

News

**Bus explosion in Dar Salm leaves two soldiers dead, 11 injured**  
Page 2



Interview

**Houthi spokesperson talks to the Yemen Times**  
Page 8



Analysis

**Socioeconomic reforms in Oman**  
Page 11



متوفر لدى جميع  
الموزعين المعتمدين  
ومراكز خدمة سبأفون

400

ريال إشتراك شهري  
حسب سنة الإشتراك

200

فائز شهرياً

## خط الفوترة لتسباً حُلة جديدة ومزايا فريدة

67%

تخفيض في خدمة  
الأهل والأصدقاء

100%

الخط مجاني

800

ريال بداية لباقات  
الإنترنت

خط سبأ الجديد كلياً ... تحدث ، اربح ، شارك ، قل مرحباً بمزايا لا حصر لها .

■ قيمة خط الفوترة سبأ مجاناً ( فقط دفع مبلغ التأمين ) .

■ إشتراك شهري يبدأ من 400 إلى 750 ريال ، وذلك حسب سنة الإشتراك حيث يحصل المشترك على 5% تخفيض عن كل سنة .

■ فقط 150 ريال إشتراك لخدمة الأهل والأصدقاء ، أول 6 أرقام تضاف مجاناً ويتخفيض في المكالمات والإشتراك الشهري يصل إلى 67% .

■ تأهل للسحب ضمن 200 فائز شهرياً بجوائز قيمة وذلك لكل 2500 ريال يتم سدادها شهرياً وتستطيع مضاعفة فرصك للفوز .

■ باقات إنترنت متنوعة تبدأ من 800 ريال فقط ( 40 ميجا بايت ) .

■ ( الأسعار غير شاملة للضريبة )

تلفزيونات إتش دي و إل إي دي فائقة الوضوح ،  
أجهزة كمبيوتر محمول ، غسالات فل أوماتك ، بلاي  
ستايشن 3 ، مسرح منزلي وجوائز أخرى متنوعة .

جائزة  
200 تنهرياً

لمزيد من المعلومات أرسل ( سبأ ) إلى الرقم ٢١١ مجاناً





# تواصل لا يشترى ...

# تخفيض حتى 60%



## للأهل والأصدقاء

خدمة الأهل والأصدقاء تتيح لمشاركي نظام الفوترة إضافة 6 أرقام  
ولنظام الدفع المسبق إضافة 3 أرقام  
والحصول على تخفيض في المكالمات والرسائل يصل إلى 60%.

لمزيد من المعلومات عن الخدمة أرسل كلمة "أهل" إلى 211 مجاناً

**سابافون**  
**SABAFON**

أصالة وتواصل

[www.sabafon.com](http://www.sabafon.com)

المشغل الأول والأكبر للهاتف النقال في اليمن



**Hertz** World On Wheels  
Think Smart... Turn to the Road Experts  
**Universal Rent a Car**  
Sana'a Tel: (01)440309, Aden (02)245625  
hertz-yemen@universalrentacar.com

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR SALE

# YEMEN TIMES

Now With "marhaba"  
Apply Visa to United Arab Emirates & fly with any Airline  
Beirut St. Hadda, Al Medinah Sakania, opp. MTN Hadda, Sana'a - Yemen  
Tel : 01 416 758, 01 424 999 - Fax: 01 416 981, 414 243  
Malla Plaza, Main Road Haram St., Beside MTN Office, Aden - Yemen  
Tel: 02 249780, 02 223146 - Fax: 245626

Thursday, 6 February, 2014 • Issue No. 1753 • Price 50 Yemeni Riyals www.yementimes.com • Founded in 1991 by Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf



Yemen's national soccer team players say the FIFA ban on matches in Yemen has affected morale and performance. "It is frustrating that FIFA has declared Yemen unsafe and [now] [prohibits] international matches [inside] of Yemen. We need our supporters," Al-Selwi said. FIFA sent a committee in August 2013 to evaluate Yemen's readiness to host international matches and has decided to hold a friendly test match in March 2014 to evaluate the situation. *Read more on Page 3*

(Photo by Ali Abulhoom)

## Shabwa on alert following rocket attack

Ali Saeed

SHABWA, Feb 5—Military and security forces in Shabwa are on high alert after unknown gunmen fired a rocket on Friday at the liquid gas plant in the Balhaf area of Shabwa, a military source told the Yemen Times.

"A blast sounded offshore the Balhaf Plant, coming from a rocket-launched explosive device," the company said on its website. The plant remains in operation and no casualties or damage was reported, according to YLNG.

It added that "Yemen LNG is working with the Yemeni Authorities to take further measures around Balhaf in order to ensure maximum security of people and assets on site."

Aysh Dahman, an assistant officer of military operations in Shabwa, told the Yemen Times on

Wednesday that "all security and military forces are on high alert for expected attacks and ambush by armed men affiliated to the AQAP."

Dahman explained that the last clashes between military forces and militants took place Wednesday evening in Al-Nushaima area of Al-Radoom district where a group of armed attempted to ambush a military vehicle while returning to the military camp from a mission.

Shabwa is one of Yemen's oil producing governorates and has been a target of numerous attacks.

Mubarak Al Azlam, the assistant security chief of Shabwa told the Yemen Times that armed men believed to be affiliated with Hiraq clashed with troops at a security checkpoint in Attaq on Wednesday.

One bystander was killed, and four people were injured, including



three soldiers, in the clashes.

The Balhaf gas plant is the main producer and exporter of Yemen liquefied gas. Yemen has exported about 6.7 million metric tons of gas per year since it began selling gas on the world market in November

2009, according to the state-run Yemen Liquid Natural Gas (YLNG).

An attack in Sept. left 22 soldiers dead and 18 others injured. Al-Qaeda affiliates claimed responsibility for the attack.

## National Security Bureau releases Ibb security official

Brother of official is accused of supporting Al-Qaeda

Mohammed Al-Hassani

SANA'A, Feb. 5—The National Security Bureau (NSB) on Wednesday released Col. Anwar Abdulhameed Hatim, the director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau of Ibb governorate, after holding him for four days at the National Security Prison in Sana'a and accusing him of having ties to Al-Qaeda.

Col. Hatim was released following protests by Ibb police officers who managed to shut down Ibb governorate's security

and criminal investigation departments on Sunday. The offices were reopened on Monday but the officers remained on strike until his release.

Lt.Col. Abdu Farhan, deputy head of the Ibb security department, said that Col. Hatim was released after he 'proved his innocence' and also promised to not have any contact with his brother, Sheikh Mamoon Abdulhameed Hatim, who is accused of being in contact with Al-Qaeda. Farhan said the NSB had arrested Hatim in order to get information about his brother.

In an interview in March 2013 with Yemen Today TV, which is associated with former President Ali Abdulla Saleh, Sheikh Hatim confirmed his support for Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). On Sunday, the NSB arrested

Col. Hatim in a hotel in Sana'a along with his 10-year-old son, Ibrahim, and one of his guards. After several hours, Ibrahim was released to a family member. The guard is still being detained.

The Yemen Times contacted the NSB, but they declined to comment.

Abdulrazaq Al-Jamal, a Sana'a-based analyst and AQAP researcher, told the Yemen Times that security forces cannot arrest Sheikh Hatim because he is a tribal leader in Al-Sadda district of Ibb governorate and is protected by tribesmen.

"Col. Hatim was arrested because there are people in the department who want someone else to occupy his post, so they informed the NSB about [his brother's support for Al-Qaeda]," Al-Jamal alleged.

He also said that the NSB arrested Col. Hatim to get information about his brother because they hoped this would help them arrest Sheikh Hatim.

Ali Al-Zanam, Ibb's deputy governor, said that the police officers from Ibb's criminal investigation department went on strike because "Hatim had a good reputation as a security figure and does not [share his brother's political beliefs]."

Several sheikhs from Ibb governorate met on Tuesday to discuss the reasons behind the detention of Col. Hatim. They threatened to block the main road that connects Taiz, Ibb and Sana'a until he was released.

Hatim has been in charge of Ibb's Criminal Investigation Bureau for four months.

**LEGADOR**  
a taste to adore!  
Pineapple Slices in Honey Syrup  
www.legador.com

**Green COOL ELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS**  
Safe Your Life With CCTV  
www.greencool-int.com

**Al-Jazeera Insurance & Reinsurance**  
www.al-jazeeraair.com - aljazeeraair@y.net.ye - info@al-jazeeraair.com

**KFC** pleasureable taste  
**pepsi**

## Doubts about Katyusha missile claims

Nasser Al-Sakkaf

SANA'A, Feb.4—A weapons expert has cast doubt on the possibility that both explosions that occurred late night on Sunday were caused by Katyusha BM 21 missiles fired from Sanhan and Khawlan districts. The Supreme Security Committee, headed by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, told Saba news agency that the explosions were actually missiles, not explosives, on Monday.

The two explosions occurred shortly after midnight, one near the Ministry of Defense and the other near Kumaim Center in Hadda.

Abdulla Muthana, a retired military officer from the Ministry of Defense with 30 years of experience and a background in weaponry told the Yemen Times that that specific type of weaponry would leave more damage than it did in the site by the Ministry of Defense, where crushed concrete, a destroyed garbage bin and a slightly damaged bus were the only signs of damage.

Immediately following the incident near the Ministry of Defense, before the area had been taped off by security forces, there was no sign of shrapnel or remnants at the site.

**Next issue**  
**Yemeni Revolution: 3 Years Later**  
In a special edition on the anniversary of the 2011-uprising, Yemen Times will shed light on the uprising's causes, prospects and implications for the daily life of Yemenis.





## Art exhibition to mark World Cancer Day

Artists raise money for Cancer Patients

Story and photo by Mohammed Al-Khyat

SANA'A, Feb. 4—More than 20 artists are participating in a three-day-long art exhibition in Al-Sabeen Park to raise funds for cancer patients. The event kicked off Tuesday, in conjunction with World Cancer Day.

Radfan Al-Muhamadi, head of the Arab Forum for Fine Arts, told the Yemen Times that 50 percent of the funds raised will go to cancer patients.

All artistic pieces displayed in the exhibition were themed around cancer. Many paintings depicted cancer patients and the struggles



The "Friends of Cancer Patients" are holding a bazaar through Thursday at the Al-Sabeen Park art exhibition fundraiser.

they go through. "The purpose of this event is to raise awareness of the disease in Yemen. We also want to raise awareness about prevention," said Abdulmunem Abdulqawi, the

media head of the National Anti-Cancer Corporation (NACC).

NACC manager Malik Al-Sabar estimates that about 100,000 Yemenis have cancer.

Yemen has one of the highest rates of cancer in the Middle East. A large increase in herbicide use in agriculture, an abundance of tobacco consumers, and the use of pesticides in qat cultivation are just some of the factors believed to contribute to the high cancer rate, according to health experts.

A group of youth calling themselves "Friends of Cancer Patients" also organized a bazaar at the exhibition in order to raise funds for patients.

Dr. Abdulla Al-Arashi, the health manager of Sana'a, delivered a speech during the event, saying the Ministry of Health provides medications for over 10,000 cancer patients across the country.

He emphasized the importance of raising awareness about the dangers of smoking and excessive qat consumption.

## People with disabilities protest for change at Disabled Care & Rehabilitation Fund offices



While happy about the successful conclusion of the NDC, the disabled demonstrate for prompt delivery of government aid.

Fund's budget triples, protesters present demands

Dares Al-Badany

SANA'A, Feb. 5—Hundreds of people with disabilities gathered outside the headquarters of the Disabled Care and Rehabilitation Fund Tuesday and Wednesday. Demonstrators are calling on the fund, which had its budget tripled this year, to increase spending on associations that provide services to people with disabilities, among other demands.

The fund currently provides financial assistance to 180,000 Yemenis with disabilities, according to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. There are about three million Yemenis with disabilities, according to the ministry.

It funds the activities of about ninety associations that serve people with disabilities, according to the General Union of the Disabled. Despite its tripled budget, protesters say the fund has not increased financial support to the associations.

The General Union of the Disabled has also called on the fund to stop purchasing costly private health and rehabilitation services

and to offer these services directly.

Abdulla Bunyan, union legal adviser, has accused the fund of mismanagement, saying the fund buys overpriced services from the private sector.

The manager of the fund, Abdulla Al-Hamdani, said the fund is sometimes forced to buy services from the private sector because they are unavailable elsewhere. Many medical devices, he said, are only available from the private sector.

The union issued a statement on Tuesday, calling on members to stand together and to "hold the fund accountable [so as to] improve its performance, to put an end to corruption and to remove dishonest employees."

Parliament increased the fund's budget in December 2013 from two billion riyals (\$9.3 million) to six billion riyals (\$27.9 billion).

Al-Hamdani told the Yemen Times that many of the union's demands are legitimate and will be addressed.

"We will discuss these issues with the fund's leadership to determine how we might be able to help them meet some of their most urgent needs, such as operational costs," he said. "Other demands will take time, but they will be addressed in the future."

## Bus explosion in Dar Salm leaves two soldiers dead, 11 injured

Story and photo by Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A, Feb. 5—Investigations are still underway in the bomb blast that targeted a Defense Ministry bus in the Dar Salm area of Sana'a on Tuesday, according to the Interior Ministry. Out of the 18 passengers on the bus, the blast left two soldiers dead and 11 wounded.

The injured soldiers are hospitalized in Hospital 48 of the dissolved Republican Guards. Four are in critical condition.

"Locals rushed to the scene, transporting the injured to the hospital because security forces were late to arrive," said Mohammed Khamash Al-Alyee, who witnessed the explosion.

The bus was transporting soldiers from their homes to a defense ministry central maintenance base in the Al-Hasaba district. The bomb detonated when the bus slowed down for a speed bump, according to Taiseer Showba', one of the survivors of the explosion.

"The explosion was very strong. One of the victims was decapitated and the windows of the bus were completely shattered," said Showba'.

Lt. Col. Abulhakim Rashid, the director of Hizyaz police station, told the Yemen Times that the military is increasing its presence on the streets to catch those who are planting explosives.

"They will not escape justice," he said.



This bus was ferrying soldiers from their homes to work at a Ministry of Defense maintenance base in the Al-Hasaba district when it was struck at a speed bump by a roadside IED.

## Ceasefire reached between Houthis and Al-Hashid tribe

Fighting left dozens dead

Nasser Al-Sakkaf

SANA'A, Feb. 5—A ceasefire agreement has been reached between the Houthis and the Al-Hashid tribe in the Hashid area of Amran governorate on Tuesday, following weeks of clashes that left dozens killed on both sides.

Sheikh Mohammed Al-Ghawli, a leading figure in Amran who is affiliated with the Shiite Houthis, confirmed to the Yemen Times that fighting has stopped between the two parties but said they are still in a state of alert and ready should more fighting break out.

Part of the ceasefire agreement, according to Al-Ghawli, includes ending the blockade of the Sa'ada-Amran road and guaranteeing the freedom of people to be able to express their opinions and dissemination of their ideas.

