to us and ask us to buy the items that the IRO has given them.”

Dealing in aid commodities appears to be fairly profitable and has become Al-Qadhi's sole source of income.

Al-Qadhi buys one aid ratio for YR4,000 (\$18.61). According to one of the IDPs from Amran, Mohammad Aqabat, the actual worth of the aid package, comprising 50 kilos of flour, two and a half liters of oil, and 4 kilos of beans, is worth much more than that.

“The price is too low, the YR4,000 (\$18.61) for which we sell our share is not enough to buy a 50 kilo sack of flower, which costs YR6,200 (\$28.85),” he complains.

Aqabat said the total cost of the IRO's food items is YR9,200 (\$42.81) when bought in the shops near his house.

According to Aqabat, Al-Qadhi pays only half of the aid commodities' actual price.

Al-Qadhi defends himself, saying that some flour sacks that he buys from the IDPs are damaged, which is why he buys all items at lower prices, which is a calculated risk.

According to Al-Qadhi, the sacks of flour are stored for a long time during which some of the flour becomes moist and cloddy, or maggot-ridden.

Nasser Saeed, who is one of the IDPs in Sana'a, observed that some traders who found the flour they



Dealing in aid commodities appears to be fairly profitable and has become the sole source of income for a few Yemenis in Sana'a.

bought to be bad still sell it—only they put it in different bags first. The IRO's bags, which carry the World Food Programme logo, are not trusted by many Yemenis, he explains.

The IRO does not check the quality of the flour before distributing it, yet, if returned by IDPs it replaces unusable goods with new ones, according to Ibrahim Salah, an IRO employee. The replacement of aid

goods is only possible, however, as long as the IDPs and the goods they received have not left the IRO's territory, Salah explains.

From bad to worse: IDPs need to sell their aid

“I live far away from these distribution centers; I am forced to sell my share. If I wanted to move my share to where I live, it would cost me as much as it is worth, thus I am

forced to sell the aid I receive for a low price,” said Aqabat.

Others are more lucky than Aqabat and able to circumvent the difficulties of transportation. “The other refugees in my area, my cousins and I, get together and rent a car to transport all the food shares to our villages, which significantly reduces the cost of transportation,” says Saleh Hammad, an IDP from Amran governorate.

“The international community granted Saleh millions of dollar, but nothing was achieved,” he pointed out.

Other analysts emphasize the importance of Hadi's political legitimacy as reason for his international support.

They point out that Hadi came to power through the GCC Initiative—a transitional power deal brokered by the GCC, the US, and the UN—and an uncontested, single-candidate presidential election.

Adel Amin, a Sana'a-based writer and political analyst, links Hadi's legitimacy to both local and international factors. On the one hand, Hadi differs from his predecessor in that he was elected in 2012, following a popular uprising. This, Amin argues, grants him a certain degree of local legitimacy. At the same time, “Hadi makes his decision after consulting with the [UN] member states,” which, according to Amin, explains his unrivaled international support.

Ever since his election, Hadi has implemented reforms, such as the restructuring of the military, that were welcomed by a majority of locals and by the international community, further bolstering his legitimacy.

Another reason why, this time, the international community is supporting Yemen's president, is that the nature of the Houthi protests differs from the wave of popular uprisings sweeping through the Middle East in 2011. “The protests of the Houthi supporters are not as serious as the 2011 protests,” Rajeh says.

Locals who do not support the Houthis see the group's actions in Sana'a not as a legitimate attempt to promote democracy in the country, but instead as an attempt to reinstate the Imamate that ruled northern Yemen until 1962. Furthermore, the major international players do not support the Houthis, viewing them as a further threat to Yemen's stability and security with little perceivable advantage to countries like the US or Saudi Arabia.

“If we decided to sell our food shares, we would do so at a low price, but the traders will profit by a rate of 100 percent, and there would be no benefit for us. Thus we rent one car and take our shares to where we live,” added Hammad.

Salah says that the IRO is aware that a large group of displaced people are selling their aid commodities to traders as they cannot move it or, as he suggests, have no need for it to begin with.

“We give the displaced people their food shares, whether they are going to sell it or not that's up to them. We can only give them their food shares and nothing more,” he explains.

Salah adds “the problem with the place we are distributing food at is that it is located far away from some people. But it is closer to others, which is the reason why we can't change where we distribute the aid.”

Suggestion of distributing the goods at several places in Sana'a, or even via home delivery, are dismissed with reference to a lack of man power and resources.

First Lieutenant Hamood Al-Matrafi, a security officer at the IRO distribution center, explains that the IRO's security personnel cannot stop the “unfair sales.”

“They are happening with the consent of both parties—although it is not in the best interest of the displaced. However, it is their personal choice, they are not forced to sell anything.”

Security personnel can only intervene in case of actual clashes or physical altercations in and around the center. “Our priority is always the protection of the Islamic Relief crew,” he added.



Yemeni women making a difference

■ Nasser Mutahar

It is as important as ever that now, during Yemen's transition, civil society and individual contributions help in building a new Yemen. Given the government's current crisis, much of the society's well-being is dependent on the support and services provided by Yemeni citizens.

A large and often underappreciated number of those working with local aid organizations in Yemen are women.

It is a noble undertaking by Yemeni women to em-

power Yemen's minorities and to stand up for their rights. Their peaceful struggle in many ways reflects the broader political goals and visions put forth during the National Dialogue Conference.

Five exemplary Yemeni women from around the country are profiled below. Their work and initiatives constitute valuable contributions to Yemeni society. They have been interviewed as part of a project by the Yemen 21 Forum, a local NGO based in Sana'a. Funded by the Embassy of The Netherlands, the project aims to give a voice to Yemeni women whose work can in many ways be regarded as outstanding.

Hana'a Al-Ghazali, Ibb governorate

To be blind does not mean that your life has ended and that all that is left for you to do is sit at home, grow old, and eventually die—That is at least what 30-year-old manager Hana'a Al-Ghazali, who is working for the Home for Blind Women, believes.

Al-Ghazali, who herself became blind when she was a child, complains that "society thinks of these women as having two impairments: The first being blind and the second being female."

This belief has led some family members to discourage their blind offspring from obtaining any proper education.

Perceiving the treatment of many blind women as unfair, Al-Ghazali launched the Dar Al-Amal (House of Hope) in Ibb city. The organization is trying to enlist as many blind women into the education system. Currently, the Dar Al-Amal has forty female members from outside Ibb city and thirty

members from within the city.

Having herself obtained a bachelor degree, Al-Ghazali is currently doing a master program in administrative sciences. She knows the difficulty that many blind women, who wish to pursue their education, are facing at home.

