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INSIDE	News Salafi-Houthi clashes a misunderstanding Page 2	Our Opinion The Houthis talk a good game, now it's time to deliver Page 4	Business The price of gold Page 5	Interview Al-Arood Square spokesperson speaks to the Yemen Times Page 6	Report Two years on, NDC tents continue operating Page 9
					

Three US drone strikes in eight days

■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A, Feb. 3—Yemeni Security and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) sources have confirmed a drone strike killed three on Monday in Al-Baida governorate, central Yemen.

According to a source from AQAP, who refers to himself as Abu Turab Al-Maribi, three AQAP members were killed on Monday evening when their vehicle was hit by two missiles.

The attack took place in Wadi Baihan on a road near the village of Maswara, within Sabah district of central Al-Baida.

Amongst the dead was Saif Al-Humaiqani, a commander in charge of a group of 40 fighters, according to Al-Maribi. The Toyota Hilux they were driving was completely destroyed in the strike, he added.

This account of events was confirmed by Al-Baida's security chief, Colonel Najem Al-Din Harash, who said the three victims were all AQAP operatives.

Monday's attack was the third drone strike in just over a week, bringing the death toll to nine.

Three were killed on Jan. 26 when



The death of Saif Al-Humaiqani, an AQAP commander in charge of 40 fighters, was confirmed by a source within the organization.

a drone targeted a vehicle in Marib governorate, carrying two confirmed AQAP militants and a 13-year-old boy. Three suspected militants were killed in Shabwa governorate on Jan. 31.

The attacks come after US President Barack Obama pledged to continue the drone campaign in Yemen, regardless of the political situation in the country.

Speaking at a joint press conference with India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi in New Delhi on Jan. 25, he said it was a "priority... to maintain our counter-terrorism pressure on Al-Qaeda in Yemen and we have been doing that."

"We continue to go after high value targets inside of Yemen and we will continue to maintain the pressure that is required to keep the American people safe," he said.

Abdulrahman Barman, a lawyer working with the National Organization for Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD) in Sana'a, says US attacks were coordinated with national intelligence under President Hadi's direction, but claims Houthi officials have been providing Americans with information since the government resigned on Jan. 22.

The Houthis are willing to cooperate with the Americans, Barman said, "in exchange for allowing [the Houthis] to control Yemen."

Mohammad Al-Bukhaiti, a member in the Houthi Political Office in Sana'a, refutes these claims. He told the Yemen Times his group "condemns US operations in Yemen and any violation of Yemeni sovereignty," and said they are pressuring the National Security Bureau to withhold intelligence from the Americans.

"We are well aware that US drone strikes do not target Al-Qaeda members exclusively, but other people for political reasons as well," he added. "This is helping spread support for Al-Qaeda. Yemenis sympathize with the group when they see their brothers getting killed by Americans."

As evidence to support his claims, Al-Bukhaiti cited a BBC Arabic article published on Jan. 31 which said the US government is facing difficulties obtaining intelligence. "US officials confirmed that these difficulties are increasing after the Houthis took

control of important sections of the security forces in Yemen," the article read.

When questioned on the legality of America's ongoing operations, Mohammad Al-Qawli, head of Yemen's National Drone Victims Foundation, said US drone strikes have always constituted a violation of Yemeni sovereignty, with or without government approval.

The fact that drone strikes have continued since President Hadi's resignation on Jan. 22 reveals how irrelevant government consent is, according to Al-Qawli.

"Any attack on Yemeni citizens by US drones constitutes extra-judicial killing, and all citizens, even those who are guilty, should be tried in Yemen's courts," he said.

The National Drone Victims Foundation claims over 200 people have been killed in 40 drone strikes over the past year. The UK-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism has confirmed 82-114 deaths in 2014, resulting from 13 to 18 drone strikes.

Protests by state media employees escalate

Story and photos by Mohammed Al-Samawi

SANA'A, Feb. 4—After two months without pay, public sector media employees protested in front of the Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) on Tuesday morning to demand their salaries.

Around 100 protestors gathered in front of the CBY after the bank's governor, Mohamed Awad Bin Hummam, refused to release funds for public media employees' salaries.

The governor's refusal came in spite of an official memorandum on Jan. 1 from the General Television and Radio Corporation demanding that the necessary funds be released. The Ministry of Finance had also taken steps to enforce the release of funds on Jan. 25, but to no avail.

Jamal Al-Hammadi, who heads the corporation's television sector, held a meeting in mid-January with Bin Hummam to discuss the matter. According to Al-Hammadi, the governor claimed the CBY "has no cash flow and the current situation in the country obligates em-



Protesters and residents in the area donate money to a broadcaster from Al-Iman TV channel who said he was forced to beg for money in order to afford the rent for his house.

ployees to be patient and endure." It is mainly contracted employees, who constitute around 40

percent of the public media labor force, who have been affected by the delays. Salaried workers have had payments for overtime work withheld, but contractors have received no income whatsoever since December.

Employees of Yemen TV channel have gone without pay for even longer, having still not been paid for the month of November.

Tents have also been set up in front of public media headquarters by contractors demanding to be hired as full-time employees. Erected over four months ago, many of the tents remain in place.

The General TV and Radio Corporation employs 2,870 full time employees in addition to 1,400 contracted workers, according to the corporation's records.

Abdulrahman Al-Bukari, who heads the Visual Media Union, said the current political situation has nothing to do with the delayed payments. He said steps

to escalate the protest will be taken if the protestors' demands are not met, and that employees will take to the air and voice their grievances on television and radio. The union, which was established in 2012, represents all public media employees.

After more than two months, many protestors are questioning how they can be expected to "be patient and endure" any longer.

Asad Humaid, a contracted employee at the Al-Iman TV channel, said he received a summons from the police because he has been unable to pay his rent. He lives with his wife and children, and said his landlord has threatened to evict them.

CBY Governor Bin Hummam could not be contacted for comment, and when the Yemen Times visited the CBY its journalist was turned away from the building by Houthi popular committee members guarding its entrance.



Dozens of public media employees protest outside the Central Bank of Yemen, demanding they be paid their salaries.

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Salafi-Houthi clashes a misunderstanding

■ Ali Aboluhom

SANA'A, Feb. 4—Following clashes on Tuesday between Houthis and Salafis at a mosque in Mabar city, Dhamar governorate, the situation has calmed and sources from both parties told the Yemen Times it was a misunderstanding.

On Tuesday morning an unknown man on a motorbike threw a bomb at a vehicle occupied by Houthi popular committee members, local journalist Abdullah Qabel told the Yemen Times. Five Houthis were injured in the blast.

The perpetrator fled to the nearby Al-Banoos mosque, which is associated with Salafis, Qabel said. According to him, some popular committee members chased the suspect, who ran into the mosque.

“Minutes later, clashes broke out between Salafis and Houthis near the mosque which left one of the Salafis injured,” he said. The clashes lasted for around an hour before both sides agreed to a ceasefire.

The Houthis appear to have targeted the mosque because they assumed the man was affiliated with the Salafis, as he entered a Salafi mosque, Qabel said. The perpetrator fled out the back door and remains at large.

A security source in Mabar city, speaking to the Yemen Times on



The Coexistence and Brotherhood Agreement was signed between Houthi and Salafi representatives in Dhamar on June 26, 2014.

condition of anonymity, said the man who threw the bomb is still at large and an investigation is underway.

After contacting members of the popular committee in Mabar, prominent Houthi activist Hussein Al-Bukhaiti told the Yemen Times

their version of events: “Al-Banoos Mosque, which belongs to Salafis, was targeted by the popular committee, thinking the man was holed up inside. But when the popular committee realized that the man was not in there, they apologized to the Salafis for the attack.”

Clashes in Hadramout leave three dead



AQAP members and security forces clashed in Al-Qatan district.

■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A, Feb. 4—Tribesmen allegedly backed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) fought security forces Tuesday evening in Al-Qatan district of Wadi Hadramout.

The five-hour battle left three militants dead and four security forces injured, according to Mohammad Al-Shum, an officer in the 135th Infantry Brigade, located in the districts of Seyoun and Al-Qatan in Hadramout.

