

INSIDE

Report
**Salafi refugees:
Settling in Sana'a
nostalgic of
Dammaj**
Page 3



Report
**Education gap:
Public schools
vs. private
institutes**
Page 4



Opinion
**First things
first, a new
government is
due**
Page 5

Report
**The
Neighborhood
gangs of Sana'a**
Page 8



Recharge To Win

**The Biggest Offer
In Yemen**

200
Monthly Prizes
with the second Extra Surprises Offer



**Send 80
to 211 free**



**Grand dreams can come true.
Win a prize of a lifetime with the second Extra Surprises Offer**

- Recharge your line with one Extra scratch card, 80 units, and enter the draw on Samsung Galaxy Duos Mobile Phones , and Plasma 43" TV Screens.
- Recharge your line with two Extra scratch cards, 80 units, and enter the draw on Samsung Galaxy Note3 and 100g Gold Bars in addition to the previous prizes.
- Recharge you line with three Extra scratch cards or more, 80 units, and enter the monthly draw on a brand new BMW X3 car, and all the above mentioned draws as well.
- This offer targets all prepaid subscribers as well as postpaid subscribers excluding corporate accounts.
- The first draw shall be conducted at the end of April, 2014.
- **This offer includes e-voucher of 80 units.**

For more information please send (80) to 211 for free.



Available at SabaFon
Service Centers and all
Authorized Dealers

200

Monthly
Winners



400

YER Monthly Fee based
on Year of Subscription



Saba Postpaid Line

New & Unique Offers

800

YER To start using
Internet Packages



100%

Free Lines



67%

Discount on Friends
& Family Service



Get a free postpaid line (pay only the deposit)

- Benefit from a reduced monthly fee starting from 400 YER to 750 YER based on the year of your subscription where you are entitled to 5% discount on every year.
- Subscribe to Friends & Family Service for only 150 YER where the first 6 numbers are added free of charge, and enjoy a discounted tariff rate for calls and monthly fees that reaches 67% discount.
- Enter the monthly draw on 200 prizes when you pay 2,500 YER from your monthly bill, and you can increase your winning chances with every 2,500 YER you pay.
- Surf the internet with several internet packages starting from only 800 YER (40 mb).

200 Monthly Prizes

HD and LED Screens, Laptops, Automatic Home ,3 Washing Machines, PlayStation .Theatres, and several other prizes

سابافون GSM
SABAFON

Heritage meets communication

For more information please send (Saba) to the free number 211 ■ The above rates do not include taxes.

Full Solutions
Universal Rent a Car

Sana'a: (967 1) 440309
Mövenpick Hotel: (967 1) 546061
Aden: (967 2) 245625
hertz-yemen@universalyemen.com
www.universalyemen.com

هزرتا
Hertz

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR SALE

YEMEN TIMES

Now With
"mārhaba"
Apply Visa to United Arab Emirates & fly with any Airline

رجيسي السفرات والخدمات
Regency Travel Services

Beirut St. Hadda, Al Medinah Sakania, opp. MTN Hadda, Sana'a - Yemen
Tel: 01 416 758, 01 424 999 - Fax: 01 416 981, 414 243
Malla Plaza, Main Road Madram St., Beside MTN Office, Aden - Yemen
Tel: 02 249780, 02 223146 - Fax: 245626

Thursday, 21 August, 2014 • Issue No. 1809 • Price 50 Yemeni Riyals www.yementimes.com • Founded in 1991 by Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf

Houthis threaten to topple Hadi government; Crisis deepens in the capital



Houthi camps along the West of Sana'a

Story and photo by
Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A, Aug. 20—Houthis welcomed the formation of the ten-member negotiation committee that President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi established on Wednesday, after a meeting with members of parliament, the Shura Council, and cabinet ministers.

President Hadi convened an urgent meeting in the presence of state leaders on Wednesday morning, calling for immediate action to put an end to escalating tensions between the Houthis and the government.

He spoke about the possibility of forming a national unity government, and called for the military to be on red alert. He also asserted protecting the republican regime and democracy and stressed the imminent need to introduce political reforms, according to sources attending the meeting.

A presidential committee was established to solve the conflict between the Houthis and the government.

The committee is headed by Dr. Ahmed Obaid Bin Dagher and includes Abdulmalik Al-Mekhlafi as a spokesperson, Sultan Al-Barakani, Yahya Mansur Abu Osba, Abdulhameed Hareez, Nabeela Al-Zubair, Mohammed Qahtan, Mubarak Al-Bahar, Abdulaziz Jubari and Hassan Zaid.

In a conversation with the Yemen Times, Ali Al-Qahoom, deputy spokesperson of the Houthis, confirmed, "The presidential committee will meet with the Houthis' leader Abdulmalik Al-Houthi on Thursday morning to negotiate the terms aimed at toppling the regime."

Houthis demands

Sources told the Yemen Times that the Houthis' demands were: Inclusion of 20,000 Houthi members in the military, allocation of 10 ministries to the Houthis, delay of the disarmament of their weapons and

change in Azal region to include-Hajja and Al-Jawf governorates

Ali Al-Qahoom, a member of the Houthis' Media Office, informed the Yemen Times that Abdulmalik Al-Houthi is still waiting for a response to those demands.

Since Monday morning the Houthis continued to flock to Sana'a governorate threatening to besiege the capital.

The attacks set to take place are viewed in similar light to the ones on Sana'a in late 1967, when an attempt was made by supporters of the Imamate to regain control after the Imam's rule was toppled in 1962.

The Houthis announced Friday as the deadline for President Hadi to reverse the decision of increasing fuel subsidies and dismiss the government.

The Houthis have set up tents along the borders of Sana'a to prepare for their entrance to the city on Friday, oust the government and take a U-turn on fuel price increases.

Houthis' congregations

The Houthis mainly gather in the northern, southern and western entrances of Sana'a city and include thousands of gunmen.

Houthis have created several checkpoints in Al-Subaha area, near the official security checkpoints.

Yemen Times staff got access to one of the Houthi camps in Al-Subaha and met some of the group's members.

"We will not go back unless the government is ousted and the decree to lift the fuel subsidies is abolished and we will enter Sana'a on Friday to achieve these demands," said Abu Hamza, head of the organizing committee in Al-Subaha area.

"We assure the people in Sana'a that we will not enter Sana'a for war, or to control it, but only to oust the government. We call on all people in Sana'a to join us," added Abu Hamza.

Ahmed Al-Khawlani, a protester sitting in one of the Houthis' tents in Hiziz, at Sana'a's southern entrance, said, "We are waiting here in the tents. We have our guns but we will not use them against the people. We will use the guns only against those who attack us."

"If Hadi will not oust the government, we will topple him and appoint a new one," he added.

Tents at the southern entrance of the capital in Hiziz area are located near the Reserve Forces camp on the highway that connects Sana'a, Dhamar, Ibb and Taiz.

Additional tents located at Sana'a's northern entrances near Al-Azraqeen area on Sana'a-Amran highway have been reported by Adel Hussein Nasser, an Amran resident. "I work in Sana'a and on the way from Amran to Sana'a I saw thousands of gunmen setting camps determined to control the capital."

Houthis presence in Sana'a

Houthis from various governorates came to Sana'a capital on Monday to pitch their tents in Change Square, Al-Khamseen Street and Al-Safia area, near Taiz Street.

"Our presence in Sana'a is to support the gatherings that came from governorates located on the borders of Sana'a," said Yazeed Ali Yahya, a Houthi armed man in Change Square.

"Friday will be an important day in Sana'a when our followers located on the borders will enter Sana'a, and we will meet them, and the capital will be full of us. We will become a bigger force, so that President Hadi will meet our demands," said Yahya.

Political action and international response

As a response to the Houthis' escalating demands a number of political actions have been launched to stop the Houthis who are determined to usurp Sana'a on Friday.

The ten countries supporting the Gulf Initiative, including the five

permanent members in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the European Union (EU), expressed their concerns on Tuesday after hearing the latest statements that Al-Houthi had released. The sponsors of the Gulf Initiative, which go by the name of G10 ambassadors, dismissed the Houthis actions in a public statement as "antagonistic, militaristic, and disrespectful of this transition process and of the authority of the legally established Yemeni government."

The G10 ambassadors reiterated, "any action that aimed to incite or provoke unrest and violence is unacceptable, and will be strongly condemned by the international community."

"We furthermore reiterate the demand made by the Security Council on July 11 that the Houthis withdraw and relinquish territory acquired by force and hand over heavy weapons and ammunition pillaged from military facilities to the national authorities," the statement said.

Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, the leader of the Houthi group, said on Monday in a televised speech on Al-Masira TV Channel, "we will open the protest camps and squares in Sana'a, and the capital will witness extensive marches until Friday, and if the relevant authorities do not respond by next Friday, we have to put severe measures into place... Those will certainly include irritating steps for everyone who underestimates the people."

Houthis are demanded in the G10 statement to stop the escalation against the Yemeni government and withdraw from the lands they had previously controlled.

"Friday is a decisive day, when the capital will fill with crowds that will replace the government, and it will be a historical day in the lives of Yemenis," said Ali Al-Emad, a member in Ansar Allah's political office, to the Yemen Times.

He declared that people from all governorates had moved to the borders of Sana'a, an act he sees as a strong testimony for the Houthis' popular support.

President Hadi had convened with a number of tribal leaders in Sana'a on Tuesday to urge them to protect the capital from the Houthis.

Major concerns

Several foreign embassies in the capital, including Britain, Canada, India, and the United States, have urged their nationals to leave Sana'a, and those currently residing in the capital have been requested to take the necessary precautions.

Within Sana'a, some residents are apprehensive the threats will escalate into a civil war. Some have started to buy essentials, while others have prepared to leave to their villages in other governorates.

"I rushed to buy a ration and many gas cylinders, lest they become scarce because of the upcoming clashes between the Houthis and the army," feared Mohammed Obadi, a Sana'a resident.

With increasing pressure on the government to act, Yemeni citizens are desperate to hear on a viable solution from President Hadi.

LEGADOR
... a taste to adore!

Maamoul
With Premium Dates

Maamoul
معمول
بالتفاح الفاخر
With Premium Dates

New

Haier
Inspired living

هاير
رفاهية الحياة

عبدالقني علي الحروي للإلكترونيات والأجهزة المنزلية
AGAH ELECTRONICS AND HOME APPLIANCES

Green COOL ELECTROMECHANICAL SYSTEMS
Design, Supply, and Install.

Sub & Main Distribution Board
H.V.A.C. Control Panel
Water Pump Control Panel
Automatic & Manual Transfer Switch Panel
Any Type of Control Panel

Tel: +967 1 428630 Mobile: (+967) 737959114 - 715959114
E-mail: marketingmanager@technocool-engineering.com

Al-Jazeera
Insurance & Reinsurance

Head Office:
Sana'a - Faj Attan - P.O.Box: 1376
Tel: +967-1-428809/425012/13
Fax: +967-1-418369

Aden Branch: Al-Mullaa St.
Tel: +967-2-243101
Fax: +967-2-243202

Hodeidah Branch:
Tel: +967-3-248011
Fax: +967-3-248010

Al-Mukalla Branch:
Tel: +967-5-307187
Fax: +967-5-307188

www.al-jazeeraair.com - aljazeeraair@y.net.ye - info@al-jazeeraair.com

يطور أداء المحرك
لمستوى أعلى

توفر زيوت المحرك
موبيل أداءً قوياً
وحماية ممتدة
لجموعه أوسع
من السيارات.

موبيل
Super
1000

20W-50
Extra High Performance
Motor Oil

XHP

لزيد من المعلومات، يرجى زيارة:
www.mobil.com و www.yemlub.com

Mobil **YEMLUB**

الهيئة لتسويق زيوت اموبيل (المحلي)
صعده - تلون: 3/14/2/11/469681
فاس: 145/4691967 - صرب: 3516



Clashes in Hadramout; Banks shut down

■ Bassam Al-Khameri

SANA'A, Aug. 19—Military units associated with the 2nd Military Command in Hadramout governorate stormed a villa on Al-Siteen Street in the capital city of Mukalla late Monday. The villa was used by militants to plot terrorist attacks, according to the state-run Saba News Agency.