In fact, Al-Ghazali argues that families' unwillingness to support their blind daughters in pursuing a higher education constitutes one of Dar Al-Amal's key challenges. Some families, she explains, lock their daughters up at home, saying that this is what God had wanted for them. They do not see the chance that education offers to their children: The chance of obtaining knowledge and the chance of leaving the house, socializing and mingling with others. It is through education, she says, that the blinds' barrier of inability and powerlessness can be broken.

Al-Ghazali holds regular meetings with the parents of blind



women, trying to bring across the advantages lying in education.

Unfortunately, having a blind daughter is widely considered a shame, says Al-Ghazali, adding that "the real shame" is taking away those daughters' right to education and depriving them from participating in society.

Determined to improve the situation of blind women in Yemen, Al-Ghazali says "willpower is the base of everything; in case blind girls have the will power they can overcome any obstacles."

Wafa Mohammad, Hodeida governorate

Wafa Mohammad is a 37-year-old employee at the Projects Department of the Al-Atif Foundation for Development.

She lives and works in Hodeida governorate, which is considered to be one of the poorest in Yemen.

People in Hodeida suffer from dire living conditions and diseases are widespread—especially among the poor in Al-Mahraqa area. Rather than standing idle in the face of this suffering, Mohammad initiated the building of a medical camp to treat skin diseases in August 2013.

To begin with, Mohammad went to collect money from in-

dividual donors, finding them to be more generous than expected. Once the camp was built, the Ministry of Public Health and Population provided medicine and doctors, who were working in the camp for one month, after which the camp was removed again.

The most important medicine, according to Mohammad, is the spread of awareness. Educating people about illnesses and preventive measures constitutes an essential part of her daily work. Mohammad is convinced that change can only come from within and cannot be imposed on the people. Education and aware-



ness, she argues, are the base of every form of development.

When asked about her goals and dreams, Mohammad responds, "everyone has dignity; my goal is to preserve the dignity of those people that society looks down on with disdain."

Amani Abdulkaki, Taiz governorate

Amani Abdulkaki is 28 years old and lives in Taiz governorate. She is convinced that all members of society have rights and that those members who are mentally or physically handicapped need to be granted special rights.

Abdulkaki works at the Handicapped Rehabilitation Association in Taiz governorate, trying to ensure that handicapped Yemenis are granted the same right to education as everyone else.

She continues being surprised by families' who strongly oppose bringing their offspring to the Handicapped Rehabilitation Association. Families, she says, frequently reject the idea of a handicapped person's education. Abdulkaki is frequently confronted with the argument that the ed-

ucation of handicapped children and youth would not make a difference to their families—no good can come out of handicapped children.

Sadly, families thus often fail to provide anything more than the most basic support—food and shelter—to their handicapped children.

"Some people say they have no need for the handicapped, and they discourage them through hurtful words instead of encouraging them."

This is exactly what Abdulkaki tries to change. She aims to raise parents' awareness about the need of educating their handicapped children and integrating them in society. Hence, one of her projects is to bring normal students to



study alongside the handicapped ones.

In the long run, Abdulkaki hopes that the special needs and rights of Yemen's handicapped will find recognition in developments and reforms on both the political and the social level.



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Ensaf Abdulsalam, Hodeida governorate

While society avoids talking about child molestation, and considers it a taboo, 34-year-old Ensaf Abdulsalam is brave enough to break that silence.

Working as the manager of The Woman and Child Department at the Al-Amal Foundation in Hodeida governorate, Abdulsalam feels it is not only her job but her personal responsibility to fight the sexual harassment of children.

The department she is managing holds regular training courses about the threats of sexual harassment, targeting children in kindergarten, first-graders, and mothers, whom she considers to play a crucial role in children's education.

Through her work Abdulsalam wants to make sure mothers do not overlook the potential danger of child molestation and wishes to raise awareness among children, as young as two years old—"Because they are children and cannot [yet] tell good from bad," Abdulsalam says.

Abdulsalam admits that it took her a long time to decide to fight the harassment of children. What ultimately motivated her was the fact that child molestation was increasing, but remained largely ignored by society. In her opinion, it is embarrassment that prevents people from raising the issue of sexually harassed children in Yemen.



In the last two months alone, Abdulsalam has spoken with 200 children and 400 mothers at schools and mosques.

What keeps Abdulsalam doing her work is the praise and gratitude she receives from mothers who attend her awareness-raising seminars.

Moaheb Al-Absi, Taiz governorate

Most people in Yemen simply condemn and denounce the violation of children's rights in Yemen, yet fail to take steps against it.

Moaheb Al-Absi, the 30-year-old head of For a Safe Childhood Initiative in Taiz governorate, constitutes an exception to that rule. In her view, children's rights are not only violated through physical abuse but also through lacking education.

For a Safe Childhood Initiative mainly focuses on poor children as they require the most support in obtaining an education.

Finding an appropriate venue in which children can gather proves to be a major challenge, Al-Absi explains. It usually takes her a long time to locate small houses in the governorate that can be turned into provisional meeting points. Spreading awareness about the

importance of education and sexual harassment constitute two key issues that Al-Absi wishes to communicate.

Her work, however, does not go unchallenged. "When we started raising children's awareness, we faced opposition from their parents who said a child's main duty is to make money and support the family, and that education is not very important."

With time, however, most families among the economically disadvantaged begin to accept the importance of education, Al-Absi says. They gradually start enlist-

ing their children in schools—even if simultaneously requiring them to work and earn money.



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Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf,
(1951 - 1999)
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OUR OPINION

We must look to the future, not fight over the past

There is historical animosity between two of the strongest, if not the strongest, tribes in Yemen: Hashid and Bakil. Although they share borders, history, and origin, they don't share fate.

For over three decades, Hashid has had superiority over Bakil despite its comparatively smaller size. This dominance started before Hashid's affiliation, former President Saleh, became president. But he made sure that Hashid, and especially the Sanhan tribe to which he belongs, had a huge advantage in wealth, access to power, and authority over Bakil, and the rest of the country for that matter.

The two tribes have had their confrontations over the years. One of the most recent significant examples occurred during the Sa'ada wars between 2004 and 2010 when Saleh recruited fighters from Hashid while Bakil supported the Houthis with money, weapons, men, and most importantly land for refuge and safe passage.

Today, with the Al-Ahmar family's power being challenged by official means with the prime minister's position removed from their control, or unofficial means by becoming a sitting target for the Houthis in Amran without any backup from the state, Bakil is using this as payback time.

