The unity: Deepening the crises [Archives:2005/846/Opinion]

By Ibrahim Hussein Mohammed
Mr. Ali Salim and a number of his colleagues from the leadership of the party felt through their stance in the new state that they could not cope with the ways of conduct in San'a.

Most of them could not absorb the nature of the relations between the center, the sheikhs and the tribal community.

A decision taken by the Cabinet or broadcast in the media during the previous southern state era would have been executable from Aden to Mahra without questioning any one can contradict it, the grip of the sate was strong beyond endurance.

The 1993 parliamentary elections came to insure the strong hold of each partner in the previous regimes. The success of Islah Party in gaining several seats had increases the Socialist Party's fears, a skepticism that was revealed later during the war.

The Cabinet was reshuffled on the basis of 2+2+1 and the Islah became a partner in the top power. It was rumored then that the Socialist Party was behind the suggestion of al-Zandani to be a member of the Presidential Council, no one knows why.

The crises deepened after the elections, the slogan of land against the majority of population and number in Parliament was clear and reflected in the results of 1993's elections. Such was expected by the Socialist Party who experienced heavy losses in the areas of his popularity. During preparation for constitutional amendments, it was agreed that the president and his vice would be directly elected, and they would be in one list while Mr. Albeed was in U.S. for a medical trip.

There was another suggestion of amendment containing another thing stipulating that a president is to be elected and then he would appoint the vice president.

This matter arouse a great amount of mystery and a number of questions were being asked why the agreement was altered in the absence of Albeed, who ratified it for his Socialist Party. So what does the amendment imply?

The partner's crisis became overt, and the media men of both parties pledged a role in escalating it, and each part had reproduced his past hostility against the other.

Many party leaders and government executives headed back to Aden with the intention to finally settle there and by the beginning of 1994, it was clear that the South of Yemen was governed in isolation from the unity agreement and the deputies and deputy assistants could not do their work and therefore lost power.

Alsaily Aden commissioner had directed some of them to leave to Sana'a where there was anxiety in the south among people and the former sectors that all northern employees were security members even workers and vegetable settlers, while it was not so sharp in the Sana'a and the north.

Signing the treaty in the Jordanian capital was a sort of hope to overcome the crisis, but the abstention of some Socialist Party leaders to not return to Sana'a gave an impression that the signing was only for the gain of time. It was clear that the Socialist partner did not want to stay in Aden, receiving the letter and seemed to be ready for war, for which we had been prepared well earlier.

The socialist partner's preparations for war began late, presumably in the last time cession has reached the execution stage and preliminary skirmishes started. The Aden Partner did not have the experience in dealing with America and the west even Kuwait and Saudi Arabia backing was lacking satisfaction in dealing with a Socialist regime. The motive was to punish Sana'a for backing Iraq during its occupation of Kuwait.
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