The news agency quoted an anonymous source from the command who confirmed they besieged the villa and fought with the militants, adding that some of the militants were injured before they fled the scene.

"We have found several explosive devices, detonators, medicine, a computer, audio systems, military clothes, mobiles and RPGs," said the source.

Clashes have been ongoing in Hadramout between Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) militants and the military since May 23, after the militants entered Seyoun.

Many AQAP members fled from Shabwa and Abyan governorates following a military offensive against AQAP in the two governorates that began on April 29.

Banks close amid fears of looting

AQAP affiliates stormed several public and private banks in Hadramout and looted large sums of cash. As a result of the violence, several banks in Hadramout closed down on Sunday for fear of being attacked.

Ayem Bahomaid, a broadcaster for Seyoun Radio in Mukalla city, said that most of the banks in Mukalla closed down, particularly following the attack on Yemen International Bank's branch in Mukalla during the first week of August.

Bahomaid said that many banks stayed closed on Sunday. While some opened on Tuesday, because of the security situation they may shut down at any time.

Ahmed Bahomaid, director of the Yemen International Bank in Mukalla, told the Yemen Times

they have reduced their working hours from 8:00 AM to 2:00 PM.

"We are not working in the afternoon nowadays because of the clashes and the attack on the bank's branch in Al-Qatan," Bahomaid said.

AQAP affiliates on August 7 stormed the branches of the Yemen International Bank and the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank in Al-Qatan district.

"Only Al-Tadhamon private bank is opened in the district but other banks such as the Yemen International Bank, the Cooperative and Agricultural Credit Bank that were attacked by Al-Qaeda affiliates are still closed," said Abdulla Bin Shihab, a journalist in Al-Qatan.

Reporting from Hadramout, Hadarem Net news website cited local sources on Tuesday saying several banks in Hadramout have transferred their foreign currency to Sana'a for fear of being attacked by AQAP affiliates.

"Closing banks indicates that

Hadramout governorate is insecure and indicates the lack of control by the security forces," said Mustafa Nassr, an economist and the head of the Studies and Economic Media Center in Sana'a.

Al-Hamedi, a resident in Mukalla, said the clashes that took place between the military and AQAP affiliates in the governorate have created widespread chaos. However, Al-Hamedi asserted that people in Mukalla are trying to cope with the strife situation.

"People go to work in the morning and the public's movement is almost normal now despite the clashes. Prices of food items slightly increased because of these clashes and the lifting of fuel subsidies," he added.

The military has launched an ongoing campaign in Hadramout to pursue AQAP affiliates following an attack on August 4 allegedly carried out by AQAP on military patrols in Hadramout that left four soldiers killed and 15 others wounded.



Taiz public transport benefits from 20 percent hike

SANA'A, August 20—The Transportation Fees Committee in Taiz governorate approved a 20 percent increase in fares for all public transportation in the governorate on Tuesday.

The new fares will be implemented next week. The committee authorized the manager of the traffic police and security departments in the governorate's various districts to supervise the implementation of new prices.

After the government's removal of fuel subsidies on July 30, transportation costs in Taiz governorate have risen inconsistently with many bus and taxi drivers claiming to be unable to afford increased fuel prices.

Power back in Al-Mahweet governorate

SANA'A, August 20—Engineering teams on Tuesday were able to fix power lines in Al-Mahweet governorate after an act of sabotage by tribesmen on Monday morning in Muhalla area.

The sabotage of electricity lines resulted in a complete power cut in the governorate.

Mohammed Al-Atefi, general manager of the Electricity Ministry's office in Al-Mahweet, told the state-run Saba News Agency the engineering teams have fixed the electricity lines but none of the attackers were arrested.

YCB: Financial situation in Yemen is stable

SANA'A, Aug 20—The Yemen Central Bank's (YCB) director, Mohammed Awadh Bin Hamam, asserted that the financial situation in Yemen is stable due to the stability of supply and demand of foreign currency.

Bin Hamam told the state-run

Saba News Agency that customers kept their deposits in commercial and Islamic banks.

The General Manager of the Arab Bank in Yemen, Amer Al-Sorr, confirmed that financial transactions have remained consistent. He explained that the financial market is stable after the government's decision to cut fuel subsidies, which lowered the pressure on Yemen's local currency.

Armed group arrested in Sana'a, government says

SANA'A, Aug 20—The state-run Saba News Agency reported the arrest of an armed group in the capital, which attempted to take control of a state-owned land in Mathbah area, northwest the capital Sana'a.

Amar Al-Ahmar, the leader of the armed group was injured during the arrest, while another person was killed, one policeman was injured and three others of the armed group were arrested.

"This armed group is involved in previous crimes and attacks against public and private properties and against policemen," the news agency said.

The arrest of this armed group came amidst growing security tension in the capital Sana'a after the Houthis threatened to topple the government and set up their camps on the borders along the West of Sana'a.

The security administrations and police stations in the city have been on alert since the Houthis started marching in the city demanding a removal of the cabinet and revoking the fuel subsidy cuts.

Mua'mar Harash, Head of Maeen Security Administration, north the capital Sana'a told the Yemen Times details of the case "must not be given to the press until investigations are completed."

JMP declines GPC's reconciliation offer

■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A Aug. 19—The Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) refused the reconciliation document on Tuesday presented by the General People's Congress on Monday.

"We refuse any reconciliation document other than the one presented in the National Dialogue Conference (NDC)," said Al-Qubati, the spokesperson of the JMP.

He alluded that the national reconciliation should be between the executioner and his victims, which is the GPC and the people, and not between two executioners, meaning reconciliation between two parties."

"The [GPC] document contained unimportant and illogical terms and

is considered a joke to civilians... the GPC is supposed to apologize to the people, but in this document they ask for the opposite," said Al-Qubati.

The GPC's reconciliation document demands an apology to the party and reparation for what the GPC's leaders and members sustained in order to achieve the sought after reconciliation.

The document further demands upholding the republic and the democratic unity, abiding by the constitution as well as the Gulf Initiative and its executive mechanism, by implementing the NDC's outputs.

In addition, it requests that all medium and heavy weapons are handed over to the state and that all

parties reject to war. Hate speeches, as well as doctrinal, sectarian and racial discrimination should also be put to an end.

The document asks signing parties to work on peace agreements between political actors that stood opposite each other during the 2011 uprising and successive events, adding "real partnership in managing the state's affairs," was necessary.

Yaseen Al-Tamimi, a political analyst and a journalist in Sana'a, said "the GPC provided this document at the time of conflict between the Houthis, the state and Al-Qaeda thinking that other parties will accept it."

However, the reconciliation document contains "impossible conditions, such as holding peace agree-

ments between the parties involved in the 2011 uprising," according to Yaseen Al-Tamimi.

In Tamimi's opinion all powers will refuse the document as it does not comply with the NDC outcomes and the GPC aims to use it as an alternative of the Gulf Initiative and the NDC.

The JMP is a political coalition opposing former President Saleh which was founded in 2003. It includes the Islah Party, the Yemeni Socialist Party, the Nasserite Party, the Arab Baath Socialist Party, the Al-Haqq Party, and the Yemeni Popular Forces Union.

Presidential committee in Al-Jawf meets tribal leaders, agreement reached

■ Amal Al-Yarisi

SANA'A, Aug. 19—The presidential committee tasked to reach a ceasefire agreement in Al-Jawf governorate reached an agreement on Tuesday with tribal leaders in Al-Jawf to be approved by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi.

Sultan Al-Aradh, the governor of Marib governorate, located just south of Al-Jawf in north-central Yemen, said that the terms emphasized all external fighters in Al-Jawf return to the areas they came from.

The agreement further demands for brigades and battalions to maintain security in Al-Jawf and for a general meeting to be held with the tribal leaders of the governorates of Marib, Al-Jawf, and Al-Bayda, in order to discuss their future merger into one federal region, the Saba region.

The Saba region is one of the six regions of Yemen's future federal state that was officially declared on February 10 but has yet to be implemented.

The Houthis demand Al-Jawf, which contains oil and areas rich in gas, to be part of the Al-Azal federal region, along with Sa'ada, Sana'a, Amran, and Dhamar.

Intermittent clashes are still ongoing between the Houthis and opposing tribesmen in Al-Ghail district and surrounding Al-Safra military posts.

Al-Arada said, "all parties seem to have approved the ceasefire which the committee has put forth [on August 9], except the Houthis who argued they will continue fighting until there is a mechanism in place to solve all the complicated issues in Al-Jawf."

Mohammad Al-Bukhaiti, a member of the Houthis' political office,

accused Al-Aradh of lying, arguing that he himself is part of the conflict and biased. "Houthis did not refuse the ceasefire, we are only responding to Islah's attacks targeting us. They are the ones who refused to accept the ceasefire," he said.

Several members of the presidential committee were replaced on August 17 at the order of President Hadi. The new presidential committee is headed by the leader of the 3rd Military Command, Brigadier Ahmad Saif Al-Yafee, and moved to Al-Jawf on Sunday. Its members include the governors of Marib and Al-Jawf governorates and a number of tribal leaders.

Al-Jawf has witnessed violent clashes since July between the Houthis, a Shia rebel group based out of Sa'ada in the north of Yemen, and opposing tribes, which are widely seen to be affiliated with the Islah Party.

Tribal leader assassinated in Sana'a

■ Aml Al-Yarisi

SANA'A, Aug. 20—Unknown armed men assassinated Abdulkareem Al-Dhahab in Sana'a on Tuesday, leaving two of his bodyguards injured.

The independent Al-Masdar newspaper quoted eye witnesses who said to have seen unknown armed men in a car, firing at Al-Dhahab's vehicle in Baghdad street in Sana'a.

Sources further reported that Al-Dhahab's corpse and the injured bodyguards were transported to the hospital, while security forces started their investigation.

Al-Dhahab is a leading tribal family in Qaifa area in Al-Baida governorate, northeast Sana'a.

Fahad Al-Taweel, a journalist based in Al-Baida, claims about 11 male members of the Al-Dhahab family are known to support Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Abdulkareem Al-Dahab, his brother Khalid Al-Dhahab and his nephew Majid Al-Dahab, however, are all opposed to AQAP and supported military operations against it.

Al-Taweel also said that Abdulkareem and his brothers have been threatened by their pro-

AQAP relative, for supporting the government and not affiliating with AQAP.

The Yemeni army had launched several attacks against those members of the Al-Dhahab family who are allegedly affiliated with AQAP. In September 2013, an air raid alleged to be an American one, killed Qaied Al-Dhahab and four of his escorts in Al-Manasch area in Al-Baida governorate.

In May 2012, an earlier attempt had been made to kill Qaied Al-Dhahab in a drone attack in Rada'a area in Baida governorate, which Qaied Al-Dhahab survived.