Another alliance between Bakil and the Houthis is being forged and now that they are standing at the edges of Sana'a side by side, they believe that it is ok to demand their turn in power, even if it means sharing some of it with the Houthis.

Simultaneously, Saleh is playing another of his trademark games as he promises and delivers support to the Houthis, just to get back at members of his own tribe, including those from the Al-Ahmar family, for going against him in 2011. He does this knowing for a fact that if the Houthis come to power, his head would be the first to fall off, followed possibly by the other names on the Houthis' black list, including Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, who led the wars against them, and the entire Al-Ahmar family, among others.

Saleh knows that the Houthis will not forget how he assassinated their leader Hussein Bader Al-Deen Al-Houthi ten years ago after tricking him into surrendering. Still, he is currently supporting the Houthis who, according to the Ministry of Interior's report, are the ones behind the tunnel reaching underneath his house—perhaps to pay him a long overdue house call.

And here comes the role of Bakil tribe. The Houthis know that they can't rely on Saleh, his money, or his promises, so they seek old friends who have a similar goal. Bakil wants revenge. So do the Houthis, and this explains today's dynamics.

It is not fair that Sana'a and the entire country pays the price for bad practices of the past. Unfortunately, what drives change in Yemen is revenge, not the 2011 dream we had for our future.

We want equal citizenship and the rule of law in a modern state where the ones who deserve it get access to power through democratic means, not through war, arm twisting, or avenging the past.

We can not continue to rely on the international community to solve our problems for us. It is already losing patience and will soon give up on us as it did with Iraq and Lebanon.

It is up to us as Yemenis to stop the power seeking tribes, religiously motivated groups, and corrupt politicians from controlling our fate and disturbing our peace. What is happening today calls for another revolution, one of minds not weapons.

Nadia Al-Sakkaf

Houthis' contradictory path in Sana'a

Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen
al-monitor.com
First published Sept. 15

Since Yemen's National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was completed in January, the military conflicts have become even more acute—most prominently the battle in the north Yemeni city of Amran. Since then, not a single step has been taken to end Yemen's political transition process and hold the elections, which were planned for February, after being postponed for 23 months. Instead, the country is heading in the opposite direction, toward war and political deadlock.

This contradictory path governs all of Yemen, particularly the Houthi movement, which has been ruling the Sa'ada governorate that borders Saudi Arabia for more than three years now. The group's rule represents the worst and most oppressive model of governance, as it runs Sa'ada as a radical religious armed group that bans music, for instance. Pictures taken at Houthi sit-ins show that women are absent. Al-Monitor attended a sit-in on Aug. 30 next to the Interior Ministry, and asked the media officer of the Houthis why no women were present; the answer was that women should stay home.

However, at the NDC, the Houthis supported the demands of the women's movement, including the quota (Houthis supported the demands of women to have a fixed share of political participation). NDC member Thurayya Damaj told Al-Monitor “the Houthis' position vis-a-vis women in the capital Sana'a is completely different than their position as a ruling authority in Sa'ada. They supported the quota in Sana'a, but tightened women's freedoms in Sa'ada governorate by imposing restrictions on their movement and clothing.”

There are several reasons for the Houthis' dualism, such as the difference between the authority of the Houthi movement as a ruler in Sa'ada, and its oppositionist role in Sana'a, where it presents itself as an appealing party compared to the rest of the

political parties in Yemen, particularly the Yemeni Congregation for Reform, (Islah Party). More importantly, the Houthi group does not deal seriously with the political process in Sana'a, including the NDC, as they have not made any political achievement so far—except by using weapons—since its inception during the 2004 war in Sa'ada.

The Houthis adopted the same dual policy in Sana'a to topple the regime and prevent an increase in oil prices, under the pretext that these are peaceful popular demands. At the same time, its armed wing besieges Sana'a, while its negotiations with the government are focused on taking part in the state's sovereign decision, i.e., achieving a presence in the leadership of the sovereign institutions such as the army and security establishments. In addition, the Houthis called for a technocrat government, while they appointed arms dealer Fares Manaa as Sa'ada's governor.

The Houthis do not only rely on weapons. What is more important is its presence in the state institutions and its broad infiltration in the army, which is divided between the pro- and anti-regime camp—a division that is related to the regional background of the Yemeni political elite. The Houthis are present in the far northern parts of Yemen—namely Sana'a's northern and surrounding areas with a Zaydi Shia majority—while a Sunni majority is present in the southern parts of Sana'a, starting in the Yarim area. In modern history, after the Ottomans departed Yemen following World War I in 1918, the Zaydi Imamate ruled northern Yemen, which was outside the control of the British and did not only include the Zaydi areas but extended to the south and included large parts of the Sunni-majority areas, too.

The Zaydi sect is close to the Sunni sects, yet with a different vision of the Imamate, with the Zaydis considering it limited to Ahl Al-Bayt (the family of the Prophet Muhammad). For this reason, the September 26 Revolution that erupted in 1962 in the

north to overthrow the Imamate system targeted the Hashemites (Ahl Al-Bayt) and oppressed Zaydi clerics. And when President Ali Abdullah Saleh took power in 1978, the country moved toward Wahhabism, and the promotion of Salafist education became an official matter supported by the authorities, especially in the Zaydi areas. This provoked many Zaydi scholars who began to establish their own school, the Youth Believers, which started its activity in 1990. The Houthi group, which engaged in an armed conflict against the state in 2004, emanated from this school.

By virtue of the sectarian nature of the Imamate system, the modern Yemeni army was established in the early 20th century, based on the sectarian Zaydi foundations. It preserved this nature until after the establishment of the republic; the September 26 Revolution was initiated by a movement in the army in the 1950s and 1960s, similarly to other Arab countries that became republics.

Thus, all the presidents of Yemen under the republican regime were military men from the north Zaydi regions, with the exception of Judge Abdul Rahman Al-Iryani. Yet, from 1967 to 1973, sectarian loyalty was replaced by regional loyalty and fanaticism for the north Zaydi regions, which monopolized the army and the rest of the state institutions. In the era of President Saleh (July 1978–February 2012), the leading positions in the army became restricted to his own Sanhan tribe, which is part of the Hashid tribal federation.

After the revolution of 2011, President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, who hails from the southern governorate of Abyan, took power. He brought with him the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (the Islah Party)—a tribal, Sunni Islamist alliance. This raised the ire of the residents of these regions, particularly those affected by the restructuring of the army.

Members of the tribe of former President Saleh were replaced by members affiliated with Hadi, the new president, who was un-

able to unify the army due to the profound influence of Saleh and General Ali Mohsen within the army. This opened numerous fighting fronts against Hadi.

