Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Baidhani to Yemen Times ” Yemen is in Dire Need of Political, Economic, Media, Administrative and Judicial Tackling” [Archives:2000/13/Law & Diplomacy]
March 27 2000
Dr. Abdulrahman Al-Baidhani is one of the most important pillars of the Yemeni Revolution. He descends from a very well-educated family since his father had also a Ph.D. Dr. Baidhani represents a very important person that formulated the modern history of Yemen and therefore, talking with him means speaking with a generation.
He took many posts before the Revolution in 1962 such as the consultant of the Yemeni Commission in Cairo, Yemen’s Representative to the Arab League 1990-1955, Ambassador of Yemen to Germany 1955-1959, Ambassador of Yemen to Sudan and the Economic Advisor of the Immam Ahmad 1960.
After the Revolution he was appointed as the Vice Chairman of the Revolution Leadership Council, Vice President of Yemen, Prime Minister, Minster of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Economics. He is also the founder of the Yemen Bank for Development and Construction.
To shed some light on some important issues related to Yemen, Mohammed Hatem Al-Qadhi, Yemen Times Managing Editor met Dr. Baidhani in his house in Cairo, Egypt and filed the following interview. Excerpts.
Q: What in your opinion are the most prominent mistakes of 26 September Revolution?
A: During the discussion of planning for the revolution with my colleagues who came to visit me in Cairo where I had taken refuge from persecution of the Imam, I had made it clear to them that it was no fault to admit that we are sons of the common people. When we would appear at the stage of power we would not at the beginning be able to fill the psychological vacuum of the masses who had been accustomed for over one thousand, two-hundred years to sanctify personalities, some of whom claimed to be descendants of the Prophet. I proposed setting up a Higher Defence Council (HDC)to part in power along with the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and the council of ministers. The HDC should be composed of scholars and sheikhs of the tribes. The council was to be headed by chairman of the RCC and was meant to offer assistance to the RCC. I also proposed that membership of the HDC should include all members of the RCC, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the ministers of defense, interior, airforce and the chief of staff of the armed forces as well as the minister for tribes affairs and the commander-in-chief of the National Guard. I had also suggested that Abdulsalam Sabra, col. Hassan Al-Amri and Ali Al-Matri take the responsibility of selecting the sheikhs of the northern part due to their close connection with them, and Abdulghani Mathar and Abdulqawi Hammim the selection of sheikhs of the southern and eastern parts for the same reason. Names of all those scholars and sheikhs were to be written on one list to be announced with communiqu’s of the revolution so that all the sheikhs and scholars would feel they were partners of power and successors to the Imam regime which was based on and monopolized by one person in the name of religion. Thus I had proposed laying the foundation stone of the structure of democracy and collective leadership in Yemen.
My revolutionary colleagues went back to Yemen to inform our other colleagues about that arrangement on which all had agreed. But very unfortunately when the revolution communiqu’s and formations were announced there was no mention of the HDC. On my arrival in Sana’a I disapproved that and asked Mr Al-Sallal to announce its formation of which he told me he had not been acquainted with communiqu’s and formations of the revolution. I then asked Abdulsalam Sabra about the reason behind not preparing the list of the HDC. He apologized by saying he was afraid to put down their names before the revolution lest they should be leaked to the Imam and suggested to obtain their names from the ministry of treasury because the sheikhs’ names were registered there. We were taken by surprise by the arrival of thousands of tribesmen in Sana’a, each of whom considered to be a scholar or sheikh. And due to their great numbers we were not able to honor them in the way they deserved according to their social status and patriotic intention to back up the revolution.
We realized that we had made a mistake when we sent invitation for attending the HDC without specifying the names of its members.