World Food Programme

VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT

YEM2014/LOG016/Gen-048

The UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME Invites both Female and Male candidates to apply for the following positions:

Job Title:	Logistics Assistant (Operations) - (SSR)
Duty station:	Sana'a
UN Category:	Service Contract - SC-5 (SB-3)
Duration:	One Year (12 months)
Vacancy Number:	YEM2014/LOG016/Gen-048
Opening date:	14 August 2014
Closing date:	28 August 2014

Supervision received:

The Logistics Assistant reports to the Logistics Officer or a Senior Logistics Assistant;

Accountabilities:

Within delegated authority, the Logistics Assistant will be responsible for the following duties: (These duties are generic and thus are not all-inclusive nor are all duties carried out by all Logistics Assistants)

- Post daily dispatches of WFP food and non-food commodities in the corporate system; monitor the correct use and quantity as per loading orders;
- Respond to queries regarding commodities staff in the unit and elsewhere in the Programme;
- Monitor ongoing shipments, pipeline information, insurance claims and other data;
- Provide day-to-day reports on the progress and movements of WFP shipments (by land, sea, or air);
- Monitor and report on WFP food stocks in operation's warehouses and prepare weekly stock reports;
- Assist and advise on flight planning, weather forecast and restricted flying areas, or railroad schedules and movements, or ship movements and schedules;
- Coordinate and manage deliveries by suppliers, clearing agents and WFP warehouses; monitor and assess quality, quantity and safety of the goods;
- Coordinate clearance of WFP, export/import in liaison with handlers and customs officials;
- Initiate action for requests for duty exemptions on all WFP imported shipments, food and non-food items;
- Establish contacts with shipping agents, clearing agents and superintendents and monitor the discharge of WFP vessels (rail, air or sea), advising supervisors of need for intervention in case of any unforeseen problems pertaining to discharge and/or clearing operations;
- Perform other related duties as required.

Expected Results:

With initiative and judgment produces organized, accurate and well documented records with well analyzed data and addresses unforeseen situations seeking advice and guidance from supervisor, as necessary. May assign work to staff in lower grades.

Critical Success Factors:

Ability to review a variety of data, identify and adjust data discrepancies. Identify and resolve operational problems with substantial independence. Ability to obtain or give factual information of a non-routine nature involving interpretation of facts and requiring clarity of expression. Ability to perform detailed work, frequently of a confidential nature and/or to handle a large volume of work systematically, effectively and accurately. Ability to train other staff regarding relevant work responsibilities. Ability to work in a team environment and coordinate assignments to achieve common goals. Ability to deal patiently and tactfully with people of different national and cultural backgrounds.

Minimum Qualification

Education:

Completion of secondary school education.

Experience:

At least four years of progressively responsible support experience including at least two years in the field of finance, accounting, transport, insurance, statistics, operations, administrative services or other related field. At least one year at G4 level or equivalent.

Language:

Fluency in both oral and written English and Arabic.

Knowledge:

Experience utilizing computers, including word processing, spreadsheet and other software packages.

Interested candidates are requested to apply by:

1. Completing their resumes, the **Personal History Form (P11)** and a covering letter addressed to WFP HR unit indicating the VA reference number and the position title as per the vacancy announcement, **YEM2014/LOG016/Gen-048**.

2. Send all above mentioned documents to the following email address **Yemen.HR@wfp.org** or in a sealed envelope no later than **28 August 2014**, to

World Food Programme, Sana'a
HR Unit
P.O. Box 7181
Diplomatic Area, Nowakshot St, House No. 22, Sana'a, Republic of Yemen.

*The **Personal History Form (P11)** attached or can be downloaded from WFP HR Yemen site, <https://teamwork.wfp.org/232/YEHR/SitePages/Home.aspx>

Only short-listed candidates meeting the required qualifications will be contacted.

Salafi refugees: Settling in Sana'a nostalgic of Dammaj

Story by **Mohammad Al-Khayat**
Photo by **Ali Aboluhoom**

Walking into Al-Fardaws, or "Paradise," Mosque in Sawan area gives you the feeling you are in an airport, bustling with people of different nationalities, from every corner of the world. What's common is that they all don beards, which they cherish, and are dressed in short garments (thawbs) reaching their ankles.

As soon as you enter the mosque, wearing jeans and a shirt, you are seen as "strange" and the guard immediately starts to search you. But when you smile, assuring him that you are not carrying any weapons he smiles back saying, "we are not looking for weapons, but cameras." Photography is considered "haram" (religiously forbidden) by most Salafis living in Sawan. The guards at the mosque are wary of journalists who might enter with hidden cameras.

Around 1,500 Salafis in Sawan have been internally displaced, and forced to leave their homes in Dammaj in Sa'ada after continued fighting with Houthi militants there. Home to many Salafis in Yemen, Dammaj village hosts the country's oldest and internationally respected Salafi teaching institute, Dar Al-Hadith.

A difficult tribal mediation brokered by President Abdu Rabu Mansour Hadi resulted in an agreement between the Houthis and the Salafis in December 2013, which required the Salafis to leave Dammaj. Around 10,000 Salafis were forced to resettle in surrounding Yemeni governorates, with many foreign Salafi students retreating back to their home countries.

A new life in Sana'a

Most Salafi eventually found themselves in Sana'a, where they started life again in Sawan or Bayt Baus neighborhoods, known for their large Salafi population.

Abdulbasit Al-Raidi, the Imam and khatib (preacher) at the Al-Fardaws Mosque, also apprentice of Yahya Al-Hajouri, director of the Dar al-Hadith institute in Dammaj, said Salafis in Sawan area offered to host refugees from Dammaj.

Abdu Abdulrahman Abdullah Al-Arhabi, a Salafi resident in Sawan said, "we are the ones who received Dammaj's Salafis in Sana'a, it was our duty. We are fully aware that they were not treated fairly, Allah has facilitated their hosting, and they were no burden to anyone."

"Although Salafis have settled in Sana'a and most of them found jobs, they are still to return to Dammaj," observed Al-Arhabi.

Al-Raidi understands the importance of Salafis in Sawan peacefully coexisting with the neighboring non-Salafi minority. "People of Dammaj are of peace and benevolence, wherever they may reside. They are no burden to the people of the area," he says.

"When we came to Sana'a people were expecting that clashes would renew between us and the Houthis but that did not happen, we do not call for war with anyone," added Al-Raidi.

Most residents prefer to live in harmony. Al-Arhabi and Al-Hassan Al-Shami, another Salafi resident in Sawan, are certain no verbal arguments or clashes have occurred in Sawan area, despite the fact some local residents are Houthis.

According to Al-Hussain Abdullah Al-Shami, a Houthi resident in Sawan, "Salafis in Sana'a are no problem to us. It is their home and they have caused us no harm in Sana'a."

Al-Shami adds, "in Dammaj Salafis used to cut roads and fire at Ansar Allah's [Houthi] locations every once in a while; therefore it is impossible for Ansar Allah to agree to their return to Dammaj, especially at this point of time."

Not only does Al-Shami differentiate between Salafis in Dammaj and Salafis in Sana'a, he also links the peaceful co-existence of Houthis and Salafis in Sana'a to a clear power imbalance between the two parties.

"Salafis appear peaceful in Sana'a because they are currently weak. We find that they are not harming anyone even in their mosque in which a group of Houthis pray without being harassed."

Untold stories of nostalgia and political views

"Dammaj is a blessed land and a little money was enough for a good life. Therefore, we miss it and we want to go back to it," said Abu Ismail Mohammad Al-Raimi, a Salafi surgeon who lived and worked in Dammaj.

Al-Raimi adds, "When we left Dammaj we left everything precious and valuable to us behind, arriving in Sana'a with nothing to rely on but Allah."

"We lived in our homes in Dammaj for more than 40 years, we worked and we were financially secured—my monthly income was about YR400,000 (\$1,860). But when we came here life became very difficult," recalled Abu Allaa Abdulsalam Al-Wesabi, a Salafi tradesman from Dammaj.

Al-Wesabi added, "I rented a house for my family and me for YR40,000 (\$186). All the money that I am now spending is borrowed from tradesmen I used to know and do business with."



Around 1,500 Salafis who fled from Dammaj are now living in Sana'a's Sawan neighborhood, which is known for its large Salafi population and its Al-Fardaws Mosque (see picture).

Al-Wesabi never expected to find himself in such a dire economic situation. While he borrowed money to open up a small shop in Sana'a, his current income was reduced to less than a third, averaging a monthly total of YR30,000 (\$150).

"Salafis did not receive support from any particular entity or Islamic party, they were provided with small amounts of money from philanthropists who are not with any party," says Abu Ali Mohammad Al-Madhlabi, another Salafi businessman who used to live in Dammaj.

Al-Madhlabi is sure that although Salafis wish to go back to Dammaj, existing circumstances do not allow for a return. Most houses were destroyed and their mosques were blown up by Houthis, he regrets.

Abu Muslim Omar Al-Naqeeb, a student of renowned Salafi cleric Al-Hajouri, is of the opinion Salafis were the most to suffer from political parties and Yemen's political regime as they were subjected to crude injustice in Dammaj.

He opposes politics in general, explaining "elections to us are 'haram' and we will never participate in any upcoming election. It's better if the clerics meet and select a president for the country, because numerous

forms of election fraud can occur." Imam Abdulbasit Al-Raidi agrees, stating that Salafis from Dammaj are not affiliated with any particular political party or group, as they view politics as "haram."

Like other Salafis in Sawan, Abu Salman Al-Jazaeri, an Algerian student of the Salafi clergy Al-Hajouri, explains, "I wish to return to Dammaj because it's a holy city, the city of knowledge and I want to continue my religious education there."

"All people in Dammaj are cooperative but here in Sana'a life is different," he said. While student life was cheap in Dammaj, where he and other Salafis enjoyed the financial support of local and international businessmen, Al-Jazaeri feels they are deprived of similar generosities here in Sana'a.

Apart from economic and spiritual motives, Salafis' desire to return to Dammaj goes beyond building a strong social network. They are keen to connect with like-minded people who follow the same religious doctrine and meet each other with friendliness and support.

Salafi refugees in Bayhan, Bayt Baus

The situation in Al-Fath mosque

in Sana'a's Bayhan area in Bayt Baus neighborhood differs from Al-Fardaws mosque; the number of Salafis is larger and most of them are young. Differences between the two places are best explained by the presence of Imam Yahya Al-Hajouri and his approximately one thousand students fleeing from Dammaj to Sana'a.

"In the mosque and its annex there are a thousand of the shaykhs students, most are single, the married students are settled in a simple home," said Abu Abdurahman Al-Junaid one of Al-Hajouri's students, who hails originally from Aden.

An American student of Al-Hajouri who is leaving the Al-Fatah mosque, holds his five-year-old daughter by the hand. Fully covered in black, she is wearing a niqab (a scarf that covers one's face), visibly facing difficulties walking, with her visual gaze being seriously impaired.

Going by the name of Abu Abdullah Gaith Al-Rahman, the young father refuses to reveal the English name that he carried before converting to Islam, explaining that he had forgotten all about his previous life.

Having originally worked as a computer engineer, he has quit his job to devote his life to the quest of

knowledge, saying he relies on God to provide for him.

Al-Junaid says, "these students do not work, they live on the aid given by international donors, and they live in one of the mosque's annexes which was built recently and sponsored by the benefactors."

Al-Junaid emphasizes that Al-Hajouri and his students do not receive money or aid from charities or international organizations affiliated with political parties. These funds come in from donors who provide it as charity (Sadaqa, meaning 'voluntary charity'), according to Islamic jurisprudence.

Al-Hajouri fears that accepting the funding of known groups and parties puts Salafis at risk of being used for political purposes.

"We are content with what Allah had provided for us. Every time we leave to work, we find that Allah sends us those who give us basic food-items so that we can keep on seeking knowledge," said Jalal Al-Assadi, a student in the mosque.

While there is no end in sight for the Salafi refugees in Sana'a, they continue to face their battles by entrusting their faith in Allah, hoping one day things will take a different turn.



INVITATION TO BID: No. ITB: ITB/HCR/BO/14/SPU/07

The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - with its Branch Office Sana'a, Republic of Yemen - has an international mandate to provide international protection and to seek solutions for the problem of refugees in Yemen. In addition, The Office assumes the lead responsibility for protection, emergency shelter and camp management for internally displaced persons in Yemen. The work of the Office is of an entirely non-political character.

The Office in Sana'a invites qualified Suppliers to provide a firm offer for the supply of the following:

FOR SUPPLY OF SCHOOL KIT PACKAGE
CLOSING DATE AND TIME: Thursday 11/09/2014 - 04:00 PM

Bidding documents are available for collection at UNHCR Supply Unit, Sana'a, between 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM. Bid documents will be issued from Thursday 21/08/2014 to 11/09/2014.