Abdulahman Al-Marwani, a resident of Al-Qatan, said military deployments had increased in the district and that locals are fearful of renewed clashes. He said AQAP militants maintain a strong presence in the area.

“We see the men [from AQAP] at night in mosques and sometimes we see them meeting at houses, and they hand out flyers inviting us to join Al-Qaeda,” he said.

Following the clashes, reports circulated that armed Houthis, disguised as Special Security Forces, have been entering Hadramout governorate since Monday.

Local journalist Mohammad Ahmed Bahaddad told the Yemen Times that Houthi militants dressed in military uniforms had arrived at Mukalla airport. He said they were “pretending to be Special Security Forces” and were moving towards Al-Qatan.

“They are noticeable because of their lack of organization and because they look different—we are familiar with special forces based in the governorate,” he explained.

However, no evidence has been provided to support these claims and both the Houthis and the Special Security Forces have denied

them. “Those reports are completely false—if we wanted to enter Hadramout we would do so without hiding in military uniforms,” Ali Al-Qahoom, a member of the Houthi Political Office, told the Yemen Times.

Al-Qahoom added that Houthi militias would not hesitate to enter a governorate if it is believed to harbor AQAP members, and that Hadramout “has thousands of [Houthi] supporters who are willing to do anything for the group.”

Local resident, Hassab Abdullah Bahaj, said he and his neighbors are worried about the prospect of Houthi divisions mobilizing in the area.

“If the Houthis come to fight Al-Qaeda, we fear they will turn Hadramout into a battlefield like in Rada'a,” he said, referring to widespread violence that followed the Houthis' move into Rada'a district in Al-Baida governorate on Oct. 17, 2014.

Fawaz Al-Silmi, an officer in the Special Security Forces Command in the capital Sana'a, has also dismissed the reports. “News about Houthi masquerading as special forces is not true, we would not allow that to happen,” he said.

The 135th Infantry Brigade was relocated from Lahj governorate in July of 2014. Its troops participated in the war against the Houthis in Sada'a governorate from 2004 to 2010, before being relocated to Aden and then into Abyan to fight Al-Qaeda in 2012.

Last August, AQAP forces attacked Al-Qatan city, temporarily taking control of its public institutions, the Special Security Forces camp, and the local Security Department.

Houthis break into activist's home

■ Khalid Al-Karimi

SANA'A, Feb. 3—Armed Houthis broke into the house of retired military officer Mohsen Khasrof in the capital city on Monday, looking for his son Shadi Khasrof, who plays a leading role in anti-Houthi protests.

“Four armed Houthis entered the house on Monday, searching for Shadi. Shadi had left the house in the morning to Sana'a University, where he is teaching political science. The armed men stayed, thinking he was hiding somewhere inside,” the father said told the Yemen Times. “They searched every single corner of the house.”

Shadi is the head of the Rejection Movement in Sana'a which was established on Dec. 22 by a number of students, activists, and other citizens who have taken part in organizing anti-Houthi protests in the capital city.

The movement publicly denounces human rights violations committed by members of the Houthi movement since it took over the capital city on Sept. 21 last year.

On Jan. 25 and 26 student protests were violently crushed by Houthis and a number of peaceful

activists were arrested.

According to Mohsen Khasrof, the four Houthi men stayed in the house until 12:30 p.m. waiting for Shadi to return. He claimed that the Houthi Political Office stepped in trying to convince the four men to leave. “Members of the Houthi Political Office called the militants and asked them to go.” The militants allegedly responded “we do not know the political office. We want Shadi.”

On Wednesday the Yemen Times contacted Mohammad Al-Bukhaiti and Ali Al-Qahoom, who are both members of the Houthi Political Office in Sana'a. They denied having any knowledge of Shadi's case.

Hussein Al-Bukhaiti, a prominent Houthi activist, explained his opposition to the crackdown on anti-Houthi protesters. “Everyone has the right to express his opinion. One important demand of the people is the freedom of expression. I can not justify using violence in order to silence others' voices,” he said.

Since leaving home on Monday, Shadi has not returned, his father told the Yemen Times on Wednesday. Shadi's father and members of the Rejection Movement said they



Shadi Khasrof (pictured) is the head of the anti-Houthi Rejection Movement. He was kidnapped by the group on Dec. 20 and interrogated before being released. His current whereabouts are unknown.

do not know about Shadi's whereabouts.

Muhammad Abdulmoghni, a student at Sana'a University who personally knows Shadi, said, “He is my friend. I've known him since the 2011 uprising. I do not know where he is. He is hiding I think.”

Husam Radfan, also a student at Sana'a University who took part in previous protests organized by the Rejection Movement, is not surprised that Houthis broke into Shadi's house. “The Houthi group is using violence to silence those

opposing them. This policy will not help them and will not silence us,” he said.

On Dec. 20, the Houthi group arrested Shadi during anti-Houthi protests in Sana'a. Eight hours later, he was released. Following his release, Shadi spoke to the independent Al-Ahali newspaper, disclosing the details of his detention. “They blindfolded me and took me to an unknown place... Once I arrived, Houthi individuals started questioning me about the protest,” the newspaper quoted Shadi as saying.

Houthi lawyer assassinated in Ibb


■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

SANA'A, Feb. 3—Mohammad Al-Musawa, a lawyer and prominent Houthi supporter, was killed in Ibb city on Tuesday afternoon by members of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

Armed men on a motorcycle fired at Al-Musawa as he was leaving his house on 30-Meter Street in central Ibb city, according to Fawaz Iskandar, director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau in Ibb governorate.

Preliminary investigations revealed five bullet wounds caused by a single weapon, according to Iskandar, who said the killing carried the hallmarks of an attack by AQAP.

Al-Musawa had also received death threats from AQAP members a month before his assassination, according to Iskandar.



This infographic was published by AQAP on its Twitter handle on Jan. 24. The group claims in the previous three months it carried out 205 operations in 11 governorates.

Once the director of legal affairs at the Central Organization for Control and Auditing (COCA) in Ibb, Al-Musawa was a known Houthi supporter who had worked on legal cases for the group over a ten-year period.

Hassan Zaid, the general secretary of the Al-Haq party, which has close ties to the Houthis, condemned the killing in a public statement released on Tuesday. He said Al-Musawa had been “killed by back-stabbing treacherous criminals,” and that he was an innocent victim who had left politics 20 years ago.

AQAP sources have since confirmed their involvement in the killing. Speaking with the Yemen Times, a source within the group claimed Al-Musawa was “an important Houthi member in Ibb gover-

norate” and that Houthi leaders often gathered at his house “to plan their operations.”

The assassination of Al-Musawa came two days after the killing of a prominent Houthi leader in the governorate, Abu Abdullah Al-Ayani. AQAP have also claimed responsibility for his assassination on Feb. 1.

Ali Al-Qahoom, a member of the

Houthi Political Office, called Al-Musawa's murder “a huge loss for the group” and said that he was an important legal aid.

Al-Qahoom referred to AQAP as a “branch of US intelligence” and claimed it was bent on “destabilizing and confusing the situation in Yemen... in order to persuade the people that Houthis are incapable of maintaining security.”

Correction:

In an article titled "Neighborhood Internet hotspots" published in issue 1853 on Jan. 22, it was said that the speed of the golden line is four gigabytes. It should have read that it is four megabits per second.



ISLAMIC HELP (UK) - YEMEN PROGRAM Invitation to Tender for supplies

Islamic Help UK (IHUK) is an international NGO with cooperative agreement with Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation Govt. of Republic of Yemen and working in Yemen since 2012 in the sectors of WASH, Emergency response with food, non-food items and basic health services.