"In spite of the ceasefire, there is no guarantee that clashes will not erupt again," he added.

The Houthis took control of Hawth and Al-Khamri areas last week and clashes erupted between the Houthis and tribes opposed to them in Amran.

Mohammed Al-Bukhaiti, a leading figure of Ansar Allah, the political body of the Houthis, told the Yemen Times that the most important thing for the Houthis in the agreement is freedom of thought and the freedom to spread one's ideas.

"The security forces and vehicles are now able to use the road, which had been blocked since August, and people can

travel between Sa'ada and Amran peacefully without being stopped at any [unofficial] tribal checkpoints," he added.

Tribesmen associated with Al-Ahmar blocked the Sa'ada-Amran road in August following clashes with Ansar Allah supporters in the area in June, when a number of pro-Ansar Allah families were killed in the Hawth district of Amran governorate.

In a Facebook post on Tuesday, Abdulqader Hilal, the mayor of Sana'a and a member of the mediation committee assigned by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi to mediate the truce, announced that the committee began to implement the agreement in Khawlan and Hawth areas.

The agreement also included evacuation of non-local gunmen and their return to their original areas; opening and securing the main road for all people; a ban on carrying weapons in public places; and the prohibition of attacks on public or private property. It also obligated the state to take action against those who violate the terms of the agreement.

Ali Al-Madlai, a resident of Amran, told the Yemen Times that the situation is stable in the area but people fear that fighting may break out again, adding that "Several mediation sessions took place and agreements were reached, but most of them have been violated."

Since the eruption of clashes between the Houthis and Al-Hashid tribe, several tribal and presidential committees have tried to reach a ceasefire between the two sides.

The clashes have so far displaced several families from the

Hawth area, forcing them to flee to the neighboring districts of Amran.

"In spite of the agreement that

was signed on Tuesday, the displaced people of Al-Osaimat area have not yet returned," Al-Madlai added.

### AROUND TOWN



A tamarhindi vendor sells Tamarhindi at the bus station near Bab Al-Yemen. The recent warmer weather has been good for the Tamarhindi business. Tamarhindi is the sour fruit of the tamarind tree, full of B vitamins and calcium. (Photo by Ali Al-Moshki)



# Popularity of Yemeni soccer teams in decline

Story and photos by  
Ali Abulohoom

With youth flocking to cafes and old movie theaters around the capital to catch matches between soccer teams, there is no lack of love in Sana'a for the world's most popular sport. But Yemeni soccer teams say they have seen their popularity drop as Yemenis pay increasing attention to the big names outside of the country like FC Barcelona and Real Madrid.

At a packed café in Sana'a, a match sponsored by the Spanish soccer league, La Liga, ends in a draw, but that does not end the yelling and arguing over which team should have won the match. The more level-headed step in and likely prevent a few blows among the more hot-headed in the crowd.

About 50 fans attend each match at Al-Thawra or Al-Thurafi stadiums, run by the Yemen Football Association (YFA), according to Yahia Awath, a member of Al-Thawra stadium organizing committee. A pal-

try number compared to those who gather to watch soccer's big stars around the city, including in makeshift theaters with big screen TVs or projectors. The cost to watch a game surrounded by other fans and foes ranges from YR100 (about 50 cents) to YR500 (about \$2.50).

Yasser Motahar, 35, has done what few hardcore fans do—he has abandoned his old favorite team and switched allegiances. Formerly a fan of the local Yemeni team, Sha'ab Sana'a, he has since devoted his soccer energies to supporting the Spanish team, FC Barcelona. He has not missed a match since switching over.

Motahar says he and others have left their former favorites because they just weren't satisfied with their performances. He says the Yemeni national team has fared poorly ever since its last moment of glory in 2006, when it reached the second round of the World Cup.

"We cannot separate the performance of the national team from that of the local teams. If the national team fares well, that means it has good players who come from good local teams," Motahar said.

Akram Al-Selwi, 25, is a player on the national team. Al-Selwi told the Yemen Times that the national team has long fallen short of expectations at both the regional and international levels because of low morale.

The Fédération Internationale de Football (FIFA) banned matches at Yemeni stadiums in 2011 following the uprising and the unstable security situation in the country. Yemen's national soccer team was forced to travel abroad to compete with foreign teams. Unable to play any home games, far away from most of their fans, the national team's performance has suffered, Al-Selwi said.

Yemen dropped in FIFA world rankings from 126 in 2010 to 180 in 2014.

"It is frustrating that FIFA has declared Yemen unsafe and [now] [prohibits] international matches [inside] of Yemen. We need our supporters," Al-Selwi said.

The poor performance of the Yemeni team has trickled down, Al-Selwi said, affecting the confidence and performance of local teams.

"When I was playing for the Helal Al-Hodeida team in the local YFA tournament and realized that no one was watching...I felt that no one cared about my performance, and that was [discouraging]."

Al-Selwi does not blame people for not supporting the local and national teams. "People want to see exciting, talented soccer players when they watch international matches. It is just not as much fun to watch the local teams because their level of play is not so high."

To boost morale—and performance—Hamid Shaibani, the secretary general of the YFA, wants the ban lifted. FIFA sent a committee in August 2013 to evaluate Yemen's readiness to host interna-



YFA teams Yarmouk (in white) and Waheda Sana'a (in red) play a match at Al-Thawra stadium in November. The bleachers are nearly empty of spectators, as both photos testify.



tional matches and decided to hold a friendly test match in March 2014 in order to evaluate the situation. "We are working hard in cooperation with the Asian Soccer Confederation (AFC)—part of FIFA—to get this ban lifted," he said.

Another reason behind the decline of local and national Yemeni soccer teams, said sports journalist and analyst Hesham Mohsin, is because "Yemeni businessmen are not keen to invest in soccer because they do not think they will get a good return on their investment."

The lack of investment in sports includes a lack of marketing, ad-

vertising and the selling of team merchandise.

"People need to see publicity for soccer teams everywhere they go, and this will not happen until businesses start sponsoring the teams."

Mohammed Rabe'e'a, 35, a fan of the Ahli Sana'a team, holds the government responsible for decline in popularity of Yemeni soccer.

"The successive governments have shown no interest in nurturing the sport in Yemen. Ever since the republic was formed in 1962, they have paid more attention to politics [than sports]," he said.

Nonetheless, some local teams

still have loyal fans that continue to support them, regardless of their local rankings. "Even though the team's matches are poorly attended, I get excited when I attend, because [Ahli Sana'a] is my favorite team," said Rabe'e'a.

For Amar Hussein, 23, the reason he follows international soccer leagues is that the local YFA teams do not have the financial ability to pull in famous Arab and international players who would create excitement among Yemeni fans.

"I would rather experience the excitement of watching Messi play for Barça or Ronaldo play for Real Madrid," said Hussein.

Hello Tomorrow

Get lost in the city where America found its way

See you in Boston

Wander the same cobblestone streets where iconic patriots helped shape America's history. Then enjoy a historic evening filled with world-class dining, sports and culture.

Starting 10th March, fly Emirates non-stop daily to Boston from YER 288,263\* and connect to 28 other destinations across America via JetBlue.

emirates.com/ye

Earn Skywards Miles with Emirates and Jet Blue ♦ Enjoy up to 1,600 channels of entertainment ♦ Dubai stopover

\*Terms and conditions apply. Fare is inclusive of all taxes. Valid for sale until 31st March for travel between 10th March and 30th April 2014. No service fee applies when booking online. Additional restrictions apply. For more information or to make a booking call us on 01 444442, contact your travel agent or visit emirates.com/ye





## JOB VACANCY



مؤسسة خالد الوزير القانونية  
KHALED ALWAZIR LAW FIRM  
محاماة، استشارات، تحكيم  
Consultancy, Litigation & Arbitration

## اعلان

### (Male/female executive secretary needed at Khaled Al Wazir Law Firm)

#### General Requirements:

- Tactful speaking skill.
- Presentable.
- Willing to work full-time.
- Wearing hijab (for females).

#### Qualification and Experience:

- Bachelor degree in administration, full knowledge of computer use, shorthand skills, proficiency in Arabic and English languages and at least three years working experience; or
- Community college Diploma in secretarial field, full knowledge of computer use, shorthand skills, proficiency in Arabic and English languages and at least six years working experience; or
- Post-Secondary Stage diploma in secretarial field, full knowledge of computer use, shorthand skills and proficiency in Arabic and English languages, and at least ten years working experience.
- Preferably proficiency in French language.

#### Duties and Responsibilities:

- Overseeing secretarial work in the firm.
- Receiving, making and forwarding telephone calls, organizing the meetings and the Chairman's schedule and preparing for and ensuring the delivery of calls for meetings.
- Following up on incoming and outgoing mails and any proceedings done in regards.
- Ensuring the circulation of instructions and information necessary for the firm's business and typing the confidential documents.
- Writing and typing periodical memos on the firm's cases and internal and external affairs, following up on the progress of cases, consultations and external accounting and reporting thereon to the Chairman to decide upon and make any necessary circulars.
- Preparing for and attending meetings and writing the necessary minutes and letters and as directed by the Chairman.
- Translating the correspondences and any meetings of the firm.
- Updating and following up on the firms' websites and social networks accounts (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube).
- Organizing, keeping and archiving the firms' paper form and electronic documents.
- Complying with the firm's bylaws.
- Carrying out any other tasks assigned thereto by the Chairman.

#### Additional Details:

- Work Location: Sana'a.
- Working Hours: From 8.00am to 1.00pm and from 4.00pm to 7.00pm Sunday to Thursday. Off days are Fridays, Saturdays and Public Holidays.
- Arabic and English resumé with a passport-size photo should be sent to the e-mail below in order to schedule an interview: [info@khaledalwazirlaw.com](mailto:info@khaledalwazirlaw.com)
- Please write the job title in the subject line and do not send your resumé more than once.

### (مطلوب سكرتير تنفيذي / سكرتيرة تنفيذية للعمل لدى مؤسسة خالد الوزير القانونية)

#### الشروط العامة:

- لياقه في التحدث.
- حسن المظهر.
- التفرغ للعمل.
- محبة للسيدات.

#### المؤهلات والخبرات:

- الشهادة الجامعية الأولى في الإدارة مع معرفة تامة باستخدام الحاسوب والاختزال وإتقان اللغتين العربية والإنجليزية وخبرة لا تقل عن ثلاث سنوات؛ أو
- دبلوم كلية مجتمع في مجال السكرتاريا مع خبرة لا تقل عن ست سنوات ومعرفة تامة باستخدام الحاسوب والاختزال وإتقان اللغتين العربية والإنجليزية؛ أو
- دبلوم بعد شهادة الدراسة الثانوية العامة في السكرتاريا مع خبرة لا تقل عن عشر سنوات ومعرفة تامة باستخدام الحاسوب والاختزال وإتقان اللغتين العربية والإنجليزية.
- يفضل الامام باللغة الفرنسية.

#### الواجبات والمسؤوليات:

- الإشراف على أعمال السكرتارية في المؤسسة.
- استقبال وطلب المكالمات الهاتفية وتحويلها وتنظيم مواعيد رئيس المؤسسة والاجتماعات والتحضير لها وتأمين وصول دعواتها.
- متابعة البريد الوارد والصادر وأية إجراءات تمت بشأنه.
- تأمين نشر التعليمات والمعلومات الضرورية لأعمال المؤسسة وطباعة الوثائق السرية.
- تحرير و طباعة المذكرات الدورية الخاصة بالشؤون الداخلية والخارجية للمؤسسة وقضاياها ومتابعة سير القضايا والاستشارات والمحاسبات الخارجية وعرض تقرير بشأنها على رئيس المؤسسة لاتخاذ ما يلزم وأي تعاميم مطلوبه.
- التحضير للاجتماعات واللقاءات وحضور هذه الاجتماعات واللقاءات وتحرير المحاضر والرسائل اللازمة لها وحسب طلب رئيس المؤسسة.
- ترجمة المراسلات وأي اجتماعات للمؤسسة.
- تحديث ومتابعة مواقع التواصل الخاصة بالمؤسسة (الويب سايت، فيس بوك، تويتر، يوتيوب).
- ترتيب وحفظ وارشفة وثائق المؤسسة الورقية والالكترونية.
- الالتزام بالنظام الداخلي للمؤسسة.
- القيام بأية أعمال أخرى تكلف بها من قبل رئيس المؤسسة.

#### مفاصيل أخرى:

- موقع العمل: أمانة العاصمة صنعاء.
- أوقات الدوام: من الساعة ٨ صباحاً وحتى ١ ظهراً ومن الساعة ٤ عصرًا وحتى ٧ مساءً، من الأحد حتى الخميس، والإجازة يومي الجمعة والسبت وفي العطل الرسمية.
- يتم إرسال السيرة الذاتية باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية مرفق بها صورة شخصيه حديثه على الايميل: [info@khaledalwazirlaw.com](mailto:info@khaledalwazirlaw.com) لتحديد موعد المقابلة الشخصية.
- الرجاء كتابة اسم الوظيفة (في الموضوع) وعدم إرسال السيرة الذاتية أكثر من مرة.

### وانتصرت الحكمة اليمنية

مجدداً يثبت اليمنيون أنهم أهل حكمة وأنهم شعب حضاري يعتمد الحوار والمنطق بدلاً عن لغة السلاح لحل جميع مشاكله. ومثل نجاح مؤتمر الحوار الوطني مكسب جديد يضاف إلى تاريخ اليمنيين في سجل إنجازاته التاريخية..  
وبهذه المناسبة، يسرنا أن نرفع أسمى آيات التهاني والتبريكات إلى

فخامة المشير الركن

**عبدربه منصور هادي**

رئيس الجمهورية

القائد الأعلى للقوات المسلحة.. وإلى الشعب اليمني العظيم  
سائلين المولى عزوجل للشعب اليمني مزيد من التقدم والإزدهار.

### The Yemeni wisdom has yet again prevailed!

Once more the Yemeni people have proved to be a nation of wisdom and civilization that counts on dialogue and reason, rather than on the use of arms to resolve their problems.

The success of the

### National Dialogue Conference

is, indeed, a new achievement in the history of the Yemenis. On this occasion, we are pleased to extend our sincere and deepest congratulations to

His Excellency President:

**Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi**

the President of Yemen and the Chief Commander of the Armed Forces, and to all Yemeni people.



on behalf of  
Yemen Petroleum Company  
Dr. Mansour Ali Al-Batani  
The Chief Executive Officer



شركة النفط اليمنية  
عنهم  
الدكتور/ منصور علي البطاني  
المدير العام التنفيذي



# Yemeni Landmarks: The Saleh Mosque

Story & photos by Samar Qaed

Despite only being around for about six years, the Saleh Mosque has become a landmark in the capital,

Sana'a. As a nation in transition, somewhere between the future it strives for and the past it carries with it, the mosque itself represents the legacy of its namesake and the controversy that carries. It is the largest mosque in Sana'a and one of the largest mosques in

the world. It is 222,000 square meters in size and can accommodate about 45,000 in the main hall, 2,000 women in a separate upstairs worship space, and there is parking for 1,900 cars.