Algeria Street 38, Building No. 2,
P.O. Box 12093 Sana'a
Republic of Yemen

Please report at the reception desk with **official letter signed and stamped from your company**. Sealed bids should be submitted at UNHCR Branch Office Sana'a at the above-mentioned address latest by **Sunday 11th September 2014, at 04:00 PM**.

For more information please feel free to contact us Tel: 01469771 or 01469772
Bids received after the deadline or sent to another address will be rejected.

UNHCR is not bound to accept any application or give reasons for rejection or acceptance.

2014 مهرجان صيف صنعاء السياحي
Sana'a Tourism Summer Festival

Entertainment - arts
handicrafts - folklore - shopping - circus
family & child events - plays - comedy - stunts & risky shows

Alsabaen Park- Sana'a - August 24th to August 31st - 2014.

For Yemen safe and stable and for flourishing tourism



Education gap: Public schools vs. private institutes

Story by **Mohammad Al-Khayat**
Photo by **Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki**

“In the beginning I could not believe that the teacher who teaches me in the morning is the same who teaches me in the afternoon,” high school student Rasheed Al-Shammakh said, describing his teacher who teaches him mathematics in school during regular hours and afterschool for private lessons at an institute.

Many students noted this difference between teaching styles at private institutes and public schools, even when the same instructor is giving the lessons.

Private institutes are a way for teachers, who are notoriously underpaid, to earn more money. And students who study at public schools, which are notoriously overcrowded and underfunded, sometimes seek additional lessons from private institutes, if they can afford it.

Private institutes can award certificates of completion, but do not offer students a formal degree.

“I needed private lessons in mathematics because [the subject] is difficult for me, so I went to a private institute to register for a mathematics course. I was surprised to see my teacher from regular school my first day at the institute,” said Al-Shammakh.

His heart sank when he realized he would have the same instructor, as he was familiar with the teacher's style, which motivated him to seek extra lessons in the first place.

“But during the class at the institute, I noticed a difference. There, he somehow simplified the equations and used many examples that enhance a student's understanding.”

Al-Shammakh told the Yemen Times that the teacher's attitude in the institute is different than

that in school. At the institute, Al-Shammakh claimed, the teacher is always smiling and listens well to the student's questions and inquiries, and if a student answers incorrectly, the teacher does not get agitated or screams as he would at the public school. On the contrary, he often goes over the entire lesson if he feels it is necessary, Al-Shammakh said.

The situation is not all that different with high school student Ameera Noman, who says, “my school teacher is very nice and we have mutual understanding and respect and she has a deep understanding of physics [the subject she teaches], but she does not go over the topics very long.”

Noman adds, “because we need to understand the book's lessons and examples, she points us to the institute in which she teaches in the afternoon, and advises us to register there to receive more lectures on the topic.”

Noman says many female teachers at the school do the same, leading students to register at the institutes they work at after hours so students get more instruction and can score higher on exams, in order to get into college.

There are about 275,000 teachers employed by the state, according to Zaidan.

If a Yemeni student wants to enter medical school at a public university, they must achieve 85 percent or higher on the national exam. To enter an engineering department, they must achieve a minimum score of 80 percent. To enter a public university at all, they must achieve no less than 75 percent.

Yemen does have a parallel system. This means a certain number of seats are reserved for students who receive lower than the necessary scores but pay additional fees. Officially, their score must not fall below the required five percent to enroll outside of the parallel system. But students blame corruption as a key reason for wealthy students

with lower scores to slip by.

Public school teacher and private institute instructor Hani Saad admitted to the Yemen Times that there was a difference in the quality of education between the instruction teachers offer at public schools and at private institutes.

“However, there are many factors that explain this difference,” she said.

“One of the main problems we face is the large number of students at public schools, which is a major hindrance to us during the teaching process. It seems that for some students, the main motivation in attending class is to disrupt the educational atmosphere and to provoke the teacher,” Saad said.

She believes that some students come to school only to please their families and feel that they are upholding their obligations. They do not, she believes, come to learn. This, she said, affects the other students in the class, who most suffer the disruptions.

In big cities such as Sana'a, Taiz and Ibb, some classrooms have as many as 80 students or more. Many institutes cap the number of students in a class at 25 or lower, according to Saad.

“I admit that there is a difference but it is not in the work ethic or attitude of teachers. I respect my students, whether at the public school or at the institute. My teaching style at the institute does not differ at all from that in the school, and I try as much as I can to teach my [female] students well in school,” says Najat Alawi a female mathematics teacher in a public school and at a private institute.

“The difference between the school and the institute is that at the institute, class is about an hour and a half, which is double the time given to subjects at public school, if not longer,” Alawi said. “And that is why teachers give more in depth lessons and have class discussions and can answer student's questions.”

A typical class in public schools lasts about 45 minutes, according to Alawi and Saad.

The best institutes, Alawi believes, are the ones that allow teachers to choose the number of classes to teach and the time frame of those classes. Others, she said, are only interested in making money and dictate the minimum number of classes each teacher must take.

Additional instruction at institutes are appealing for many students, but there is a large contingent of students who cannot afford to attend. After all, there is a reason they are in public school and not private school.

“I cannot study at a private institute because I cannot afford to pay the fees, my family cannot spare any money to help me,” said Yousif Mubarak, a high school student.

“I sell ice cream for five hours a day to save money in order to pay for my public school expenses and to buy simple supplies, such as notebooks, pens, and subject guides, as well as for transportation. After those costs, there is nothing to spare for additional classes,” he said.

Mubarak adds that he and other “ambitious, but poor kids like [me],” are the most affected by the educational system, because it requires them to work twice as hard to study and to comprehend lessons.

The cost of a monthly course at a private institute in Sana'a ranges from \$15 to \$25 according to many institutes the Yemen Times contacted. Costs are slightly cheaper in other governorates like Taiz.

Poor public schooling and widening class gaps

“Our role as educational inspectors is to compile facts about education in public schools and to write reports about teachers' performance in those schools and to evaluate the teachers when they teach students,” said Muhammad Al-Hosami, the Taiz department manager of the Ministry of Education's quality-



Private institutes that offer expensive lessons to students from better-off backgrounds are worsening the class gap in Yemen.

control department in Taiz.

He adds, “The biggest problem teachers suffer from is low salaries, which is what drives them to teach at private institutes in the first place. This, in turn, badly affects their performance at public schools.”

Al-Hosami accuses some teachers of teaching at public schools in order to market for the courses they teach at private institutes.

Despite the large number of institutes who provide lessons, there are many public school teachers who refuse to teach at private institutes. Abdulsalam Al-Khateeb is one of them.

Al-Khateeb says, “in my view, teaching at institutes is not suitable for students or teachers. The teacher loses his prestige and the respect of students as well as his own self-respect.”

“The institute forces you to make sure that students are satisfied and not to upset them in any way, which forces you to pander to them and to give in to their whims. It leads many to do away with disciplinary standards,” he added.

Al-Khateeb said the cost of courses

es makes it an option only for the well-off, which in turn effects all of society. It means those from better-off backgrounds are more likely to earn higher marks because of their resources, and it worsens the class gap.

Mr. Ismail Zaidan, the public relations director at the Ministry of Education said that there is little the ministry can do regarding course time.

“It is really difficult to increase the length of courses at public schools. Both students and teachers are completely against it, so we cannot increase the amount of school hours.”

Zaidan adds, “the number of periods allocated for each subject is part of a plan made by specialized educational researchers in this field and in their point of view it is very suitable.”

According to Zaidan, the insufficient number of schools in the country, combined with an inadequate ministry budget, as well as an explosion in the population of young people over the past decades, are reason for the large number of students in public school classrooms.

VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT

YEM2014/LOG016/Gen-046

The UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

Invites both Female and Male candidates to apply for the following positions:

Job Title:	Senior Logistics Assistant (COMPAS- Data Analyst)
Duty station:	Sana'a
UN Category:	Service Contract – SC-6 (SB-3)
Duration:	One Year (12 months)
Vacancy Number:	YEM2014/LOG016/Gen-046
Opening date:	14 August 2014
Closing date:	28 August 2014

Supervision received:
Under the direct supervision of the Logistics Officer and the overall supervision of the Head of Logistics

Accountabilities:
Within delegated authority, the Logistics Assistant will be responsible for the following duties: *(These duties are generic and thus are not all-inclusive nor are all duties carried out by all Logistics Assistants)*

- Assist with logistics operations including all logistics assets in order to ensure timely and cost-effective delivery of WFP cargoes;
- Assist in the training of staff, particularly ensuring that support staff are adequately trained;
- Cross trained and identify any additional training needs to achieve high working standards;
- Follow up on projections of needs and call forward requirements;
- Follow the movement of food and non-food items for the projects and operations in the country;
- Collect regional and statistical information related to needs in various locations;
- Assist the sub-stations in the distribution and control of food and non-food aid;
- Organise and supervise the distribution at food sites and maintain appropriate records;
- Prepare contracts for the transport of food and non-food items in both emergency and development operations;
- Initiate regular visits to stores to ensure conformity with regulations for storage of food and non-food items;
- Maintain cost data on various means of transport in the country;
- Deliver WFP standard waybills to those involved in the transport of WFP operations; ensure that the proper paperwork has been prepared;
- Assist with the accounting, reporting on food and non-food items and ensure that internal control systems are functioning and that all relevant records are maintained;
- Assist in contingency planning and logistics preparedness reviews;
- Supervise general service staff as required;
- Perform other related duties as required;

Expected Results:
Well organised, reports and/or records, put together independently with only general guidance. Well organized work with accurate information and databases; efficiently supervised team of support staff or work unit.

Critical Success Factors

- Sound judgment; ability to extract, interpret, analyse and format data and to resolve operational problems. Ability to work with minimum of supervision; to supervise and train support staff; and to work effectively with people of different national and cultural backgrounds.
- Ability work with accuracy under time constraints and pressure; to deal patiently and tactfully with staff members and others and to have a high sense of confidentiality, initiative and good judgment.

Minimum Qualification

Education:
Secondary school education, preferably supplemented by technical or university courses in a field related to logistics/transport activities.

Experience:
At least five years of practical commercial/professional experience in one or more of the transportation and ancillary sectors: port operations, shipping, clearing and forwarding, air operations, large scale road/rail transport and distribution management.

Language:
Fluency in both oral and written English and Arabic.

Knowledge:
Experience utilizing computers, including word processing, spreadsheet and other software packages.

Interested candidates are requested to apply by:

1. Completing their resumes, the **Personal History Form (P11)** and a covering letter addressed to WFP HR unit indicating the VA reference number and the position title as per the vacancy announcement, **YEM2014/LOG016/Gen-046**.
2. Send all above mentioned documents to the following email address **Yemen.HR@wfp.org** or in a **sealed envelope no later than 28 August 2014**, to
World Food Programme, Sana'a
HR Unit
P.O. Box 7181
Diplomatic Area, Nowakshot St, House No. 22, Sana'a, Republic of Yemen.

*The **Personal History Form (P11)** attached or can be downloaded from WFP HR Yemen site, <https://teamwork.wfp.org/232/YEHR/SitePages/Home.aspx>

Only short-listed candidates meeting the required qualifications will be contacted.

VACANCY ANNOUNCEMENT

YEM2014/LOG017/Gen-047

The UNITED NATIONS WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

Invites both Female and Male candidates to apply for the following positions:

Job Title:	Logistics Assistant (Warehouse) - (SSR)
Duty station:	Sana'a – Warehouse Logistics
UN Category:	Service Contract – SC-5 (SB-3)
Duration:	One Year (12 months)
Vacancy Number:	YEM2014/LOG017/Gen-047
Opening date:	14 August 2014
Closing date:	28 August 2014

Supervision received:
The Logistics Assistant reports to the Logistics Officer or a Senior Logistics Assistant.