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The deadline for receiving offers is 19 Feb 2015 at 13:00pm Sana'a time

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Senior Communications Officer (Social Fund for Development "SFD")

Job Summary

Working as a member of the Monitoring and Evaluation Team, and under the supervision of the Unit Head (UH), the Senior Communications Officer:

Primary Duties or Responsibilities

- 1) Works with the SFD's management to define overall communication objectives and draft an annual plan based on SFD's targeted audiences' needs.
- 2) Communicates with SFD various units and branches to solicit communication materials and messages.
- 3) Maintains a list of SFD's upcoming, current and completed activities to keep the SFD's website and communication materials updated.
- 4) Co-ordinates, writes and manages the design, editing, printing and dissemination of promotional materials such as press releases, brochures, reports, newsletters and others.
- 5) Participates in producing SFD's Annual Report.
- 6) Disseminates SFD news to its audiences via various media channels including social media, website, exhibitions, workshops and others.
- 7) In consultation with SFD management, coordinates SFD's presence at exhibitions; identifies suitable opportunities and represents SFD as necessary.
- 8) Develops and maintains relationships with specialized media.
- 9) Establishes monitoring mechanisms to ensure that dissemination channels are reaching their identified target audiences.
- 10) Keeps SFD up to date with current developments within the key development activities.
- 11) Networks and shares knowledge with media and Information Officers and other counterparts in the country; creates opportunities for dissemination in newsletters, web sites, discussion lists, etc.; follows up on media requests and occasionally collaborates with partners to fill content gaps in the subject areas relevant to SFD stakeholders.

Education

1. University degree in Communications, Public Relations, Journalism or equivalent.
2. At least 5 years working experience in development agencies
3. Excellent academic record.
4. Good communication skills in both English and Arabic.
5. Edits and rewrites materials for different audiences.
6. Understands and applies communication and advocacy techniques including websites and social media.
7. Good command in Microsoft Office applications.

Acceptable candidates have to pass an English written exam before being shortlisted to the interview.

Interested candidates should mention the post title in the subject line and submit their application by email to: hr@sfd-yemen.org before February 14, 2015. Applications received after the closing date will not be considered. Only short-listed candidates will be contacted for interviews.

The price of gold

■ Ali Ibrahim Al-Moshki

“My life savings, everything that I’ve worked for, is gone,” exclaimed Muhammad Al-Hajj Ubad. Muhammad, 40, spent YR10 million (\$46,500)—his life savings—on 884 grams of gold in 2012, in the hopes that the precious metal would increase in value, and provide him and his family with enough money to purchase a home.

“I purchased the gold in the hopes of being able to buy a house,” he said. “However, by early 2013, the price of a gram had dropped to YR9,500 (\$44),” he added. “I held onto it, though, in the hopes that the price would go up again.”

When Ubad made the purchase, he was spending on average YR11,300 (\$53) per gram. The value of the precious metal dropped to YR9,500 (\$44) per gram in January 2013, then YR8,000 (\$37) in 2014, and again to YR7,000 (\$33) by the beginning of 2015. These numbers were confirmed to the Yemen Times by Ahmed Saeed Shamekh, an economic researcher for the Yemen Central Bank.

Since 2008, Ubad has worked as a taxi driver, after having spent several decades serving in the “Giants” brigade, an elite military unit established in 1974 during the reign of former President Ibrahim Al-Hamadi. He has two daughters and ten sons, eight of whom live with him and his wife in a home they rent on Hayal street.

Following the drop in value, Ubad was presented with two choices: Either sell the gold, and

lose nearly half the value of his life savings, or continue to hold on to it in the hopes that its value would once again increase.

“I’m still holding onto the gold,” he said. “Me and my family are still renting, however one day, god willing, we’ll have enough to be able to buy a house of our own.”

Internationally, gold prices first began to rise in December 2008 in the aftermath of the world economic crisis, as investors sought refuge in a stable and reliable financial instrument in an international market reeling from instability.

Prices continued to rise until January 2013, when indicators began to show that the US economy was recovering. “The price of gold is decreasing internationally due to strengthening of the price of the dollar,” explained Saad Al-Din Bin Talib, Yemen’s former Minister of Industry and Commerce. “Investors worldwide are putting their money into other financial instruments, causing demand for gold, and subsequently its price, to decrease.”

By 2013, increases in the US price index—the value of the dollar—meant that for the first time since the 2008 crisis, investors began putting their money back into more traditional financial instruments that were once again providing stable returns.

By early 2014, claims that the US Federal Reserve would decrease its Federal Fund Rates—benchmark interest rates that effect interest rates at which financial institutions lend funds maintained at the US Federal Reserve to each other—further increased investor confidence in traditional financial instruments, in particular govern-

ment bonds, whose potential for high yields became increasingly attractive.

This, combined with decreased demand for gold in India—the world’s largest purchaser, responsible for 20 percent of world demand in 2012—has further pushed down prices.

A series of price curbs imposed by the Indian government, including an increase in import duties on gold from two percent to ten percent in January 2012, have helped to stave off demand in the sub-continent. Such regulations led to a 25 percent year-on-year decrease in Indian imports of gold during the 2013/2014 fiscal year compared to 2012/2013 levels.

Abdullah Al-Haidari is the owner of the Al-Haidari gold shop located on Sana’a’s Hayal Street. “As soon as gold prices go down people rush to the market and sales go up,” the 30-year-old said. “When prices go up, they sell. In the end, we sustain heavy losses.”

“Five months before gold prices decreased in 2013, I imported 17,000 grams of gold from Bahrain, at YR10,000 (\$47) per gram,” he said. “For a while, I was able to sell at YR12,000 (\$56) and churn a profit.” Until now, Al-Haidari claims he has sold roughly a quarter of his total stock, however is holding off selling the rest. “If I sell the rest at current rates I could lose millions,” he said. “I’m trying to hold off for the moment.”

Al-Haidari claims that the current political situation in Yemen has helped to push down the average price of gold domestically compared to official rates internationally. “Even though domestic prices are tied to international rates, prices



in Yemen are also affected by domestic purchasing power,” he said.

In most cases, economic crises cause gold prices to increase, as gold is viewed as a secure place to store one’s wealth. In Yemen, gold is a relatively niche market, and the same principles don’t always apply. Despite Yemen’s recent economic and political crisis, some vendors have taken to lowering their prices.

“As the economy worsens, people can’t afford to pay as much. Some vendors that are looking to cut their losses and get rid of their stock lower their prices even more in order to attract buyers,” Al-Haidari said. “This forces the rest of us who compete to cut our own prices as well.”

Such haphazard trading is exacerbated by the fact that there exists no official body in Yemen tasked with regulating gold prices. “It’s true, within the ministry, no one is

tasked with enforcing a standard rate for gold prices,” claimed Bin Talib.

“No such body exists in any other authorities either. This can have a negative effect on vendors, especially now as prices are dropping internationally,” he added. “Prices in Yemen are largely subject to the whims of specific traders, and whether or not they’re willing to suffer a loss.”

Jamil Al-Sadi, owner of the Bin Attaf gold shop in Sana’a’s Tahrir Square, told the Yemen Times that he and many others in the gold market have suffered in recent years due to drops in international prices. “Many people have lost tens of millions [of riyals],” he said. “However, on the other hand, this trend is good for average citizens,” he said. “People are flocking to gold markets now,” he added. “If prices go up again, they’ll benefit.”

The Yemen Times met Ahmed Al-Jumaili in Al-Sadi’s store as he was purchasing gold for his wedding, scheduled to take place in May. “Now’s the perfect time to buy,” he said. “I was able to get 50 grams for just under YR350,000 (\$1,628). More people should be taking advantage of this opportunity if they have a wedding or any other occasion coming up for which they need to buy gifts,” he said.

It is unclear whether international and domestic traders will find a way to increase prices given improvements in the US economy and other worldwide indicators. Despite this, Al-Jumaili is optimistic that before long prices will increase, and that when they do, he’ll be the one to benefit. “I’m hoping to earn some extra money in the early stages of our marriage in order to help raise a family,” he said. “This could be the way to do that.”

YEMEN TIMES Radio

التأسيس

“راديو يمن تايمز” هو أول إذاعة مجتمعية في صنعاء، حيث بدأ العمل في هذا المشروع في بداية 2012، والذي كان تأسيسه من أهم رؤى مؤسس يمن تايمز الراحل، البروفسور عبد العزيز السقاف. ولذلك سعت الأستاذة / نادية السقاف رئيس تحرير صحيفة يمن تايمز إلى تحقيق فكرة المؤسس الراحل، من خلال تأسيس راديو يمن تايمز بمشاركة الكثير من المتطوعين والداعمين ومن أمن بأهمية الإعلام المستقل ودور الإذاعات المجتمعية. وتعد إذاعة يمن تايمز جزء من مشروع أصواتنا، وهو برنامج دولي يدعم تأسيس الإذاعات المجتمعية في دول الربيع العربي. حيث يتمحور هذا البرنامج حول العرب الذين سعوا لأن تكون أصواتهم المستقلة مسموعة، بعيداً عن الاحتكارات الحكومية، أو التجارية، بحيث تكون نقطة انطلاق جديدة لكل من يريد الخوض في تجربة الإذاعات المجتمعية المستقلة.