Originally, there was a plan to enlarge the historical grand mosque in the Old City, but that plan was abandoned as impractical due to space constrictions. In 1998 the decision was made to build a new mosque.

Actual work on the mosque began in 2001. SIAC Industrial Construction & Engineering Company won the bid, and the work was done in cooperation with the Al-Saeed Office for Engineering and Contracting in Yemen.

The location of the mosque was carefully selected. Al-Sabaen is an area open from all sides that lies at the intersection of four major roadways. It is also historically significant for being the location of the 70-day siege that was imposed by the Imam's forces on the Republicans in the capital in 1970.

The mosque cost anywhere from \$60 million to \$125 million to build and took nearly eight years before construction was finished. Its designers studied the mosques of Cordoba in Spain, Al-Faisal in Pakistan, Sultan Ahmed in Turkey, and the influence of these mosques is evident in its designs. The designs of the minarets, domes and facades were derived from traditional Yemeni architecture.

There are 23 domes in the mosque. The central dome measures 28 m in diameter with a height of 54.5 m. The mosque has six minarets that are each 100 m tall.



Master craftsmen from Syria were hired for the masonry work, and stones were brought in from different areas of Yemen such as Amran, Subaha, Eyal Suraih, Nihm and Khamir. Stones included black basalt as well as red, white and black limestone. Quranic verses are inscribed on the walls.

Numerous chandeliers made from Czech crystal, of different sizes and designs, hang from the ceilings and


domes, gracing the inside of the mosque. The largest chandelier hangs in the dome beneath the tallest minaret. It weighs about six tons and includes 81 golden lanterns made of Czech crystal. The blue carpeting that covers the floor was imported from Turkey and is made of the best quality New Zealand wool.

The main worship space has 15 doors. Each one is five meters wide

and covered with copper. Three of these doors are named after companions of the prophet: Ali bin Abi Talib, Abi Musa Al-Ashari and Mu'ad bin Jabal.

The ceilings are lined with 30,000 pieces of white oak that are covered with gold leaf and decorated with Islamic inscriptions drawn from some of the oldest mosques.

*Continued on the back page*



**COMMUNITY LIVELIHOODS PROJECT (CLP) |**

## Tender Invitation


The Community Livelihoods Project (CLP) is a USAID-funded project in Yemen managed by Creative Associates International.

In coordination with the Ministry of Education (MOE), CLP is responsible for the following works:

### Printing Teacher guides books, Part #2

CLP is inviting qualified Companies specializing in these areas to submit offers.

Interested companies are invited to contact CLP at the address below to request a copy of the RFQ (specifying in your request the tender name) during the period: **Feb 6, 2014 thru Sunday, Feb 9, 2014 03:00pm** to receive the complete Tender Documents.  
CLP email: [proc@clp-yemen.com](mailto:proc@clp-yemen.com)



**FOOD SECURITY CLUSTER**  
*Strengthening Humanitarian Response*

### Food Security Vulnerability Study On Yemeni Returnees Migrant Families Terms of Reference and Invitation to Application

- 1. Background**  
The Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) in Yemen was established in 2012 and is co-led by WFP and FAO. Yemen is facing large-scale displacement, civil conflict, political instability, food insecurity, high food prices, endemic poverty, a breakdown of social services, diminishing resources and influxes of refugee and migrants. In 2012, WFP conducted a Comprehensive Food Security Survey, which found that more than 10 million people—almost half the country's population—either hungry or on the edge of hunger. Five million of those, 22 percent of the population, were found to be severely food insecure; unable to produce or buy the food they need. The same survey found child malnutrition rates are among the highest in the world with close to half of Yemen's children under 5 years, that is two million children, stunted and one million acutely malnourished. In 2013 the Government of Saudi Arabia decided to revise the national working visa policy. This has led to loss of income for thousands of Yemeni families that were surviving on their remittances.
- 2. Purpose of Food Security Assessment**  
In a bid to improve and strengthen its understanding and coverage for profiles of food security and build partners awareness, Food Security and Agriculture Cluster Yemen recognizes the need to improve upon its vulnerability analysis, so as to ensure better understanding of localized factors behind food insecurity. Accordingly, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster seeks to undertake a food security sensitive assessment in order to acquire an enhanced understanding of the macro and micro level dynamics of Yemeni returnees migrants and their families. The scope of the study is to build awareness around this particular group of the Yemeni society and the perception by all actors on the ground, from communities, government institutions, the international community, CSOs. More broadly, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster intends to utilize the study outputs for advocacy purposes and to promote vulnerability-sensitive and protection mainstreaming based approach for programming amongst the humanitarian community in Yemen.
- 3. Food Security Vulnerability Assessment Outputs:**  
The production, of an analysis on food security vulnerabilities, among the Yemeni returnees migrants and their families, in three Yemeni governorates (Taiz, Hoddeidah and Hajja) will include:
  - Desk review of national and international frameworks on food security, framework and already conducted researches on Yemeni migrants;
  - The identification of their families coping mechanisms, assessing positive and negative practices in terms of health and nutrition;
  - Vulnerability analysis of the targeted group (based on age and gender disaggregated analysis);
  - Identification of possible humanitarian advocacy strategies targeting national and international actors;
- 4. Outputs, Methodology and Location**  
The methodology should be primarily based on qualitative research methods, with data to be collected in three governorates identified by the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster. The final output will be a report in English of minimum 40 pages (not counting the annexes).
- 5. Timeframe and Duration**  
The Study will commence from February and end in March 2014. The research organization will include following specific activities in the study and will indicate in their proposal number of days they propose for each activity to be discussed and agreed with the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster Coordinator.
- 6. Submission of Expression of Interest**  
The deadline for the expression of interest is 9th February. Consulting companies/research organizations and national NGOs that meet the above requirements should submit an expression of interest, which should include the following:
  - Cover letter including the individual research person/organization suitability for the assignment (been already operating in the country or been able to independently obtain the necessary visa) and current contact information;
  - Supporting documents providing evidence of required qualifications by research;
  - Person/organization, including name of reports, relevant experience, CV of the person who will lead this study, as well as proposed research team details;
  - A detailed work plan;
  - A budget (lump sum fee) for the Study (with accompanying budget outline/justification).

**All applications should be sent to [FAO-YE@fao.org](mailto:FAO-YE@fao.org)**



**YT vision statement****"To make Yemen a good world citizen."**Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf,  
(1951 - 1999)  
Founder of Yemen Times**OUR OPINION****Rough times ahead in Yemen**

**R**ecently we have been waking up to news of terrorist incidents ranging from kidnappings to explosions and assassinations. This is expected because change is getting serious. The discussions that dragged on during the National Dialogue Conference are now starting to transform into concrete action.

We are already working on a map for the country's six federal regions and the division of authority on regional and federal levels.

There is a strong move towards the decentralization of power and wealth. Positive vibes are spreading as citizens start to think about how their lives will be affected. We are already talking about the unexplored potential resources in each and every village and city in the country and how we have been presented with an amazing opportunity to reinvent ourselves as a nation.

For once, we as Yemenis are analyzing our own country in terms of resources, potentials and risks while keeping in mind the cultural and geographic characteristics of this country.

There is more!

We are using science and keeping the future in mind! We are forecasting population growth and development needs, using environmental indicators, and even following technology trends!

It sounds amazing, and yes, feels amazing.

But this euphoric mood is tainted by the desperate attempts of those who will lose so much if we become a developed democratic nation. This is why everyday there is an act of terrorism. The situation will only worsen in coming months.

The problem is that we—the reformers of this country—can't get through to the wrongdoers. It is a group of players and implementers. The players are obsessed with the past and with their glory when things were chaotic. The implementers are unprincipled mercenaries who sell their souls for money and will not be putting the interests of the country first.

If the groups resisting change would allow themselves to think logically they would realize that it is in their best interests to have a rich, stable country. Because this means their businesses will flourish, their international reputation will improve and their consciences will be clear—they'll have peace of mind, which they desperately need.

If only those culprits would use their creativity for the good of the country rather than against it. This is not happening and, if history is any indicator, it never will.

So the legendary war between good and evil continues. And here we find ourselves facing another battle which we will surely win. I just worry about the price we will have to pay to reach the next milestone in the rebuilding of Yemen.

**Nadia Al-Sakkaf****Will decentralization in Yemen marginalize citizens?****Rafat Al-Akhali**  
**Atlanticcouncil.org**  
**First Published Jan. 29**

**W**ith the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in Yemen concluded on 25 Jan. 2014, the constitution-drafting period will focus on incorporating the outcomes of the NDC discussions into the new national charter. A close examination of the outcomes of the NDC may help address any shortcomings in the NDC agreements during the constitution-drafting process.

One of the key, attention-grabbing outcomes of the NDC is the transformation of Yemen into a federal state. Addressing the extreme centralization of power was one of the main demands of the protestors in 2011. In addition, the secessionist demands of the Southern movement (known as Southern Herak) that gained momentum since 2007 meant that a radical solution to the centralization of power in Yemen had to be reached. The ex-regime in Yemen gutted the Local Authority Law (intended to decentralize authority by establishing locally elected district and governorate councils) and its application from any real meaning, so promises of improving the current system of local authority were no longer accepted, especially by the Southern Herak. A federal system was seen as the only politically-acceptable solution that would address the issue of centralization and transfer power and authority to be closer to the citizens in the different areas of Yemen.

The current administrative system in

Yemen consists of three levels of government: Central government in Sana'a, Governorate-level councils, and District-level local councils. Since the beginning of the NDC, many delegates, activists, and experts emphasized the importance of distributing power to the "third level of government" (district-level local councils) and protecting the powers of local authorities by including them in the constitution. This proposal was generally viewed as necessary, irrespective of any NDC steps towards decentralization.

As heated negotiations on the Southern Issue and the form of state progressed, however, a new administrative layer began to shape the discussions on federalism: namely, the "regions." The Southern movement pushed for a two-region federal system as an alternative to their demands for secession. Gradually,

*Addressing the extreme centralization of power was one of the main demands of the protestors in 2011.*

over the weeks and months of the negotiations, a new administrative structure for the new Federal Yemen emerged. The final document ratified by the NDC delegates adopted a federal system with a three-tiered system of government: central, regional, and state governments.

States are understood to be the current governorates, while the new regions and their exact number have yet to be decided (anywhere between 2 to 6 regions, with every region containing a number of states).

Under the structure proposed by the NDC outcomes, and specifically by the Southern Issue Solutions Agreement, the "third level of government" effectively became the state level (previously known as governorate level) due to the addition of the regions layer as shown in the figure. Statements from the NDC delegates and supporting international actors gradually became focused on devolving power and authority to the regions and states, displacing the focus on local councils. In reviewing the State Building Working Group final report, the delegates deferred the section on state structure to the outcomes of the Southern Issue Working Group, which adopted the three-tiered system of central, regional, and state governments. However, another section of the State Building Working Group Report stated, "the division of each region into local administrative units (to be called governorates or municipalities or cities), and into districts." The group also adopted that each administrative unit should have elected councils, and that Regional Law shall specify the purview of these administrative units. In comparison, the

Southern Issue final report clearly states that "the three levels of government (central, regional, and state-level) shall have independent executive, legislative, administrative, and financial authorities as stated in the constitution."

The NDC succeeded in creating the basis for a decentralized state in Yemen and redistributing powers away from the center. Yet, the closest administrative units to the citizen with any constitutional authority now lies with the states, creating a fourth level of government (the district-level) whose authorities and responsibilities will be determined by regional laws.

A four-level system is more complex and costly than a three-level system. Nonetheless, due to the political realities on the ground, Yemen will now have to adapt to a four-level system. The question that the constitution-drafting committee will have to address is whether to include a fourth-level of government in the constitution and grant this fourth-level constitutional authority and power, or whether to leave it up to each region to decide on the structure, authorities, and responsibilities of its fourth-level of government. The end result will have significant impact on defining the relationship between the new federal Yemen and its citizens.

*Rafat Al-Akhali is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. He is also the cofounder and chairman of Resonate!Yemen, a youth-oriented NGO working to bring the voices and ideas of young Yemenis to the public policy discourse.*

**Tunisia's new constitution and the triumph of modern values****Amal Mousa**  
**Aawsat.net**  
**First Published Feb. 2**

**T**he ratification of Tunisia's new constitution marks one of the most significant events to have taken place in the country's recent history.

In fact, this event is so significant that it has to be approached from more than one angle.

Analyzing the articles of the new constitution, it could be said that the modern view has triumphed over the traditional one.

Proponents of this modern vision strongly influenced the mindset governing the constitution-drafting process and won the heated debates that raged during this period. So the voice and values of modernity have the upper hand in Tunisia today. This is thanks to the visionary political elite who were able to promote their ideas and present a modern image of Tunisia at the National Constituent Assembly, despite this body being dominated by the Islamist Ennahda Movement.

How did this triumph of the modern vision demonstrate itself in the drafting of the constitution of the second republic in Tunisia?

It is not difficult to link the triumph of the modern vision with the decline in the features of theocracy. Even though the new constitution maintains Article I of the 1959 constitution—which establishes

Islam as the official religion of the country—it shows an implicit commitment to the nature of the modern Tunisian state, inspired by the founder of the first republic, Habib Bourguiba. Furthermore, the reviews that dealt with the constitutional preamble and issue of freedoms in August 2012 and June 2013 combined to consolidate Tunisia's move towards civil freedom. The new constitution criminalizes takfirism, enshrines freedom of conscience, recognizes human rights and preserves the political gains that have been made by Tunisian women. These are all clear signs that the modern elite has achieved a symbolic victory and laid the foundation stone for a Tunisian civil state.

On the other hand the conservative and Islamist elites failed to impose their ideology on the new constitution, something they fought to enforce. The draft constitution does not provide for the hegemony of religious authority, nor does it endorse the Islamist Shari'a law interpretation of relations between genders or public freedoms.

This triumph of modern values over traditional Islamist principles was neither easily secured nor spontaneous. It was the result of a long struggle and public debate, which was fed, to a large extent, by the series of crises that hit Tunisia's ruling troika.

To explain the victory of the modern vision, we have to look at a number of issues, namely Tunisia's own culture and the country's long-standing ties to re-

*Therefore, any success of Islamist movements in Tunisia will ultimately only be temporary and fleeting, as they represent a limited demographic.*

formist views and modern values. Tunisia's history is steeped in this, dating back to the time of Hayreddine Pasha and the 1857 Fundamental Pact which ensured equality among Tunisia's Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Following on from that came Tahar Haddad's famous book *Our Women in the Shari'a and Society* published in the 1930s, and in the 1950s Tunisians finally saw the establishment of a sovereign state based on a modern project and vision.

The end result is that these gradual modernizing steps have influenced both the Tunisian individual and society as a

whole. Therefore, any success of Islamist movements in Tunisia will ultimately only be temporary and fleeting, as they represent a limited demographic.