Accountabilities:
Within delegated authority, the Logistics Assistant will be responsible for the following duties: *(These duties are generic and thus are not all-inclusive nor are all duties carried out by all Logistics Assistants)*

- Post daily dispatches of WFP food and non-food commodities in the corporate system; monitor the correct use and quantity as per loading orders;
- Respond to queries regarding commodities staff in the unit and elsewhere in the Programme;
- Monitor ongoing shipments, pipeline information, insurance claims and other data;
- Provide day-to-day reports on the progress and movements of WFP shipments (by land, sea, or air);
- Monitor and report on WFP food stocks in operation's warehouses and prepare weekly stock reports;
- Assist and advise on flight planning, weather forecast and restricted flying areas, or railroad schedules and movements, or ship movements and schedules;
- Coordinate and manage deliveries by suppliers, clearing agents and WFP warehouses; monitor and assess quality, quantity and safety of the goods;
- Coordinate clearance of WFP, export/import in liaison with handlers and customs officials;
- Initiate action for requests for duty exemptions on all WFP imported shipments, food and non-food items;
- Establish contacts with shipping agents, clearing agents and superintendents and monitor the discharge of WFP vessels (rail, air or sea), advising supervisors of need for intervention in case of any unforeseen problems pertaining to discharge and/or clearing operations;
- Perform other related duties as required.

Expected Results:
With initiative and judgment produces organized, accurate and well documented records with well analyzed data and addresses unforeseen situations seeking advice and guidance from supervisor, as necessary. May assign work to staff in lower grades.

Critical Success Factors

Ability to review a variety of data, identify and adjust data discrepancies. Identify and resolve operational problems with substantial independence. Ability to obtain or give factual information of a non-routine nature involving interpretation of facts and requiring clarity of expression. Ability to perform detailed work, frequently of a confidential nature and/or to handle a large volume of work systematically, effectively and accurately. Ability to train other staff regarding relevant work responsibilities. Ability to work in a team environment and coordinate assignments to achieve common goals. Ability to deal patiently and tactfully with people of different national and cultural backgrounds.

Minimum Qualification

Education:
Completion of secondary school education.

Experience:
At least four years of progressively responsible support experience including at least two years in the field of finance, accounting, transport, insurance, statistics, operations, administrative services or other related field. At least one year at G4 level or equivalent.

Language:
Fluency in both oral and written English and Arabic.

Knowledge:
Experience utilizing computers, including word processing, spreadsheet and other software packages.

Interested candidates are requested to apply by:

1. Completing their resumes, the **Personal History Form (P11)** and a covering letter addressed to WFP HR unit indicating the VA reference number and the position title as per the vacancy announcement, **YEM2014/LOG017/Gen-047**.
2. Send all above mentioned documents to the following email address **Yemen.HR@wfp.org** or in a **sealed envelope no later than 28 August 2014**, to
World Food Programme, Sana'a
HR Unit
P.O. Box 7181
Diplomatic Area, Nowakshot St, House No. 22, Sana'a, Republic of Yemen.

*The **Personal History Form (P11)** attached or can be downloaded from WFP HR Yemen site, <https://teamwork.wfp.org/232/YEHR/SitePages/Home.aspx>

Only short-listed candidates meeting the required qualifications will be contacted.

YT vision statement
"To make Yemen a good world citizen."
 Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf, (1951 - 1999)
 Founder of Yemen Times

OUR OPINION

First things first, a new government is due

President Hadi held a high level meeting of national bodies as well as political and social figures on Wednesday to create a national synergy amongst political entities against the Houthis.

The meeting was a reaction—albeit late—to the forceful and fast-spreading control of Houthis to various locations in the north of Yemen that has now reached the borders of the capital city.

Committees have been going back and forth to Sa'ada negotiating with Abdulmalik Al-Houthi, also trying to convince him to join the political dialogue rather than resort to violence. But so far all committees have failed at their mission, and so will the one just formed by President Hadi on Wednesday.

In his meeting Hadi called on Houthis to stop using the people's grievances for political gains. He said that he had instructed the government to take on appropriate actions to mitigate the impact of fuel subsidy cuts on the poor. But Hadi did not discuss who will monitor the government, and see through the objectives it originally set out for itself.

The people of Yemen no longer want promises. They need a new government and one whose prime minister is concerned with the people's plight rather than touring the world.

What I think Hadi should do urgently is to announce a state of emergency, remove the prime minister and turn Yemen's semi-presidential system into a presidential one.

We can no longer wait for the Houthis' response to Hadi, or try to reach a compromise. We already know they feel empowered and are arrogant, believing their demands should be met in full. The Houthis' demands include a take over of important ministries, refusal to surrender their weapons, and accept Al-Jawf and Hajja as part of the Azal region, and allocation of 20,000 army positions to their followers.

Which one of those demands will be met, remains to be seen. But based on previous experience I assume that simply surrendering to Houthis' demands will only encourage them further. Simultaneously, ignoring the Houthis, as has been done so far, will also encourage them to further expand their power.

The best solution is to create an inclusive political dialogue and to truly reform the government, which includes the restructuring of the army, in order to make the state stronger, confident and competent to enforce its status against outlaws and rebels.

Nadia Al-Sakkaf

The scourge of Shiaphobia

Eldar Mamedov
 muftah.org
 First published Aug. 19

During a meeting with a delegation from the European Parliament last November, an advisor to the Saudi interior minister, Prince Mohammed Bin Nayef, touted a widely-acclaimed Saudi de-radicalization program for extremist youth in the kingdom. Describing the program in detail, he emphasized the promotion of religious tolerance as one of its pillars. In presenting the program, he contrasted it with what he described as Iranian intolerance, exemplified by Iran's denial to permit Sunni Muslims to build or operate a mosque in Tehran, since the 1979 Revolution. When asked by the delegation how many Shia mosques there are in Riyadh, the advisor became flustered and responded, "there is none, and there would never be since, unlike the Iranians, we do not pretend to be tolerant."

The incident could surely be dismissed as one of the absurd ironies of the hermit kingdom, a long-standing ally of the West, which allows no religion, other than Wahhabism, a form of puritanical Islam, to be practiced on its soil. A close examination of official Saudi attitudes toward religion reveals widespread Shiaphobia—the religious, political, economic and social discrimination against Shias, followers of a minority Islamic sect who are seen by the Saudi state and Wahhabi religious establishment as heretics, traitors to "true Islam," and Iranian agents.

These notions are by no means limited to Saudi Arabia. For years, wealthy donors from other Persian Gulf emirates like Kuwait and Qatar have funded Shiaphobia in the Muslim world. In its most aggressive form, this sectarianism has manifested itself through anti-Shia violence practiced by groups like Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba in Pakistan, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and now the "Islamic State" (formerly known as ISIS, but now abbreviated as IS) under the self-proclaimed "caliph" Abu-Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Al-Baghdadi has openly called for the annihilation of all Shias, who are referred to as "Rafidis" or "Safawis"—derogatory terms denoting their supposed Iranian affiliation and affinity.

These extreme forms of discrimination and violence have received relatively little attention in the West. While Western politicians are very vocal, and rightly so, in their condemnation of Christian persecution in many Muslim majority countries, reaction to the extreme violence against Shia communities is much more muted.

Why is this?

Many Western politicians and commentators are reluctant to identify Shiaphobia as a specific problem, fearful of siding with one particular sect in a conflict where all sides are perceived as equally guilty. Sunnis and Shias

are perceived to be trapped in a bout of medieval religious hatred, incomprehensible to the modern Western mind. Since Iraq has become the most recent battleground in this supposed Sunni-Shia war, policies pursued by the government of Nuri Al-Maliki, who hails from the Iraqi Shia party, Dawa'a, have been seen as a major factor behind the conflict.

Political, Not Religious, Rivalry

It is undeniable that the Maliki government's failure to reach out to the Sunni minority in Iraq has fuelled the violent insurgency, spearheaded by IS. However, the roots of Al-Maliki's policies are political, not theological. Once Shias, the hitherto second-class citizens of Iraq, gained political power in Baghdad following the US led overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, their first priority was to consolidate, not share, their new found influence with their former Sunni oppressors. The Maliki government's vindictive, revanchist policies against the Sunnis were evidence of an exploitative appeal to sectarian solidarity in the service of political expediency and survival.

"The most significant factor

Iranian reliance on regional Shia power, to the extent it exists, is motivated not by sectarian bonds, but by realpolitik.

behind Iraq's problems," notes Georgetown professor Shireen Hunter, "has been the inability of Iraq's Sunni Arabs and its Sunni neighbors to come to terms with a government in which the Shias, by virtue of their considerable majority in Iraq's population, hold the leading role." Hunter adds that "the goal of Iraqi Sunnis has been to prove that the Shias are not capable of governing Iraq. Indeed, Iraq's Sunni deputy prime minister, Osama Al-Najafi, recently verbalized this view. The Sunnis see political leadership and governance to be their birthright and resent the Shia interlopers."

Maliki's government was not the only, or even the most authoritative, Shia voice in the country. After IS captured the cities of Mosul and Tikrit, the foremost Shia religious authority, Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, hinted that the Maliki government's sectarianism was to be blamed for the crisis. Another cleric, Muqtada Al-Sadr, who many in the West associate with the feared Shia militias, similarly called for a new, inclusive government that would in-

clude moderate Sunnis.

Meanwhile, Qatari-based sheikh Youssef Qaradawi, chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars and a pre-eminent authority in Sunni Islam, greeted IS advances in Iraq as a "popular revolution," ignoring the jihadists' unequivocally genocidal intent of ridding, not only Iraq, but the entire Middle East of Shias.

Sunnis have long faced discrimination in Iran, but the Iranian government does not have a legacy or policy of killing Sunnis or destroying their properties as punishment for their religious identity. By contrast, in countries like Pakistan and Egypt, Shias are often targeted by vicious sectarian attacks from extremist Sunni groups, usually in collusion with government authorities. Many fear that, if the Taliban regains power in Afghanistan, it will again engage in sectarian killings of Hazara Shias.

But the story of sectarian conflict in the Middle East is not always one of intractable, centuries-old religious animosity. Writing in The Guardian, Jonathan Freedland, recently suggested that "what's driving IS, or at least making its phenomenal success possible, is not pre-modern religious zeal so much as a pre-modern absence of state power."

Quoting Toby Dodge, an Iraq scholar at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Freedland explains that, while "fierce religious ideology, financial acumen and tactical nous" have all contributed to IS's ascendancy, "what has been crucial, Dodge says, is 'not ancient hatreds but this collapse of state power.'" This is a struggle for survival and control, Dodge argues, more than it is a pursuit of the wholesale slaughter of Shias.

It is no wonder, then, that IS "attacks wherever it sees a gap, an area of weakness where the state's writ does not run or that will be too feeble to resist," writes Freedland. The targeting of Christian and Yazidi areas falls under this rubric.

Legitimizing Iran

While the fall of Mosul and nascent IS advances on Baghdad provoked no direct Western military intervention against the group, airstrikes against the Islamic State were authorized by US President Barack Obama only when the lives of 40,000 Yazidi Kurds were threatened.

One reason behind Western reluctance to recognize or react to rampant persecution of Shias may very well be concern this would legitimize Iran's role as the foremost Shia power in the region. Many Western leaders have criticized Iran's support for Bashar Al-Assad in Syria and Maliki in Iraq. For its part, however, as a majority Shia and ethnically Persian power, Iran has long been wary of overplaying the Shia card. Well aware of its neighborhood, Iran has recognized that such a move would severely undermine its appeal as a force for resistance and independence among the Sunni

Arab masses.

Iran's approval of Maliki's decision not to seek a third-term and, instead, make room for Haider Al-Abadi to become Iraq's new prime minister shows that Iranian reliance on regional Shia power, to the extent it exists, is motivated not by sectarian bonds, but by realpolitik. On the other hand, when Sunni extremist groups threaten to destroy holy Shia shrines in Iraqi cities, like Karbala and Najaf, the strong reaction from Iran is unsurprising—indeed, it is no less than the Western reaction to Christian persecution in Iraq.