I assumed that the council’s members would be around 200 of scholars and sheikhs of the tribes. Had it been accomplished according to the plan we had agreed upon before the revolution that would have realized my great dream represented by participation of all those in defending the revolution. The Judge Abdulsalam had made a mistake when he overlooked preparation of the list before eruption of the revolution and then we were all mistaken when we invited tribes chiefs without defining names of those eligible to take part in the council. We could not then provide enough lodging for the important tribesmen and therefore we were obliged to tell them that we would invite them to a later meeting. Their response was sheer disappointment. They returned to their places bearing a feeling of grudge towards the revolution and many of them have later begun fighting it. I think those were among the most gross mistakes of the revolution.
Q: Could you spell out why you have left power a short while after the revolution?
A: Firstly, right after the revolution I declared that we were not communists and would not be so, we were not socialists and would not be so. Our need of Egyptian forces support would not mean that we would adopt Egypt’s socialist policy and our need of Soviet arms did not mean that we would follow its ideological theory.
Secondly, Out of my understanding of international politics axioms and its red lines, I rejected the advice of president Gamal Abdulnasser to close down the U.S. and British embassies because their governments had not recognized our republican regime. That advice was interpreted as being under instruction from the Soviet Union so that the Yemen battlefield would expand and pave the way for the Soviet Union to reach the Gulf of Aden, a development of which that would engage us in conflict with the Atlantic Alliance which does not allow the Russian approach to Aden’s strategic area and would not stand hand-folded against a threat to the Gulf petroleum. For that purpose I had exchanged letters with the U.S. president Kennedy and we reached an agreement stipulating recognition of our republican regime and withdrawal of the Egyptian forces to Egypt on condition that a number of armors and warplanes remain in Yemen. We had then established a 150 thousand strong men army of volunteers given training by Egyptian army men. Those correspondences were under knowledge of president Abdulnasser who welcomed the return of his troops from Yemen and the U.S. commitment to prevent enemies of the republic from infiltrating into our territories.
The U.S. had virtually recognized our republican regime on December 18, 1962 immediately after I had issued a statement announcing that we confine our activity to raising the living standard of our people and non-interference in our neighbors affairs. The U.S. helped us join the UN and started sending us economic assistance. The battlefronts in Yemen calmed down and the Egyptian army troops began their return to Egypt.
On January 18, 1963 president Al-Sallal asked me to convene the Revolutionary Command Council where I was surprised by the attendance of the Egyptian commander Brigadier Anwar Al-Qadi . I learnt that he had told Al-Sallal about our loss of many positions of the republic to its enemies. That was not true. The only wireless set of the Yemeni command was in my room and I was in contact with all positions day and night. My last contacts with them were immediately before attending that meeting. But the Egyptian commander insisted that his information was correct and asked Al-Sallal to send a delegation to president Abdulnasser to halt withdrawal of the Egyptian troops from Yemen and to send more reinforcements.
I realized then that there was some sort of concoction aimed at deceiving president Abdulnasser to prevent the return of his troops to Egypt, strain the Yemeni-American relations and bring them back to the state of war that had stopped completely. I decided to lead that delegation to explain to president Abdulnasser the deceit and to continue withdrawing his forces particularly that it was a herald of improvement in the Egyptian-U.S. relations.
I arrived in Egypt at the head of a military delegation and explained that to president Abdulnasser who was convinced by viewpoint but asked me to stay in Egypt till he could straighten the attitude of president Al-Sallal who had secretly sent to Abdulnasser a letter with a member of the delegation. It has come out later that it was dictated on him by the Egyptian army commander. President Al-Sallal asked Nasser in the letter to keep me in Egypt under an allegation that I had promoted salaries of all government employees the security and armed forces by sevenfold and that threatened a deficit to the state budget. It appeared as if he did not know that I am an expert in economics and that prevention of corruption necessitates sufficiency of salaries. I managed to increase resources of the state by selling some of the deserted areas of land that were good for agrarian reform and founded the Yemeni Bank for Construction. Many Yemeni expatriates came back home with their money and expertise and began purchasing some of these lands and reforming them.