The Houthis succeeded in addressing the regionalism expressed against the southern head of state, as well as the sectarianism against the Islah Party expressed by senior army officers, security leaders and other state employees, as well as Hashemites. The latter felt bitter for having been excluded from power since 1962. Even though they were entrusted with some state leadership positions, they remained excluded from some institutions such as the army and security.

The first failure suffered by the Houthis is failing to infiltrate the army and provoke large-scale defections within its ranks. This failure is due to the discovery of their network within the army, a source close to the president told Al-Monitor in an exclusive statement. The source estimated that more than 30 senior officers were arrested for having communicated with the Houthis. This foiled the Houthis' scheme, which would have led to the defection of at least three major brigades within the army by proclaiming what they call a popular revolution to overthrow the government and reject the rise of oil prices.

The source added that there is an Omani mediation between Iran and the Yemeni government to reach a solution. According to the source, the president rejected Iran's request for direct negotiations with the Yemeni state since Iran is funding three Yemeni channels inciting against the Yemeni government and supporting the Houthi movement in the north and south.

The same source also ruled out the possibility of armed clashes, since the state will massively interfere in Sana'a and will cause the Houthis a major defeat. Moreover, even if the presence of pro-Houthis within the army—whose identities are yet to be revealed—is not ruled out, clashes still represent a great risk to the Houthi movement. The other failure of the Houthis is their inability to stage highly

popular demonstrations outside the circle of their supporters of the same sect, while their opponents organized highly popular demonstrations with more participants, especially the one that was held on August 25.

Yet, this did not curb the Houthis' arrogance and they refused the president's initiative announced on September 2. The initiative aims at reducing oil and oil derivatives prices by 30 percent so that the state bears the value of transportation, forming a government of national unity following the NDC that involves the Houthis and the Southern Movement, while the president reserves the right to appoint ministers to hold “sovereign portfolios” such as the ministries of finance, foreign affairs, defense, and interior. The initiative also aims at extending the state's influence over the republic's territory and stopping armed escalation by the Houthis inside the capital.

The Houthi movement was aspiring to be a popular hero by canceling the increase of oil prices and achieving a political victory through its participation in sovereign ministries. Thus, it is difficult for the Houthis to accept Hadi's initiative, despite their awkward position given the weakness of their popular base compared to their opponents' large numbers and the absence of any defects worth mentioning within the army.

Therefore, the situation is about to become worse on the military level in other areas in Yemen, such as Al-Jawf governorate to the east, while Houthis might be heading toward limited military clashes in Sana'a to put pressure on the state to meet their demands. On the other hand, the Yemeni state, with its divided army, is forced to be patient with the Houthi movement until the latter loses its dualism.

Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen is a Yemeni journalist who writes for Jaddaliyya, Weghat Nazar, and several Yemeni newspapers. A master's degree student at the American University in Cairo, she has recently finished shooting a documentary about Yemen.

Convenient genocide: Another failed war to re-arrange the Middle East

Ramzy Baroud
middleeasteye.net
First published Sept. 14

A few months ago, not many Americans, in fact Europeans as well, knew that a Yazidi sect in fact existed in northwest Iraq. Even in the Middle East itself, the Yazidis and their way of life have been an enigma, shrouded by mystery and mostly grasped through stereotypes and fictitious evidence. Yet in no time, the fate of the Yazidis became a rally cry for another US-led Iraq military campaign.

It was not a surprise that the small Iraqi minority found it-

self a target for fanatical Islamic State (IS) militants, who had reportedly carried out unspeakable crimes against Yazidis, driving them to Dohuk, Irbil and other northern Iraqi regions. According to UN and other groups, 40,000 Yazidis had been stranded on Mount Sinjar, awaiting imminent “genocide” if the US and other powers didn't take action to save them.

The rest of the story was spun from that point on, as the Yazidis—whose very existence was rarely acknowledged in most international media—became a rally cry for US-Western intervention in Iraq. The logic for intervention that preceded the latest US bombing campaign

of IS targets, which started in mid-June, is similar to what took place in Libya over three years ago. Early 2011, imminent “genocide” awaiting Libya's eastern city of Benghazi at the hands of Muammar Gaddafi was the rally cry that mobilized Western powers to a war that wrought wanton killings and destruction in Libya. Since NATO's intervention in Libya, which killed and wounded tens of thousands, the country has fallen prey to an endless and ruthless fight involving numerous militias, armed and financially and politically backed by various regional and international powers. Libya is now ruled by two governments, two parliaments, and a thousand

militia.

When US special forces arrived to the top of Mount Sinjar, they realized that the Yazidis had either been rescued by Kurdish militias, or were already living there. They found less than 5,000 Yazidis there, half of them refugees. The mountain is revered in local legend, as the final resting place of Noah's ark. It was also the final resting place for the Yazidi genocide story. The finding hardly received much coverage in the media, which used the original claim to create fervor in anticipation for Western intervention in Iraq.

We all know how the first intervention worked out. Not that IS' brutal tactics in eastern, northern

and central Iraq should be tolerated. But a true act of genocide had already taken place in Iraq for nearly two decades, starting with the US war in 1990–91, a decade-long embargo and a most destructive war and occupation starting in 2003. Not once did a major newspaper editorial in the US bestow the term “genocide” on the killing and maiming of millions of Iraqis. In fact, the IS campaign is actually part of a larger Sunni rebellion in Iraq, in response to the US war and Shia-led government oppression over the course of years. That context is hardly relevant in the selective reporting on the current violence in Iraq.

Continued on the back page

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Conceptualizing Islam and Violence

Phil Dorroll
muftah.org
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In the West, many often assume Islam has a naturally close relationship with violence and coercion. This assumption is part of how Christianity and Islam are often compared in Western societies. While Christianity is viewed as a religion of peace with no interest in state power, Islam is seen as a religion naturally inclined to seek state power and exploit it to oppress others. These assumptions are only further hardened by the emergence of organizations like ISIL, which have wrecked havoc across the region.