أهدافنا

يعمل “راديو يمن تايمز” على طرح وجهات نظر جديدة وموضوعات هامة للجمهور اليمني ويعايش قضايا المواطنين الذين يجيدون اللغة الانجليزية والعربية والأميين بشكل مباشر. ويسعى أيضا لإيجاد فضاءات جديدة لحرية الرأي والتعبير في اليمن عامة وفي العاصمة صنعاء خاصة ليكون راديو يمن تايمز «صوت من لا صوت لهم» وليعزز مفاهيم الديمقراطية وحرية الرأي والتعبير من خلال دوراته البرمجية المتنوعة التي تعالج قضايا المرأة والطفل وحقوق الإنسان وتدافع عن الحريات بواسطة إعلامها الهادف وبرامجها المتعددة والتي تخاطب بشفافية وموضوعية كل مستمعيها وتنسم بروح شبابية وإيجابية واضحة لكل من يتابعها سواء سكان صنعاء أو اليمن.

رؤيتنا

للإعلام دور كبير ومهم في الدعوة للتغيير السلمي فهو ركيزة من ركائز التغيير نحو الأفضل، ولكن الصراعات السياسية اعتادت أن تفرض أجنداتها على المؤسسات الإعلامية مما يخلق أثراً سلبياً واضحاً على طابع استقلال الإعلام و أثر بشكل مباشر على معايير أساسية مثل الحيادية والموضوعية. وهنا تسعى إذاعة يمن تايمز لتعزز من دور مؤسستها الإعلامية المستقلة لتصل إلى كل من لا تصل إليه عبر صحيفتها لتكون من الإذاعات الرائدة في اليمن التي جعلت من الحياد والاستقلال سياسة خاصة لها مواصلة بذلك سمعتها الحسنة التي استطاعت أن تفرزها من خلال سياسة الصحيفة على الرغم من عدم وجود قوانين منظمة لعمل الإذاعات الخاصة في اليمن.

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Al-Arood Square spokesperson to the Yemen Times: “We are telling the entire world that the southern people want to regain their state.”

Protesters have been camped out in Aden city's Al-Arood Square since Oct. 14, 2014. Their demand is clear: Independence for the southern people. How they—along with the rest of the south—plan to gain back their former status as citizens of South Yemen, is less clear.

The Southern Movement, an umbrella for the dozens of political organizations and groups calling for independence, is divided. With instability in the north reaching unprecedented levels, the question remains: Is a united goal enough to overcome a divided leadership?

The Yemen Times discussed this question and others with Radfan Al-Dubais, the spokesperson for protesters in Al-Arood Square. He was selected for the role by the Supervisory Committee of Al-Arood Square, which is composed of representatives from all southern governorates. Though he acknowledges the importance of discussing and overcoming the divisions between southerners, his answer was simple: There is no way that the southern people can be dissuaded from achieving secession.

Now 38 years old, Al-Dubais was born and raised in Aden. He has a bachelor's degree in political science and worked for five years as a broadcaster for the pro-secession Aden Live TV channel. Currently, he is the office manager of Sawt Al-Janoub (The South's Voice), a TV station that also advocates for independence.



■ Khalid Al-Karimi

After more than three months of sit-ins at Al-Arood Square, what has been achieved so far?

First, many were thinking the revolution in the south [in 2007, when the Southern Movement was founded] only amounted to protests by political groups and some southern military personnel who were sacked from their positions following the 1994 war. However, the open sit-in which started on Oct. 14 gathered all the civil society organizations and public factions. Clearly, they have become part of the revolution. Now the revolution in the south is not a protest by only some individuals who have grievances. The open sit-in has made everyone consider the southern issue. Everyone is following what is happening in Aden, and the media are present in Aden more than before.

Do you think the southern people, including the protesters in Al-Arood Square, will become fed up one day and stop their peaceful protest, using weapons to obtain independence from the north?

The struggle by southerners is a civilized and peaceful one. Everyone knows that Yemeni citizens have enough weapons to enable them to resist. However, we realize that violence, fighting and chaos will not allow us to reach our goal peacefully. We hope we will not resort to such means. At the same time, allow me to tell you that the peaceful revolution has a limit if violations against

“Abdulmalik Al-Houthi has talked about southern grievances. We do not wait for him give us justice. We call on him not to repeat what Ali Abdullah Saleh did.”



As the spokesperson at Al-Arood Square, Radfan Al-Dubais takes it upon himself to create a united southern voice and to raise awareness about southern Yemen's struggle for independence.

the southern people continue. There is nothing that prevents us from defending ourselves and the south. We will defend the south as much as we can.

Protestors have been camping in the square for months. Do you receive domestic support or support from other countries?

We do not receive any support from other countries or from any government body in Yemen. Southern migrants are the ones who are providing support. They are outside Yemen eking out a living for their families, and use part of their money to devote to the peaceful struggle in the south. To be honest, our financial situation is difficult considering the protesters need food and other items. However, the Yemeni migrants are determined to bear such burdens.

What are the protesters' views on the current developments in Sana'a?

What is happening in Sana'a is extremely sorrowful. What has happened has become a new burden on citizens in the south and north. Those who seek power are worse than those who are in power. The government was established but had no effective role due to interference by the militant groups which took control of all the major government institutions. We are telling the entire world that the southern people want to regain their state. Our demand is not negotiable. We have spent a lot of time on a failed experiment with the north since the

nineties. Unfortunately, the backward-minded stakeholders of power in the north have tightened their grip on the state, and seemingly will not accept building a civil modern state. Even if new governments or parliaments are formed, this will only be for show.

“My message to Hadi and all the southern officials in the north is... return to the south, your home.”

Early last week, some Southern Movement factions declared the formation of the National Southern Body for Liberation and Independence? What was your reaction to this move?

The factions which formed this body are from the south and share the same cause—the southern cause. The world can not deal with the southern people unless they

have a single united leadership and clear vision. The world wants to see to how the southern people deal with one another, deal with regional countries, and our stance on terrorism and human rights issues. Therefore, there should be one united southern leadership. Accordingly, the idea of forming this body took shape following several meetings headed by [leader of the body] Abdulrahman Al-Jifri and Sheikh Ahmed Bamuaalem, the deputy head. The youth are part of this body, and I think this body has received a lot of support. The purpose is a united leadership to send a clear message to the world at a time when Houthi militants are controlling Sana'a.

You seem enthusiastic about united leadership in the south. But some say the rifts among the southern people are countless, and may lead the south to become further divided. What do you think?

We have been hearing such speculations, particularly from northern politicians. Thinking that we are divided more than the north is completely untrue. I think they are blind to what's occurring in the northern governorates and what is happening in Marib, Sa'ada, Sana'a and Amran. I think the divides are plentiful in the north. We are not happy with these rifts in the north because this negatively affects the south. In the south, we do not have endless factions as is the case in the north. We have only some problems and minor differences which will disappear as we focus on independence. Today, we believe in the culture of difference and we will establish our future state on it. Through this state, we will co-exist, build the nation democratically, and we will never return to the past. Everyone [in the south] believes in one goal—liberation and independence.

We have heard much about popular committees in Aden. What is the nature of these committees? Are some members of these committees also protesters in Al-Arood Square?

These popular committees are part of the committees which were established [in late 2011] to fight Al-Qaeda in Abyan. Currently, the committees are working to protect public institutions in co-ordination with the local council. These popular committees are from the south, and they believe in the in the southern state.

How can you describe the rela-

“The world can not deal with the southern people unless they have a single united leadership and clear vision.”

tionship between the Southern Movement and the Houthis?