In addition to the historical, cultural, and social elements, it seems that the failures of the Ennahda Movement's rule—characterized by the emergence of the phenomenon of political assassinations, a deteriorating security situation and economic woes—have served to silence the voices of these Islamist hawks. During the first year of Ennahda rule, several voices emerged calling for the establishment of an Islamic state, and Tunisia's mosques opened their doors to the convoys of extremist preachers whose ideology was completely removed from true Islam. The subsequent fading and disappearance of these voices was the result of Ennahda's failures, or rather, incompetence. This led to Islamists being forced to offer compromises to the more moderate parties and organizations waiting on the sidelines and able to take advantage of the situation.

All in all, Tunisia's historical national identity, the accumulated political, economic and security setbacks suffered by the Ennahda Movement, and the direct and indirect pressures from the international community have combined to present Tunisian society with a more moderate and liberal constitution that recognizes civil rights and values.

*Amal Mousa is a Tunisian writer and poet.*

**YEMEN TIMES**

www.yementimes.com

First Political English Newspaper  
in Yemen. Founded in 1991 by  
Prof. Abdulaziz Al-SaqqafTel: +967 (1) 268-661  
Fax: +967 (1) 268-276  
P.O. Box 2579, Sana'a, Yemen  
Letters: yreaders.view@gmail.com**ADVERTISEMENTS:**Tel: +967 (1) 510306  
Email: adsyemen@yahoo.comBUSINESS  
FOR PEACE  
AWARD**Publisher & Editor-in-Chief**  
**Nadia Abdulaziz Al-Sakkaf****Managing Editor**  
**Nima Tamaddon****Editorial Staff**

Ali Mohsen Abulohoom

Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

Amal Al-Yarisi

Ali Saeed (Senior Editor/Reporter)

**CEO**  
**Khair Aldin Al Nsour****Senior Reporter**  
**Mohammed bin Sallam**

Bassam Al-Khamiri (Translator)

Khalid Al-Karimi (Translator)

Najlaa Hassan

Nasser Al-Sakkaf

**Deputy Editor-in-Chief**  
**Ahlam Mohsen****Head of Design Dept.**  
**Ramzy Alawi**

Mohammad Al-Hassani

Samar Al-Ariqi

Samar Qaed

**Offices****Taiz Bureau:**  
Imad Ahmed Al-Saqqaf  
Tel: +967 (4) 217-156,  
Telefax: +967 (4) 217157  
P.O. Box: 5086, Taiz  
Email: yttaiz@y.net.ye**Subscriptions**

For subscription rates and related information please contact Majdi Al-Saqqaf, Subscription and Distribution Manager, on 268661/2 ext 204 or mobile: 711998995, email: majdi\_saqqaf@yahoo.com

**Policies:**

- All opinion articles that have not been written by Yemen Times staff on the Opinion, Op-Ed and Youth pages do not necessarily represent the newspaper's opinion and hence YT could not be held accountable for their consequences.
- Letters to the Editor must include your name, mailing address, or email address. The editor reserves the right to edit all submissions for clarity, style, and length.
- Submissions will not be returned to the writer under any circumstance.
- For information on advertising, contact the advertising department at any of the Yemen Times' offices



Ministry of Education (MoE)  
Project Administration Unit (PAU)  
(Global Partnership for Education Grant)

## VACANCIES

The Project Administration Unit (PAU) of the Ministry of Education (MoE) administers Activities under The Global Partnership for Education Catalytic Fund awarded to the Government of Yemen under the supervision of the UNICEF. The grant supports the implementation of the Medium Term Results Frame work (MTRF) through the Global Partnership for Education (GPE). PAU is now seeking applicants for the following position:

### Financial Officer

- Prepare requests for funding of GPE program activities ensuring that they confirm with the quarterly and annual plans of the Ministry of Education and other partners in the GPE program; Ensure that budgets are in line with the set sector set rates and other rates as agreed within the GPE program.
- Regularly monitor the financial follow of the GPE program so that funds are optimally utilized; prepare quarter and annual financial needs and follow of funds and advice when to request additional funds.
- Prepare regular financial reports on funds utilized, outstanding and any other important financial reports necessary for the effective and efficient implementation of the GPE program; regularly contribute to the periodic and other reports as necessary.
- Oversee the preparation of goods receipts; ensure that contractors documents, invoices and correspondences associated with payments in place.
- Enter all the financial transactions on daily basis into the Financial Sys.
- Prepare all necessary accounting documents.
- Prepare bank reconciliation for all bank accounts on monthly basis.
- Prepare initial financial analysis of data & preparation of the project basic data (plans, cost, budget, actual... etc).
- Prepare The Financial Monitoring Reports and Cash Disbursements Plans.
- Deal with the external auditors.
- Assess the FMs capacities at the governorates level.
- Maintain overall integrity of financial statements and accounting records.
- Developing, propose, implement & support changes or improvements to financial policies & procedures.
- Any other tasks as required by the project Financial Officer and the Project Director.

#### Qualifications:

- A minimum of Bachelor's degree in Accounting or Business Administration with major in accounting and finance.
- Minimum of 5 years of professional experience in a financial management and accounting position, preferably in the private sector.
- Familiarity with the government's and GPE financial management requirement is a plus.
- Experience in the use of accounting programs and software.
- Proficiency in both Arabic and English.
- Good Interpersonal and communication skills.

All applications along with a detailed resume and supporting documents should be submitted by 13/2/2014 to the following address:

Education Development Project Administration Unit  
60M Southern Road, Bait Meyad  
Tel: 01-619163/4 Fax: 01-619219  
Email: Bilqis6@hotmail.com



OXFAM

### INVITATION TO TENDER FOR SUPPLY, DELIVERY AND INSTALLATION OF TAILORING MATERIALS FOR THE LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITIES IN HODEIDAH GOVERNORATE

Oxfam is a development, relief and campaigning organization dedicated to finding lasting solutions to poverty and suffering around the world. We believe that every human being is entitled to a life of dignity and opportunity; and we work with poor communities, local partners, volunteers, and supporters to help this become a reality.

OXFAM is inviting tenders for the following:

Ref No: OX/YEM/HOD/2014/REQ 4754, 4756, 4757 – Supply, Delivery and installation of sewing machines, tailoring accessories and textiles for the livelihood activities

Tender documents are available for collection from our offices in Yemen as follows:

Sana'a Office: The Diplomatic Area, Tel: 01- 444568/9  
Hodeidah office: The Commercial Area, Tel: 03- 219635

Please report at the reception desk with official letter signed & stamped from your company. Tender documents will be issued at the Logistics Offices between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM. Tender documents will be issued from Tuesday 06/02/2014 to 12/02/2014.

For more information please feel free to call on Tel numbers: 01- 444568/9.

Oxfam is not bound to accept any application or give reasons for rejection or acceptance.

### دعوة إلى تقديم العطاءات لتوريد وتسليم وتركيب مكائن الخياطة ومستلزمات الخياطة والأقمشة الخاصة بأنشطة سبل المعيشة

منظمة أوكسفام، هي منظمة التنمية والإغاثة والحملات المخصصة لإيجاد حلول دائمة للفقير والمعاناة في جميع أنحاء العالم. ونحن نؤمن أنه لكل إنسان الحق في حياة كريمة، ونحن نعمل مع المجتمعات المحلية الفقيرة، والشركاء المحليين، والمتطوعين، والداعمين للمساعدة في جعل هذا حقيقة واقعة.

منظمة أوكسفام تدعو للمناقصة على ما يلي:

الرجوع مناقصة رقم: OX/YEM/HOD/2014/REQ 4754, 4756, 4757

توريد وتسليم وتركيب مكائن الخياطة، ومستلزمات الخياطة، والأقمشة الخاصة بأنشطة سبل المعيشة

وثائق المناقصة متاحة في مكاتب المنظمة باليمن كالتالي:

صنعاء - الحي السياسي - حدة: تلفون 01- 444568/9  
الحديدة، الحي التجاري تلفون 03-219635

الرجاء التقدم الى مكتب الاستقبال بالمنظمة مع رسالة رسمية من شركتكم، والحصول على وثائق المناقصة من قسم خدمات الامداد والتمويل بالمنظمة من الساعة 9:00 صباحا وحتى الساعة 4:00 عصرًا وستصدر وثائق المناقصة اعتبارا من تاريخ 2014/02/06م حتى 2014/02/12م.

لمزيد من المعلومات الرجاء الاتصال على الرقم: 01-444568/9

مع العلم بان منظمة أوكسفام غير ملزمة بتقديم أية أسباب لرفض أو لقبول العطاءات.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN  
MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE & IRRIGATION  
WATER SECTOR SUPPORT PROJECT (WSSP)  
NATIONAL IRRIGATION PROGRAM (NIP)  
(IDA GRANT: H-449 RY)

CONSULTING SERVICES FOR UPPER WATERSHED MANAGEMENT OF WADI AHWAR AND  
ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT  
IN THE AHWAR DELTA – ABYAN GOVERNORATE.  
Contract# 58/CS/IRR/WSSP/13

## REQUEST FOR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST

This request for expressions of interest follows the general procurement notice for this project that appeared in Development Business No. (758) dated September 16, 2009 and updated on September 16, 2010

#### 1. Background

The Government of Republic of Yemen has received a grant from the International Development Association (IDA) towards the cost of implementation of the National Irrigation Program (NIP) under Water Sector Support Project (WSSP), and intends to apply part of the funds to cover eligible payments under the contract for the Consultancy Services for Study of Upper Watershed Management of Wadi Ahwar and Assessing the Impact on Irrigation Development in the Ahwar Delta (Abyan Governorate)..

#### 2. Scope of Services

The scope of work for the consultancy services shall cover the whole area of Wadi Ahwar. The study shall comprise a comprehensive technical, economical, financial, environmental, and social analyses leading to Watershed Management of the WAdi. Based on these TOR, it has been agreed that a qualified Consulting Firm will be hired to carry out the proposed study according to broad tasks indicated in paragraph 3 below,

#### 3. Tasks to be performed by the Consultant:

- Review of data/reports:** Review of all available data and reports including the reports on Hydrology of Wadi Ahwar by M/S Hydrosult., Binnie and Partners and Soviet Experts, preliminary investigations, reconnaissance survey, data collection, and field investigations and updating of available data;
- Water Resources Assessment:** To review the Water Resources assessment of Wadi Ahwar carried out by M/S Hydrosult and others and evaluate current status of the water resources in Wadi Ahwar and effect on the supplies available for spate irrigation in the basin using Integrated Watershed Management approach to simulate the impact of current and different future change scenarios (climate change, changing demography, life styles and changing land use).
- Measures for preventing soil erosion:** Recommend measures (structural measures: like check dykes to prevent soil erosion; and non-structural measures: like plantation on the hill slopes to check soil erosion etc.) for reduction of large quantities of sediment load (travelling down) for improving the sustainability of the spate irrigation schemes in Wadi Ahwar;
- Sustainable Management of Water Resources:** New solutions for the sustainable management of the scarce water resources in arid region is to be explored within this study including achieving optimum conjunctive uses of surface and groundwater in Wadi Ahwar;
- Optimization of all available Water Resources:** Make use of all available water in Wadi Ahwar for optimization of water use in agriculture and considering salt water intrusion, groundwater abstraction/recharge and other limiting parameters;
- Measures for Protection of Structures:** Recommend measures for protection of the different structures, agricultural lands and villages in Ahwar Wadi.
- Pilot Farm:** A pilot typical farm using modern irrigation and agriculture techniques for demonstration purposes has already been established by the Agricultural Research and Extension Authority (AREA) of MAI as a Consultant under the ongoing implementation of the Agricultural Demonstration Program ADP 2 in Wadi Ahwar and its results may be utilized by the consultant.
- Modeling Approach:** Development of innovative models as a basis for a sustainable watershed management.
- Data Base:** To commence monitoring on the Hydromet stations installed in July 2013 and groundwater monitoring on the selected wells (paragraph 2.4.2), provide on-the-job training and to establish data base for the water structure and weirs (Fuad and Hanad) with linkages to Hydro-Met network;
- Work Plan:** Prepare work plan for study of upper watershed management of wadi Ahwar taking into account the effect of water structure (weirs, tanks) already constructed, under construction or proposed (including a Dam U/S of Fuad Weir –under this study in upper watershed on the net water quantities available for the lower area for the irrigation system and on the sediment load;
- Topographical Maps:** Prepare Topographical maps for the upper watershed in a scale acceptable to the Client.
- Reports:** Preparation and submission of Inception Report, and Draft Final Report (DFR). The DFR will be discussed in a workshop which is expected to come up with findings and recommendations that will be utilized in preparation of the Final Report.

#### 4. Qualification and Experience of the Consultants' Team and Duration of assignment

The consultant is required to express his interest for the proposed study. The indicative staffing schedule required for this consultancy assignment is about 5 months and expected consultant's staff is as tabulated below along with their required qualifications and experience.

Position	Minimum Experience (years)	Qualifications and Field of Experience	Expected M/M
Team Leader (Nos.1)	10	MSc degree in civil/irrigation engineering with experience in integrated watershed management	5.0
Watershed Management Specialist (No.1)	7	At least BSc. in civil engineering/irrigation or equivalent with experience in watershed management, IWRM/modeling	3.5
Hydrologist (No.1)	7	At least BSc. in hydrology or equivalent. With experience in data analysis and field data collection.	2.5
Agricultural Specialist (No. 1)	7	At least BSc in Agriculture or equivalent with experience in agricultural development programs	2.0
Social specialist (No.1)	7	At least BSc. in sociology or equivalent. With experience in formation of WUG, WUA. Has good knowledge about NGOs	2.0
Topographic Surveyor cum Draftsman	5	Diploma in Surveying	4.0

The National Irrigation Program (NIP) now invites eligible consulting firms to express their interest in providing the services for the above mentioned study.

Interested consulting firms must provide information indicating that they are qualified to perform the services (brochures, description of similar assignments, experience in similar conditions, availability of appropriate skills among staff, etc.).

Consulting firms may associate to enhance their qualifications.

Consulting firms will be selected in accordance with the procedures set out in the World Bank's Guidelines for Selection and Employment of Consultants by World Bank dated January 2011.

Interested consultants may obtain further information at the address below or by visiting NIP web site: [www.nip.gov.ye](http://www.nip.gov.ye)

Expressions of interest must be delivered to the address below by **March, 5th 2014** at 12:00 Noon.