This polemical association has a long history in Christian texts. The first systematic ideological attempts to equate Islam with violence appear in the treatises of Christian theologians writing in Arabic in imperial Islamic territories in the ninth century, such as Ammar Al-Basri and Abu Raitah Al-Tikriti. These theologians wrote in a pluralistic intellectual environment where members of diverse intellectual communities, including Jews, Christians, Muslims, and philosophical naturalists, debated the truth and falsity of their religious positions through reasoned dialectic referred to as “Kalam” in Arabic. Searching for a rational way to invalidate Islamic claims to spiritual truth, Christian polemicists argued that Islam was more closely associated with worldly desires. Based on their argument, Islam is more liable to succumb to destructive impulses

such as violence and sexual excess

Consequently, the original association between Islam and violence, which began in the Middle East, came from a thoroughly polemical and politicized intellectual context. The reason this polemical debate gained traction in the West is not because it represented an accurate reading of Islamic history. Instead, the popularity of this narrative reflects the political conditions in which Muslim-Christian relations have largely existed throughout Western history, namely, the politics of empire.

Throughout the Middle Ages, Muslims and Christians occupied rival empires that competed for territory and resources. Needless to say, imperial politics are not the ideal conditions for fostering sincere religious dialogue. To the contrary, objective and empathetic analysis is very difficult in these circumstances, because of perceptions about mutual threats. These political realities cemented Islam’s association with violence in the Western mind.

As with other ancient religious traditions, however, Islamic societies have produced a wide variety of interpretations regarding the proper relationship between religion and the exercise of violence.

During his life as the Last Prophet of God, Muhammad led the Muslim community as both a political and spiritual leader. His role was similar to other religious leaders, such as the prophets of the Hebrew Bible. Like these figures, Muhammad lived in social circumstances which were characterized by the absence

of a central imperial authority to mediate tribal conflicts. Creating a successful religious community required creating a political community to defend the members of the faith against outside threats. Consequently, warfare waged by the early Muslim community must be viewed in this context.

Islamic societies have produced a wide variety of interpretations regarding the proper relationship between religion and the exercise of violence.

In fact, the earliest biographical sources of Muhammad’s life make it clear that early Muslims interpreted acts of violence on the part of the Muslim community as a necessary part of self-defense and political necessity in that specific context. Specifically, Muhammad’s canonical biography states that God only directed him to fight others after the ruling clan of Mecca threatened the existence of Muhammad and his community. In this context, God “gave permission to His apostle to fight and to protect himself against those who wronged them and treated them badly.”

For instance, the Quran (9:5) states that God has commanded Muslims to fight non-believers. Scholars have widely understood this verse as justifying the need to fight enemies in a specific time and place. Several medieval commentators, however, interpreted this verse as license for imperial expansion, particularly during the medieval or classical period of Islamic history (roughly 750-1600) when large Muslim empires engaged in territorial expansion and conquest. Others, including the famous historian Al-Tabari, argued that verses in the Quran such as (60:8) that command peace and understanding between Muslims and non-believers take precedence, while verses such as (9:5) that command warfare are restricted to circumstances that existed only in the past.

Similarly, Al-Marghinani (1135-1197), one of the most authoritative classical scholars of Islamic law, stated, “mere disbelief [in Islam] does not of itself legalize killing [a non-Muslim]. Rather, it is a state of battle that makes it permissible to kill an aggressor. That is why it is not allowed to kill women, children, people of old age, the handicapped, and others who do not have the capability to fight.”

Muslims today agree that warfare waged by the Muslim community during its infancy occurred in a context absent from contemporary societies and was only appropriate in those circumstances. As in other religions, Muslims hold that violence as self-defense or in service of a just cause is religiously permissible, and may even be a religious duty. This

kind of fighting is labeled jihad, a term reserved for struggling in the name of justice rather than simple killing or warfare. Traditional Islamic texts have always condemned the killing of innocent civilians and non-combatants. Taking one’s own life is considered to be equally unacceptable.

The association between religious groups and violence remains complex and cannot be reduced to essentialized characterizations of faith.

Around the world, Muslims and Muslim organizations have widely condemned the death of innocents, religious violence, and terrorism. According to a 2011 Gallup survey, out of all major American religious groups (including Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Mormons, Agnostics, and Atheists), Muslims were the most likely to reject the killing of civilians for any reason.

To show that the Quran only sanctions violence and warfare in cases of self-defense, modern and contemporary Muslim commentators cite Quranic verses such as (2:190), which states “fight in the

cause of Allah those who fight you” and (8:61) which advises “but if the enemy inclines toward peace, do thou (also) incline towards peace.” In addition, the saying of Muhammad, “there should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm” (among many others) is also often cited in this context.

Overall, the association between religious groups and violence remains complex and cannot be reduced to essentialized characterizations of a faith. Attitudes toward violence on the part of any religious community are subject to political, social, and ideological factors that cannot be reduced to the basic tenets of a religious tradition.

Just as the presence of radical nationalists in 20th and 21st century Eastern and Central Europe does not reveal an inherent connection between Christian doctrine and radical nationalism, the presence of militants among 21st century Muslims does not reveal an inherent connection between Islamic doctrine and extremist violence. Searching for such a connection only obscures the social, political, and ideological roots of these phenomena, which may or may not find fertile soil within specific kinds of religious discourses. Indeed, the only groups that benefit from such reified and overly simplistic analyses are those seeking to manipulate religion to maintain or establish relationships of power or dominance, including religious militants themselves.

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Rethink needed on humanitarian funding for national NGOs

IRIN
First published Sept. 15

With humanitarian aid effectiveness high on the agenda of the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, there is much talk of how to reform humanitarian financing to make it more inclusive of national NGOs, but risk aversion will slow progress, say analysts.

Between 2009 and 2013 local and national NGOs received 1.6 percent of the humanitarian aid that international donors gave to NGOs, representing 0.2 percent of total humanitarian aid, according to research by Development Initiatives. The actual percentages might be different given that these figures represent only assistance reported to the UN Financial Tracking System. All agree, however, that the percentage is low, particularly when compared to the development sector, which turns to national NGOs far more prominently.

Guillaume Le Duc, director of development and communications at NGO Alima, which partners with national NGOs, said this amounts to exclusion, noting that even strong, technically expert NGOs—such as BEFEN in Niger and Alerte Santé in Chad—cannot access the bulk of international funding directly. As a result, “it qualifies the capacity to manage and deliver services based on the citizenship of the organization and not on the quality of the staff or their track record,” he said, adding, “qualified staff who worked for MSF [Médecins Sans Frontières] in other countries and wanted to return home could find no work in their own country.”

For Makimere Tamberi, president of Chadian health NGO Alerte Santé, which relies on funds through Alima

as well as some small-scale foundation funding, said this exclusion reduces aid effectiveness. “Qualified national NGOs can intervene more quickly than international NGOs. We’re already there [in the country]. We have the expertise. We can do it more cheaply. If money were given directly, it would speed up the response,” he told IRIN.

“International financing for national NGOs is not fit for purpose. It is unpredictable, volatile, difficult to access, insufficient...”