We should recognize a fact: Iran wants to hold control of Bab Al-Mandab through the Houthi group. The Houthis are grandsons of Iran. The interests of the southern people lie in building good relations with Saudi Arabia and the gulf countries. The southern people are Sunni, and the Houthis are Shia. Abdulmalik Al-Houthi has talked about southern grievances. We do not wait for him give us justice. We call on him not to repeat what Ali Abdullah Saleh did.

How do you read the international community's stance regarding the southern issue?

Though they do not publicly support the southern issue, we feel they are understanding of the southern issue and they will one day openly declare their support for the southern people and their right to regain their state. Stability in the south reflects on stability in the region. Also, they know what it means if the Houthis fully control Bab Al-Mandab.

Will the southern people accept elections in order to put an end to this current political crisis?

How can we accept to run for election at this difficult time in the south and the north? At the end of the day, the goal of the southern people is clear—I mean independence. Even if the north becomes a powerful great state, we will not abandon our goal. Even if there will be elections, we will not change our mind.

As the spokesperson for protesters in Al-Arood Square, what is your message to Abdul Mansour Hadi and the Houthi group?

My message to Hadi and all the southern officials in the north is that if you are able to exit from the north, just do it and return to the south, your home. My message to the Houthis is that international conventions authorize expatriates [referring to southerners in the north] to return to their nation. Let them return to their country in order to continue amicable relations between the two nations.

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Ziya TAŞKENT



A tourist trip brought us together with the civilizations of successive city and the history of Mughal in the past to make it contains a lot of historical monuments and the picturesque nature contributed to make it a tourist destination for millions of tourism around the world, whatever multiple visits of Istanbul, it is not enough or saturation for the lovers of this city, in our journey which has been organized by Turkish Airlines we visited new tourist places that we did not go before in our previous visits.

Despite the fact that this visit was outside the tourist season, but the tourists were present, especially from the Gulf region in all tourist areas that we visited and they were not prevented by the cold winter to visit Istanbul which is being so crowded by visitors in Summer in all its

prominent places and tourist attractions, as Sultan Ahmed which is considered to be most famous place ever no only in Istanbul but also in all Turkey, including the Aya Sophia, the Sultan Ahmed Mosque and Toup Kapi

Museum and nearby there is Sulaymaniyah mosque and university , Egyptian Bazaar and Grand Bazaar

Interesting ways to highlight the history

Interesting ways to highlight the history of Turkish strive to highlight their history and their culture is very invented in views and the delivery date has been set up for visitors to museums and used the very modern methods based on the element of attraction and the thrill of the recipients and the new shrines we visited

On this trip, and she was very magnificence and thrill like a place at the Museum of the idea is to highlight the opening of Istanbul by Mehmed through to take a trip on a boat made of wood passes over the water and on the side of the sea route there are cut outs subhuman begin the story from the beginning since the processing of the battle and the building fortifications and prepare for making weapons and all of the models move either to humans or horses or other

things, accompanied by sound effects and Ochrohat on the lips of those statues of historical information about this grand opening and pass the ship continues to progress and statues explain the unfolding events and evolve and revolve war is victory and get out the Fatih Sultan Mehmet horses and waving his hand waving victor , great creativity and calculated way to the Turks in the creation of methods and means of promoting tourism and history without getting bored or tired.

Launching daily trips between Turkey and Yemen

The purpose of this trip is to meet with officials from the Middle East department in the Turkish Airlines and to where we have been met by Mr. Ziya Taskent Vice Chairman of Turkish Airlines for Middle East Affairs and Chairman Department of the Middle East, Mr. Adam Geylan was announced by Turkish Airlines that by next summer flights will be daily to and from Yemen through their offices in Sanaa and Aden . In addition to granting Mr. Ziya gave a brief explanation proved with enhanced statistics for Turkish Airlines in terms of both the number of aircraft which is 262 and the flights journey to 108 countries around the world and their expectations to achieve revenue in the current year up to \$ 14 billion, also spoke about the importance of the new airport, which is outfitted in Istanbul, which will be the largest airport in the world, will be expanded to 150 million passengers annually For his part, Mr. Adam said that the total number of Yemeni travelers via Turkish Airlines in the last year amounted to more than 15 thousand passengers, pointing out that Turkish Airlines is considering the possibility of opening offices in Taiz and Mukalla. He said that Turkish Airlines is also seeking to introduce Arabic as a language addresses in addition to English and Turkish in flights to and from Arab countries, including Yemen, spoken by the hosts and hostesses in the plane which increases confidence between the Turkish and Arab

travelers. One of the places we visited is DO&CO.

It is the institution which is responsible for providing food, drinks and desserts for travelers through Turkish and we listened to a detailed explanation from Relation and Communication Responsible about the work strategy and the success they made for providing their services to almost 60 Airline Company from Turkey and abroad and it is owned by a business man and Turkish Airline. The workers of this institution number is 8 thousand and they provide (160) thousand meal for (900) plane. We went through the institution's departments to be acknowledged about the steps of preparing foods and beverages and the way of their processed , inspected and transported to aircraft to be freshly served. One of the things that we paid our attention to is that Turkish Airlines has a training Academy Aviation Services equipped with sophisticated equipment needed for training, including the heads of the different types of aircraft to train students and live moments as it is a real plane except the fact that it is mounted to the ground and by simple movements and glass screens which make flight training like a fact.

Transportation

Returning back to tourism, third day of this trip was dedicated to visit tourism and amazing places starting from Phosphorus strait and ending with locations of civilized and historical places in Sultan Ahmed and Eminonu places which are considered to be the two more targeted places by tourists to visit as they reflect a lot of historical monuments and most of them reflect the Islamic image mixed with Turkish traditions. The wonderful aspect is that these historical places coexist with modernity which is aligned with technology to serve this history and its visitors, and then reflect positive impact on tourism in general as the transportation as an example, is available with its different types as Metros, long and medium buses and Tram.



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Two years on, NDC tents continue operating

■ Nasser Al-Sakkaf

In the heart of Sana'a stands a resilient reminder of the long-passed National Dialogue Conference (NDC): A white tent, plastered with posters.

The NDC tent was first set-up at the beginning of Yemen's nationwide political dialogue—a historical moment that many associate with feelings of hope and aspirations for change. Long after the NDC came to an end in January of 2013, the tent continues to attract visitors and remains a spot for political debate. Located in the public park in Tahrir Square, it is one of many similar tents that are spread throughout the country's governorates.

"The tents were not established to only operate during the NDC period, but throughout the entire transition period—which is still ongoing," said Nezar Al-Showaiter, program assistant at the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

Initially, the tents were supposed to link and mediate between NDC participants and the broader population. Local residents would meet and discuss ideas for change, present these in the form of a document



Photo by Nasser Al-Sakkaf



Photo by Nasser Al-Sakkaf

Established as part of the Yemen Ata project, an initiative funded by the International Organization for Migration, NDC tents have become a permanent fixture and acquired new purpose as centers for learning and dialogue on a range of issues that matter to Yemenis.

14 NDC tents, which are in 11 governorates, he told the Yemen Times.

Upon the conclusion of the NDC, tents did not disappear but were turned into awareness-raising centers that started teaching people about the outcomes of the NDC. Twice-weekly events continue to be held, covering a variety of topics that range from women and minority rights to federalism and Yemen's future constitution. In be-

Shahamah Women Foundation, has organized a number of awareness-raising events in Tahrir's tent since the conclusion of the NDC. All of the events focused on the NDC outcomes related to women's rights.

On Jan. 4, for example, the foundation organized an event that centered on the issue of early marriage. "There are several issues discussed in the NDC tents, such as the danger of marrying under 18 years of age," said Shaheen.

According to data provided by the United Nations and the Yemeni government in 2006, 52 percent of Yemeni girls get married before turning 18, while 14 percent get married before age 15. In addressing this phenomenon, one of the NDC outcomes stipulates, "The state should define 18 as the legal age of marriage for girls."

Shaheen made it her task to spread people's awareness about this decision. According to her, events on women's rights are usually attended by dozens of people. Attendance sometimes suffers in line with the security situation in the capital, but she argues that overall the number of visitors has not decreased in the past year and residents are still as interested in the issues being discussed.