Director of National Irrigation Program (NIP)  
Irrigation & Land Reclamation Sector – MAI  
Al-Mithak Street, Near Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation  
Sana'a – Republic of Yemen  
Tel : 967(1)228594  
Fax: 967(1)228626  
E-mail: [wssp-nip@yemen.net.ye](mailto:wssp-nip@yemen.net.ye) or [www-nip@hotmail.com](mailto:www-nip@hotmail.com)





Houthi spokesperson to the Yemen Times:

**“[They would not have blamed Ansar Allah if they were not themselves involved in Sharaf Al-Deen’s assassination.]”**

**In an interview with the Yemen Times, Ali Al-Bukhaiti—spokesperson for the political wing of the Houthis, Ansar Allah, discusses the assassination of Dr. Ahmed Sharaf Al-Deen and denies that his party had any involvement. Al-Bukhaiti also discusses the decision to boycott the closing ceremony of the National Dialogue Conference (NDC) and Ansar Allah’s take on the Regions Defining Committee. The committee, he said, does not represent all political factions and groups that participated in the NDC and its decisions should be reached by consensus.**

*This interview was conducted on January 28.*

**Interview and photo by Mohammed Al-Hassani**



**You have objected the Regions Defining Committee. Can you lay out some of your objections. Are you opposed to Hadi forming the committee, to Hadi’s personality, to something else?**

No, the objection had nothing to do with Hadi’s personality. What is being said by some political partisans is a desperate attempt to stir up discord between us and the president. We stressed the importance of setting up a committee that will represent all political factions. The representation should be in the same percentages as it was for the NDC. The committee’s decisions should be taken using the consensus mechanism that was used in the dialogue. This will help make the decisions effective. However, some of the political factions do not recognize this committee because they feel that they are not appropriately represented. Consequently, this will pose challenges in the future to the outcomes of the NDC.

**Some say your objection does not carry a lot of weight, since you signed the Southern Issue Solutions and Guarantees Document that mandates president Hadi form a committee to determine the number of regions. What do you have to say about that?**

When we signed, we expressed our reservations on the mandate. We signed the document in spite of our objections because we saw that the majority of the political factions were signing it. Anyway, we have recorded our stance for posterity and all of the Yemeni people will know that Yemen will be divided along regional and religious lines, and this will lead to dire consequences in the future.

**Was your objection to the president’s mandate meant as an objection to the Regions Defining Committee?**

We objected to the president’s mandate because he was not clear about the structure of the committee. The parties from which the committee was formed are loyal to the president one way or another. So he [hand-picked the members] of this committee in order to [rubber stamp] the program that had [already] been drawn up at the NDC.

**Let us move to another topic. Why did you boycott the concluding plenary session and**

**closing ceremony of the NDC?**

This happened for two reasons. The first was the assassination of Dr. Ahmed Sharaf Al-Deen. We were expecting President Hadi to suspend the plenary for at least 24 hours in light of what had happened. We were taken back when the plenary continued [without pausing to pay respect to Dr. Al-Deen, who at that moment was lying in a pool of blood].

The second reason is that the NDC Guarantees Document was signed in the plenary without taking our view into account, even though we are an [important political entity]. It looked like the outcome was already predetermined. This provoked a very negative reaction from us, and as a result, we withdrew. What happened made us wonder: if the dialogue was built on consensus, what was the rush? We expected the plenary session to be suspended that day [due to the assassination] and resumed the following day, [when everyone would have a chance to discuss the document, voice their opinions, make up their minds, and vote accordingly].

Moreover, there were a number of problems with the concluding ple-

simple majority. We had hoped that laws and regulations would be respected, but unfortunately the dialogue participants tried to establish a new state by changing the rules.

**If this was so, why were you the only ones to object?**

Everyone has the right to decide for themselves and to take their own position on an issue. [That being said,] we were not alone.... the Socialist Party objected as well, and its leaders, Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Sakkaf and Qadri Ahmed, signed the same petition we signed. Some Nasserite youth also voiced objections.

**If we delve deeper into the assassination of Sharaf Al-Deen, some say he agreed with the NDC Guarantees Document and he was on his way to the NDC to sign it. Is this so?**

The issue is not Al-Deen’s agreement or disagreement. He was at the NDC to represent Ansar Allah. In the end, it is the decision of [Ansar Allah], not the personal decision by Sharaf Al-Deen. Whether he agreed or disagreed was his personal business. But his death became the issue of [Ansar Allah]. Those who claimed that Al-Deen was on his way to sign the document—do they really know what happened between him and [Ansar Allah]? Moreover, Al-Deen’s stance was clear regarding our rejection of the items in the document. However, Al-Deen was not confrontational. Being an academic and a patient listener, he was good at controlling his emotions. In his role as a representative of Ansar Allah, he would [closely follow a discussion to its end] and only then express his reservations about certain points, just prior to a vote.

**So Sharaf Al-Deen supported Ansar Allah’s position in terms of signing the document?**

Sharaf Al-Deen was definitely committed to the party’s position and also to law and order both inside and outside the NDC. He was a good man and did not hesitate to reformulate some articles to be [legally more precise].... He was opposed to the continuation of the current government because he found that most of the [NDC participants] had agreed to maintain the current [form of] government based on the wishes of President Hadi. Although he did not always agree [with the

content], he volunteered to draft some articles because he is a constitutional expert.

**Some accuse [Ansar Allah] of assassinating Sharaf Al-Deen because he adopted a different political stance. What do you say?**

This is not true. The parties that accuse Ansar Allah of assassinating Sharaf Al-Deen are trying to deflect blame because they them-

selves were involved in the assassination. These parties assassinated leading figures of the Yemeni Socialist Party in 1993 and killed a lot of its strongest members, activists, writers and politicians in preparation for the 1994 war against the south and at the same time accused the Socialist Party of assassinating its [own] members due to dissent within its various factions. The same thing is currently happening to Ansar Allah. The groups

involved in assassinations always try to blame others. [They would not have blamed Ansar Allah if they were not themselves involved in Sharaf Al-Deen’s assassination.] We challenge the security apparatus to prove the involvement of [Ansar Allah in his death].

*Translated from the Arabic by Khalid Al-Karimi and Bassam Al-Khameri*

*We challenge the security apparatus to prove the involvement of [Ansar Allah in his death].*

nary of the NDC. The voting mechanism changed from consensus to majority. This is a heresy. There is nothing called a “majority” at the NDC because the dialogue regulations clearly state that there must be 90 percent consensus [on a particular issue] in the first vote. If this percentage is not reached, the issue is brought forward for discussion again and then, if the vote exceeds a 75 percent consensus, it passes. But what happened is that during meetings to mandate President Hadi to form the committee for designing the regions and during the voting session on the NDC Guarantees Document, the vote was based on a



Ref. No.: **UNOPS/HUB/YAM/14/010**

**TEMPORARY JOB OPENING ANNOUNCEMENT  
National Public Information Officer**

**Office of Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen  
(OSASG)**

Duty Station:	<b>Sana’a, Yemen</b>
Duration of need:	<b>3 months with possibility of extension</b>
Deadline:	<b>15 February 2014 (12am local time)</b>
Estimate Start date:	<b>22 February 2014</b>

**DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

The National Public Information Officer will report to the Principal Political Affairs Officer and closely coordinate with the Communications and Media Consultant, under the overall direction of the Special Adviser.

Within delegated authority, the National Public Information Officer will be responsible for coordinating media and public activities for OSASG in Yemen including:

- Assist in circulating public information and increasing awareness on the role of the OSASG and the good offices of the Secretary-General,
- Ensure the UN position is reflected through various communications tools
- Monitor the news in local, pan-Arab and international broadcast, print and new media;
- Produce a daily analysis report on media coverage of the political transition;
- Produce a weekly newsletter on OSASG public activities and statements in Arabic and English;
- Draft/translate press releases, talking points and other material as needed;
- Liaise with local journalists and media outlets;
- Provide media support to projects and activities of OSASG, including arranging for press briefings/conferences, media conference calls, interviews, roundtable discussions, and town hall meetings as needed;
- Assist in implementing communications strategies, campaigns and public participation programs to support the role of OSASG and the good offices of the United Nations;
- Perform other relevant duties as required.

**Competencies**

**Professionalism:** Shows pride in work and in achievements; Demonstrates professional competence and mastery of subject matter; Is conscientious and efficient in meeting commitments, observing deadlines and achieving results; Is motivated by professional rather than personal concerns; Shows persistence when faced with difficult problems or challenges; Remains calm in stressful situations; Takes responsibility for incorporating gender perspectives and ensuring the equal participation of women and men in all areas of work.

**Communication:** Speaks and writes clearly and effectively; Listens to others, correctly interprets messages from others and responds appropriately; Asks questions to clarify, and exhibits interest in having two-way communication; Tailors language, tone, style and format to match audience; Demonstrates openness in sharing information and keeping people informed.

**Planning and Organizing:** Develops clear goals that are consistent with agreed strategies; Identifies priority activities and assignments; adjusts priorities as required; Allocates

ALL SUBMISSIONS TO BE SENT TO: [vacancies@unops.org](mailto:vacancies@unops.org).

Kindly include "National Public Information Officer - UNOPS/HUB/YAM/14/010" in the subject.

OSASG is an equal opportunity employer and welcomes applications from both qualified and experienced women and men. OSASG encourages applications from female candidates. Only those applicants short-listed for interview will be contacted



الناطق باسم الحوثيين في مؤتمر الحوار الوطني في حوار مع «يمن تايمز»:

# تقسيم اليمن إلى ستة أقاليم حسم منذ فترة .. واللجنة كانت مجرد ديكور

أجرت صحيفة يمن تايمز مقابلة بتاريخ ٢٨ يناير مع المتحدث الرسمي باسم الجناح السياسي لحركة أنصار الله علي البخيتي حيث ناقش حادثة إغتيال الدكتور أحمد شرف الدين ونفى أن يكون لأنصار الله أي صلة بالحادثة. كما ناقش أيضاً قرار أنصار الله بمقاطعة الحفل الختامي لمؤتمر الحوار الوطني ودورهم في لجنة تحديد عدد الأقاليم حيث قال أن اللجنة لا تمثل كافة الأطياف والمكونات السياسية التي شاركت في المؤتمر ويجب أن يكون هناك إجماع على قرارات اللجنة.

حوار وتصوير/ محمد الحسني



يعني هذا اعتراف منك أنهم تورطوا! لا إطلاقاً.. المنشور كان واضحاً.. وأنا قصدت منه أن يطلع الناس قبل أن يوقع أعضاء اللجنة، أي أن الموقع هو من سيدخل قائمة العار، وليس كل الأطراف، لأنني قلت اتصلوا قبل أن يتورطوا بالتوقيع.

**لماذا إذا حذفتم بعد إغتيال شرف الدين مباشرة؟**

لأنه بعد أن توفي الدكتور خشيت أن يطلع بعض أفراد أسرته على المنشور ويسبب ذلك إنزعاجاً نفسياً لهم أو سوء تقدير.. ومع ذلك فقد نشرت المنشور من جديد، لأنه كان واضحاً، وقد أخبرني الكثير من أعضاء لجنة الضمانات بأنه سبب ارتباكاً أثناء اجتماعهم بالرئيس هادي لتوقيع الضمانات، وجعل الكثير منهم حينها يتحفظ على التوقيع لولا ضغوط من الرئيس في الساعة الثانية بعد منتصف الليل لما كانوا وقعوا على وثيقة ضمانات مخرجات الحوار.

**ألا تعتقد بأنك كنت مخطئاً بنشرك للمنشور على الأقل لكونه فتح باباً لاتهامكم بالوقوف وراء عملية إغتيال الدكتور؟**

لا أعتقد.. لأنه حتى في جريمة إغتيال الدكتور عبد الكريم جديان اتهم أنصار الله بالوقوف وراء عملية الإغتيال، رغم أنني لم أنشر أي منشور.. فضلاً عن ذلك أنه كان من بين الأسماء التي نشرتها محمد صالح البخيتي، وهو ابن عمي فهل من المعقول أن أحرض على ابن عمي.. بالتأكيد لا.

**هناك أطراف اتهمتكم بالوقوف وراء اغتيال الدكتور شرف الدين لأنه كان يحمل موقفاً يختلف عن موقفكم.. كيف ترد على مثل هذا الاتهام؟**

هذا الكلام غير صحيح.. الأطراف التي تتهم أنصار الله هي تحاول إبعاد التهمة عن نفسها، لأن التهمة هي لصيقة بها، وهي من وضعت نفسها في هذا الموضوع.. هذه الأطراف هي التي قامت بإغتيال قيادات الحزب الاشتراكي في 93 وقتلت الكثير من الكوادر والناشطين والكتاب والسياسيين تمهيداً لحرب صيف 94 ضد الجنوب كانت تتهم الحزب بأنه يقوم بتصفية أعضاءه بمبرر أن هناك خلاف داخل أجنحة الحزب، وهي تقوم بذات العمل اليوم ضد أنصار الله.

الجهات التي تنفذ الاغتيالات دائماً تحاول التضليل كونها من يتحكم بأجهزة الاستخبارات.. هم فقط فضحوا أنفسهم.. وضعوا أنفسهم في موضع المساءلة.. نحن نتحدى الأجهزة الأمنية أن تثبت علاقة أي طرف آخر غير الأطراف التي ذكرتها لك.

**لكنك قبل يوم من اغتيال شرف الدين نشرت منشوراً على فيسبوك ذكرت فيه أسماء من أعضاء لجنة الضمانات وصفتمهم بقائمة العار كان اسم شرف الدين أحدهم؟**

أنا نشرت قائمة العار في المساء أثناء ما كانت اللجنة منعقدة وطلبت فيه من كل الأصدقاء أن يتواصلوا بالأسماء الموجودين في القائمة قبل أن يتورطوا ويوقعوا على التمديد لحكومة باسندوة.

الموضوع بطريقة قانونية، فينتبر بصياغة بعض المواد على اعتبار أنه خبير دستوري، وهذا لا يعني أنه موافق على ما انتقدت عليه المكونات، فكان في معظم الأعيان يعيد صياغة بعض المواد في الوثيقة بطريقة قانونية رغم أنه غير موافق عليها.

**”** **الجهات التي تنفذ الاغتيالات دائماً تحاول التضليل كونها من يتحكم بأجهزة الاستخبارات..**

**”** **يعني أن شرف الدين لم يكن موقفاً مغايراً لموقفه، بشأن التوقيع على الوثيقة؟**

بالتأكيد.. الدكتور من أكثر الناس التزاماً بمواقف مكونه وبالنظام والقانون داخل الحوار وخارجه، لكن الحقيقة أنه كان رجلاً طيباً، بمعنى أنه حتى مع معارضته لاستمرار الحكومة بشكلها الحالي إلى ما بعد الحوار، ووجد أن معظم المكونات اتفقوا على أن تستمر الحكومة بشكلها الحالي نزولاً عند رغبة الرئيس هادي، لم يرفض رجوع ممثلي كثير من المكونات السياسية إليه لصياغة

والرأي هو رأي المكون بغض النظر عن الرأي الشخصي للدكتور، قد يكون الدكتور وافق أو رفض هذا شأنه، لكن بعد أن توفي الدكتور رحمه الله.. الموقف أصبح موقف المكون، هذا من ناحية، ومن يزعمون أن الدكتور كان أتياً للتوقيع، هل كانوا يعلمون أنه سيوقع مع اعتراض أو مع تحفظ، هل كانوا يعرفون ما دار بينه وبين مكونه في اللحظات الأخيرة.