Alerte Santé was running a nutrition programme in Southern Chad’s camps for returnees and refugees from the Central African Republic and applied for international funding to extend it, but had to cut it short due to the lack of response.

In the first report done on national NGO humanitarian funding, “Aid at the Sharp End,” NGO CAFOD sharply criticized the current funding system when it comes to the approach to national NGOs: “International financing for national NGOs is not fit for purpose. It is unpredictable, volatile, difficult to access, insufficient, and is not sufficiently enabling to support the strengthening and capacity development that is central to improving preparedness, response capacity, and resilience to

disasters.”

Most national NGOs receive funding through international NGOs or sometimes UN agencies, according to analysts. But some direct international funding is available: Notably country-based pooled funds which have been set up in several countries and deemed to work well, particularly in Somalia, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).

The proportion of pooled fund money going to national NGOs has increased gradually over recent years.

Perceived risks

The NGO Start Network, which aims to improve aid effectiveness by reforming emergency funding approaches, among other things, plans eventually to fund national NGOs directly. But currently “owing to risk aversion in donor governments” Start channels at least half of its funds to national NGOs through sub-agreements whereby international NGOs take the legal risk for implementation, said the network’s coordinator, Sean Lowrie.

National NGOs can also approach national governments for humanitarian funding—the Chadian, Philippines, and Ethiopian governments among others, have encouraged this approach over recent years, but national disaster management agencies themselves in many cases need more direct donor support or investment, say analysts.

Most large donors, meanwhile, refrain from directing funding national NGOs due to the perceived risks involved. European Union humanitarian aid body ECHO is legally bound only to fund NGOs that have signed a framework partnership agreement and thus have proven their operational and administrative capability, something which

goes beyond the scope of most national NGOs.

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) funds mainly through partners and pooled funds, though national NGO funding is about to be reviewed, according to sources there, and partners and suppliers are having to increase their transparency when it comes to the visibility of local NGOs. DFID aims eventually to be able to trace official development assistance along the aid delivery chain, including through national NGOs, to show where the money is spent.

The US Agency for International Development (USAID), meanwhile, is making a concerted effort to channel more funds through government and local institutions through its initiative USAID Forward.

Risk tolerance guides donor approaches to national NGOs, said Lisa Doughten, head of the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). “Ultimately the donor needs to feel comfortable with the level of risk they’re taking on through the chain. What is their tolerance level? If it shifts, additional direct funding might open up.”

Managing risk

Pre-auditing national NGOs, which the DRC and Somalia country humanitarian funds attempted, is an effective way to manage risk and should be extended to other funders, said CAFOD’s humanitarian adviser, Anne Street.

CAFOD also recommends that donors and UN agencies improve awareness of what funds are available to national NGOs; set up pooled funds specifically targeting national NGOs; undertake an assessment of national NGO capacity country by country; and adjust contracts to be more favorable to national NGOs.

Training national NGO staff so

they are better aware of available funding and how to access it should be a priority in coming years, said Jessica Alexander in the Policy Analysis and Innovations Section of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), noting that this capacity building should also apply to national disaster management authorities, which are increasingly taking the helm on response.

“Can donors reconfigure a system where they take these actors into account? Because at some point they will have to.”

And stricter reporting requirements should be set up to track the impact of indirect funding to national NGOs, said Street. “Very few funding recipients are able, let alone required, to report even basic information about the funds they pass on to third-party implementers, so there is no way systematically assessing the timeliness, appropriateness, or impact of funding.”

CAFOD’s report and its recommendations are gaining traction, said Street, who is helping to convene a series of global discussions to map reform priorities.

While all agree that some degree of change is needed in international financing to national NGOs, many

assert the importance of various actors along the transaction chain when funding is indirect. OCHA’s Alexander said “people tend to overlook the capacity the international community can bring [to the funding cycle]—the middle man can be a broker of solutions—can provide accountability, stress humanitarian principles, transparency, among other vital roles.”

The CERF’s Doughten agrees, saying “if each part of the chain is working well, it would add value.” But Street is more skeptical, calling the pervasive long transaction chains “inefficient and expensive.”

Sub-contracting humanitarian finances typically means that seven percent of the contracted amount is taken up in administrative costs. But overheads should not be seen as waste, stressed Alima’s Le Duc. “I could run a programme on one percent overheads but I couldn’t guarantee the quality. Likewise some agencies may be at 25 percent overheads but maybe they’re the most efficient,” he told IRIN, noting “on seven percent you don’t necessarily have the room to provide career development to further qualify staff—something that can make a project 50 times more efficient.”

Assessing the comparative advantages of direct versus indirect funding requires more study. But one thing is clear for Le Duc: Donors need to keep up with the changing times. “In a region like West and Central Africa new NGOs are setting up all the time—the same thing is happening in the political and media arenas. So the question is: Can donors reconfigure a system where they take these actors into account? Because at some point they will have to.”

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٠١/٥.٦٣٧٣٢
ف: ٠١/٢٤.٠٩٥٨٠
٠١/٢٧.٧٥١
فرع شيرتوتن ٠١/٥٤٥٩٨٥
فرع عدن ٢/٢٤٥٦٣٥
صنعاء ٠١-٤٤٠.٣٠٩
فرع شيرتوتن ٠١/٥٨٩٥٤٥
عدن ٣-٢٤٥٦٣٥

مراكز تدريب وتعليم الكمبيوتر

٠١/٤٤٥٥١٨/٧

البريد السريع

٠١/٤٤٠١٧.٠
عدن ٢/٢٤٥٦٦٦
الدهيدم ٢/٢٦٦٩٧٥
تعز ٤/٢.٥٧٨٠
اب ٤/٤١٩٨٨
المكلا ٥/٣.٣٦٤١
شبهه ٥/٢.٣٣٢٦
سيئون ٥/٤.٧٣١٩
بلحاف ٧٧٧٨٨٦٠
سقطرى ٥/٦٦.٤٩٨

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٤٣١٣٤٠
alnda2@yemen.net.ye
٥٢٣٢٦١٠ - ٠١/٥٢١٢٢١ M&M Logistics & Aviation Services
٠١/٢٦٧٩٢٩

مستشفيات

وظائف شاغرة

• المركز الكندي للتدريب وتنمية القدرات بحاجة إلى سكرتارية وادارة شؤون الطلاب . لتفاصيل اكثر اتصل على ت: 406448, 467588, فاكس: 406437

• مطلوب مدرسين للعمل في المدارس التركية اليمنية لكافة التخصصات العلمية والأدبية القسم العلمي قسم انجليزي حاصلين على بكالوريوس كحد أدنى مع خبرة 3 سنوات. ت: 525121, فاكس: 525124