It goes without saying, then, that geopolitical rivalries with Iran should not prevent the West from voicing strong concerns about the plight of Shia minorities in Sunni majority countries.

Anti-Shia Hawks

Finally, there is a small group, affiliated with neoconservative and pro-Israeli circles, which believes the West and Israel have more to fear from Shias than Sunnis. The argument is deliberately crafted to demonize Iran and undermine recent diplomatic advances.

Last year, Hudson Institute fellow Hillel Fradkin and former Bush administration official and convicted felon, Scooter Libby, argued in Commentary, a conservative US publication, that the United States should support Sunni regimes against Iran, which they described as "the more serious threat to our well-being."

Earlier this summer, Michael Oren, the former Israeli ambassador to the United States, insisted that "the lesser evil is the Sunnis over the Shias," reasoning that countries like Iran and Syria pose a greater challenge to Israel than Sunni resistance and jihadist groups. "It's of a different magnitude entirely," Oren stated, before warning the United States against working with Iran to

combat the rise of IS. "Do not make a pact with Iran," he declared.

Of course, Oren and other Israel supporters exploit supposed Sunni and Shia threats in equal measure to serve the strategic and propaganda interests of the day—justifying the destruction of Gaza as a fight against an existential enemy in Hamas on the one hand, then railing against nuclear negotiations and the easing of sanctions against Iran as capitulation to another existential threat. While fearing any changing balance of power in the Middle East, including the loss of total military hegemony, right-wing Israelis and their neoconservative allies would be wise to remember the ideology of IS and similar radical organizations is as much violently anti-Western and anti-Semitic as it is anti-Shia.

Pick Rights, Not Sides

Overall, differences with Iran or rejection of the Maliki government's sectarian policies should play no role in Western acknowledgment of and advocacy against the threat of Shiaphobia. This is both a moral and strategic imperative: The West should live up to its own self-proclaimed reputation as the protector of religious liberty and pluralism worldwide.

Instead of succumbing to the binary concept of "us vs. them," so readily promoted by leaders such as Israel's Netanyahu and IS's Baghdadi, Western governments would do well to oppose all exclusivist and expansionist states. While perhaps a pipedream at the moment, the realignment of Western interests against common adversaries in the region may very well produce some unlikely—and worthwhile—alliances.

Republished with permission from Muftah.org

إعلان تحذيري

تعطى مؤسسة نبيل الهروجي التجارية بأنها الوكيل الوحيد والحصري لشركة شمشيك لصناعة البسكويت والأغذية التركية وذلك بموجب العقود الموقعة بينهما و المسجلة بوزارة الصناعة والتجارة - إدارة الوكالات برقم (٧٦٢٢) ، وعليه فإن مؤسسة نبيل الهروجي التجارية تحذر كل الكيانات التجارية القائمة في الجمهورية اليمنية من التعامل أو الاستيراد من شركة شمشيك لصناعة البسكويت والأغذية وأنها تمتلك كافة الحقوق المدعومة قانونياً لاتخاذ كل الإجراءات التي من شأنها حماية المؤسسة كوكيل حصري ووحيد في الجمهورية اليمنية.

Warning Announcement

Nabil AlHarojii Trading Corp. would like to announce that it is the sole and exclusive agent for the Turkish company **Simsek Biscuits and Food Industry**. The signed agreements between both parties are officially registered at the Ministry of Trade, department of agencies under registration number: (7622). Nabil Al Harojii Trading Corp. warns all business entities in Yemen off dealing and/or importing from Simsek company. Nabil Alharojii Trading Corp. possess all legal rights to protect its rights as a sole and exclusive distributor according to effective laws in Yemen.

YEMEN TIMES
 www.yementimes.com
 First Political English Newspaper in Yemen. Founded in 1991 by Prof. Abdulaziz Al-Saqqaf
 Tel: +967 (1) 268-661
 Fax: +967 (1) 268-276
 P.O. Box 2579, Sana'a, Yemen
 Letters: yreaders.view@gmail.com
 BUSINESS FOR PEACE AWARD
 ADVERTISEMENTS:
 Tel: +967 (1) 510306
 Email: adsyemen@yahoo.com

Publisher & Editor-in-Chief
 Nadia Abdulaziz Al-Sakkaf

Deputy General Manager
 Saleh Al-Khulaqi

Managing Editor
 Judit Kuschnitzki

Managing Editor Assistant
 Nasser Al-Sakkaf

Security Reporter
 Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

Senior Editor/Reporter
 Ali Saeed

Senior Reporter
 Mohammed bin Sallam

Head of Design Dept.
 Ramzy Alawi

Editorial Staff

Ali Mohsen Abuloohom
 Amal Al-Yarisi

Bassam Al-Khamiri
 Brett Scott

Khalid Al-Karimi
 Madiha Al-Junaid

Offices

Taiz Bureau:
 Imad Ahmed Al-Saqqaf
 Tel: +967 (4) 217-156,
 Tel: +967 (4) 217-157
 P.O.Box: 5086, Taiz
 Email: ytaiz@y.net.ye

Subscriptions

For subscription rates and related information please contact Majdi Al-Saqqaf, Subscription and Distribution Manager, on 268661/2 ext 204 or mobile: 711998995, email: majdi_saqqaf@yahoo.com

Policies:

- All opinion articles that have not been written by Yemen Times staff on the Opinion, Op-Ed and Youth pages do not necessarily represent the newspaper's opinion and hence YT could not be held accountable for their consequences.
- Letters to the Editor must include your name, mailing address, or email address. The editor reserves the right to edit all submissions for clarity, style, and length.
- Submissions will not be returned to the writer under any circumstance.
- For information on advertising, contact the advertising department at any of the Yemen Times' offices

Politics of Qat: The Role of a Drug in Ruling Yemen

By Peer Gatter

Book review and extracts
Nadia Al-Sakkaf

The cover page shows an old man with an apprehensive look in his eyes, half-smiling as he hands you a bunch of qat leaves. In the background there is a wild-eyed teenage boy, cheeks swollen from the qat that fills them, peering into the camera. This 862 page hard-cover book published by Reichert Publications is a weap-

on in all senses of the word. Besides documenting the ever growing role qat plays in Yemen and in the life of Yemenis, the book also analyses Yemen's qat policy, the tribal qat economy, and the qat connections of our decision makers.


I had this huge publication lying by my bedside for months before I summoned the courage to pick it up and start reading. This was not only due to its intimidating size, but probably even more so due to its

topic. Qat, and the political and economic schemes around it, were to me as a Yemeni always a well-known problem. I just was too afraid to read for myself and acknowledge how I as a citizen am part of a society that enables this culture of qat.

I don't chew Qat and personally I am ardently opposed to it. But I live in a society where Qat prevails. After years of research, Peer Gatter, the author of this book, published it in 2012, offering to the

world an insight into this drug and what it has done to my country. Gatter was working for many years for the World Bank and UNDP in Yemen and is now heading the Integrated Expert Program for Afghanistan of the German Development Cooperation (GIZ-CIM).

To read more about the book go to www.qat-yemen.com



PART 11

Ups and downs in qat politics after 2002 (part 2/2)

With the resource base of the Yemeni regime having stabilized due to high oil prices and the resumption of lending by international donors, the political discussion on qat quickly died down following the First National Conference on Qat in 2002. During the following years, qat only made brief headlines.

However, starting again in 2006, there were several government attempts to tackle this issue with varying degrees of seriousness and success.

In February 2008, Prime Minister Ali Muhammad Mujawar decreed the formation of an inter-ministerial committee on qat with approval of all members of Cabinet. The commission was to be headed by the Ministers of Agriculture and Irrigation, and comprised also the ministers of Legal Affairs, Health, Water and Environment, Electricity and Power, Local Administration, Finance, Industry and Trade, as well as the Chairman of the Tax Authority.

The inter-ministerial committee was to prepare a draft decree to constrict agricultural land use for qat cultivation and to review possibilities to (a) levy taxes on land used for qat cultivation, (b) move qat markets away from the cities, (c) issue a decree to report any farmers who spray insecticides on qat plants to district

prosecution offices and the judiciary, (d) allocate 50 percent of tax collected on qat to support the agriculture sector, particularly the cultivation of grains, and to support irrigation and water harvesting establishments, and (e) raise customs tariffs including fees on permits for importing agricultural insecticides used in qat cultivation, and record and allocate 50 percent of fees for the benefit of the agricultural sector.

Based on this decree, the Ministry of Agriculture & Irrigation called for a second National Conference on Qat in 2008 and summoned the secretariat members of the First National Conference on Qat to submit ideas and hold a preparatory workshop. The cabinet debates that led to the Prime Ministry Decree No. 35 were highly controversial. A number of fellow ministers strongly cautioned the agriculture and irrigation minister of including any kind of measures that he would not be able to enforce. A relocation of qat markets or a monitoring of pesticide application on qat farms was thought by many cabinet members to be simply overambitious and illusionary. Yet, the minister prevailed, muzzling also all criticism within his own ministry, pointing out that he had the direct order from President Saleh to go for a comprehensive decree that would give a strong signal to the Gulf Cooperation Council that Yemen was determined to act on qat now.

Replacing qat trees with crops

One milestone in the state's initiatives against qat, was the prohibition of qat cultivation on agricultural flatlands. It took two years until an opportunity with audience appeal arose to implement the 2007 decree regarding this prohibition. During his February 2009 visit to Dhamar, President Salih admonished the population for rising numbers of revenge crimes and called upon both farmers and governorate authorities to "use land for cultivating useful crops" and to "take necessary mea-

asures to ban qat cultivation in the Jahran basin."

In response to the presidential directives, Dhamar's Governor Yahya Al-Amri launched a campaign to uproot qat and personally assisted when on February 22, governorate officials and local farmers destroyed the first three hectares of qat plantations on the plateau south of Ma'bar. During the months of March and April the campaign was intensified especially in the Wasta area of the Jahran plain to the west of Ma'bar,

where six farmers voluntarily uprooted some 30,000 qat trees.


With the help of the World Bank-funded Water and Soil Conservation Project drip-irrigation schemes and water tanks were made available to over a hundred farmers by mid 2009, who could thereby reduce irrigation time from 18 to just five hours. Besides wheat, also peaches, strawberries, hot pepper, cabbage, onions, tomatoes, and potatoes have successfully been planted here as replacements for qat.

Yet, progress was slow and farmers were rather hesitant in following uprooting orders. Many farmers explain their reluctance to substitute qat as due to the lack of marketing and storage facilities for fruits, vegetables, almonds, or grain. They demanded guarantees from the governor to be supported in marketing in order to receive a good price for their produce.

A "Governorate Committee on Qat" was thus established in May 2009 to explore and organize marketing processes and controls, and study the phenomenon of the expansion of qat cultivation in the cold flatlands. Farmers also received the pledge that government companies would initially buy their products at favorable prices of above market value. The Corporation for Producing Improved Seeds already started in 2009 to purchase grain from the Wasta area at double the market price. Upon instruction of President Salih, cultivators additionally received interest-free loans of up to YR200,000 (ca. \$1,000) in order to buy farming equipment. The Agricultural Credit Bank made a total of YR100 million in loans for Dhamar farmers available (ca. \$500,000). A number of Jahran farmers who had uprooted their qat also received support in apiculture development.

Although the 2007 decree mentions six flatland areas in Dhamar in which qat is to be eliminated, Governor Al-Amri has implemented the order so far only as a pilot initiative in the Jahran plain along the Dhamar-Ma'bar-Sana'a road.

Ibb and Sana'a governorates replace qat
In April 2010, the Ministry of Ag-



One of the many pictures showing Saleh riding or engaged in sports during 1999. Here an election poster showing the president on a rearing horse—the emblem of the GPC. It was inspired by Jacques-Louis David's famous painting showing Napoleon crossing the Alps in 1810 (see insert on upper right).