إضافة إلى أن الدكتور كانت مواقفه واضحة حيال رفضنا لبنود الوثيقة المتعلقة باستمرار الحكومة على ما هي عليه.. كان يدعو إلى تشكيل حكومة جديدة، وهو المنظر للمرحلة التأسيسية بشكل كامل، لكن الدكتور لم يكن صدامياً، بمعنى أنه كان إذا رأى ضغوطاً لفرض اتجاه معين ورأى أن أغلب القوى خضعت يسكت ولا يحتج.. الرجل أكاديمي له وقار ولا يظهر اعتراضاته بشكل كبير، يجعل الأمور تمشي إلى النهاية، وحين يحين موعد التوقيع يظهر الأمور التي يتحفظ عليها كممثل لمكونه.

**كما أن ما حدث جعلنا نستغرب.. ما دام أن الحوار كان بالتوافق فلماذا الاستعجال.. كان المفترض أن ترفع الجلسة في ذلك اليوم، وتعد في اليوم التالي.. فإن وافقنا على وثيقة الضمانات وافقنا وأن لم فمحن حقناً، ومن ثم يقومون بالتصويت على الوثيقة.**

إضافة إلى ذلك هناك الكثير من الخلل رافق الجلسات الختامية لمؤتمر الحوار، وهي أنه تم الانتقال من آلية التصويت عبر التوافق إلى آلية التصويت عبر الأغلبية، وهذه بدعة، لأن نظام الحوار واضح ينص على التوافق في

الجلسة الأولى بـ 90٪ إذا لم يتم الوصول إلى هذه النسبة يطرح الموضوع للنقاش في جلسة أخرى بعد إجراءات معينة، وإذا حصل على 75٪ من موافقة المكونات يتم تمريره، لكن ما حدث خلال جلسات تفويض الرئيس هادي لتشكيل لجنة الأقاليم أو خلال جلسة التصويت على وثيقة ضمانات مخرجات الحوار تم وفقاً لمسألة الأغلبية.. يعني برفع الأيدي دون احتساب الأصوات، وبالتالي يؤدي إلى طعن كثير من الأطراف التي لم تشارك في الحوار وحتى الذي شاركت.. كنا نتمنى التقيد بالأنظمة والقوانين، لكن للأسف أراد المتحاورون أن يؤسسوا دولة جديدة على مخالفة القوانين.

**يعني ما زلت تدارسون موقفكم بشأن لجنة تحديد الأقاليم؟**

نعم.. **حسناً.. انتقل بك إلى محور آخر، وهو مقاطعتكم للجلسة الختامية والحفل الختامي لمؤتمر الحوار.. لماذا قمتم بذلك؟**

سبب المقاطعة أمران: الأول اغتيال الدكتور أحمد شرف الدين، حيث كنا نتوقع من الرئيس هادي أن يعلن تعليق الجلسة لأربعة وعشرين ساعة على الأقل، خصوصاً وأن الإغتيال وقع أثناء انعقاد الجلسة، لكن فوجئنا أنه تم المضي بعقد الجلسة، وشعرنا أن ذلك يعني عدم إحترام لدم الشهيد شرف الدين الذي كان دمه حينها لا يزال يقطر على الإسفلت، والثاني أن الأمر لم ينتهي عند ذلك، بل تم التوقيع على وثيقة ضمانات مخرجات الحوار في تلك الجلسة دون أخذ رأينا كمكون سياسي فاعل على الساحة، وكأنه تم إستغلال الحادث بصورة سيئة.. وهذا ما أثار علينا كثيراً وأدى إلى اتخاذنا قرار الانسحاب.

**لا الاعتراض ليس على شخص الرئيس هادي، وما يبرح في شأن ذلك تقوم به بعض الأطراف السياسية في محاولة بائسة منها للإيقاع بيننا والرئيس.. نحن قلنا بضرورة أن تشكل اللجنة من كل المكونات السياسية، وأن تكون نسب التمثيل فيها للمكونات بنفس نسبة تمثيلها في مؤتمر الحوار، وأن تتخذ القرارات فيها بنفس آلية التوافق التي كانت في الحوار، لكي تحصل على إجماع أغلب القوى السياسية إن أمكن حتى يسهل تنفيذها.. لكن أن يتم تشكيل اللجنة بهذا الشكل.. الآن هناك عدد من الأطراف لا تعترف بهذه اللجنة، لأنها تشعر بأنها غير ممثلة فيها بشكل صحيح، وبالتالي سيؤدي ذلك إلى الطعن بمخرجات اللجنة مستقبلاً.**

**هناك من يقول إن اعتراضكم هذا ليس له أهمية ما دام أنكم وقعتم على وثيقة حلول وضمانات القضية الجنوبية، والتي تنص على تفويض الرئيس هادي بتشكيل لجنة تحديد الأقاليم؟**

نحن عند التوقيع أكدنا أننا معترضون على مسألة التفويض، وقلنا ما هي مطالبنا، وهي التي ذكرتها لك سلفاً.. ومن ثم وقعنا رغم اعتراضنا عندما رأينا أغلبية المكونات السياسية قد وقعت، فقلنا يتحملون مسؤولية ذلك.. المهم أننا سجلنا موقفنا للتاريخ، وسيعرف أبناء الشعب اليمني أن هذه اللجنة ستكون مدخلا لتنفيذ مخطط الشرق الأوسط الجديد الذي أعلنت أمريكا عن عزمها تنفيذه قبل فترة، وتقسيم اليمن على أسس مناطقية ومذهبية سيؤدي في المستقبل إلى ما لا يحمد عقباه.

**وهل اعتراضكم على التفويض هو اعتراض على لجنة تحديد الأقاليم التي شكلها الرئيس هادي؟**

نحن اعتراضنا على تفويض الرئيس بتشكيلها، لأنه لم يكن واضحاً، وقد ظهر ذلك في تشكيل اللجنة، لأن الأطراف التي شكلت منها هي أطراف موالية للرئيس بطريقة أو بأخرى، وبالتالي هو اختار الأسماء التي شكلت من اللجنة حتى يمضي في المشروع الذي رسم أثناء مؤتمر الحوار بجعل اللجنة مجرد ديكور.

**كيف ذلك، وأنتم ممثلون فيها؟ حتى الآن لم يصدر موقف رسمي منا.**

**وهل اعتراضكم على التفويض هو اعتراض على لجنة تحديد الأقاليم التي شكلها الرئيس هادي؟**

نحن اعتراضنا على تفويض الرئيس بتشكيلها، لأنه لم يكن واضحاً، وقد ظهر ذلك في تشكيل اللجنة، لأن الأطراف التي شكلت منها هي أطراف موالية للرئيس بطريقة أو بأخرى، وبالتالي هو اختار الأسماء التي شكلت من اللجنة حتى يمضي في المشروع الذي رسم أثناء مؤتمر الحوار بجعل اللجنة مجرد ديكور.

**بإعادة إلى حادثة إغتيال الدكتور أحمد شرف الدين.. هناك من طرح أنه كان موافقاً على وثيقة ضمانات مخرجات الحوار وأنه كان في طريقه للتوقيع عليها؟**

الموضوع ليس موافقة الدكتور من عدمه.. الدكتور أحمد شرف لم يكن في الحوار يمثل أسرته وإنما كان يمثل مكون أنصار الله،

أبدأ معك من آخر اعتراض أعلنتموه في مؤتمر الحوار وهو تفويض الرئيس هادي بتشكيل لجنة تحديد الأقاليم.. ماهو سبب اعتراضكم؟

كان اعتراضنا على اللجنة بسبب أنه لا توجد معايير لتشكيلها.. لا توجد آلية لاتخاذ القرار فيها.. وقد لاحظنا عندما صدر القرار الجمهوري بتشكيل اللجنة، كان التمثيل فيها غير واضح، كما أننا لا نعرف على أي أساس سيتخذ القرار في اللجنة، هل على أساس الأغلبية أم بنظام التوافق.. وأعتقد أن اللجنة كانت أشبه بديكور ومسألة تقسيم اليمن إلى ستة أقاليم قد حسمت قبل فترة.. وغاية اللجنة هو تمرير خيار تقسيم اليمن إلى ستة أقاليم، وهذا ما كنا نخشى منه.

**حسناً.. لكن في شأن تفويض الرئيس.. على أي شيء كان اعتراضكم هل على الآلية التي تم فيها التفويض أم على شخص الرئيس أم غير ذلك؟**

لا الاعتراض ليس على شخص الرئيس هادي، وما يبرح في شأن ذلك تقوم به بعض الأطراف السياسية في محاولة بائسة منها للإيقاع بيننا والرئيس.. نحن قلنا بضرورة أن تشكل اللجنة من كل المكونات السياسية، وأن تكون نسب التمثيل فيها للمكونات بنفس نسبة تمثيلها في مؤتمر الحوار، وأن تتخذ القرارات فيها بنفس آلية التوافق التي كانت في الحوار، لكي تحصل على إجماع أغلب القوى السياسية إن أمكن حتى يسهل تنفيذها.. لكن أن يتم تشكيل اللجنة بهذا الشكل.. الآن هناك عدد من الأطراف لا تعترف بهذه اللجنة، لأنها تشعر بأنها غير ممثلة فيها بشكل صحيح، وبالتالي سيؤدي ذلك إلى الطعن بمخرجات اللجنة مستقبلاً.

**هناك من يقول إن اعتراضكم هذا ليس له أهمية ما دام أنكم وقعتم على وثيقة حلول وضمانات القضية الجنوبية، والتي تنص على تفويض الرئيس هادي بتشكيل لجنة تحديد الأقاليم؟**

نحن عند التوقيع أكدنا أننا معترضون على مسألة التفويض، وقلنا ما هي مطالبنا، وهي التي ذكرتها لك سلفاً.. ومن ثم وقعنا رغم اعتراضنا عندما رأينا أغلبية المكونات السياسية قد وقعت، فقلنا يتحملون مسؤولية ذلك.. المهم أننا سجلنا موقفنا للتاريخ، وسيعرف أبناء الشعب اليمني أن هذه اللجنة ستكون مدخلا لتنفيذ مخطط الشرق الأوسط الجديد الذي أعلنت أمريكا عن عزمها تنفيذه قبل فترة، وتقسيم اليمن على أسس مناطقية ومذهبية سيؤدي في المستقبل إلى ما لا يحمد عقباه.

**وهل اعتراضكم على التفويض هو اعتراض على لجنة تحديد الأقاليم التي شكلها الرئيس هادي؟**

نحن اعتراضنا على تفويض الرئيس بتشكيلها، لأنه لم يكن واضحاً، وقد ظهر ذلك في تشكيل اللجنة، لأن الأطراف التي شكلت منها هي أطراف موالية للرئيس بطريقة أو بأخرى، وبالتالي هو اختار الأسماء التي شكلت من اللجنة حتى يمضي في المشروع الذي رسم أثناء مؤتمر الحوار بجعل اللجنة مجرد ديكور.

**كيف ذلك، وأنتم ممثلون فيها؟ حتى الآن لم يصدر موقف رسمي منا.**

**وهل اعتراضكم على التفويض هو اعتراض على لجنة تحديد الأقاليم التي شكلها الرئيس هادي؟**

نحن اعتراضنا على تفويض الرئيس بتشكيلها، لأنه لم يكن واضحاً، وقد ظهر ذلك في تشكيل اللجنة، لأن الأطراف التي شكلت منها هي أطراف موالية للرئيس بطريقة أو بأخرى، وبالتالي هو اختار الأسماء التي شكلت من اللجنة حتى يمضي في المشروع الذي رسم أثناء مؤتمر الحوار بجعل اللجنة مجرد ديكور.

**بإعادة إلى حادثة إغتيال الدكتور أحمد شرف الدين.. هناك من طرح أنه كان موافقاً على وثيقة ضمانات مخرجات الحوار وأنه كان في طريقه للتوقيع عليها؟**

الموضوع ليس موافقة الدكتور من عدمه.. الدكتور أحمد شرف لم يكن في الحوار يمثل أسرته وإنما كان يمثل مكون أنصار الله،

**UNHCR**  
The UN Refugee Agency

**Algeria Street 38**  
**Building No. 2**  
**P. O. Box 12093**  
**Sana'a, Republic of Yemen**

**INVITATION TO BID:**  
**No. ITB/HCR/BO/14/SPU/01**

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), based in Sana'a, Republic of Yemen, has an international mandate to protect refugees and to seek durable solutions to their problems. UNHCR plays a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees and displaced persons of concern.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Branch Office, in Sana'a invites qualified construction suppliers to submit a firm offer for the provision of the following:

**SUPPLY OF CLEANING SERVICES FOR OFFICES AND BUILDING**

Bidding documents are available at UNHCR Supply Unit, Sana'a at the above-mentioned address. Tel: 01 469 771; 01 469772

Sealed bids must be received by UNHCR Branch Office Sana'a at the above-mentioned address on or before **20th February 2014, latest at 16:00 hours.**

Bids received at the deadline or sent to another address will be rejected.

**UNHCR**  
The UN Refugee Agency

**Algeria Street 38**  
**Building No. 2**  
**P. O. Box 12093**  
**Sana'a, Republic of Yemen**

**INVITATION TO BID:**  
**No. ITB/HCR/BO/14/SPU/02**

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), based in Sana'a, Republic of Yemen, has an international mandate to protect refugees and to seek durable solutions to their problems. UNHCR plays a major role in coordinating aid to refugees, returnees and displaced persons of concern.

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Branch Office, in Sana'a invites qualified construction suppliers to submit a firm offer for the provision of the following:

**THE PROVISION OF PRINTING AND PHOTOCOPYING SERVICES**

Bidding documents are available at UNHCR Supply Unit, Sana'a at the above-mentioned address. Tel: 01 469 771; 01 469772

Sealed bids must be received by UNHCR Branch Office Sana'a at the above-mentioned address on or before **20th February 2014, latest at 16:00 hours.**

Bids received at the deadline or sent to another address will be rejected.





# Century of violence

## What World War I did to the Middle East

Bernhard Zand  
Spiegel.de  
First Published Jan. 31

World War I may have ended in 1918, but the violence it triggered in the Middle East still hasn't come to an end. Arbitrary borders drawn by self-interested imperial powers have left a legacy that the region has not been able to overcome.

### Damascus, year three of the civil war

The 4th Division of the Syrian army has entrenched itself on Kassiou Mountain, the place where Cain is said to have slain his brother Abel. U.N. ballistics experts say the poison gas projectiles that landed in the Damascus suburbs of Muadamiya and Ain Tarma in the morning hours of Aug. 21, 2013 were fired from somewhere up on the mountain. Some 1,400 people died in the attack—1,400 of the more than 100,000 people who have lost their lives since the beginning of the conflict.

Baghdad, in the former palace quarter behind the Assassin's Gate: Two years after the American withdrawal, Iraqis are once again in full control of the so-called Green Zone, located on a sharp bend in the Tigris River. It is the quarter of Baghdad where the Americans found refuge when the country they occupied devolved into murderous chaos. Currently, the situation is hardly any better. On the other side of the wall, in the red zone, death has once again become commonplace. There were over 8,200 fatalities last year.

