WHAT IT MEANSThe demise of Sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar [Archives:2008/1118/Local News]
Adel Ameen
Indubitably, he was no ordinary man. His cortege was attended last week by more than one million Yemenis. A public congregation with record enormity, a humble attitude of gratitude on the part of the Yemeni people towards an eminent national figure, late Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar. What does his demise mean for Yemenis? How much hard-to-fill empty space is left by him? Could we ever cement the cracks his death on the wall of Yemeni tribe and politics?
The observers of the Yemeni situation almost agree unanimously that that the demise of Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussein Al-Ahmar in such circumstances is an irreplaceable loss not only for political forces in the government and opposition but also for the Yemeni people in general. Some pundits claim that the greatest loser of Al-Ahmar's death is President Saleh given the amount of support he used to enjoy from the late sheikh, while others believe that the greatest losers is the opposition and particularly the Islah Party.
Sheikh Al-Ahmar goes off the stage at the darkest, gloomiest and most complicated times when Saleh's reign is beset with myriad crises. The country is still heaving under a cluster of chronic problems caused by wrong policies that let them build up their pressure over years, and suddenly they all blasted in the face of the authority. There is an ongoing war in the North, and political congestions in the South; in between are tribes seeking to reset their agendas, form new coalitions and build new alliances. The tribes have an eye on new social and political roles to ensure current and potential interests amidst a political situation that seems to be sliding into more crises and instability. Moreover, the government-opposition political dialogue has reached an impasse. What adds insult to injury is the existing economic distress which overshadows the lives of people and makes them disgruntled and more likely to respond positively to the civil disobedience calls from the Retirees movement in the South.
Political Absence
Sheikh Al-Ahmar firstly did not accept Saleh to be president. He had preferred the governance to be brought back to civilians. However, he later changed his mind for two reasons: the first one is that he was keen to restore political stability to the country and get rid of the disturbance that followed the murders of presidents Al-Hamdi and Al-Ghashmi; secondly, foreign parties (particularly the Saudis) seemed to back Saleh, something unexpected by sheikh Al-Ahmar.
Later on, a strategic divergence occurred between Al-Ahmar and President Saleh, which the latter utilized to strengthen his governance and tighten his grip on power. In the last three years, the relationship between the two men took a new turn as sheikh Al-Ahmar was marginalized by the authority and even criticized in public. A single phrase said by Al-Ahmar at an Islah conference where he described the country as being led into a dark tunnel, was enough to draw a fierce impolite counterattack from the ruling General People's Congress (GPC). This suggested that they got a green light to attack from the higher political echelon. Another sign was the GPC's proposal for biannual reelection of the Parliament Speaker, a position held by Al-Ahmar, signifying that they could remove him whenever they want.
President Saleh has been in power for about one third of a century and has been able to some extent to tame his tribal and political opponents. Having gathered all tools of power in his hand as the sole ruler of the country, it seemed that President Saleh no longer needed a strong man like sheikh Abdullah to back him.
Considering the above as a part of the changes to the relationship of the two men which sometimes relaxed, we should also consider another key change that interferes with the historical relationship: the sheikh's sons. They quite recently have been playing an oppositionist role against the regime. They publicly posted many labels on the regime such as practice of exclusion, marginalization, monopoly of power and wealth, tendency towards the establishment of political inheritance, etc.
In this context, we could say that gone are the days of strategic relationships between the president on one hand and Al-Ahmar family and party on the other. The thin thread that used to keep that relationship warm has broken. Moreover, even while their father was alive, Hameed and Hussein Al-Ahmar chose to take their own ways to oppose Saleh's policies. Hameed's way was through the Islah Party and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) while Hussein through the tribal National Solidarity Council (NSC) which was established recently. Earlier, the Islah Party had defined the shape of their new relationship with the GPC after the 2001 local elections when they called it quits on their strategic alliance. Sheikh Al-Ahmar remained the only link between the Islah and the president. Although it is unlikely that Al-Ahmar's death would put an end to the two side's relationship, it certainly would weaken it further. We should not forget that the 2006 elections slackened their bond and widened the gap between them and pitted them face-to-face on the ring of competition and challenge.
Politically speaking, the Islah Party has lost their patron, someone we could describe as a protective wall or umbrella under which the party was sheltered since its establishment. Although the Islah Party, as its Secretary General claims, is founded institutionally and is supposed to have, by now, become fortified and empowered, it could not have done without the help of sheikh Abdullah Al-Ahmar. It is expected in the days to come that the president would be tougher with the opposition and particularly the Islah Party, especially if sheikh Hameed Al-Ahmar keeps up his oppositionist attitude of last year's elections.
Impact on tribe
Al-Ahmar had his reasons to stand by president Saleh in the past and ironically his sons have their own reasons to challenge him today, including monopoly of power and wealth and succession, a point that tops the list of differences between the president and Al-Ahmar's sons, in addition to other corruption issues. President Saleh is expected to hasten to fill the tribal empty space left by Al-Ahmar the father. Although it is unlikely that Al-Ahmar's sons would be displaced as Hashid Tribes' leaders, rivals may appear. This seems to be possible given the death of two major Hashid personalities: Abdullah Al-Ahmar and Mujahid Abu Shawarib. On the other hand, President Saleh is going to establish a relationship with Sadiq Al-Ahmar, the new sheikh of Hashid.
Following its old trick of “divide and rule,” the authority's next objective will be to weaken Hashid Tribes and create new chieftains rivaling each other. The President will no longer need strong tribal leaders that limit his ambitions and prevent tribal insurgency. Strong chieftains do not serve his interests while the tribesmen can be dealt with through strong state officials who enjoy sheikh skills such as Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar who can employ the state's resources for attracting or deterring them.
If they are preparing for the future, Al-Ahmar family have no option but to reintegrate into their tribal community. Sheikh Hameed's latest call at his father's funeral for forging reconciliation among tribes is a part of this reintegration. It appears that there attempts to thwart such an endeavor and create chaos and disturbances especially with the authority expecting that, after Al-Ahmar's death, many tribesmen would renege on their loyalty towards some parties for the sake of their tribes.
The writer is the managing editor of Al-Asima newspaper, and a specialist in Yemeni affairs. He is a member of the political department at the Islah political party's execution office. He is also an administrator at the media section of the party.
——
[archive-e:1118-v:15-y:2008-d:2008-01-07-p:ln]