The government-run Al-Thawra Al-Iqtisadi newspaper denounces the loss of "11-17 million working hours daily" due to qat chewing (April 2, 2002).

riculture and Irrigation in cooperation with local authorities of Manakha district, Sana'a governorate, launched a qat-uprooting campaign in the Haraz mountains.

Authorities propagated the crop's replacement with corn, wheat, beans, almonds, and coffee in order to reduce water depletion and improve food security. The Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, Mansur Ahmad Al-Hawshabi, promised that his ministry would support and encourage farmers in adopting modern irrigation systems and make almond and coffee seedlings available at a very low price.

In May 2010, Ibb's Governor Ahmad Abd Allah Al-Hajri inaugurated a coffee and mango planting campaign in the province under the slogan "The Number of Trees is the Same as the Number of People." The aim of the campaign was to replace qat trees with "useful" crops, to establish a number of nature reserves across the governorate, develop tourist and archeological sites, and improve the highway connecting Yarm district with the town of Al-Qaeda. 500,000 trees were to be planted in six Ibb districts until the end of 2010. In a three-day campaign in Al-Sahul area 800 acres cultivated with qat had already been uprooted and replanted with 3,000 coffee and 500 mango seedlings. Also in Al-Qasr area 3,000 acres of qat were cleared and replaced with 10,000 coffee and 2,000 mango plants. Further uprootings were planned in the Dhi Al-Sufal, Jibla, Al-Radma, and Badan areas.

In early 2011, the Sana'a governorate branch office of the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation launched a qat-substitution project in the Arus area of Bani Matar district. In cooperation with the World Bank-financed Groundwater and Soil Conservation Project at least

3,000 qat trees were uprooted and replaced with almond seedlings on agricultural lands rehabilitated by the project.

Qat on the fast track to the Millennium Development Goals

Yemen's first MDG report of 2002 made no mention of qat and the country's 2003 progress report only marginally referred to the drug in the context of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger. This changed in 2011, when the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) presented its strategy entitled "Fast-track to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals 2011-2015" in which the fight against qat plays a central role in alleviating poverty and extreme hunger. The strategy paper calls for "expanding food production and limiting qat cultivation and consumption through raising awareness among the population on the negative impacts of qat." It also calls for raising qat taxes by as much as 200 percent and proposes to "take out the qat markets from the main cities and reactivate the decrees of preventing qat chewing while on the job and on public premises."

MOPIC also proposed to prohibit qat transfers among governorates and to "support the cultivation of alternative crops like coffee, olives, and almonds." The strategy further suggests to produce improved and drought resistant seed varieties, support agricultural research, and link it with extension work.

The revival of the qat debate was paralleled by countless GCC meetings in the Gulf States focusing on the rehabilitation of the Yemeni economy in order to make the country fit for membership by 2015.

The Yemeni government held several expert meetings and negotiations with international donor

representatives in order to develop a road map for Yemen's integration into the GCC.

The period until the outbreak of the "Youth Revolution" in early 2011 has truly been exceptional also in terms of qat activism. For over five years the government demonstrated with multiple approaches its perseverance in overcoming the qat problem.

When reviewing news reports of the past years, it seems indeed that Yemen has come a long way in combating the drug since 2006. When digging however deeper, it becomes apparent that despite various government efforts and reforms, little true change regarding qat cultivation, marketing, and consumption has taken place. The measures were compartmentalized, lacking coordination, and were bare of any common thread.

Many of the schemes were abandoned after only a few weeks, leading the attentive observer to believe that it was all about headlines. Even before the 2011 unrest, security forces once again parked their service vehicles unopposed and without any embarrassment outside qat markets to purchase qat while still in uniform. Also in Aden, only a few weeks after a comprehensive ban of chewing in public that was issued in 2007, citizens once again crowded the sidewalks and seaside promenades in the early evening hours when temperatures started to drop to bearable levels—with dangerously bulging checks.

Qat shipments to Socotra long exceed the levels prior to a shortlived 2009 ban of exporting qat to the archipelago, much to the frustration and despair of many Socotris. And also the illicit pesticide trade is undiminished, a short stroll through Sana'a's Shuub quarter with all its pesticide shops dashes all illusions.

The Neighborhood gangs of Sana'a: Disappearing with time or turning into a more serious problem?

■ Madiha Al-Junaid

As you walk into Sana'a's Musaik neighborhood, one does not have to search long to find heavily armed young men, members of the neighborhood's gang, congregating in one of their hang-out places.

In a vacant store, they sit on worn-out mattresses, smoking and staring at a large flat screen television. A single light-bulb casts the empty, windowless and shabby looking room into dim light. On entering, one hits a wall of dense smoke, struggling to make out Mohammed Abdulla Al-Hali, who is known as "Al-Mudara," (the armored man).

When asked about gang activities in the neighborhood, the first thing Al-Mudara says is, "I'm not a head of a gang and those people beside me aren't members of gangs. We are a group of friends who studied together and are used to helping one another in need."

He clarifies the misunderstanding by saying, "we fight those who fight our friends and support one another were we right or wrong. This made people think that we are a gang."

Al-Mudara then goes on to explain he and his friends have respectable jobs, and work hard to earn money. "We don't get our income from banditry," he stressed.

Yahya Omaia, who goes by the name of Yahia Columbus and who used to be one of Al-Mudara's "friends," takes a very different view on Al-Mudara's social circle, which he refers to as a "gang."

The now settled-down father Columbus recalls that he and his gang got most of their income from illegal sources. He admits to exploiting landowners under the pretext of protecting them from being hijacked, or selling weapons, alcohol and hashish.

While those activities are undoubtedly criminal in nature, neighborhood gangs differ from organized criminal groups, in the sense, they are of a far more informal character. They are best described as a bunch of young men who seek to bolster the reputation of their neighborhood, and of themselves, to gain people's respect, and to make money through illegal business.

The violence these groups engage in is predominantly local and often motivated by rivalry with neighboring gangs.

Neighborhood gangs: Caught between reality and fiction

Much of the neighborhood gangs' power today lies in an illusory, far-reaching reputation of control and authority which causes people to fear them—a fear inherited from one generation after another.

Siham Al-Qubati, 19, recalls hearing the fearfully screamed words "it's Quraish gang" a couple of times in the past. "I was raised hearing terrible stories about Quraish and other gangs," she recounts.

Residents in Sana'ani neighborhoods, like Quraish and Musaik, are familiar with gang violence. Some have experienced it first hand, others have heard the stories from their parents, sensing the fear in their eyes.

The spread of rumors only further enforces the gangs' status as powerful groups. "The people talk and are scared of entering certain neighborhoods because of its gang; this only upgraded the gangs' reputation," said Al-Qubati.

Al-Qubati lives near to where Mu-



While gangs used to be prevalent in Sana'ani neighborhoods like Musaik (right) or Quraish (left), residents nowadays report a noticeable decline of gang activities.

saik area gangs are located, which as many describe, are the most dangerous and savage of Sana'a's neighborhood gangs.

"Everyone knows what Musaik gangs are. They like to make trouble till this day," said Ousama Al-Duba'ee, a taxi driver who resides multiple kilometers away from Musaik on Al-Zubairi Street. "Their reputation is even known here in my neighborhood. They hold weapons and are not welcoming to those who go to their neighborhood, especially if from an enemy neighborhood."

While gangs used to be prevalent in Sana'ani neighborhoods like Musaik or Quraish, residents nowadays report a noticeable decline of gang activities.

But, it seems unclear whether the decreasing presence of neighborhood gangs is the result of their members growing up and moving on to more respectable jobs without being replaced, or whether they are absorbed into more organized and institutionalized forms of criminal activity.

Neighborhood gangs: Then and now

Abdulaziz Abdullah, a young man living in Quraish gang's neighborhood in Al-Safia area, said, "five to six years ago, young people from those gangs were rebellious and wanted to obtain self-made power and security to only themselves and their neighborhood."

To gain power and control over

the neighborhoods, gang members not only threatened the personal security of residents. They also intervened with the work of police and security patrols.

"In the past, fights between different gangs took place approximately every day, just like a sporting tournament," said Abdullah.

These crimes and acts of violence were not usually well-organized or pre-planned. Al-Duba'ee explained that they were chronic problems for unimportant causes; problems created out of nothing and petty in nature.

"For example," Al-Duba'ee continued, "periodic fights occurred between two neighborhood gangs over YR50 (\$0.23), and another fight was triggered by one man shouting at another, who belonged to a different gang."

Thankfully, residents who live in gang-affiliated neighborhoods and security officials alike have noticed a clear reduction in gang activity.

"The gangs nowadays are not an issue nor an obvious and critical challenge like they used to be in the past. Only their remains and a few new gangs from the new generation are here currently, who are not as loud as the previous ones were," said Abdullah.

Al-Duba'ee adds that "the troubles those gangs create are mostly among them and those members of other gangs; other citizens rarely face any troubles with the gangs."

Moving on to bigger and brighter things?

After marriage, Columbus left the Musaik area gang and now lives with his family in a small house in the same area and works as a construction worker.

"I joined the gang when I was young but now I have a wife and children. As a gang member I can be killed or wounded any moment," said Columbus on leaving the gang.

"The situation of the gang, after several members were either killed or arrested, made me leave it, particularly after I got married," he added. "The risks became simply too high."

Abu Ali, who is over 50, was involved with a gang five years ago. He regrets his decision to join and feels remorse about the work he was doing. However, his decision to join was influenced by the lack of work, he recalls wistfully.

"We were smuggling medicine from Saudi Arabia to Haradh and then to Hodeida, and finally the medicine would reach the gang's team in Sana'a, which I was a part of."

He explained that his work involved distribution of medicine inside the capital city to pharmacies. Many pharmacies were buying their medicine from the gang because it was cheaper. Abu Ali's wage differed from one week to the next, between 10,000YR (\$47) and YR100,000 (\$465).

The reason Abu Ali made the

decision to leave and find more respectable work was because it got too dangerous; two of his friends were arrested by the end of 2013 and he decided to quit.

According to Abdullah, many people who used to be part of neighborhood gangs in Sana'a are no longer involved with them. They've either moved on to better things or struggle behind bars. "Many are married now and are stable with their families, and few are in prison till now," he said.

According to Al-Juma'ee, the passage of time eliminated some of these gangs, who seemed unable to advance and grow in power. In other cases, small and random gangs, which could retain their members, turned into more organized and criminal groups.

The institutionalization and adoption of neighborhood gangs

While several former members of Sana'a's neighborhood gangs moved on to a normal life style, working in ordinary jobs, other gang members have taken a different path.

Several gangs have become institutionalized, turning into more serious criminal organizations, according to Colonel Musid Al-Sayedi, deputy director of investigation in Sana'a.

The groups' work is no longer limited to street riots and skirmishes with other gangs. Instead, they have advanced to serious criminal work, ranging from "money or mobile phones robbery, blackmailing, to

vandalism," said Al-Sayedi.

The scope of their work has expanded to include kidnapping. "A recent example is the kidnapping of a tradesman named Yahya Al-Selwi by anonymous gunmen," Al-Sayedi said.

Security forces themselves feel threatened, according to Al-Sayedi. "Especially after some gangs grew bigger and became part of political parties, powerful tribes, or larger criminal organizations."

Many sociologists and security officials attribute the decreased observance of local gangs to their institutionalization and adoption by larger, more organized criminal networks, including Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The gangs' reputation of deviance and power—whether true or not—made young neighborhood gang members a susceptible target for recruitment by other and larger criminal groups, which were in need of young men to execute unattractive tasks on the ground.

"Other powerful organizations attracted those young people who lived under no parent, society, or family censorship, and used them in the different operations," explains Dr. Salahaddin Al-Juma'ee, a professor of psychology and social service at Sana'a and Amran universities.