Beirut, the capital of Lebanon that is so loved by all Arabs: The city has long been a focal point both of Arab life and of Arab strife. The devout versus the secular, the Muslims versus the Christians, the Shites versus the Sunnis. With fighting underway in Libya and Syria, with unrest ongoing in Egypt and Iraq, the old question must once again be posed: Has Beirut managed to leave the last eruption of violence behind or is the next one just around the corner?


Two years after the revolts of 2011, the situation in the Middle East is as bleak as it has ever been. There is hardly a country in the region that has not experienced war or civil strife in recent decades. And none of them look immune to a possible outbreak of violence in the near future. The movement that came to be known as the Arab Spring threatens to sink into a morass of overthrows and counter-revolts.

That, though, is likely only to surprise those who saw the rebellions in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria as part of an historical turn of events for the Middle East. To be sure, the unrest was a bloody new beginning, but it was also the most recent chapter in an almost uninterrupted regional conflict that began 100 years ago and has never really come to an end.

### 'The Children of England and France'

In no other theater of World War I are the results of that epochal conflict still as current as they are in the Middle East. Nowhere else does the early 20th century orgy of violence still determine political conditions to the same degree. The so-called European Civil War, a term used to describe the period of bloody violence that racked Europe from 1914 onwards, came to an end in 1945. The Cold War ceased in 1990. But the tensions unleashed on the Arab world by World War I remain as acute as ever. Essentially, the Middle East finds itself in the same situation now as Europe did following the 1919 Treaty of Versailles: standing before a map that disregards the region's ethnic realities.

In Africa, Latin America and—following the bloodletting of World War II—Europe, most peoples have



The Middle East, before and after World War I.

largely come to accept the borders that history has forced upon them. But not in the Middle East. The states that were founded in the region after 1914, and the borders that were drawn then, are still seen as illegitimate by many of their own citizens and by their neighbors. The legitimacy of states in the region, writes U.S. historian David Fromkin in "A Peace to End All Peace"—the definitive work on the emergence of the modern Middle East—comes either from tradition, from the power and roots of its founder or it doesn't come at all.

Only two countries in the broader region—Egypt and Iran—possess such a long and uninterrupted history that their state integrity can hardly be shaken, even by a difficult crisis. Two others continue to stand on the foundation erected by their founders: The Turkish Republic of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, finally united by Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Saud in 1932.

These four countries surround the core of the Middle East, which is made up of five countries and one seemingly eternal non-state. Fromkin calls them the "children of England and France": Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Israel and Palestine.

No group of countries, particularly given their small sizes, has seen so many wars, civil wars, overthrows and terrorist attacks in recent decades. To understand how this historical anomaly came to pass, several factors must be considered: the region's depressing history prior to World War I, the failure of the Arab elite and the continual intervention by the superpowers thereafter, the role of political Islam, the discovery of oil, the founding of Israel and the Cold War.

### A Peace to End All Peace

Perhaps most important, however, was the wanton resolution made by two European colonial powers, Britain and France, that ordered this part of the world in accordance with their own needs and literally drew "A Line in the Sand," as the British historian James Barr titled his 2011 book about this episode.

It is still unclear where the Arab Spring will take us and what will ultimately become of the Middle East. Apocalyptic scenarios are just as speculative as the hope that that the region will find its way to new and more stable borders and improved political structures. But where does this lack of legitimacy and absence of trust which poisons the Middle East come from? How did we arrive

at this "Peace to End All Peace," as Fromkin's book is called?

Istanbul, the summer of 1914: The capital of the Ottoman Empire seems half a world away from the sunny parlor in the Imperial Villa in Ischl where Emperor Franz Joseph I signed his manifesto "To My People" on July 28 and unleashed the world war by declaring war on Serbia. For centuries, the Ottoman Empire had controlled the southern and eastern Mediterranean, from Alexandria to Arish, from the Maghreb to Suez. But Algeria and Tunisia fell to the French while the British nabbed Egypt; in 1911, the Italians established a bridgehead in Libya. By the eve of the Great War, the empire had shrunk to include, aside from today's Turkey, only the Middle East, present-day Iraq and a strip of land on the Arabian Peninsula stretching down to Yemen.

It is these regions, south of present-day Turkey, that became the focus of the Middle Eastern battles in World War I. For 400 years, the area had wallowed deep in history's shadow. But in the early 20th century, it rapidly transformed into the arc of crisis we know today—a place whose cities have become shorthand for generations of suffering: Basra, Baghdad, Aleppo, Damascus, Beirut, Gaza and Suez.

The protagonists of World War I were not fully aware yet that the Ottoman Empire's backyard was sitting atop the largest oil reserves in the world. Had they known, the fighting in the Middle East would likely have been even more violent and brutal than it was. At the time, however, the war aims of the two sides were determined by a world order that would dissolve within the next four years: Great Britain wanted to open a shipping route to its ally Russia and to secure its connection to India via the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. The German Empire wanted to prevent exactly that.

### Shifting to the Periphery

It remained unclear for a few days following Franz Joseph's declaration of war whether the Ottoman Empire would enter the war and, if it did, on which side. But shortly after the conflict began, Istanbul joined Berlin and Vienna. On Aug. 2, the Germans and the Ottomans signed a secret pact; a short time later, two German warships—the SMS Goeben and the SMS Breslau—began steaming from the western Mediterranean toward Constantinople. Once they arrived, they were handed over to the—officially still neutral—Ottoman navy and renamed Yavuz

and Midilli; the German crews remained, but donned the fez.

With the arrival of the two battleships in the Golden Horn and the subsequent mining of the Dardanelles, the casus belli had been established: The Ottomans and the Germans had blocked the connection between Russia and its allies, the French and the British. Shortly thereafter, the Goeben, flying the Ottoman flag, bombarded Russian ports on the Black Sea. At the beginning of November, Russia, Great Britain and France declared war on the Ottoman Empire.

In London, strategists began considering an attempt to break the Dardanelles blockade and take Constantinople. The result was the arrival of a British-French fleet at the southern tip of the Gallipoli Peninsula three months later. The attack, which began with a naval bombardment but soon included an all-out ground-troop invasion, failed dramatically. The Ottoman victory led to the resignation of Britain's First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill and provided the foundation for the rise of the man who would later found modern Turkey: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The bloody battle also became a national trauma for Australia and New Zealand, thousands of whose soldiers lost their lives at Gallipoli.

The Allies' defeat at Gallipoli marked a strategic turning point in the war in the Middle East. Because their plan to strike at the heart of the Ottoman Empire failed, the Allies began focusing on its periphery—targeting the comparatively weakly defended Arab provinces. It was a plan which corresponded with the Arab desire to throw off the yoke of Ottoman rule. In July 1915, Sir Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner of Egypt, began secret correspondence with Hussein Bin Ali, the Sharif of Hejaz and of the holy city of Mecca. He and his sons, Ali, Faisal and Abdullah—together with the Damascus elite—dreamed of founding an Arab nation state stretching from the Taurus Mountains in southeastern Turkey to the Red Sea and from the Mediterranean to the Iranian border.

In October 1915, McMahon wrote Hussein a letter in which he declared Great Britain's willingness—bar a few vague reservations—"to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca."

### Imperialistic Dealings

The Arabs fulfilled their part of the

agreement. In June 1916, they began their insurgency against the Ottomans—a decisive aid to the British advance from Sinai to Damascus via Jerusalem. Their revolt was energized by the British archeologist and secret agent Thomas Edward Lawrence, who would go down in history as "Lawrence of Arabia."

Britain, though, did not fully live up to its part of the deal. In a dispatch sent in early 1916, Lawrence wrote that the Arab revolt would be useful to the British Empire because, "it marches with our immediate aims, the break-up of the Islamic 'bloc' and the defeat and disruption of the Ottoman Empire." But in no way were the British thinking of the kind of united Arab state that Hussein and his sons dreamed of. "The states the Sharifs would set up to succeed the Turks would be... harmless to ourselves.... The Arabs are even less stable than the Turks. If properly handled they would remain in a state of political mosaic, a tissue of small jealous principalities incapable of cohesion."

Far more important to the British than their Arab comrades in arms were the French, with whom their troops were fighting and dying in untold numbers on the Western Front. "The friendship with France," British Prime Minister David Lloyd George later told his French counterpart Georges Clemenceau, "is worth ten Syrias." France was a colonial power that had long laid claim to the Christian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Great Britain would have preferred to control the region alone, but with their common enemy Germany bearing down, London was prepared to divide the expected spoils.

Even as McMahon was corresponding with Sharif Hussein, British parliamentarian Sir Mark Sykes was negotiating a contradictory deal with the French diplomat François Georges-Picot. It foresaw the division of the Arab provinces which still belonged to the Ottomans in such a way that France would get the areas to the north and the British those to the south. "I should like to draw a line from the 'e' in Acre to the last 'k' in Kirkuk," Sykes said as he briefed Downing Street on the deal at the end of 1916.

The so-called Sykes-Picot Agreement was an unabashedly imperialistic document. It took no account of the wishes of the peoples affected, ignored the ethnic boundaries existing in the Arab and Kurdish world and thus provoked the conflicts which continue to plague the region 100 years later. "Even by

the standards of the time," writes James Barr, "it was a shamelessly self-interested pact."

### The Balfour Redesign

The document initially remained secret. And by the time the Bolsheviks completed their revolution in Moscow in 1917 and made the Sykes-Picot Agreement public, the British had already signed another secret deal—one which neither the Arabs nor the French knew about.

On Nov. 2, 1917, Foreign Minister Arthur James Balfour promised the Zionist Federation of Great Britain "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." There were several factors motivating the British to grant the oppressed Jews the right to self-determination and to give them a piece of the Ottoman Empire for that purpose. One of the most important was the accusations of imperialism against London that had grown louder as the war progressed. Not that the imperialists in the British cabinet shared such concerns. But it bothered them, particularly because one of the critics, Woodrow Wilson, had just been reelected as U.S. president.

"Every people should be left free to determine its own polity, its own way of development, unhindered, unthreatened, unafraid," Wilson intoned in January of 1917 on the eve of America's entry into the war. At the time, Wilson was unaware of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, but the British suspected that they would ultimately have to come clean with their new ally. As such, the Balfour Declaration can be seen as an effort to guard against the expected U.S. reaction to Britain's arbitrary redesign of the Middle East.

In the meantime, the British—with the help of the Arabs—were establishing military facts on the ground. Against stiff Ottoman and German resistance, they advanced across the Sinai and Palestine to Damascus. At the same time, they progressed up the Euphrates to Baghdad and occupied Iraq. Between 1915 and 1918, there were more than 1.5 million soldiers fighting in the Middle East, with several hundred thousand casualties—not including the around one million Armenians who were killed or starved to death in the Ottoman Empire.

In October of 1918, World War I came to an end in the region with the Armistice of Mudros. The Ottoman Empire had been defeated and, with the exception of Anatolia, was divided among the victors and their allies. The "peace to end all peace" was forced upon the Middle East—for an entire century.

When U.S. President Wilson arrived in Paris in early 1919 for peace negotiations with British premier Lloyd George and French leader Clemenceau, he became witness to what for him was an unexpected show. The heads of the two victorious powers were deeply divided and engaged in a biting oratorical duel. The French insisted that they be given the mandate for present-day Lebanon and for the region stretching to the Tigris, including what is now Syria. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, after all, guaranteed them control over the area.

### Asking the People

The British, who were mindful of their own mandate in Palestine and who had just received more exact information regarding the immense oil riches to be had in Mesopotamia, were opposed. Granting France the mandate over Syria, after all, was in contradiction to the promises they had made to the Arabs at the beginning of the war. Furthermore, the British had fought the war in the Middle East essentially on their own, with almost one million soldiers and 125,000 killed and injured. "There would have been no question of Syria but for England," Lloyd George said.

Continued on the back page



# Socioeconomic reforms in Oman: An uncertain sustainability?

**Sulaiman Wasty  
Mei.edu  
First Published Jan. 29**

The Sultanate of Oman has made remarkable strides over the past three decades in transforming a tribal desert country into a functioning modern economy. By all metrics—rapid economic growth rates, improved social indices, enhanced availability and use of commercial energy, a favorable investment climate for foreign entrepreneurs, widespread technology use, and growing global links—Oman today is a “high income developing country.” [According to the World Bank] However, there is a difference between a “high income developed” versus a “high income developing” country; the latter denotes a state undergoing a structural change in its modes of production, from agriculture to manufacturing to distribution to services. With time, such structural change is likely to occur with increased productivity from technological changes in modes of production and the provision of financial and consumer services.

Notwithstanding its successes to date, Oman is encumbered with unique challenges that may threaten the long-term feasibility of this development. While the country enjoys a stable political structure, relatively sound ethnic and sectarian cohesion, and an absence of imminent economic strife involving its local and expatriate labor, and though it still possesses significant renewable oil and natural resources, it cannot replicate the success or emulate the experience of its oil-

rich neighbors. Oman therefore requires a distinct way forward, and fostering accountable institutional-development frameworks will be key.

By enhancing its citizens’ participation in the political process and undertaking public sector management reforms, Oman witnessed several restructurings of state institutions in 2011 and 2012. These changes have allowed Omanis to play a major participatory role through the establishment of the Council of Oman (Majlis Oman), consisting of the State Council (Majlis al-Dawla) and the Consultation Council (Majlis al-Shura). The Municipal Councils’ Law also transformed the country’s regions into governorates, regulated the functions of governors, and introduced a greater degree of decentralization. Simultaneously, the current five-year plan (2011-15) lays the foundation for civil service reform and the delivery of public services, including social safety nets for indigent population groups.

What is still missing, however, is the buttressing of these regulatory measures for public sector management through a transparency and accountability framework. Such a framework would render results evident to the public, with mechanisms provided for the redressing of grievances and independent means to verify progress toward significant change. As of yet, Oman does not have an anti-corruption agency, the absence of which also hinders the flourishing of a competitive private sector. Further, whereas considerable efforts are rightly being made for the “Omanization” of the country’s labor force, Oman

needs to strike a balance between “indigenous” entitlements (that is, preferential policies for Omanis) and the move to a market-based economy (that is, fee structures for social benefits to both the local and migrant population). For minimal social disruption, these structures could take the form of graduated scales and/or incorporate grandfather clauses.

Economic diversification in Oman is spurred by the country’s relatively limited oil and gas reserves compared to other Gulf countries. In this context, Oman’s current five-year plan appropriately focuses on strengthening the private sector, accelerating privatization and/or public-private partnerships, utilizing human resource capabilities, and diversifying sectoral and production bases. Toward meeting that goal, the Sultanate has invested in income-generating projects in industry, mining, agriculture, and fisheries. It is also eliciting business advisory services and modeling frameworks for its banking sector from international financial institutions, notably the International Finance Corporation and the World Bank.