President Abdulnasser promised me that I would stay in Egypt only for a few days until correcting the information of president Al-Sallal. He received a letter from Khrushchev warning him that if Al-Baidhani went back to Yemen the Soviet Union would cease all its assistance to Egypt because Al-Baidhani’s policy with the United States would ”Americanize” the Arab Peninsula. The letter said the Soviet Union could not tolerate two setbacks against America in one year: one in Cuba when it was forced to dismantle its missiles and the other when it would be compelled to keep away from Aden in case our friendship with America continued. President Nasser asked me to tender my resignation to Al-Sallal and to stay in Egypt, saying the situation was an Egyptian dilemma in Yemen. I told him he was in an Egyptian dilemma in Egypt.
The course of events had proved that in the period till the setback June 5, 1967, Egypt was actually ruled by the followers of Field Marshal Amer who were also the major cause of the Syrian secession before the outbreak of the Yemeni revolution. They were compliant cat’s-paw to the Soviet Union and could not tolerate my staying in Yemen in order to undertake ruling it by themselves in the name of Al-Sallal who had let them hold the reins of its leadership.
Q: What was the nature of your relationship with Abdulnasser?
A: It was friendly, but characterized by difference in opinion whether on international policy or the economic one. I was and still consider him a sincere Arab leader but he had sought the help from those whom he thought to be trustworthy and so they misled him and distanced himself from the experts. This is a phenomenon prevalent and controlling many rulers of developing countries.
Q: What secrets of the revolution you have not unveiled till now?
A: I still prefer not to reveal more that I have already done.
Q: What are the causes behind the campaign against you and what you write launched by some official newspapers?
A: Some of the president’s entourage thinks that I vie with them on their posts. Some others think that I want to run for the presidency office, therefore they are all unanimous on attacking me on pages of government newspapers subject to their direct influence. I do not seek after anything of that kind but rather try to support the president so that the people get satisfied with him by their hearts. The majority of those around the president do not perceive that what preoccupies me is Yemen’s development and solving its economic crisis. They seem they do not understand in this respect the scientific treatments I write. Or they do not want to solve the economic crisis because they are the beneficiaries from it, disregarding suffering of the people or future of the president.
Q: How do you assess the current political and economic situation in Yemen and role of the opposition inside and outside, is it able to mobilize the public opinion?
A: Yemen is suffering from a strangling and increasing economic crisis and is in dire need of political, economic, media, administrative and judicial tackling. The opposition role should be devoted to prepare these treatments, explain and publish them and call for their discussion. The opposition must work out national programs local and world variables need and infuse fresh blood into elements of the opposition parties, enhance their leaderships so that to qualify efficient cadres capable of executing the principle of peaceful transfer of power. The opposition should not exhaust its effort in replying to personal vituperations. Without that the opposition will not be capable of mobilizing the street, meaning to enlighten the citizens on using their peaceful democratic rights to choose the best that would solve their crisis and realize their development.
Q: Some opposition leaderships abroad connected their return home to a condition of a change in the present structure of government, what is your comment on that?
A: I do not agree that the opposition return be conditional on any change. The grave economic crisis and the prevalent corruption would impose inevitability of political, economic, media, administrative and judicial reform. I hope this fact would be realized by the officials or would be imposed by suffering of the desperate unemployed, and that is what I am afraid of. The opposition return from abroad will help develop certainty of the officials and prepare efficient alternatives in the process of peaceful transfer of power.
Q: How do you view the current program of economic reform in Yemen?
A: There is no program for economic reform in Yemen. Raising prices itself does not lead to an economic reform but would rather result in a popular anger and revulsion. As for dealing with the budget deficit, it must not be at the expense of the hungry but rather by preparing an economic plan for developing the state’s resources and putting an end to corruption. All platforms of the political parties, including the president’s electoral platforms included that.
Q: Are you opposed to the existing regime?
A: Absolutely not. I am not opposed to this regime but calling for its good performance without having any personal aim and I pray to the Almighty God that the president would follow the steps that consolidate his regime and rule.