Topics of discussion in the NDC tents go beyond women's rights. "These days we are raising the youth's awareness regarding federalism, the constitution and many other NDC outcomes. We will not stop these activities until the final

draft of the constitution is ready," Ibrahim explained.

His job is to coordinate with people who wish to organize a seminar, workshop, or other events inside Tahrir Square's NDC tent. As the tent officer he is supervised by the Youth Development Foundation, a civil society organization that was founded in Dec. 2011 and receives support from Yemeni Ata.

Alongside women's rights, federalism, and the constitution, the topic of discrimination is also addressed inside NDC tents. Yahya Saleh, head of the Anti-Discrimination Organization, told the Yemen Times that several events concerning the legal situation of the Muhamasheen have taken place inside Tahrir's tent.

The Muhamasheen, or "marginalized ones," are dark-skinned Yemenis with African heritage. Sometimes still derogatorily referred to as "akhdam," or "servants," they have suffered under a long history of institutionalized discrimination in Yemen.

"We discuss policies and political decisions that affect the Muhamasheen and exchange ideas. Some of the participants suggested a quota for Muhamasheen in government jobs, for example," he said.

While those involved in tent activities express support for their continued existence, opinions among residents in Sana'a's Tahrir neighborhood are divided.

Abdulaziz Al-Badani, who lives close to Tahrir Square, thinks that NDC tents have been a farce from the start. "I attended several seminars in the tent and suggested,

along with others, to open up cinemas throughout Yemen but nothing happened," he said, pointing out that the tents' entire concept of "mediating" between NDC participants and the population is flawed.

Mohammad Al-Hassani, the managing editor of Tagheer Net, an independent Yemeni news website, holds an equally critical attitude toward the NDC tents. He accuses the organizers of reaping profits for themselves while holding events that are of no public value. "I believe that the NDC tents are no longer needed, awareness can be obtained in numerous other ways," he said.

Samir Al-Karti, who is also a resident in Tahrir Square, appreciates the tent there, saying that he learned a lot about the NDC outcomes by attending its events. However, after learning that money is flowing into the organization launching awareness raising activities, he changed his mind.

"I thought these tents were operating on charity. I think the money

would be better spent on helping homeless people living on Tahrir Square, or at least the tent should be transformed into a living place for the homeless."

Program director of the Youth Development Foundation, Osama Al-Mikhlafi, confirmed to the Yemen Times that IOM finances activities run out of the NDC tents. He refused to give specifics, but said "The money only covers operating costs."

Al-Showaiter denies any profit reaping by those involved in organizing tent activities, explaining that the organization requires project proposals with estimated costs to be approved before being funded.

Contrary to Al-Karti and Al-Hassani, Ibrahim is convinced of the ongoing relevance of NDC tents. Dozens continue to attend events, he claims, a clear sign that interest and the need for information continues to rank high among citizens. "The mere level of attendance testifies to the importance of our events," he said.



Photo courtesy: Osamah Al-Mikhlafi

Locals attend an anti-corruption seminar at the NDC tent in Tahrir Square on Jan. 6.

to a designated individual, who then forwarded it to NDC members.

According to Al-Showaiter, the tents were established by IOM's "Yemen Ata" project, which worked in co-ordination with governor's offices around the country and the NDC secretariat. Through Yemen Ata, IOM is the sole funder for all

tween its seminars and lectures, national songs are played, according to Hafed Ibrahim, Tahrir Square's tent officer. A second, but less frequented tent in Sana'a is located in Al-Sabaen neighborhood. Both tents open each day at 9:00 a.m. and close at midnight

Ridha Shaheen, the head of the

ADVERTORIAL

CPLUS Celebrates Health Campaigns



CPLUS hospital held an award giving celebration for the winners of CPLUS annual medical competition on Tuesday November 3 of 2015, in the hospital's building.

During the ceremony, director of the hospital Dr. Nabil Dhaban gave a speech clarifying the hospital administration's efforts in enhancing and developing the hospital's medical services, he indicated that the hospital is exerting in-filed social and educational efforts regarding human health.

Also the hospital have launched field health campaigns including the first health campaign to test blood pressure and blood glucose levels in which 6000 citizens were targeted 3400 of them either had glucose and blood pressure related illnesses or had symptoms indicating the presence either of the illnesses.

One of the discoveries of this campaign is that 34 of 100 Yemenis suffer high blood pressure or imbalance in their blood glucose levels or symptoms that indicate the presence of either illnesses.

At the conclusion of this campaign a competition was held and during which awards were given to the attendees, and Dr. Sadiq Al-Rawhani head of the public relations and marketing department in the hospital said that the hospital's administration will continue its educational programs and field health campaigns with cooperation with different establishment and corporations which sponsor such activities.

There were many entertaining activities and segments including poetry reciting and chanting in the conclusion over 100 awards were given to the competition's winners.

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Jordan pilot's murder and the banality of evil

Ibrahim Al-Marashi
aljazeera.com
First published Feb. 4

A video, released by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), documenting the execution by immolation of captured Jordanian pilot Moaz Al-Kassasbeh represents a shift in its strategy of communicating brutality.

Before Kassasbeh's execution, ISIL implemented a strategy of brutality ranging from forced expulsions of Syrian and Iraqi groups deemed "heterodox," destruction of their religious sites, and enslavement of their women.

When ISIL implemented capital punishment, such as crucifixions, beheadings, and throwing gays off rooftops, each act in itself was brutal, but the fact that ISIL sought to film and document these events for future dissemination served the dual purpose of instilling resolve in its core constituency and terrorizing the publics of its enemies.

Manipulating leaders

ISIL's previous executions of US and British citizens were designed to manipulate the leaders of the US and UK to react and acknowledge that despite their advanced militaries deployed against ISIL, the group had the means to retaliate.

The recent execution follows the same pathology, demonstrating how it could manipulate the King of Jordan. The use of immolation sent a particularly nasty and brutal message of revenge against a Muslim head of state. In the case of ISIL's recent execution, it has shown that it does not accord to Hannah Arendt's notion of the Banality of Evil, where the elimination of Europe's Jewish population was routinized

and systemized in the Nazi bureaucracy managing the Holocaust.

ISIL seems to demonstrate that its violence is not banal, but that it escalates its acts of savagery, beginning with beheadings to burning a human being. The act of beheading by knife and sword, in ISIL's calculation, might give the impression to the publics it seeks to terrorize as something that ISIL has routinized.

Immolation in this case was designed for greater shock value. ISIL's execution demonstrates that it has become obsessed with crafting the spectacle of execution, seeking new ways to both inspire and shock publics, specifically the Jordanian public.

Symbolic significance

The execution of this Jordanian pilot in this brutal fashion also has a tragic symbolic significance. The irony of the Jordanian pilot's execution is that he ultimately succumbed to the violent legacy established by another Jordanian, Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal Al-Khalaylah, otherwise remembered by his nom-de-guerre, Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi.

Hailing from the Jordanian town of Al-Zarqa, in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq war, Al-Zarqawi would establish the terrorist group that would later morph over a decade into ISIL.

In another ironic twist, the woman in Jordanian custody who was to be released in exchange for Kassasbeh, Sajida Al-Rishawi is an Iraqi who took part in a bombing at a hotel in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, an incident where the pre-ISIL terrorists in Iraq expanded their war to Iraq's neighbor.

Besides the tragic deaths of innocent civilians attending a wedding during this attack, one of the victims included Moustapha Akkad, the Syrian-born director of

both the "Halloween" film franchise and "The Message," a biopic of the Prophet Muhammad produced in both Arabic and English.

Zarqawi's group and its later incarnation has always been a nihilistic death cult acting in the name of Islam, and the act of killing a director who had done more in his lifetime in the service of educating publics about the life of the prophet only illustrated that ISIL and its predecessor organization have done more damage to the Islamic world itself than anything else.

From the 2005 Amman attack to the recent execution, examining the perpetrators of this violence and its victims demonstrate that what is occurring is a Muslim civil war that has also unfortunately led to the death of numerous innocent non-Muslims as well, illustrated most recently by the death of the Japanese hostage Kenji Goto.