• مطلوب مندوبين مبيعات مواد غذائية، المؤهل لا يقل عن الثانوية العامة، رخصة قيادة سارية المفعول، خبرة لاتقل عن سنة في نفس المجال،

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مستشفى الجمهوري
المستشفى الالمانى الحديث

المستشفى الاهلي الحديث
مستشفى العلوم والتكنولوجيا
مستشفى الكويت

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الإماراتية
الاثيوبية
الامانية (لوفتهانزا)
التركية
السعودية
القطرية

طيران الخليج

طيران الأردنية - صنعاء

طيران الاتحاد

طيران دبي

فندق ميركيور صنعاء

فندق شمر

فندق مومبيك

فندق لازوردي
فندق تاج صيدة زردنيس
العالمية للفندقة - صنعاء
فندق شهران - صنعاء
فندق واجنحة التاج الملكي

معاهد

٠١/٢٤٦٩٦٧-٦٦
٠١/٢٧٤٣٨٦-٨٧
٠١/٦.٠٠.٠٠٠
ف: ٠١/٦.٠١٨٨٩
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٠١/٥.٠.٠.٠.٠
٠١/٢٨٣٢٨٣

شركات طيران

٠١/٤٥٤٥٤٥
فرع تعز : ٠١/٢١٧١٢٦
فرع عدن: ٣/٥٢٤٥٦٦
فرع الحديدة : ٣/٢٠١٤٧٤
٠١/٥٦٥٦٥٦٠ ٠١/٣٥.٠٨.٠
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٠١/٤٣٧٩٩٣
٠١/٢١٣٤٠٠
٠١/٤٥٩٧٠-٣
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٠١/٥.٦.٣.٠
٠١/٤٤.٠٩٣٢
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٠١/٤٤٦٧٥.٠

٠١/٢١٣٥٤٤-٦٦
عدن ٢/٢٢٨٦٦٦
٠١/٤١٨٥٤٥/٧
٠١/٥٤٦٦٦٦
ف: ٠١/٥٤٦.٠.٠
٠١/٤٣٢.٠.٢/٠/٤٠
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٠١/٤.٠٦٦٦١, ٤.٠٦٦٨١

معاهد

٠١/٤٤٥٤٨٢/٣/٤

معهد يالي



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ف: ٠١/٥٥٧٤١٥
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٠١/٤٤١.٠٣٦
٠١/٤٤٨٥٧٣

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٠١/٥٥٥٥٥٥
٠١/٧٢٧٩٣٤
٠١/٦.٠٨٢٧٢
٠١/٢١٤٠.٩٣
٠١/٤٣٨٨.٠٩
٠١/٢٠١٤٧٤ ٠١/٢
فاكس: ٤٤٨٣٤٠
٤٤٨٣٢٩

مدارس

٠١/٤٤٠.٨٤٠
موبايل: ٧٣٣٤٥٥٦٤٥
٠١/٤١٤.٣٦
٠١/٤٣٤٤٣٣
٠١/٣٧.٠٩١/٢
٠١/٣٧.٠٩٣
ف: ٠١/٤٤٦٠.٦٤/٥/٧
٠١/٤٤٨٢٥٨/٩
٠١/٣٨٢.٠٩١


سفريات

٠١/٢٨.٧٧٧ ٠١/٢٧٤٦٩١
٠١/٥٣٥.٠٨٠
عدن ٢/٢٣١٢٧٠
٤٤٤١١٨
٤٤٦٣٥٠
٠١-٤٤١١٥٨/٥٩/٦٠
٠١/٢٧٢٨٩٥-٦

مطاعم

مطعم ومخازنة الشيباني (باسم محمد عبده الشيباني)
تلفون : ٠١٠٥٧٣٦٦٢ - ١٠.٠٩٣٥٠٥ - فاكس: ٩١٦٦٦٢
مطعم منابو الياباني
فطيرتي

كلمات متقاطعة




عمودي:

- مدينة مصرية (م)- متشابهة
- الازدرار (م)- متشابهة
- متشابهان - تقال في البرد - رحلت (م)
- حرف هجائي - الوهم (م)- سينما باللجة المصرية (م)
- ارتفع (م)- سلاح قديم - مكوث
- خاف- امتنع عن الطعام والشراب لوقت محدد- أبسط- يزهق (م)
- فيلم من بطولة احمد عز وغادة عادل
- علم مذكر (م)- حرف اجنبي
- ماركة عطور- خاصتي- اهداكما
- انتفاخ في الجلد- ينتسب الى احدى دول امريكا الجنوبية
- علم مؤنث (م)- صاحبة احدى المهن (م)
- علم مؤنث- رايات (م)
- المطربة (م)- من الحمضيات
- عكس الخلفية (م)- عاصمة الفلبين

افقي:

- روائي اميركي- متشابهان
- موسيقار يوناني- ينتسب الى احدى الدول العربية
- رد الكلام بلجاجة- المتوالمون (م)- بحر
- وحدة قياس- بطن منتفخ- نصف النصف (م)
- صر- مصمم ازياء لبناني (م)- متشابهان
- متشابهة- سيف الحصاد (م)
- هاجر (م)- الشحم (م)- احصل
- متشابهان- بين اثنين - عكس صغيرة
- العائق- من الاوان (م)
- للتعريف- علم مذكر- تهب (م)- حرف جزم
- تبع (م)- جوهـر- جمع المكتب (م)
- من الوان الغناء الغربي- روعي (م)- اداة استعظام
- مجلة عربية- من عندك (م)- يزهق (م)
- من أعمال طه حسين - حلو- عذب (م)
- مرض عصبي- جاءنا

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استراحة العدد

النجمة



١- ابدأ من الحرف القريب من الرقم (١) في الدائرة الكبيرة متجنباً مع السهم مستقيماً يادى الكلمات المناسبة من كلمات القائمة .
٢- تبدأ الكلمة التالية بأحد حرف من الكلمة السابقة .
قم بجمع الحروف الخمسة الموجودة في الدوائر الخمس الكبيرة على اطراف النجمة وترتيبها بالتسلسل الرقمي الغريب من تلك الدائرة لتحصل على حل ما هو مطلوب داخل النجمة .

حمال	رمال	هليل	لامع
حمد	رمش	عامر	لمح
مهر	سعيك	عمر	لندن
ريظ	شموغ	كفاح	نمى



عجائب وغرائب

حاول لص بالغ من العمر ٣٦ عاما فتح نافذة منزل في منطقة ماغوليا في سيابل فوقعت نظارته فبدأ الكلب في النباح من دون أن يسرق أي شيء ولكنه عاد ورن جلس الباب ليلطلب استعادة نظارته.

