WHAT IT MEANSThe political role of Yemeni tribes (Part 2) [Archives:2008/1132/Local News]

Prof. Mohammed M. Al-Thahery
Recent tribal movements in the form of tribal conferences

While tribal conferences are deemed to be a vital mechanism of the tribal system for expressing their claims and needs, they also are used as a trick by tribal oppositionists in Yemen.

Such conferences are a political “phenomenon.” During the last century, Yemen witnessed a number of tribal conferences presided over by tribal leaders.

The following list of tribal conferences bears witness to this phenomenon's existence:

1- Amran Conference, 1963

2- Khamer Conference, 1965

3- Raidah Conference, 1968

4- Bir Al-Shaif Conference, 1972

5- Solidarity Conference of Yemeni tribes, 1990

6- National Solidarity Conference, 1991

7- Saba Conference, 1992

8- Unified Bakeel Conference, 1994

9- Dahm Tribes Conference, 1998

These conferences were a peaceful means through which Yemen's tribes sought to serve their economic ends, which included an emphasis on caring for rural areas, establishing a plan for economic development and calling on the government to evenly distribute development projects throughout Yemen.

Yemeni tribes stressed the necessity of achieving their social and political needs, whether those of their tribe or others. These needs include solving intertribal problems and disputes within each tribe according to agreed conventions and Sharia law, but subject to state laws and regulations; granting the Bakeel tribes a proportional share in Yemen's political representation, whether in Parliament, at influential institutions or abroad, and endeavoring to halt the Yemeni government's policies aimed at impoverishing and starving its citizens.

These necessities are linked inextricably to the entire nation's fundamentals, such as preserving Yemeni unity and promoting an understanding of the indispensability of such national unity.

It appears that most of these tribal conferences contained both patriotic and nationalistic dimensions because while many were “tribally located,” they had “national objectives.”

Despite the tribal venues of these conferences – as they were held in the strongholds of certain Yemeni tribes such as Amran, Khamer, etc. – they promoted national objectives and claims. For example, they supported Egypt, then led by Gamal Abdul Nasser, and lashed out at foreign conspiracies, although Yemeni political life itself witnessed unbelievable political overlapping, as described above.

Nevertheless, one could say that establishing obviously tribal conferences, such as the National Solidarity Council and last year's Khamer meeting, signifies certain points:

– they were held during a political crisis wherein there was some type of political instability, demonstrations here and there, rights campaigns, more paupers, excessively rampant corruption, etc.

– modern institutions, namely NGOs and political parties, have failed to fulfill their duties.

– the ruling elite's ineffectiveness and underperformance.

– Yemeni political practitioners hate institutionalism.

– coming under foreign influence and attempting to emulate the outside world; for example, we're being influenced by it, but we are unable to act upon it for historical, political, social, economic and cultural reasons.

There are the determiners of the tribes' political role in Yemen, including social roles, geopolitical roles, those related to tribal structure – whether cultural, leadership or military – and concluding with the foreign factor, which considerably strengthens or weakens the tribes' political role.

One is justified in assuming that Yemeni tribes' presence and political role will grow if the ruling elite's legitimacy continues dwindling, with the Yemeni government failing to perform its tasks and exaggerating its abilities; if there's continued personification of political authority and institutional feebleness within Yemen's political system; and if the Yemeni opposition fails to present itself as a viable substitute to the current government and detaches itself from Yemeni citizens' real worries.

In this regard, credit must be given to the Yemeni government – namely the Joint Meeting Parties – for subscribing at least relatively to the struggle of many Yemenis who voiced their sufferings at nationwide rallies and marches in 2007.

It has been noted that traditional institutions, or so-called pre-State institutions, come into play when modern institutions are absent or when the ruling elite's legitimacy is shaken.

A politically abnormal relationship plagues Yemeni political life, i.e., political tribes practicing politics and making and breaking alliances. On the other hand, there are those parties with no political identity, who neither want to form a government nor be involved in a peaceful transfer of power with others.

“Tribal politicism” is encouraged because by definition, tribes firstly are political and secondly, they are led by figures who aren't ambitious to rise to power or overthrow the existing government.

Therefore, a political ruler may be on the safe side when it comes to tribal leaders because they limit themselves to tribal leadership rather than becoming heads of state. They have a “livelihood” ambition that doesn't seek to usurp statewide authority.

To the contrary, political parties cherish a replacement ambition, which is unacceptable by the ruling authority. Because, in Yemen, authority means wealth, it's fitting to say that there's a peaceful extension – rather than a peaceful transfer – of power.

Current political circumstances indicate that Yemen's political system has ushered in a phase of political instability, unabated intertribal strife (wars, revenge killings, banditry, etc.), initiatives and election programs failing to solve the crises of Yemeni people and their government, elections (parliamentary, presidential, local) seeking to cure social ailments but coming to no fruition and constitutional amendments failing to lead to political reform.

Hence, those parties concerned should be fully mindful of this new phase and its relevant risks. Not admitting the existence of the political system's crises will open the door to possibilities that aren't necessarily in the interests of the Yemeni people or their government.

Prof. Mohammed M. Al-Thahery is Head of Political Science Dept., Sana'a University.
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