Timeline of events

To recap, a Jordanian, Zarqawi moved from Jordan to Afghanistan to Iraq in 2001, set up a terrorist group that killed thousands of Iraqis, and dispatched Iraqis to Jordan in 2005 to kill Jordanians and a prominent Syrian director. A Jordanian pilot, sent to combat a transnational terrorist group in Syria and Iraq is killed in 2015 by that very group established by a fellow Jordanian.

What killed Kassasbeh was not Islam. What killed him are the new dynamics of globalization and transnational violence that have consumed the Middle East and the Islamic world, unleashed by the 2003 Iraq war and the 2011 Syrian civil war.

While sympathies to ISIL might have existed among elements in Jordan's society, this execution will most likely strengthen Jordanian



The recent execution demonstrates how ISIL could manipulate the King of Jordan, writes Marashi.

resolve in combating this group. In the impoverished Jordanian town of Maan, support for ISIL has been vocal and explicit, with inhabitants of the town flying ISIL's flag.

Kassasbeh's death will most likely harden Jordanian resolve and eliminate any public sympathy for ISIL. However, Jordan is now at a critical juncture. A heavy handed response by the Jordanian state against Maan in light of Kassasbeh's execution might have the inverse effect of dissipating any sympathy for the pilot's death, and spur some of its citizens to join ISIL.

How the Jordanian security fore-

es and the state will react after the death of its pilot will have ramifications for its long-term security. Jordan has announced it has executed Rishawi in response to Kassasbeh's death. As I wrote in response to Obama's State of the Union speech, state-sanctioned violence in response to non-state actor violence will continue to produce an endless cycle of violence if not coupled with addressing the conditions—unemployment, humiliation, lack in governance—that produce terrorism in the first place.

As a non-Jordanian, it might be easy for me to write that Rishawi

should not have been executed. But as an Iraqi-American, who has witnessed the likes of Rishawi devastate my native Iraq, I understand the desire for revenge.

However, her execution raises the ethical quandary of should the Jordanian state match, tit-for-tat, the violence of ISIL's terrorists?

Ibrahim Al-Marashi is an assistant professor at the Department of History, California State University, San Marcos. He is the co-author of "Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History."



World Food Programme

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برنامج الأغذية العالمي

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Interested companies are encouraged to ask for the Supplier's Registration Form & the Questionnaire by sending their Expression of Interest to the email address: yemen.procurement@wfp.org. The completed Supplier's Registration Form and Questionnaire including all supporting documentation should be returned to WFP by [26th Feb, 2015], at [14:00] hrs. if your company wishes to be invited for 2015 tenders.

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EOI#YEM15EOI001
Attn.: Procurement Unit
United Nations World Food Programme
Nowakshot St.
P.O. Box: 7181
Sana'a, Yemen

Any enquiries regarding this EOI must be addressed to: yemen.procurement@wfp.org

إعلان تجاري

الموضوع: دعوة لإبداء الرغبة لتوفير السلع الغذائية والغير غذائية والخدمات لبرنامج الأغذية العالمي للأمم المتحدة في اليمن.

برنامج الأغذية العالمي هو أكبر منظمة للإغاثة الإنسانية تُعنى بمكافحة الجوع في جميع أنحاء العالم. منذ نشأته في عام 1963، يتبنى البرنامج رؤية تجارة العالم يتمكن من خلالها كل رجل وامرأة وطفل في كل وقت من الحصول على الغذاء اللازم لحياة نشطة وصحية. ونحن نعمل على تحقيق هذه الرؤية مع وكالات الأمم المتحدة الأخرى. وعلى الصعيد العالمي يعمل برنامج الأغذية العالمي في 74 بلداً، وقد بدأ البرنامج العمل في اليمن من خلال المكتب الإقليمي في صنعاء والمحافظات الأخرى منذ عام 1967.

في عام 2014 بلغت مشتريات برنامج الأغذية العالمي للسلع الغذائية والغير غذائية والخدمات حوالي خمسين مليون دولار أمريكي، حيث وصلت المساعدات الغذائية المقدمة من البرنامج في اليمن إلى حوالي 5 مليون مستفيد. ومن أجل المشاركة في دعوات المناقصات لعام 2015 فإن البرنامج يشجع الشركات المهتمة من خلال هذه الدعوة وطلب نموذج استمارة التسجيل مع الاستبيان وذلك عن طريق إبداء الرغبة في رسالة إلى عنوان البريد الإلكتروني: yemen.procurement@wfp.org. يجب إعادة استمارة التسجيل مع الاستبيان المعبئة معمداً، بما في ذلك جميع الوثائق الداعمة إلى برنامج الأغذية العالمي خلال مدة أقصاها الساعة (14:00) تاريخ (26 فبراير 2015).

كما يشجع البرنامج الموردين المسجلين حالياً مع برنامج الأغذية العالمي أيضاً لاستكمال وإعادة تقديم استمارة التسجيل والاستبيان مع تحديث الوثائق الداعمة. يمكن إعادة نموذج التسجيل والاستبيان المكتمل مع الوثائق الداعمة في ظرف مغلق ومختم على العنوان التالي:

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عناية: وحدة المشتريات
برنامج الأغذية العالمي للأمم المتحدة
شارع نواكشوط
صندوق بريد: 7181
صنعاء، اليمن

أي استفسارات بهذا الخصوص يجب أن تكون موجهة إلى البريد الإلكتروني: yemen.procurement@wfp.org

Yemen's Houthis and Islamist republicanism under strain

Stacey Philbrick Yadav
washingtonpost.com
First published Feb. 2

A Houthi, an Islahi and an independent Islamist walked into a bar. Okay, actually, it was a conference room. It was 2012, and these three youth leaders from rival movements stood together across from a group of similarly diverse secular youth, debating the possibility of a madani (civil) state in Yemen built on an Islamic foundation. In that moment, they were what I call Islamist republicans, more than they were Shafi or Zaydi Muslims (let alone Sunni or Shia), or members of any particular political organization. By this I mean that they shared an ideological convergence made possible by the upheavals of 2011. That solidarity has been largely (but not entirely) eroded by events over the past two years. But in that moment, those commitments were real and sensible in the context of Yemeni politics. The erosion of the concept of Islamist republicanism in Yemen over the past two years of "transition" has troubling implications for the ability to sustain many Yemenis' dream of a civil state.

Yemen's current spiraling crises can be read in light of the proxies and flows of interests outside of Yemen as much as within it. This is not to say that domestic politics aren't primary—they establish the basic terrain of conflict, without a doubt. But since 2011, Yemen's politics have been continually negotiated by a complex (often opaque) web of actors stretching from Riyadh in Saudi Arabia and Tehran to Washington and London. This has entailed both qualitative and quantitative shifts in the nature of foreign interest and action in Yemen, much of it driven by anxieties over or misunderstandings of Islamic republicanism. In the face of the transitional government's resignation on Jan. 22, it became less clear than ever who is actually in charge of what in Yemen.

Following the dramatic "fall" of Sana'a in September 2014, many American and European analysts have offered explanations of Yemen's political breakdown. These explanations point to the sectarian conflict between partisans of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah), a long-standing staple of Yemen's opposition politics and participant in the transitional government, and the militias of the Houthis, a Zaydi Shia movement originating in Yemen's far Northern Sa'ada governorate. As the Houthis successfully compelled the government to renegotiate the terms of the transitional agreement originally brokered by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in 2011, American and European media framing has suggested that Yemen's future (or at least the future of central state institutions) was being shaped by Shia militants bent on eliminating their Sunni rivals. As Sheila Carapico and I, and several others, have argued, this was then and remains now a blunt oversimplification of sectarian dynamics that masks important institutional power-politics.

Analysis of the Houthi movement and its conflict with the Islah party has largely been characterized in terms of military capability or sectarian composition, not substantive ideology (at least beyond noting the



Supporters of Yemen's Houthi movement chant slogans during a rally in Sana'a, Yemen, Jan. 28.

Houthis' anti-American rhetoric and slogan proclaiming "a curse on the Jews"). This has been a mistake, given that it is the Houthis' substantive political claims that make its relationship with Islah so difficult to disentangle. As Jillian Schwedler argues in a forthcoming piece, it is dangerous to overemphasize nominal difference (in this case, in sect) over substantive difference (in access to institutional power, for example), especially when this leads analysts to overlook substantive convergence (in ideological claims).

