WHAT IT MEANSElecting Al-Rai as speaker of Yemen’s house of representatives [Archives:2008/1129/Local News]
Dr. Abdullah Al-Faqih
After a month of intra-party fighting over who should be the next speaker for the Yemeni House of Representatives (HR), the ruling General People's Congress (GPC)'s substantial majority finally adhered to President Saleh's wishes and unanimously elected Yahya Al-Rai as speaker for the remaining 14 months of the HR's tenure. To keep up with appearances, the election was carried out by a secret ballot on Monday, Feb. 12.
Born in 1953 in Gahran district of Dhamar governorate, Al-Rai had been a deputy speaker since 1997.
With late speaker sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmer (1933-2007) spending most of his time over the past four years outside the country for treatment, Al-Rai became the de facto speaker in his place. And with the support of President Saleh as his only “qualification”, the little-known politician and ex-officer's climb to the presidium of the HR was anything but democratic. In January, while the HR wasn't in session, many GPC members openly rejected Al-Rai's nomination to the post in statements made to various media outlets. Nonetheless, Al-Rai managed Monday's to collect 186 votes out of the 301 total number of the HR members who voted in the ballot. His Joint Meeting Parties (JMP)'s rival candidate, Ali Ashal, gathered 69 votes. Interestingly enough, Al-Rai's first deputy, Himeer Abdullah Al-Ahmer)the son of the late speaker)was elected by a majority of 220 votes, gaining 34 more votes over his soon-to-be boss and proving more popular among both JMP and GPC members.
Many Opponents
The most ferocious opposition to Al-Rai's nomination came from within his own party, the GPC. For some GPC members, Al-Rai is a president-made sheikh and military officer who only knows how to obey orders from superiors. For others, Al-Rai belongs to the old guard within the regime and lacks the merits needed for the post. For a third group, Al-Rai's manners are what matters, and they are bad by any standard. Many stories are told by MPs of how Al-Rai has acted improperly, and in many instances verbally abused his colleagues.
A brief official resume of Al-Rai)posted to the HR website)says nothing about Al-Rai's educational background, except that he graduated from the Faculty of War in 1972. Official records show that Al-Rai holds a master's degree in military sciences. This claim is not made in the official resume.
However, the widely unpopular new HR speaker might not be intellectually challenged, as some of his opponents claim. Al-Rai might have simply acted according to the system's established rules and tried to accumulate his colleagues' disgust to assure Saleh that he represents no political threat to him. This technique has been frequently employed by some of Saleh's men.
Possible implications
The rise of Al-Rai to the helm of Yemen's House of Representatives seems to be a typical example of how President Saleh has been, and still is, exercising power. While Yemen has dramatically changed over the past decade, Saleh seems to find it difficult to adapt. As a result, he continues to play his outdated political games. While weighing the pluses and minuses, Saleh must have thought that supporting Al-Rai can have several advantages. First, it reinforces Saleh's principle of “loyalty first” and, as such, sends a message to his men to stick with him because he is the one who makes and breaks leaders.
Second, imposing Al-Rai on GPC Parliament members in the HR also sends a message that, despite increasing opposition to his political style and policies from within his own party, he is still Yemen's most powerful man, who can rally his supporters and opponents alike when necessary. Third, Saleh sees Al-Rai as someone who he can push around in the near future. He can put him next time as a Speaker or as a Deputy Speaker or as a commander of newly created military camp without facing a political rebellion. Saleh himself might have encouraged Al-Rai's opponents to loudly express their dislike as a way of further weakening Al-Rai.
Third, Saleh seeks to undermine the HR's power and morale after a growing number of its members came out openly against him. If all remains the same, Saleh is expected to use the next parliamentary elections in April 2009 to replace all of the troublemakers. He is also expected to use his constitutional initiative to constitutionally and institutionally weaken the HR by adopting bicameralism instead of the current unicameralism.
Saleh's political tactics, however, may turn out to be disastrous. For example, his appointment last year of a little-known political figure as prime minister has created havoc in the executive branch. Likewise, his selection of Al-Rai to succeed sheikh Al-Ahmer is expected to undermine the HR's power, which will in turn weaken Saleh's regime as a whole. In fact, the country's political, economic, and social conditions all pointed in one direction; that is, to select a very strong and credible politician, preferably from the southern governorates. But Saleh, as he has always done during his 30-year reign, chose to swim against the tide.
In another sign of trouble to come, two of President Saleh's allies serving as deputies decided in mid-January, before the HR met early February, not only to step down but also not to run for re-election. The reason cited was President Saleh's insistence on making Al-Rai the HR's new Speaker.
Dr. Abdullah Al-Faqih is a professor of politics at Sana'a University. For comments, please email the author at: [email protected]
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