In order to minimize reliance on natural resources, additional efforts are necessary to attract investment in banking, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), and tourism. The privatization of power and water companies is a promising advancement, and there is also a critical need in the near future for additional privatization of government-owned businesses. Importantly, the diversification efforts hinge upon the development of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and access to fi-



**While Oman has made a number of reforms in recent years, it still lacks a solid transparency and accountability framework necessary to regulate measures for public sector management.**

nance by domestic entrepreneurs.

But perhaps the most pivotal matter to be tackled by the Omani government is access to quality education. At the moment, the Omanization of the country’s labor force and the development of the private sector both suffer from a lack of targeted and quality education opportunities offered to Omani citizens on par with what is now freely available in other GCC countries. The current reliance on expatriate professionals could be mitigated by intra-regional (GCC) research and training exchanges.

Oman today resembles neither the resource-rich countries in the Gulf nor a “market-transition economy” that warrants a second gener-

ation of reforms (that is, movement away from monetary and fiscal stabilization and movement toward reforms in other critical sectors, such as agriculture, mining, and industry). Rather, Oman needs institutional development so that efficient public sector management can create diversified productive sectors in which Omani-trained, qualified, and indigenous human capital can enter the already-captured services-oriented sectors such as duty-free commerce, finance, aviation, retail, and real estate. The term “institutional development” is not intended to imply the creation of brick and mortar structures or the establishment of official committees. Nor does it focus on eliminat-

ing irregularities in public procurement and financial management. Instead, it encompasses clear and open covenants with the general population, the enforcement of regulations, and access to justice—in other words, the demand side of governance.

*Sulaiman Wasty is a Scholar at the Middle East Institute and has over 25 years’ experience in planning and monitoring and evaluation (M&E). He was Special Assistant to Pakistan’s Minister for Planning and Development; owns a Washington-based financial integrity services firm; and is a visiting professor at Johns Hopkins and Princeton Universities.*



Vacancy Notice NO: UNFPA/SSA/2014/01

## Finance Assistant to the MoPH

Grade: SSA-G6 Equivalent  
Duration: Six Months

The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) Country Office in Yemen Sana’a is seeking to recruit a finance professional to provide technical support to the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MOPHP) of the Republic Of Yemen specifically in the area of the financial management.

### Duties and Responsibilities:

Under the guidance and supervision of the, Deputy Minister of Population Sector, the Finance Assistant will provide technical assistance in the area of financial management specifically on strengthening the Ministry’s capacity to manage and report on the financial resources received from the UNFPA and other donors as may be required. He/she will be expected to deliver quality services on financial management to internal and external clients mastering all relevant rules, guidelines, processes, procedures and reports. He/she will support the Ministry to accurately interpret the rules, procedures and guidelines as well as train the project staff on financial management including proper recording keeping of the UNFPA-supported projects. In this regard the incumbent will be expected to perform following duties and responsibilities:

### I. Financial Support:

- Support the monitoring of programme financial performance for all financial resources by providing necessary financial information and analysis, including implementation rate against indicators/results; detect potential over/ under expenditure problems and propose remedial action.
- Develop tools and mechanisms for effective and efficient monitoring of programme and project budgets, coordinate compilation of financial data and provide accurate and up-dated financial information to UNFPA on a continuous basis.
- Interpret financial policies and procedures and provide guidance and training to staff and project managers; strive to identify ways in which programme financial needs can be met within existing policies.
- Support MOPHP to maintain an effective financial recording and reporting system, internal control and audit follow-up, and processing of financial transactions in an accurate and timely way.
- Follow up on the preparation and submission of Quarterly Financial reports.
- Follow up on NEX audit reports and implementation of the audit recommendations as well as reporting on the compliance actions.
- Support and build the capacity of the government staff at MOPHP on daily basis on effective financial reporting.

### II. Working Environment:

While the incumbent will be working directly with the finance unit of the MOPHP, s/he will also be working in close collaboration with the UNFPA staff specifically the RH Team and the UNFPA Finance Associate; and sometimes with support from the Assistant Representative and Operations Manager as may be needed.

### III. Deliverables

At the end of the contract the incumbent will be expected to submit a report to MOPHP and UNFPA on accomplishments and recommendations on the lessons learnt and best practices.

### IV. Required Competencies:

- Knowledge sharing/Continuous learning
- Valuing diversity
- Managing Relationships
- Personal Leadership and Effectiveness
- Results orientation/Commitment to excellence

### V. Qualifications and Experience:

- A minimum of a bachelor’s degree in either of the following fields, finance and accounting or business administration,
- Two years of progressively responsible experience in administration or technical support preferably in a work related to UNFPA mandate;
- Yemeni nationality or Work-Permit Visa
- Fluency in oral and written Arabic & English;
- Adequate computer skills, good interpersonal communication and team building skills.

UNFPA offers an attractive compensation package commensurate with qualifications and work experience. UNFPA offers equal opportunities however qualified females are strongly encouraged to apply.

Please send your application with covering letter including P11 FORM which can be downloaded from the below link:

<http://yemen.unfpa.org/P11.doc>

To: [Vacancies.yemen@unfpa.org](mailto:Vacancies.yemen@unfpa.org) or to UNFPA Address below:

UNFPA Faj Attan behind Alwi al-Salami residence

P O Box 7272, Sana’a,

Deadline for applications: 20 February 2014

Please note that only short listed candidates will be considered and notified



## VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT

**Post Title:** Database Administrator (DBA)  
**Location:** Social Fund for Development/ Sana’a  
**Duration:** Full time including three (3) months probationary period  
**No of Post:** 1  
**Date Announced:** 04 February 2014  
**Closing Date:** 15 February 2014

### Main Responsibilities:

- Install and upgrade the Oracle server (database) and application tools.
- Allocate system storage and plan future requirements for database system.
- Plan for backup and recovery of database information.
- Make backup and restore the database.
- Maintain the database in safe mode.
- Monitor and optimize the performance of database.
- Maintain database, system security, solve problems and replication (streaming) between the SFD and all branch offices.
- Contact oracle corporation for technical support.

### Requirements:

SFD calls on Yemeni Nationals of mature, energetic, creative and dynamic personalities to apply for this job which also requires:

- A Bachelor Degree from a reputable university in Computer Science or equivalent.
- At least three years of experience in database management and systems programming.
- Holding Yemeni nationality.
- Sound knowledge of DBA OCP.
- Good knowledge on streaming database.
- Good knowledge on developing system using oracle tools.
- Full-time availability according to the SFD’s work system.

### Reporting:

The database Administrator will report directly to SFD’s related head unit.

### Submission guideline:

The application should comprise of a one-page cover letter explaining the applicant’s interest and suitability for the position, indicating earliest joining date if selected, along with detailed CV.

Interested candidates should submit their application by email to: [hr@sfd-yemen.org](mailto:hr@sfd-yemen.org) before February 15th 2014. Applications received after the closing date will not be considered.

Only short-listed candidates will be contacted for interviews.











CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

## The Saleh Mosque

Contained within the mosque is the Islamic Science College where women study Islamic jurisprudence and learn about the life of the prophet. Women attend religion classes in the mornings. They also take special lessons to help them memorize the Holy Quran.

Manal Al-Hamadi attends the Islamic Science College.

"It is fantastic to study in such a beautiful place. I have benefited a lot from the daily lectures," she said.

The mosque welcomes visitors, including families with children, on the mosques flower-filled grounds from 8 a.m. until 6 p.m. Families tend to stay on the grounds for hours, enjoying the green space surrounding the mosque. Many bring lunch with them and picnic on the lawn, enjoying hours at the mosque.

Yousif Ali, of Sana'a, visited the mosque with his wife and child.

"We feel very comfortable sitting here. My child is happy to be able



WWW.COLOP.COM

**COLOP**  
MARKING SOLUTIONS

أختام المايكروبان  
أختام مع حماية ضد الجراثيم

Microban

COLOP Printer 30

The Spirit of Innovation

Exclusive Agents:  
**Thabet Son Corporation**  
Graphic Arts Division

الوكالة الوحيدة:  
**مؤسسة بن ثابت للتجارة**  
قسم معدات ومستلزمات الطباعة

Showroom Telefax: 269924 - Mujaheed St. - Sana'a - Yemen

to run and play. It is a clean and quiet place."

Qota Abdulla, another visitor, said the "decorations inside are amazing, and every time we enter, our eyes are especially drawn to the beauty of the ceiling."

Former president Ali Abdulla Saleh takes great pride in this mosque and considers it one of his greatest achievements. The mosque was completed in 2008 and is the largest mosque in Yemen. It is also depicted on the 250-riyal banknote.

When youth took to the streets during the 2011 revolution, there were calls to change the name of the mosque. They demanded it

be named the "People's Mosque" instead of the Saleh Mosque.

Ahmed Al-Naqib, a broadcaster at the state-sponsored radio station in Sana'a—which was the only radio station in Sana'a at that time—was suspended from his job upon referring to it on-air as the "People's Mosque."

From the date of its opening until today, government TV and radio air the mosque's Friday prayer live, and Al-Naqib has returned to his job following former president Saleh's signing, in Riyadh, of the Gulf Initiative that transferred power to his vice president, Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi, in November 2011.

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 10

## Century of violence

Wilson proposed a solution. The only way to find out if the residents of Syria would accept a French mandate and those of Palestine and Mesopotamia would accept British rule, the U.S. president said, was to find out what people in those regions wanted. It was a simple and self-evident idea. For two months, the Chicago businessman Charles Crane and the American theologian Henry King travelled through the Middle East and interviewed hundreds of Arab notables. Although the British and the French did all they could to influence the outcome of the mission, their findings were clear. Locals in Syria did not want to be part of a French mandate and those in Palestine were uninterested in being included in a British mandate. London had been successful in preventing the Americans from conducting a survey in Mesopotamia.

In August, King and Crane presented their report. They recommended a single mandate covering a unified Syria and Palestine that was to be granted to neutral America instead of to the European colonial powers. Hussein's son Faisal, who they describe as being "tolerant and wise," should become the head of this Arab state.

Today, only Middle East specialists know of the King-Crane Report, but in hindsight it represents one of the biggest lost opportunities in the recent history of the Middle East. Under pressure from the British and the French, but also because of the serious illness which befell Wilson in September of 1919, the report was hidden away in the archives and only publicly released three years later. By then, Paris and London had agreed on a new map for the Middle East, which diametrically opposed the recommendations made by King and Crane. France divided its mandate area into the states of Lebanon

and Syria while Great Britain took on the mandate for Mesopotamia, which it later named Iraq—but not before swallowing up the oil-rich province of Mosul. Between Syria, Iraq and their mandate area of Palestine, they established a buffer state called Transjordan.

Instead of the Arab nation-state that the British had promised Sharif Hussein, the victorious powers divided the Middle East into four countries which, because of their geographical divisions and their ethnic structures are still among the most difficult countries in the world to govern today.

### Fatal and Long-Term Consequences

And they knew what they were doing. Just before the treaties were signed, the question arose as to where exactly the northern border of Palestine—and thus, later, that of Israel—was to run. An advisor in London wrote to the British Prime Minister Lloyd George: "The truth is that any division of the Arab country between Aleppo and Mecca is unnatural. Therefore, whatever division is made should be decided by practical requirements. Strategy forms the best guide." In the end, the final decision was made by a British general assisted by a director from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

The Arab world, of course, wasn't the only place where borders were drawn that local populations refused to accept. It happened in Europe too. But three factors in the Middle East led to fatal and long-term consequences.

First: Whereas many Europeans had begun to develop national identities and political classes by the beginning of the 19th century at least, World War I yanked Arabs out of their historical reverie. The Ottomans took a relatively hands-off approach to governing their

Middle Eastern provinces, doing little to introduce any kind of political structure to the region or to promote the development of an intellectual or economic elite. On the contrary, at the first sign of a progressing national identity, the Ottoman rulers would banish or execute the movement's leaders. This heritage weighed on the Middle East at the dawn of the 20th century, and the region's pre-modern conflation of state and religion further hampered its political growth.

Second: The capriciousness with which France and Great Britain redrew the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire's former Arab provinces left behind the feeling that a conspiracy was afoot—a feeling which grew into an obsession in the ensuing decades. Even today, the legend lives on that the mysterious buckle in the desert border between Jordan and Saudi Arabia is the result of someone bumping the elbow of Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill as he was drawing the line. That, of course, is absurd—but it isn't too far removed from the manner in which Sykes, Picot, Lloyd George and Clemenceau in fact carved up the region.

Third: In contrast to Europe, the tension left behind by the untenable peace in the Arab world was not released in a single, violent eruption. During World War II, the region was not a primary theater of war.

But the unresolved conflicts left behind by World War I, combined with the spillover effects from the catastrophic World War II in Europe—the founding of Israel, the Cold War and the race for Persian Gulf resources—added up to a historical burden for the Middle East. And they have resulted in perpetual conflict—conflict that has yet to come to an end even today, almost 100 years after that fateful summer in 1914.

**SHARP**

هي الأقوى والأكثر مبيعاً في العالم

شهره واسعة بفضل جودتها ومثابرتها وإنتاجيتها العالية

**ناتكو natco**  
تقنية المعلومات Technology

04-285097 • فاكس: 04-285095 • تيمز ت: 01-218121 • 01-218233/2 • 01-211373/2 • صنعاء شارع هائل ت:  
03-205857 • فاكس: 03-205857 • الحديدة ت: 02-243482 • صنعاء شارع حدة ت: 01-454475 • فاكس: 01-454473/4 • صنعاء شارع حدة ت: 01-454475 • فاكس: 01-454473/4 • صنعاء شارع حدة ت:  
05-314973 • فاكس: 05-314977/5 • المكلا ت: E-mail: natco.bis2@y.net.ye • بريد الكتروني:

**HORIZON AGENCIES & COMMERCIAL SERVICES (HACS)**

**DRESSER Consolidated** Safety valves & Pressure Relief valves

**KOBOLD** Flow Products Pressure Products Level Products Temperature Products

**BIOKUBE** Wastewater Purification

**FMC Technologies** Chiksan / WECO / Dynetor products

**FMC Technologies** Smith Meters / LACT Units / ULTRASONIC Meters

**Solar Turbines** A Caterpillar Company

**Petrofac** Mechanical Svcs.

**Manpower Supply**

**Calibration & Maintenance of Flowmeters**

**DRESSER Masoneilan** Control Valves

**FMC Technologies** Marine & Truck Loading Arms & Systems

**Rockwell Automation** Allen-Bradley

**SEKO** Pumps & Dosing Systems

**MURPHY** Frank W Murphy

**FMC Technologies** Fluid Control Fittings/Pumps/ Invalco / Manifolds

**Honeywell Enraf** Tank gauging & Inventory system

**SEVERN TRENT DE NORA** Power, Desalination & Coastal Seawater Electrochlorination

**Construction & Facility Maintenance**

Tel: +967-1-421508 / 421532 Fax: +967-1-421514 Email: info@hacs-yemen.com Website: www.hacs-yemen.com