Colonel Musid Al-Sayedi, deputy director of investigation in Sana'a, explained that some gangs disappeared from people's view as they became part of larger and more powerful and organized groups that operated outside the neighborhood's scope.

Those accounts were confirmed by Mujahid Al-Ansi, a member of Al-Mudara's gang in Musaik.

"There were several members in the gang two years ago but now some of them were killed, or arrested and some others left us," he said.

"The gang was powerful at that time and we were together in good and bad times but now we are divided because some of us joined the Houthis," added Al-Ansi, specifying that some gang members went to Amran and Al-Jawf governorates to back the Houthis there.

The families of those who leave neighborhood gangs and join larger criminal networks are often in the dark about their sons' activities. In some cases they only find out when hearing about their family members' death in the news, a YouTube video, or when their relative's corpse are brought back to the house.

Ammar Abdullah lost a family member who used to hang out with a neighborhood gang close to Musaik area. He had left to fight in Abyan governorate a few years ago "without saying where he would go. He never even said 'goodbye,'" recalls Abdullah.

Abdullah only found out about his relative's whereabouts when his corpse was brought back home.

Given the current problems that plague the economy and unstoppable political unrest, there are little signs of the violence slowing down. "Young men can only be used and recruited [by large criminal organizations] due to the hunger, poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, and subjugation they suffer from," says Al-Juma'ee.



World Humanitarian Day: Staying Safe

IRIN
First published Aug. 19

World Humanitarian Day this year brought grim news: More aid workers died in 2013 than any year since records began. In total, 155 were killed, while another 305 and were either seriously wounded or kidnapped, according to newly-released data from the Aid Worker Security Database. The number of victims was 66 percent higher than in 2012.

UN agencies, NGOs and academics are seeking ways to reduce the threats to staff even as they tackle a growing number of often-violent humanitarian crises.

Part of the debate is over quite how severe the problem is, with some keen to stress that humanitarianism is an inevitably dangerous activity. Larissa Fast, assistant professor of conflict resolution at the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies and author of "Aid in Danger—The Perils and Promise of Humanitarianism," said that while the increase in deaths was concerning, "without context those numbers don't mean a lot."

She pointed to the increase in the amount of aid work being done—spending by government donors has increased nearly 75 percent over the last decade—and better reporting of deaths, as mitigating factors. "It would hold that there would be an increasing number of incidents at the same time as an increasing number of operations."

Yet she accepts that aid workers are now more threatened, with numerous conflicts involving actors hostile to foreign charities. "Aid agencies are willing to accept more risk and stay in places that are more dangerous than they might have done 10 years ago."

Coping strategies

Adapting and adjusting to limit these risks is key, according to the Humanitarian Outcomes' report accompanying the latest statistics. Among the key findings is the high number of attacks on NGO workers on the move. While vehicles have long been more susceptible to attack than armed compounds, more than half of the violent incidents in 2013 occurred in the context of an ambush or roadside attack.

The report identified a number of different strategies for travel that had been employed, including regularly alternating routes, keeping a low-profile and road reconnaissance.

Another mechanism by which aid agencies have sought to improve their travel security is through better sharing of information. In recent years, coordination bodies have been established in Afghanistan, Yemen, Gaza and elsewhere to help NGOs negotiate security is-



A UN flight takes aid workers from Baghdad to Erbil in Iraq. Most of the countries where insecurity is highest host radical groups, like ISIL in Iraq, that control large areas.

sues, such as which roads are safe to travel on.

The most recent addition to such bodies is The Safety & Security Committee for Lebanon (SSCL), a body funded by European Commission humanitarian aid arm ECHO, which facilitates the sharing of security information between UN bodies, as well as local and international NGOs. Lebanon has seen continued low-level violence throughout 2014, with Islamic State militants briefly claiming a strategically important eastern town earlier this year.

Lawrence Tucker-Gardiner, SSCL's director, says such information-sharing helps NGOs avoid unnecessary risk and foresees a need for both aid agencies in Iraq and Syria to develop similar networks.

The networks have been strengthened by their ability to adapt. When the first information-sharing networks were formed a few years ago, he said, they sought to push all agencies into the same security policies, often leading to tensions as NGOs worried about their independence. "The UN would have one approach [to security], which might be more protective, while NGOs would be much more [focused on] acceptance. That meant they became wary of sharing information."

Over time, however, information-sharing networks have become less prescriptive, instead seeking to give agencies the power to devise their own policies. "What seems to have developed really well is the recognition that the information sharing does not have to be linked to the strategy. On one level you share safety and security information and on another level it is up to organizations what they do with it."

While deterring and avoiding attacks are short-term fixes, the ultimate goal for humanitarians is often acceptance of their work by all parties. Kroc Institute's Fast said that in recent years there had been a growing perception of a disconnect between aid workers and the people they are supposed to help—a

debate little helped by the tougher security measures they have often been forced to take.

"There needs to be a return to recapturing the purpose of humanitarianism," she said, stressing that walled compounds for aid workers also created the perception of being foreigners. "Security [needs to act] as part of the relationship [with the recipients] as opposed to thinking of increasing ways to separate aid workers from the people they are working with."

Islamist groups

Many of the countries where insecurity is highest host radical groups that control large areas, with four of the top six most dangerous countries—Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Syria—home to militants allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda.

Threats to aid workers in Iraq have also risen in recent months as the militant group calling itself the Islamic State (IS, previously known as ISIS) has captured huge swathes of territory, displacing hundreds of thousands; while the withdrawal of US led forces from already dangerous Afghanistan at the end of 2014 could lead to more territory in the hands of the Taliban.

Negotiating deals with such groups can be a challenge for aid actors, yet a new study from the UK-based Overseas Development Institute's Humanitarian Policy Group appears to support Fast's argument about the need for engagement. The three-year research project focused on aid workers dealing with the Taliban in Afghanistan and Al-Shabab in Somalia.

Ashley Jackson, the report's author, said the aim was to systematically study attitudes towards aid workers by Islamist groups. "We really wanted to talk to ground level fighters, mid-level commanders and the senior leadership because we didn't feel that had been done before."

Continued on the back page

برعاية معالي نائب رئيس الوزراء وزير الاتصالات وتقنية المعلومات

الدكتور / أحمد عبيد بن دغر



الملتقى التعريفي
لحوكمة الإنترنت
Internet Governance Meeting

الخميس، 21 أغسطس 2014

سيقام في مدرج المعهد العام للاتصالات - صنعاء

تنظيم



Yemen Chapter

جمعية الانترنت - اليمن

الرعاة الرسميون



الرعاة المشاركون



الرعاة الإعلاميون



10%

خصم

اقطع هذا الجزء

تشكيلة واسعة من الأجهزة المنزلية عالية الجودة

اشتر و تمتع بالخصم الخاص
لحامل هذا الكوبون

Max cool
MTC
JVC
etesa
YORK
DAEWOO ELECTRONICS
OPTIMA
IGNIS
GE Appliances
Hisense

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 8

World Humanitarian Day: Staying Safe

The key finding, she said, was that agencies should commit significant resources to developing and maintaining relationships with figures at all levels of Jihadist groups. "A lot of agencies are afraid to address the problem head on," she said, adding that many NGOs were worried about the high costs of building

such networks in terms of manpower and falling foul of counter-terrorism legislation if they interacted with banned groups. "What you often found was there was this 'don't ask, don't tell' environment where senior managers were sitting away from the actual programming denying [that they

dealt with Jihadi groups] but maintaining that they had access as... 'communities' protected them. But when we spoke to the field workers on the ground they gave a dramatically different story—they would [admit] they work with Al-Shabab all the time." This shifting of responsibility to

the lowest level of authority, she said, was likely to lead to corruption and a lack of organized relationships and also increases the risk of misunderstandings between aid agencies and militants that led to killings and kidnappings.

So far in Iraq and Syria these structured approaches do not appear to be in place. Some of the NGOs that were already operating in areas now controlled by IS have been allowed to stay and provide services, though some employees have been arrested.

Yet one NGO worker whose organization works in IS areas in Syria said so far little had been done across the sector to discuss normalized rules. Anti-terrorism legislation meant that NGOs were petrified of being seen to formally accept IS and other militant Islamist groups. "How can we pay our staff who live in that area when we know they will be forced to pay taxes directly to IS?" the NGO worker asked.

Yet for Jackson the dangers of not negotiating with such groups are far higher. She said that in Iraq the situation was perhaps still too volatile for aid agencies to start delivering in IS areas but that they should be thinking about how to do it safely.

"Starting dialogue early is the critical thing, even if it is just talks about talks or informal communication that helps you as an aid agency understand who you might talk to when the situations are more permissible for access," she said.

Other techniques may be necessary to help facilitate humanitarian access with Islamist militants. To better understand legal systems in place in areas where groups may not accept international humanitarian law, humanitarians are increasingly being trained in Islamic law, while Fast said she was beginning research into whether faith-based actors were more able to make agreements than secular ones.

Republished with permission from IRIN.

اجهزة الكترونية لعالم رقمي

UPS technology for the digital world

ناتكو

Technology التقية

فروعنا منتشرة في كبرى مدن المحافظات الرئيسية (صنعاء - عدن - تعز - الحديدة)

صنعاء، شارع هائل، ت: 01 21373/2، فاكس: 01 218123 /2

صنعاء، شارع حده، ت: 01 454473/74، فاكس: 01 454475

عدن، تلفاكس: 02 243482، الحديدة، تلفاكس: 03 205857، المكلا، ت: 05 314977/5، فاكس: 05 314973

CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS GROUP S.A.L OFFSHORE (CCC)

CONSTRUCTION OF MECHANICAL AND HEAVY CIVIL PROJECTS

- Petrochemical plants, refineries.
- Heavy, light industrial plants.
- Power and desalination plants.
- Fuel and water storage tanks.
- Oil fields ancillary installations.
- Air purification for industry
- Marine docks, harbours, deep sea berths & refinery terminals.

- Offshore structures and underwater works.
- Pipelines construction and maintenance.
- Prefabricated accommodation & office facilities.
- Sewage treatment plants & collection networks.
- Airports, roads, highways, bridges & fly-overs.
- High quality buildings & sports complexes.
- Water treatment plants, reservoirs & distribution systems.

Sanaa
Tel: (967-1) 441638
Fax: (967-1) 441630
E-Mail: ccc@cccyemen.com

Aden
Tel: (967-2) 377328
Fax: (967-2) 377716
E-Mail: cccaden@y.net.ye

الأعمال الثقيلة

كلاسيك لاين، اكسبرت لاين، أوفيس لاين

Exclusive Agents:

Thabet Son Corporation **مؤسسة بن ثابت للتجارة**

Graphic Arts Division قسم معدات ومستلزمات الطباعة

Showrooms: Sana'a - Mujaheed St. Telefax: (01) 269924 - Taiz - Telefax: (04) 212 628

EPSON

EXCEED YOUR VISION

star net technology authorized agent

ستار نت تكنولوجي وكيل معتمد

customer service 209581

center almiat 208863/733050607

ستار نت تكنولوجي مؤتمتع

EMC²

where information lives[®]

authorized distributor

www.starnet-tec.com

HORIZON AGENCIES & COMMERCIAL SERVICES (HACS)

Safety valves & Pressure Relief valves

Flow Products
Pressure Products
Level Products
Temperature Products

Wastewater Purification

Chiksan / WECCO / Dynetor products

Smith Meters / LACT Units / ULTRASONIC Meters

A Caterpillar Company

Mechanical Svcs.

Supply

Flowmeters

Control Valves

Marine & Truck Loading Arms & Systems

Automation

Pumps & Dosing Systems

Frank W Murphy

Fluid Control Fittings/Pumps/Invalco/Manifolds

Tank gauging & Inventory system

Power, Desalination & Coastal Seawater Electrochlorination

Construction & Facility Maintenance

Tel: +967-1-421508 / 421532 Fax: +967-1-421514 Email: info@hacs-yemen.com Website: www.hacs-yemen.com