Three Constitutions During a President’s Tenure! [Archives:2000/36/Law & Diplomacy]

Mohammad Ali
Al-Saqqaf,
Professor of International Law,
Sana’a University
Compared to the 27 constitutional amendments in the American constitution of 1787 and the single amendment in the Egyptian constitution made in 1971, Yemen has had three constitutions and only one President since declaration of its unity on May 22, 2000.
Yemeni constitution was prepared by a committee formed of an elite group from the then two parts of Yemen. In 1972, this committee started working on this constitution and finished it on December 30, 1981. The constitution was not officially approved by both authorities of then two parts of Yemen until they had signed the unity agreement in Aden in November 1989. Signing the unity agreement marked the beginning of a new era in the history of Yemen necessitated a constitution compatible with the democratic path the country had adopted.
In 1993, preparation to amend the constitution started. Voting for the amendments of the constitution was made in September following the civil war of 1994. 52 articles of the constitution were amended, 29 others were added and one was deleted. These amendments meant that a new constitution was created.
On 23.8.2000, the parliament endorsed two drafts to amend the constitution. The president’s draft contains 14 articles. The other project was presented by third of the parliament members. The president’s draft was to extend the parliamentary tenure from 4 to six years while the MPs’ draft was to extend the presidency term of office from 5 to 7. The authority justifications for these amendments are meant to grant the legislative power more stability; to enhance competitive elections so as to encourage political parties to participate in the presidential elections; to enlarge participation in the decision-making process. In short, they claim that these amendments aim at pushing the democratic process forward. The sticking point is “how much is this true?”
If we just discuss the use of extending the presidential tenure to 7 years, we will find very little to think of. In the Middle East, for example, there is only one country that is applying this system which is Syria. In Europe, France is also applying this system. However, plans to reduce this tenure length to 5 years are taking place. Therefore, there are two sides of the problem in our case; the first is that it constitutes a breach of the constitution; second it constitutes a backing down from the democratic course.
The constitution clearly stipulates electing parliamentary members and the president in accordance with certain provisions fixed in the constitution. To change this, means that the legitimacy of the parliament as an elected council would not be through elections but through constitutional amendments.
The same thing is applied to the president who was elected by the people in September 1999 on the basis of a five-year tenure. To change his term of office to 7 years, after less than one year of his election, will represent another branch of the constitution and only serve the interests of those who proposed the amendments.
This also constitutes a violation of the constitution articles in terms of violating the President’s tenure which was based on the American system for only two terms. This was included in the amendments of 1994. According to the constitution the president’s first term extended from 1994-1999 and the second from 1999 to 2004. However, the government interpreted it in other way. It claimed that the first term should not be accounted for and that the first term should be from 1999-2004 while the second from 2004 to 2009.
Now by changing the President’s term from 5 to 7 the first term will be from 1999 to 2006 and the second from 2006 to 2013. Through the illegal official interpretation of the constitution the authority managed to get extra 5 years. Now through this amendment the authority will get a new term. The final outcome is that instead of ending president Ali Abdullah Saleh’s term in 2004 it will end in 2013. This extra nine-years period is mainly because of the wrong interpretations of the constitution and unconstitutional amendments. Why does the ruling regime lead this policy?
There are two answers for this question; the first is for the sake of staying in power as along as possible. The second is to make use of the Syrian experience and give powers to President Saleh’s son Ahmad who is born in 1970. The constitution stipulates that the Presidency candidate should be 40 of age. Therefore, if the constitution articles remain as they are , each term five years, the second term will end in 2009. By that time Ahmad’s age will be 39 meaning that he is not yet a legitimate candidate for the presidency. If the constitution is to be amended at that time as it happened in Syria, big disputes may be aroused in the country. However, if the new amendments were endorsed during this time there will be enough time to pave the way for the new president who will be mature enough by the end of president Saleh’s second term. So as to make other political forces endorse this amendment, the president tempted MPs to extend their term in office from 4 to 6. In order to contain the reaction of opposition parties, the authority tempted them by suggesting to reduce the endorsement rate from 15% to 5% for the presidency candidate.
This 5% will be from a combination of the number of parliaments’ members, 301 and those of Showra Council, 111altogether. The new council is proposed to be established according to the new amendments. That is, the 5% will be out of 412 members. However, as the president enjoys a huge majority in the parliament, 221 MPs out of 301 and is going to appoint the 111 members of the Showra Council, it is obvious that he is going to be in control of the legislative and executive authorities.
Moreover, there is an obvious deterioration in the judiciary system which means a clear backsliding course from the emerging democracy that the country adopted in 1990.

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