Q: What is your opinion of the local authority law , are you in support of the 18-article Oath and Agreement Document adopted by the opposition before the war of 1994, as the opposition considers it a referential for a national reconciliation?
A: I do not think there is a local authority in our country but could be described as local administration. Local authority stipulates direct election by the people, of governors and local councils members. Any elected governor could not be ousted from his post but according decision by the residents of the governorate, represented by the elected local council, and it is not allowed to discharge any elected member of the local council but through a decision taken by the majority of the council. The constitution defines and regulates the central authority’s supervision on the governors and members of the local councils and relationship of all those with the central government. The constitution also defines the cases of the request for lifting immunity of each of them and holding new elections for those to succeed the governor who loses his eligibility for reasons stipulated in the law.
As for the document of Oath and Agreement, it was not adopted by the opposition alone. All the national forces had taken part in preparing and approving it. Some of its articles, such as arresting those responsible for acts of physical liquidation, have been overstepped by time. Some of the document’s articles have been actually implemented and rationalization of government performance is still requested and it is supposed to be speeded up. Nevertheless, it is not permissible to consider the remaining unimplemented articles as a condition for opposition return home. Their return would constitute a positive addition to create conviction for favoring implementation of the remainder articles within the framework of reciprocal national confidence and cooperation.
The actual practice leading to make the majority of people feel the reality of the national unity is the foundation on which the united state, people and land, is based. Any written document is not enough to create such feeling, it is rather created by actual practice embodying equal citizenship. It also requires drawing up a comprehensive development plan covering all Yemen along with abolishing the clause in the constitution granting the ruling party the right to choose the one that nominally vie with it in the presidency elections, a matter that practically cancels the possibility of peaceful transfer of power.
Q: What are the obstacles preventing you from assuming a government post in the present state?
A: First of all I do not seek to have any government post and I do not want it because those controlling them would disable me from doing any useful work dealing with the economic crisis. The foes of reform would join forces to abort efforts of any reformer. The second point is that it is sufficient for me to continue warning in my writings against continuation of this crisis and showing signs of the possibility of solving it, which I think is the most significant patriotic and historic post.
Q: Why does not Dr Al-Baidhani return to Yemen to practice his political activity there?
A: I have actually returned to it, living in it and practicing my political and ideological activity from my house and office on its territories.
Q: ”Agonies of Yemen” is the title of your latest book, why did you give it this title?
A: I wanted this title to be really expressive of what the majority of the sons of Yemen are suffering from. Yemen’s woes are summed up in the increasing of unemployment of the intellectuals and non-intellectuals, aggravation of pains of hunger and some of the hungry are forced to pick up leftovers from trash boxes to allay their hunger. The roads are swarmed with beggars, children abandoned education, and there is spread of moral and criminal delinquency in quest of means for living. Hope is dwindled in the implementation of reform programs promoted by official mass media.
Q: What are your prominent activities abroad, especially in Cairo?
A: All of them are cultural activities; attending intellectual symposiums or giving lectures or press and radio and TV interviews to Egyptian and Arab media, not forgetting to mention my weekly articles in Al-Ayyam weekly of Yemen. Wherever I am in any city in the world I maintain a daily contact with my office in Sana’a. I benefit scientifically from my travels and meetings with thinkers of various orientations while sharing logic and governed by mentality open to any new thought. I also spend long time in Sana’a to renew my feeling of its reality and needs but unfortunately its cultural field is limited and censored by security authority.
Q: Any final remarks?
A: I wish the president to succeed in resolving Yemen’s economic crisis and begin building its civilizational upswing. I hope to live to the day when I see all my Yemeni brothers in the opposition have returned home so that to participate, all of us with the president, in resolving its crisis, building its progress and consolidating its unity. Since national reconciliation was realized between the republicans and their adversaries and have become among its senior leaders after the martyrdom of over half million people, what then does hinder the return of those living abroad?
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