حكمة العدد

من كتم سره كان الخيار بيده

نكتة العدد

الأول: في واحد صيني طلع على القمر شو صار؟

الثاني: مايعرف شو؟

الأول: نقص من الصين واحد

الثاني: طيب في واحد ياباني طلع على القمر شو صار

الأول: مايعرف شو

الثاني: شاف صاحب الصيني هناك

لغز العدد

ماهر في الرسم ويارع في الكتابة يزداد قصرا اذا نشط في عمله فما هو؟

أن العقب اذا احيط بالنار يلسع نفسه ويموت

الحلول بالمفلوب

مفلوب

مفلوب

مفلوب

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مفلوب

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 6

Convenient genocide: Another failed war to re-arrange the Middle East

It goes without saying, US policy-makers care little for the Yazidis, for they don't serve US interests in any way. However, experience has taught that such groups only become relevant in a specially tailored narrative, in a specific point in time, to be exploited for political and strategic objectives. They will cease to exist the moment the objective is met. Consider for example, the fact that IS has been committing horrific war crimes in western and northern Syria for years, as did forces loyal to President Bashar Al-Assad and militants belonging to the various opposition groups there. Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed and wounded. Various minority groups there faced and continue to face genocide. Yet, somehow, the horrifying bloodshed there was not only tolerated, but in fact encouraged.

For over three years, little effort was put forward to find or impose a fair political solution to the Syria civil war. The Syrians were killing each other and thousands of foreigners, thanks to a purposely porous Turkish borders, were allowed to join in, in a perpetual "Guernica" that, with time, grew to become another Middle Eastern status quo. In fact, all of us are guilty in permitting the Syrian genocide to perpetuate with all of its

barbarity and gruesomeness to this day. It is as if we learned to co-exist with some acts of genocide, but not others. Many fortified themselves behind a mountain of self-tailored evidence that one party was committing all the crimes, and the others and their supporters were, in fact, innocent or in a state of self-defense.

Weren't the massacres of Aleppo in fact genocide? The siege of Yarmouk? The wiping out of entire villages, the beheading and dismembering of people for belonging to the wrong sect or religion?

Even if they were, it definitely was not the kind of genocide that would propel action, specifically Western-led action. In recent days, as it was becoming clear that the US was up to its old interventionist games, countries were being lined up to fight IS. US Secretary of State John Kerry was shuttling the globe once more, from US to Europe, to Turkey, to Iraq to Saudi Arabia, and still going. "We believe we can take on ISIL (previous name for IS) in the current coalition that we have," he said. But why now?

The French are also keen on fighting IS. After all, France was one of the two main parties in the Asia Minor (Sykes-Picot) Agreement in 1916, which divided Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire between

France and Britain. Major wars and upheavals didn't alter the old colonial borders imposed on the Arabs since then, as much as the IS, whose numbers are being artfully overstated from ten thousand up to 31 thousand, according to the CIA. Francois Hollande flew to Baghdad in a reported show of support for Iraq's new government. In actuality, he was there, ahead of a Paris conference on Iraq, to show a united Western front, and that the Obama administration was not alone in this war. France, of course, has its own calculations in Syria and Lebanon, and will find the right moment to cease in its support of the US war.

In his speech on the eve of the 13th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, Obama declared war on IS. Obama's tangled foreign policy agenda became even more confused in his 13-minute speech from the White House. He promised to "hunt down" IS fighters "wherever they are" until the US ultimately destroys the group, as supposedly, it has done with Al-Qaeda. IS, of course, is a splinter Al-Qaeda group, which began as an idea, and thanks to the US global "war on terror" has morphed into an army of many branches. The US never destroyed Al-Qaeda; but it inadvertently allowed the creation of IS.

"That means I will not hesitate to take action against ISIL in Syria, as well as Iraq. This is a core principle of my presidency: If you threaten America, you will find no safe haven," Obama said. Of course, he needed to say that, as his Republican rivals have accused him of lack of decisiveness and his presidency of being weak. His democratic party could possibly lose control over the Senate come the November elections. His fight against IS is meant to help rebrand the president as resolute and decisive, and perhaps create some distraction from economic woes at home. Obama is using the same language that his predecessor, George W. Bush used, and is appealing to the same fear and trepidation of the foreign menace created by the media and fed to the US public for many years.

That same media has also cleverly devalued and branded conflicts, and acts of genocide in ways consistent with US foreign policy agendas. While the Yazidis were purportedly stranded on mount Sinjar, Israel was carrying out a genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. Over 2,150 were killed, mostly civilians, hundreds of them children, and over 11,000 wounded, the vast majority of whom were civilians. Not an alleged 40,000 but a confirmed 520,000 thousand were on the run, and along with the rest of Gaza's 1.8 million, were entrapped in an open-air prison with no escape. But that was not an act of genocide either, as far as the US-Western governments and media were concerned. Worse, they actively defended, and, especially in the case of the US, UK, France, and Italy, armed and funded the Israeli aggression. Just as the Israeli army was running out of badly needed ammunition to carry out its war crimes, the US was quick to ship more weapons to Israel. Thanks to US aid and backing, the Gaza genocide was finalized to perfection.

Experience has taught us that not all "acts of genocide" are created equal: Some are fabricated, and others are exaggerated. Some are useful to start wars, and others, no matter how atrocious, are not worth mentioning. Some acts of genocide are branded as wars to liberate, free, and democratize. In that case, body count is not important. Other acts of genocide are to be encouraged, defended, and financed.

But as far as the US involvement in the Middle East is concerned, the only real genocide is the one that serves the interests of the West, by offering an opportunity for military intervention, followed by political and strategic meddling to re-arrange the region. The first Bush administration tried but failed, the second Bush administration flirted with the "New Middle East" idea and also failed, and now, Obama.

The US experience in Iraq also taught us that its effort will only succeed in exacerbating an already difficult situation, yielding yet more disenfranchised groups, political despair and greater violence. If the US war on Iraq and Afghanistan failed so miserably to achieve any long term political objectives, despite the trillions of dollars spent there and the hundreds of thousands of lives taken, Obama's chances of success now are close to nil.

Ramzy Baroud is a PhD scholar in People's History at the University of Exeter. He is the Managing Editor of Middle East Eye. Baroud is an internationally-syndicated columnist, a media consultant, an author and the founder of PalestineChronicle.com.

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