What does it mean to say that Yemen experienced a convergence around Islamist republicanism? Republicanism has often been dismissed by scholars as a logic of governance in the Middle East and North Africa, owing in part to its discursive appropriation by populist authoritarian regimes. Islamic modernism, drawing upon incipient nationalisms in the late colonial period and seen as central to the development of contemporary Islamism, has been taken more seriously. What has not always registered, however, is that identifiably republican claims have been central to the ideological core of Islamic modernism. In recent decades, the concept of Islamic republicanism has been primarily associated with post-revolutionary Iran, and the ideological claims of the former supreme leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in particular. This fails to appreciate the inherent republicanism among Islamists elsewhere in the region, an intellectual blind spot that has had some real effects.

Islamists in the Arab Middle East have often called for states that serve their citizens on the basis of accountable governance and at least some measure of political equality. They typically limit their calls for equality and citizenship in procedural terms such as electoral suffrage and due process, rather than more wide reaching forms of legal equality. In the 2000s, even such limited republican claims proved challenging to existing regimes, which were for the most part either insufficiently Islamic in orientation (as in the secular military regimes) or insufficiently accountable to citizens (as in the monarchies) or both. This made Islamist republicans a

staple of the opposition landscape in most countries in the region in the 2000s and facilitated meaningful Islamist-secularist cooperation in protests and civil society in Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and elsewhere.

The Arab uprisings of 2011—and the suppression of Islamist republican dissent since then—highlight the strain that this specific ideological trend puts on regional regimes, particularly when it cuts across the putatively unbridgeable Sunni-Shia divide. The uptick in sectarian mobilization today is, in part, a response to the suppression of just such convergence. While Islamists played little leadership role in the Arab uprisings, the logic of accountability that undergirded each of the populist movements was recognizable and resonant. But from Syria to Egypt to Yemen, when republicanism has been endorsed by Islamists as a specifically Islamic republicanism, it has faced dual resistance by Arab and non-Arab foreign actors and organizations alike.

On the one hand, the anti-republicans in the Gulf have typically managed the threat of republicanism through a combination of co-optation, coercion and the manipulation of a citizenship (or subjecthood) that has allowed the exclusion, suppression and ultimately denaturalization of republican dissent. On the other hand, European and American liberals who are critical of Islamism on the basis of its illiberalism have offered at best tepid support for their inclusion in the political process. The 2011 uprisings presented a challenge to both groups, bringing to the fore a populist demand for citizen accountability among people for whom Islam is one of several resonant mobilizational frames. Islamist republican claims were not in 2011 and never have been an automatic choice among mobilized Muslims, but neither have they been irrelevant. In "tipping the balance," outside actors and institutions have been important arbiters of domestic political struggles.

It is the Houthi movement's republican claims—which focus on accountable governance, legal equality and anti-corruption—that have helped attract prominent "Sunni" figures, such as the Shafi mufti of

the city of Taiz, Saad Bin Aqil, who has delivered Friday sermons to gatherings of Houthi loyalists. At its base, the Houthi movement makes a claim for limited government, and has resisted the consolidation of power that characterized the regime of former president Ali Abdullah Saleh and was repackaged by the 2011 GCC framework. The claim flows naturally from the Zaydi intellectual elite's move in the 1980s and 1990s to adopt constitutionalism as a means of political survival as they faced encroachment from a populist left and a Salafi right. In the 2000s, Zaydi thinkers like the recently-assassinated Muhammad Abdulmalik Al-Mutawakel were at the forefront of a constitutionalist opposition, and their claims formed a critical bridge between the Houthis and republicans among Islah's center, as well as others in the smaller but intellectually significant parties of the Left. Such thinkers—and the broader transformation of political discourse they helped to bring about through cross-sectarian and cross-partisan activism in the 2000s—helped shape a language of dissent that contributed to the 2011 uprising and made it possible for Islamist republicans of diverse stripes to recognize one another's claims and the republican claims of their fellow (non-Islamist) citizens.

The work was not done only by Zaydi thinkers. The republican commitments of a cohort of Islah leaders have also been obvious, if nonetheless complex and dynamic. The Islah party cannot be glossed as a simple facsimile of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, though many party leaders studied in Egypt and are otherwise influenced by the movement. It would similarly be a mistake to consider the party a front for the wider Salafi movement, as some of its critics do, though the party counts prominent Salafis among its numbers. And then there are the tribal figures (some from well-known Zaydi families) who have served as kingmakers, adjudicating disputes between the Brothers and the Salafis, and between the party and the regime. But it is the Brothers who form the ideological core of the party, producing its public materials, crafting the speeches of most of its leaders and chairing

and staffing its policymaking apparatus. This group has a longstanding commitment to republican governance, consistently articulating a version of limited government that would, in the eyes of one party member, produce a constitution that would be the envy of Plato.

So if the possibility of Houthi and Islahis converging around a shared republican agenda seems far-fetched today, it was not always so. Young members of both movements, as well as some independents, came out of the 2011 protest movement with an invigorated commitment to (civil, i.e., non-military, non-tribal) republicanism, though they differed from many prominent activists on whether secularism was a requisite attribute of such a republic. Young leaders from both groups professed to see no contradiction between the concept of a civil state, and a republican regime with an Islamist orientation. So what happened?

Two factors—one domestic, one regional—exerted a pull on this convergent republicanism in a way that has divided Yemen's Islamist republicans. The GCC transitional mechanism, which was fronted by authoritarian regimes to promote stability, initially empowered Islah, and Houthi militants waged war on Salafi evangelists in Dammaj. Together, these two developments put tremendous strain on the Muslim Brothers in Islah, and left Islamists far more deeply polarized.

Both as a hedge against possible Iranian influence over the Houthis, and because Islah was the leading party in the existing opposition coalition, the GCC transitional framework apportioned governing power to Islah and excluded the Houthis. Meanwhile, the framework failed to deliver on the anti-corruption or transitional justice demands made by Houthis, which helped them to retain their relevance among Yemeni citizens. Escalating violence between Houthi and Salafis also unfolded in Dammaj, around the issue long-standing issue of Salafi evangelism and cultural encroachment. This fighting led to an exodus of thousands of internally displaced Salafis who re-congregated in Sana'a. Though these Salafis are not necessarily Islahis—many are not even Yemeni—they have strained the possibilities for convergence and contributed to an escalating

rhetoric of sectarian animus. A bete noire for centrist Brothers, Yemen's Salafis have little institutional power under the transitional agreement and have piggybacked on the party, leaving it the most obvious target for Houthis excluded by that agreement and eager to play a more direct role in reconstituting power in a post-Saleh Yemen.

Meanwhile, Gulf countries' toleration of Islah became more difficult to sustain in the aftermath of the coup against Mohamed Morsi in Egypt and the subsequent suppression of Muslim Brothers there and in the Gulf. The Houthis' move into Sana'a in September 2014 and forcible rewriting of the transitional agreement was countenanced not because external actors recognized their republican claims, but as a means of clipping Islah's wings. Yet it is precisely the Houthi movement's political claims—and its resistance to details of the proposed federal restructuring in Yemen's draft constitution—that escalated the most recent crisis.

International "openness" toward the Houthis in September, while legible in terms of dual Gulf and European and American anxiety about (Islahi) Islamist republicanism, has had disastrous consequences, just as the earlier exclusion of Houthis from the governing compact did. As the International Crisis Group's most recent report suggests, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is the only beneficiary of the January 2015 crisis. No matter how poorly conceived the GCC framework may have been, the events in September communicated clearly that agreements could be rewritten by force, a process now underway again. This time, however, Yemen stands more polarized in sectarian terms, with Islamist republicans from Islah and the Houthi movement unlikely, if not unable, to realign their substantive convergence. Understanding the processes that "undid" this possibility is essential to any hope of its recuperation.

Stacey Philbrick Yadav is an associate professor of political science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges and the author of "Islamists and the State: Legitimacy and Institutions in Yemen and Lebanon" (I.B. Tauris, 2013) and other work on opposition politics in Yemen.

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